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

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JOHN J. INGALLS

CAMPAIGNING IN THE PHILIPPINES

ILLUSTRATED

BY
KARL IRVING FAUST

SAN FRANCISCO
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

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PREFACE.

WHEN the idea of compiling an historical account of the operations of the American forces in the Philippine Islands was conceived, the war clouds had nearly all disappeared from the horizon, and all that remained were those caused by the prospect of trouble with the insurgents, which, however, were not supposed to be serious. It was expected that the volunteer regiments would be speedily replaced by regulars, who would only be needed for policing the islands.

It was intended, therefore, to give in this book an accurate description of the campaign, from Dewey's great victory to the return of the volunteers, and, in addition, a brief description of the islands. It was also proposed to publish special editions of the book for each of the volunteer regiments, which would contain, in addition to the foregoing, a detailed account of the experience of the regiments from date of mustering into service as volunteers to their return to the United States. In order to obtain this information, it was found necessary to go to Manila, and consequently on December 24, 1898, MR. KARL IRVING FAUST, to whom is due the credit of having conceived and carried into execution this work sailed from San Francisco on the steamer *Gaelic*, bound for Manila via Hongkong, with plans and prospectus for compiling such a book.

Arriving at Manila on February 2, 1899, it soon became apparent that the plans must be changed. Dark foreboding clouds were hanging over the city, and for more than a month there had been ominous rumors of an outbreak of hostilities. Two days later the expected happened and the real campaign of the Eighth Army Corps commenced in dead earnest.

It at once became evident that there would be great deeds to be recorded on many fields, involving time and labor far exceeding that which had been anticipated and provided for. Mr. Faust at once set about organizing a competent staff of writers who would follow up the troops and be eye-witnesses to whatever happened. The data thus collected must be collated, condensed and arranged. Fortunately the volunteer regiments furnished abundant material for doing this most important work.

The commanding officer of each regiment was visited with the object of securing his co-operation in compiling an accurate account of the operations of his regiment. A man was found in each of these regiments competent to write the story, and the official records of the regiments were placed at his disposal. From first to last we enjoyed the hearty and effective co-operation of all the division brigade, and regimental commanders, who placed at our command all facilities, records and information so far as military regulations would permit.

We were fortunate in securing the services of MR. PETER MACQUEEN, the Boston clergyman and journalist, who had come fresh from the battles about Santiago, where he had become associated in a non-official way with the famous "Rough Riders," among whom his conduct had been such as to win the distinction of being one of the two civilians to be decorated with the medal of the regiment, and formally adopted as one of its members. He had also rendered, during the Cuban campaign important services to the government which were recognized when he came to Manila, by letters from the Secretary of War, which gave him ready access, for the purpose of obtaining information, to all commanding and other officers in the government service. Mr. MacQueen at once entered heartily into the spirit of the enterprise and from the time of his joining the staff assumed the direct charge of the collection of official data from general, division and brigade headquarters.

As it was intended that the book should be profusely illustrated, photographers were employed to go with the different expeditions, and the many pictures secured of troops in action speak more plainly than words the danger and difficulties under which they were taken. The old Spanish galleries of Manila were ransacked for views of the interior of Luzon and beyond the lines occupied by our troops. A canvass was also made of the members of the different

regiments who had cameras in the field, and some very fine views of troops in action were obtained in this way. The views which appear in this book are those selected from more than fifteen hundred photographs collected by our staff.

Maps of all the battlefields and movements of the expeditions are shown in the book. The maps were made by Mr. P. E. Lamar, C. E., the official map-maker of the Second Division, Eight Army Corps, who personally accompanied each expedition with a company of surveyors, and the maps made by him have been endorsed as officially correct by the commanding generals. These maps have been copyrighted by Mr. Lamar, who has published a large map, 64x46 inches, and permission has been secured at considerable expense to use the map in sections in this book,

We desire to acknowledge our great obligations to Admiral Dewey and Lieutenant-Commander Colvocoresses of the *Olympia*, Major-Generals Lawton, MacArthur and Anderson and Brigadier-Generals King, Ovenshine, Hale, Wheaton, H. G. Otis, Hall, Funston, Summers and Smith for facilities, suggestions, and such information as military regulations permitted them to give. This history will be found accurate, so far as earnest zeal and industry on the part of those best informed can make it so. The narrative in the first chapter, describing the naval battle of Manila Bay, was written by Lieutenant-Commander G. P. Colvocoresses of the *Olympia*, an old schoolmate of Admiral Dewey. The other chapters were prepared in the office, from data collected as above stated in the field and from official records. While this method prevents a certain uniformity of expression and literary finish which would appear in the work of one writer, the fact that many thousands of the book have been sold in advance of publication makes it imperative to complete the work at the earliest possible date, consistent with accuracy, and it would be the work of at least two years for one person to digest the immense quantity of original data which we have collected, and prepare a narrative therefrom.

Special editions containing about one hundred pages additional matter giving a complete history of the regiment from date of muster-in to muster-out are published for sale in States which sent volunteer regiments to the Philippine Islands. Each of these editions contain the name, rank, postoffice address, and occupation of every man in the regiment; a list of killed and wounded; all deaths, with date and cause; all discharges, promotions, etc. A certificate from the commanding officer of the regiment verifies the history as officially correct. Cuts of each company, the field and staff officers, band and hospital corps are shown. Many of these company pictures were taken in view of the enemy, while the regiment was entrenched, and in several cases the company was fired upon while being photographed.

THE HICKS-JUDD PUBLISHING COMPANY.

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CHAPTER I.

THE AMERICAN FLEET AT MANILA.

Take a hold o' the wings o' the mornin'
And flop 'round the world till you re dead;
But you can't get away from the tune that they play
To the bloomin' old rag overhead.—*Kipling.*

ONE of the most wonderful events of history is the American occupation of the Philippines. When the Spanish-American war began, these islands were hardly thought of in the problem. The archipelago was to most of us simply a few blotches on our geographies; and Admiral Dewey was a Commodore at the close of an honorable but obscure career. The big headlines were all about Santiago and Havana, Ponce and Porto Rico, Sampson, Schley and the Rough Riders. Suddenly from a clear sky and an unvisited sea, rose clouds and constellations; nations were confused; American patriotism and glory were put on pinnacles; and the deeds of a simple, quiet gentleman with a company of American Jacktars were placed in the pantheon of history along with those of Farragut and mighty Nelson.

It was expected by the civilized world that this war would keep its limits in the West Indies. In fact one of the great nations made a move to have the United States understand that the trade of the world was not to be interfered with outside the zone affected by the principles at stake in the island of Cuba. The theater of war has changed. The West Indies are no more interesting than Van Dieman's land; and the focus of American history and the cynosure of statesmen is the remote archipelago, lying in the China Sea, seven thousand miles from our western coast. Nor was the change in scene the only miracle. The change in the attitude of the nation was greater than the distance that separates Havana from Manila. The war began in the sacred name of liberation for a fettered people, dragging their chains in pain and sweat. To-day in jungles of Luzon, by the rivers of Panay, and along the shores of Cebu a sullen people dispute us inch by inch, straining every human effort to be free from the governance of the liberators. To the Filipinos in their long contest for liberty, we appear as the European oppressor appeared to our forefathers who wrought out human rights at Valley Forge and Bunker Hill. Flying with their wives and children to the hills, burning their homes with their own hands; killed by the thousand in the rice-fields and the cane-brakes; driven like wild beasts back to mountain lair—the mightiest nation in the world can not but dread the audacity of their despair.

The problem is as grave as any that ever put swordcuts of thought on human brows. These islands lie in fair summer seas. They are rich in furrowed field

and forest height; in the river beds that gleam and the hills that are crowded with waiting metals. Yet their history has been and is to-day a history of blackness and darkness; a history of work and want, of ignorance and fear. No star, no hope as yet shines out for them. In the ruthless game of nations where the pawns are men, the Filipinos must play a losing game. The chains of Spain must be exchanged for the strong government which America, however unwillingly, in the evolution of history, must place upon these islands. The history of how this has come about is one of the romances of the nineteenth century.

There was a time when England trembled at Philip the Tyrant, called the Second of Spain. He was a supreme bigot and thief. He stole, among his many thefts, 114,000 square miles of island real estate in the Malay archipelago, and called them the Philippines. Spain never conquered them; Luzon, the largest, was never colonized; Mindanao, the second largest, was never explored. Some of the flora and fauna of these islands are at this moment no better known than those of Mars. A fastidious gentleman in the American navy said to a friend that he was getting old and would like just one voyage more before he retired. This man was appointed to a rather obscure post in the Pacific. The Pacific is quite large, and the old gentleman might have been lost in one of its many monsoons. He had a small fleet, but it was well equipped. Nobody knew a great deal about this American sailor. He had been in the Civil War, and had tied a certain Farragut to the main top of the *Hartford*. At last the fastidious sailor turned up at Hongkong with about twenty dress suits. He was a perfect gentleman. Very difficult to snub this man. A German prince tried it once, but was severely taken down. A message of import having arrived shortly after our sailor reached China, he sailed away towards the Malay archipelago. The next heard from him was a story so astonishing that the world was shaken. It was said that this American gentleman, with his slim fleet, had entered a defended harbor at night, silenced its guns, and destroyed utterly and beyond remedy the fleet which guarded the entrance. Wilder than all was the incredible story that he had not lost a single man in the action. The man of many suits had played well. King Philip's real estate suffered a considerable jar. America had long been a sinister omen for Spain. In 1783 the United States were declared free; in that year Bolivar was born. By the time Bolivar died, Spain had lost South America. The Antilles alone were left her in the west. She could not reform. On February 15, 1898, the ***Maine*** was destroyed at Havana, and the war was on.

THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.

On the 24th of April, 1898, the Secretary of the Navy of the United States sent the following cablegram:

DEWEY, HONGKONG, CHINA.

War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy them.

That same day the British Commander of Hongkong, owing to the fact that his government had declared its neutrality, gave notice to the American squadron that it would have to clear port inside of twenty-four hours.

The American fleet left Hongkong, China, under the command of Commodore Dewey in the flagship *Olympia* on Friday, April 25th, bound for the Philippine Islands, fully equipped as to ammunition, coal and provisions, and with an extra supply carried along in the transports *Nanshan* and *Zafiro*, recently put under the American flag. After a short stop at Mirs Bay the fleet got under way for the seat of future operations in the following formation: *Olympia*, *Baltimore*, *Raleigh*, *Concord*, *Petrel* and *Boston*, and after arriving off the Island of Luzon steamed slowly in the direction of Manila Bay. On the afternoon of Saturday, April 30th, the *Boston*, *Concord*, and later the *Baltimore*, were sent ahead to reconnoiter Point Subig.

INTERIOR FT. SAN ANTONIO.

Finding no sign of the enemy, our ships again assembled in the original formation, with the transports convoyed by the despatch boat, *McCulloch*, forming a separate column to the right. For the further operations of the fleet in the battle of Manila Bay, we quote from an article prepared for CAMPAIGNING IN THE PHILIPPINES, by Lieutenant-Commander G. P. Colvocoresses, executive officer of the *Olympia*.

"When the United States squadron was off Subig Bay on the afternoon of April 30th the captains were assembled on board the flagship, and on returning to their vessels it was learned that we go immediately to Manila Bay, anchor and be prepared to bombard the arsenal at eight o'clock in the morning. We proceeded at a speed of eight knots in the following formation, single column, four hundred yards distance: *Olympia* flying the broad pennant of George Dewey, *Baltimore*, *Raleigh*, *Petrel*, *Concord* and the *Boston*, the despatch boat, *McCulloch* and the transports *Nanshan* and *Zafiro*. The ships were cleared for action and the crews were at their guns. The entrance to Manila Bay was made at midnight. There were known to be batteries there, and it was probable that

EFFECT OF SHELLS ON FORT SAN ANTONIO.

the channels had been mined. Corregidor Island is at the mouth of the bay, and on either side of it are channels named Boca Chica and Boca Grande, two and one-half and six miles wide respectively. It was a beautiful starlight night. A gentle breeze tempered the intense tropical heat. A young moon, occasionally veiled by clouds, was in the zenith, and the sea was smooth. Silently and in perfect order the squadron entered the Boca Grande, and suddenly a light gleamed from the summit of Corregidor, probably signaling our approach. As we passed a large rock called El Fraile, a rocket was fired, followed by the boom of a gun over the still waters, and a shot hurtled between the main and mizzen masts of the *Concord.* It was immediately replied to and the ***Raleigh*** had the honor of firing the first shot. We had been fired upon by a battery of four seven-inch guns on El Fraile. The squadron continued up the bay, the stillness occasionally broken by the cry of the lookouts announcing a light upon the distant shore.



SAN JUAN DE AUSTRIA. *Photo by Bishop.*

"At the first break of dawn we could make out the shipping of the city of Manila, apparently consisting only of merchant vessels. At 5:05 A. M. a battery near the city opened on the squadron, and immediately a number of shots were exchanged with it. The Spanish range, however, proved too short. Our transports here left us in order to keep out of fire, and the increasing daylight disclosed the shadowy forms of the Spanish men-of-war at Cavite on the eastern shore of the bay about five miles distant—phantom-like they appeared gliding about in the mist. The smoke was pouring from their stacks and it was evident that they were forming in line of battle. This line extended from behind and beyond a long low sandy spit known as Sangley Point, which partly encloses the little bay of Canacao, in the rear of which is Cavite, where the arsenal is situated. The point was defended by batteries which protected the left flank of the line. The vessels behind it were fairly sheltered from fire, while the right flank was extended into such shallow water that it could not be turned. The Spanish vessels were in close order, and as the mist lifted, the proud red and yellow banners of Castile and Leon could be seen grandly floating from each masthead.



Photo by Bishop.
ISLA DE CUBA.

"Our fleet in splendid order turned to the right and went for the foe at full speed, the Stars and Stripes fluttering in the breeze, and the signal 'Commence Action' flying from the yards of the *Olympia;* only one other signal, 'Close Up,' was made during the first part of the combat. It was a grand moment, and as we advanced the Spaniards opened fire. The zip-zip of their shells increased; soon a reply was given as each of our

vessels came within range, and the steady booming of the guns became a deafening roar. Everyone was almost deaf, and altogether begrimed with smoke before the action was over.

"A supposed torpedo-boat was seen, making for our leader, but it was obliged to turn back and was beached and abandoned. No torpedo-boat in the world could have passed that shell-swept interval of a mile and a half. Our squadron defiled before the Spanish line, pouring in its shower of death with terrible effect from the port battery; and turning, it continued the same steady shower with the starboard guns. Seven separate times our ships performed this evolution as if on parade, and the Spaniards met our fire with the greatest bravery. They had fully a hundred guns playing upon us from their vessels and batteries; but their aim was poor, and the power of their artillery was inferior to ours, although they had a number of five-inch and six-inch breech-loading rifles. The effect was soon apparent; a large lead-colored cruiser which was taken to be the *Reina Christina* presented the best target, and suffered terribly. Her ensign was shot away, but it was soon rehoisted, and it was evident that she was on fire, as we could see the fire-hose playing aloft. A Spanish vessel went to her relief and appeared to be taking men from her. Two gunboats particularly distinguished themselves, steaming up and down behind the point and keeping a steady fire upon us. These vessels were the *Isla de Cuba* and the *Isla de Luzon.*

BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.

"At 7:40 A. M. firing ceased by signal from the commander-in-chief, and we withdrew from action, the men going to breakfast. They had stood at their guns all night. The commanding officers were ordered to repair on board the flagship and a council was held. Affairs looked grave; the extent of damage done the enemy was not fully known; and the hot cannonade had expended a great quantity of our ammunition. The spirit of men and officers was most admirable. For two hours and a half they had served the guns with unflinching zeal and bravery, and cheered at every telling shot, and now as their captains passed in their gigs, they manned the rails and shout after shout rent the air. Sullenly the Spanish guns joined in the uproar.

"No time was lost, and again our squadron stood in for the enemy and renewed the contest with redoubled animation. The Spanish fire was slack. One of their ships suffered an explosion and was wrapped in flames and smoke. The *Baltimore's* fire told heavily against the remaining guns of the Sangley battery. The *Concord* received orders to go inside the Spanish line and destroy a large


U.S.S. BOSTON
U.S.S. RALEIGH
U.S. FLAGSHIP OLYMPIA
U.S.S. BALTIMORE
U.S.S. PETREL

steamer that was in shallow water, obstructed by fish weirs, an ideal place for torpedoes and mines. At the first volley, which was opened at long range, ten boats loaded with men were seen to leave the steamer and land upon the beach. Our position was particularly favorable for enfilading two Spanish men-of-war behind the mole at the arsenal, and this was improved to the best advantage by all the division, whose work was most excellent. Every shot seemed to tell; stones and clouds of dust flew from the walls of houses, and the shells passed through the roofs, bursting beyond.

"At 12:25 not a Spanish flag was seen in the Canacao Bay except from the staff of the sunken cruiser *Don Antonio de Ulloa* submerged behind Sangley Point. This vessel went down with her colors flying in the most gallant manner. The *Reina Christina*, that had so bravely borne the brunt of battle, was a mass of fire, sinking near the bastion of Cavite, while the *Castilla* was burning rapidly in Canacao Bay. The remainder of the Spanish fleet had sought shelter behind the arsenal, and several of them were also on fire. The guns of the batteries at Sangley Point were silent and a white flag appeared on the sheers of the arsenal.

"The *Concord* continued to shell the steamer, and in order to hasten operations, boats were hoisted out and provided with combustibles for the purpose of burning; but before she had got any distance it was seen that our shells had set her on fire.

"At 1:45 we were ordered to join the *Petrel* at Cavite, where she was destroying the vessels at the arsenal. As we neared her, she signaled, 'Have destroyed eight vessels,' and she had six small vessels, tugs and launches in tow as prizes. When we anchored, white flags were seen flying from various points on shore and there was no longer any resistance. The battle was won, and all the vessels of the Philippine fleet had been destroyed.

"The *Boston* joined us at five o'clock, and we guarded the approach of Canacao Bay for the night, while the remainder of the squadron anchored near the city. The sun went down upon a 'wide and woeful sight;' the beautiful cruisers *Reina Christina* and *Castilla* were outlined from trucks to water line in flames that burst out in great columns of rose-colored smoke as the fire reached some explosive. The *Isla de Mindanao* was a mass of fire on the shores of Las Pinas, while behind the arsenal tongues of flames shot high above the walls.

"All night the calm moon looked down upon this scene of devastation, silvering alike the cross upon the quaint old church of Cavite, the grey walls of the fort and the shattered hulks in the bay. Our crew remained at the guns all night, and early in the morning a launch flying a flag of truce came out. In it were an aide-de-camp and his orderly, and they were taken to the flagship. Later in the morning the General commanding at Cavite and his staff passed us in mournful procession. They had been to the flagship to surrender. Our men stood at attention as they neared, and saluted, which the Spanish officers returned with punctiliousness.


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"The Spanish force at Cavite was about 2000 men belonging to the navy, with a good many soldiers whose numbers we cannot ascertain. Their loss was estimated from 900 to 1200 killed and wounded. The arsenal was abandoned in great haste, only a few taking time to get away their personal effects, and large quantities of stores, provisions and ammunition fell into our hands. The church and hospitals of Cavite were filled to overflowing with dead and wounded, and ten Spanish surgeons and some Sisters of Mercy remained to take care of them. The following is a list of the vessels destroyed or captured: Burned and sunk in action: *Reina Christina*, flagship of Admiral Montejo; *Castilla*, cruiser; *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, cruiser; *Isla de Mindanao*, mail steamer armed. Scuttled and burned after the action: *Don Juan de Austria*, cruiser; *Isla de Cuba*, gunboat; *Isla de Luzon*, gunboat; *Gen. Lezo*, gunboat; *Marquis del Duero*, gunboat; *Elcano*, gunboat; *Velasco*, gunboat; *Argos*, hydrographical vessel. Captured since the battle: *Manila*, armed transport; *Callao*, gunboat; also several tugs and launches. All the batteries in the bay had been dismantled. Our casualties consisted in four slightly wounded, on board the *Baltimore*. Some shots struck our vessels, but without doing the least harm."

REINA CHRISTINA.

A SPANISH VERSION OF THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.

As General Otis said to one of the writers of this book: "All histories lie. One man sees a battle and describes it; another man sees it and describes it. Their accounts differ entirely." Therefore, it may be interesting to know how this battle seemed to the beaten foe. For this reason we quote from the *Diario de Manila* of May 4, 1898, the following description of the great sea-fight as seen by a Spaniard. The translation is by the chief officer of the *Olympia*, G. P. Colvocoresses:

THE NAVAL COMBAT AT CAVITE.

As the sun rose above the mists and clouds that overhung our shores on the morning of May 1st., the inhabitants of Manila saw with surprise and dismay the enemy's squadron in well-ordered line of battle on the waters of the bay. Who could have imagined that they would have had the rashness to stealthily approach our shores, provoking our defenders to an unavailing display of skill and valor, in which, alas! balls could not be propelled by heart throbs, else the result might have been different?

PLACE OF EXECUTION, CAVITE.

The sound of shots from our batteries and those from the enemy's ships, which awakened the citizens of Manila at five o'clock on that May morning, transformed the character of our usual peaceful and happy surrounding. Frightened at the prospects of dangers that seemed greater than they were, women and children in carriages, or by whatever means they could, sought refuge in the outskirts of the city, while all the men, from the highest to the lowest, the merchant and the mechanic, the soldier and the peasant, the dwellers of the mainland and those of the coast, repaired to their posts and took up arms, confident that never, except by passing over their dead bodies, should the

soil of Manila be defiled by the enemy, notwithstanding that from the first it was apparent that their armored ships and powerful guns were invulnerable to any effort at our command.

The walls of the public square, the towers of the church, the upper stories of houses and every place that commanded a view of the bay was thronged by citizens whose duties as regulars or volunteers did not assign them to posts within the city or on the decks of our ships. All were eager to observe the least detail of the enemy's vessels, which in perfect line of battle advanced toward Cavite, parallel to the Manila shore, as if steaming out of the harbor. Shots from the batteries and plaza produced no impression on the cruisers. The spectators on the shore, with and without glasses continued to scan the advancing enemy; they may have been brave, but had no occasion to prove it since the range of their guns and the deficiencies of our artillery enabled them to do us all the harm they wished with impunity.

Those who comprehended the undisturbed movements of the enemy, seemingly so inoffensive, were filled with rage and desperation, realizing that there was no remedy, and only a choice between honorable death or remaining in impassive cowardice. A soldier of the first battalion of sharpshooters who saw a squadron so far out of range of our batteries, said, glancing up to heaven, "If Holy Mary would only transform that water into land then the Yankees would see how we could fight;" and a Malay squatting near by exclaimed, "Let them land and we will crush them under heel." Meanwhile the enemy proceeded with speed and safety in perfect formation toward Cavite with a decision born of security. At about 4:45 A. M. absolute silence reigned. All was ready. Ideas of death and danger vanished at approach of conflict, and the battle flags waved proudly from the masts of the national vessels. Majestically (for why should we not admit it), and in perfect order of battle the nine Yankee vessels bore down on our line. The *Olympia* flying the Admiral's flag led the way to Cavite at full speed and behind her defiled the other vessels. As the enemy's squadron approached Cavite the crew of the mail steamer *Isla de Mindanao* heard on board the Spanish vessels the order to clear ship for action, and the three cheers for the king, for the queen and for Spain, and responded with frantic enthusiasm.

EFFECT OF SHELL, CHURCH AT CAVITE.

At 5:40 A. M. the *Olympia* opened fire, which was instantly replied to by the battery mounted on the angle of the works of the ports, and pursued her way to Cavite, pointing her armored prow at the *Christina* and the *Castilla*, and opening a murderous fire upon both vessels. This was followed by the broadsides of the six vessels that accompanied her. The *Baltimore's* fire took particular effect upon our ships, and this cannonade continued until 7:45 A. M. At this time we saw the *Austria* advance against her enemies with the intention of boarding the *Olympia* and if a tremendous volley had not checked her career of vengeance perhaps both vessels would now be at the bottom of the bay.

The captain of the *Christina* seeing that the efforts of his consort had failed, started full speed ahead to within two hundred meters of the *Olympia*, intending to engage her at close quarters. A hail of grape-shot swept the deck and shelters, filling the ship with dead and wounded. Heroes and martyrs that the motherland will never forget as long as she exists! A thick column of smoke burst out of the forward store-room of the *Christina* indicating that an incendiary projectile, of the kind prohibited by divine and human laws, had taken effect in the cruiser. Without ceasing her fire she retired toward the shore and was scuttled. The

indignation of the sailors of the *Christina* was raised to the highest pitch at seeing the *Castilla* on fire from the same incendiary causes.

Our principal vessels were now out of the combat, and as several of the Yankees were badly injured by our vessels and batteries, they withdrew toward Mariveles, ceased firing, and occupied themselves in repairing damages until ten o'clock, when they commenced their second attack, which was to complete their work of destruction. In the second combat the fire of the arsenal was silenced and the cannonade continued upon our ships that were burning in all directions. A gunboat that seemed to have no more daring object than the destruction of the *Isla de Mindanao* detached herself from the enemy's squadrons and riddled the vessel with balls.

The Spanish vessels that had not succumbed to the flames or the shots of the enemy were run aground, as they could not be disposed of in any other way. This was the last stroke. We could do no more. The combat at Cavite was ended and our last vessel went down flying her colors.

It is impossible to picture the bloody scene presented by the waters of Cavite on that Sabbath morning. We will not attempt a description that would be weak and imperfect and unworthy of the heroic deeds that should be perpetuated in the pages of history. To mention those who distinguished themselves in this combat would be to transcribe the names of the crews from captain to cabin boy. For them our words of praise, for them our congratulations, for the living our laurels, for the dead our prayers, for all our deepest gratitude.

For more than an hour and a half cannonading had continued, keeping in suspense the hopes of those on the opposite shore of the bay, who with their hearts took part in this unequal struggle, in which, as ever, the Spanish sailors went down with their ships rather than strike their colors. Anxiously we asked, "What is going on at Cavite?" From Manila we could see by the aid of glasses the two squadrons almost confounded and enveloped in clouds of smoke. Owing to the inferiority of our batteries it was evident that the enemy was triumphant, and, secure in his armored strength, he was a mere machine requiring only motive power to keep in action his destructive agencies. Only the cheers of our intrepid boarders and the glitter of their cutlasses could have checked this automatic confidence, but alas! we could not reach them. Who can describe the heroic acts, the prowess, the deeds of valor performed by the sailors of our squadron as rage animated them? All who were beneath the folds of the banner of Spain did their duty as becomes the chosen sons of the fatherland. They slacked not their fire nor yielded to superior force, and preferred to perish with their ships rather than live with them in the hands of the enemy.

THREE OF THE SUNKEN SPANISH SHIPS.

DISPUTED POINTS.

Since the battle of Manila Bay or Cavite, as it is sometimes called, several questions have been disputed. The first point about which discussion has been raised is which entrance to Manila harbor the ships entered. Some said that it was by way of the Boca Chica or "little mouth," others that it was by way of the Boca Grande or "great mouth." This question is settled by the description given by the Lieutenant-Commander of the *Olympia* in the earlier part of this chapter, viz., that it was by way of the Boca Grande.

The second point at issue was the reason for the withdrawal of the American fleet between the first and second fight. Some maintained that it was for the purpose of giving the men their breakfast. Others assert that it was in order to count the ammunition, which, it was feared, was running short.

To settle these points beyond all dispute and also to make this book an absolutely correct history, the writer of this chapter visited Admiral Dewey on the *Olympia* on May 15, 1899. The Admiral was most courteous and obliging in the matter, and put at our disposal the best sources of information. He said, "there was talk of a lack of ammunition." Referring to the article of Mr. Joseph L. Stickney in *Harper's Monthly* for February, 1899, Admiral Dewey said that the account therein given was accurate as to its details of the withdrawal of the fleet. We quote Mr. Stickney's language:

It has always been assumed in the United States that, from start to finish, there was nothing felt on our side except a buoyant certainty of victory. It will do no harm now to tell the real facts.

It will be remembered that the battle began at six minutes past five o'clock on the morning of May 1st; that Commodore (now Rear-Admiral) Dewey led the line of American war-ships into action in his flagship *Olympia;* that after a fierce fight, lasting two hours and a half, the attacking fleet retired from the battle into the center of Manila Bay, and did not renew the attack until nearly four hours later.

When we hauled off from the fighting line, at 7:36 o'clock, the situation had become apparently serious for Commodore Dewey. We had been fighting a determined and courageous enemy for more than two hours without having noticeably diminished the volume of his fire. It is true, at least three of his ships had broken into flames, but so had one of ours—the *Boston*. These fires had all been put out without apparent injury to the ships. Generally speaking, nothing of great importance had occurred to show that we had seriously injured any Spanish vessel. They were all steaming about in the bight back of Sangley Point, or in Bakor Bay, as actively as when we first sighted them in the early dawn. So far, therefore, we could see nothing indicating that the enemy was less able to defend his position than he had been at the beginning.

On the other hand, our condition was greatly altered for the worse. There remained in the magazines of the *Olympia* only eighty-five rounds of five-inch ammunition, and though the stock of eight-inch charges was not proportionately depleted, it was reduced enough to make the continuance of the battle for another two hours impossible. When it is remembered that Commodore Dewey was more than 7000 miles from a home port, and that under the most favorable conditions a supply of ammunition could not be obtained in less than a month, the outlook was far from being satisfactory. The Commodore knew that the Spaniards had just received an ample supply of ammunition in the transport *Mindanao*, so that there was no hope of exhausting their fighting power by an action lasting twice as long. If we should run short of powder and shell, we might become the hunted instead of the hunters.

VIEW OF THE SUNKEN SPANISH SHIPS FROM CAVITE

I do not exaggerate in the least when I say that, as we hauled off into the bay, the gloom on the bridge of the *Olympia* was thicker than a London fog in November. Neither Commodore Dewey nor any of the staff believed that the Spanish ships had been sufficiently injured by our fire to prevent them from renewing the battle quite as furiously as they had previously fought. Indeed, we had all been distinctly



From a Spanish map giving position of their ships. Made by Commander Don Juan de la Concha of the *Don Juan de Austria*. Copied from a tracing which Captain Concha gave Lieutenant Nelson of the *Olympia*, and which he gave to me.

G. P. COLVOCORESSES,
Lieut.-Commander *Olympia*

A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE AMERICAN AND THE SPANISH FLEETS ENGAGED AT MANILA.

AMERICAN FLEET.

Name.	Class.	Armament.	Men and Officers.	Built in
Olympia	Protected Cruiser	Four 8-in., ten 5-in., 24 R. F.	466	1892
Baltimore	Protected Cruiser	Four 8-in., six 6-in., 10 R. F.	395	1888
Boston	Par. Protected Cruiser	Two 8-in., six 6-in., 10 R. F.	272	1884
Raleigh	Protected Cruiser	One 6-in., ten 5-in., 14 R. F.	295	1892
Concord	Gunboat	Six 6-in., 9 R. F.	150	1891
Petrel	Gunboat	Four 6-in., 7 R. F.	100	1888
McCulloch (not in action)	Revenue Cutter	Four 4-in	130	1888
			1,808	

*SPANISH FLEET.

Reina Christina	Steel Cruiser	Six 6.2-in., two 2.7-in., 13 R. F.	352	1887
Castilla	Wooden Cruiser	Four 5.9, two 4.7, two 3.4, two 2.9, 12 R. F.	349	1881
Don Antonio de Ulloa	Iron Cruiser	Four 4.7, 5 R. F.	159	1875
Don Juan de Austria	Iron Cruiser	Four 4.7, two 2.7, 21 R. F.	179	1887
Isla de Luzon	Steel Protected Cruiser	Six 4.7, 8 R. F.	156	1887
Isla de Cuba	Steel Protected Cruiser	Six 4.7, 8 R. F.	156	1887
Velasco	Iron Cruiser	Three 6-in., two 2.7, 2 R. F.	147	1881
Marques del Duero	Gunboat	One 6.2, two 4.7, 1 R. F.	96	1875
General Lezo	Gunboat	One 3.5, 1 R. F.	115	1885
Argos	Gunboat		87	
Two torpedo boats and two	transports, practically not	in action.	1,796	

*El Correo is mentioned in Admiral Dewey's list of May 4, but is omitted in that given in his despatch of July 9.

disappointed in the results of our fire. Our projectiles seemed to go too high or too low—just as had been the case with those fired at us by the Spaniards. Several times the Commodore had expressed dissatisfaction with the failure of our gunners to hit the enemy. We had begun the firing at too great a distance, but we had gradually worked in further on each of the turns, until we were within about 2500 yards at the close of the fifth round. At that distance, in a smooth sea, we ought to have made a large percentage of hits; yet, so far as we could judge, we had not sensibly crippled the foe. Consequently Commodore Dewey hauled out into the open bay at the end of the fifth round to take stock of ammunition and devise a new plan of attack.

As I went aft the men asked me what we were hauling off for. They were in a distinctly different humor from that which prevailed on the bridge. They believed that they had done well, and that the other ships had done likewise. The *Olympia* cheered the *Baltimore* and the *Baltimore* returned the cheers with interest. The gun-captains were not at all dissatisfied with the results of their work. Whether they had a better knowledge of the accuracy of their aim than we had on the bridge, or whether they took it for granted that the enemy must have suffered severely after so much fighting, I do not know, but, at any rate, they were eager to go on with the battle, and were confident of victory. I told one of them that we were merely hauling off for breakfast, which statement elicited the appeal to Captain Lamberton, as he came past a moment later, "For God's sake, captain, don't let us stop now. To hell with breakfast!" When I told the Commodore that I intended to attribute our withdrawal to the need for breakfast, he intimated that it was not a matter of much importance what reason I gave, so long as I did not give the true one. And so the breakfast episode went to the world as a plausible excuse for what seemed like an extraordinary strategic manœuver—one which has been the subject of more comment than almost any other event during the battle. Many people have said to me that it would be a pity to spoil so good a story but, as the Commodore will be sure to let the cat out of the bag some day, I may as well let her have her freedom now.

WALLS OF FORT SAN ANTONIO.

Of course we learned the truth about the effect of our fire when we saw, soon afterward, the flames rising from the *Reina Christina* and the *Castilla*, and heard the explosion of their ammunition, and the former's magazine. We could not understand why the *Castilla* did not blow up. She burned fiercely, and was in a bright glow even as late as Monday night, having been on fire since Sunday forenoon. It is probable that her magazine had been flooded before the Spaniards abandoned her, so that no explosion accompanied her destruction. Although built partly of wood, the *Castilla* was also to a great extent a steel vessel; and when we boarded her, after the flames had left nothing but her bare bones, her sponsons and gun platforms were found to be so littered with pieces of our shells that it was impossible to walk there without displacing some of them. Nothing gave a better idea of the storm of projectiles that must have struck this ship than these heaps of rusty fragments.

THE GERMAN FLEET IN MANILA BAY

There is still another matter that has interested the American public very greatly—the actions of the German fleet in Manila Bay. Personally after grave investigation the writer thinks that the Germans have at no time had serious

thoughts of opposing the American control of the Philippine Islands, or of causing any friction between the United States and Germany. The German commander was undoubtedly using what in other countries is called diplomacy, but in our country is called "bluff." If the bluff had worked the officer would have been promoted; it failed and he was recalled.

VIEW OF THE BAY FROM CAVITE.

About the relations of the German fleet and ours Mr. Stickney in the article already quoted, says:

And speaking of the Germans, it may be well to point out that, while they made themselves as offensive as they dared, and while they acted in a very disagreeable way from the first, Commodore Dewey refrained from taking any notice of their discourtesy until he should be able to do so in such a manner as to admit of no reply.

It would require too much space to repeat all the annoyances to which the Germans lent themselves during the early part of their stay in Manila waters. Their ships came into and went from the harbor at all hours of the day and night. When a steamer made her appearance to seaward, a German vessel would run out to examine her with great promptitude. After one such instance, which occurred at a time when Vice-Admiral Von Diederich's flag-lieutenant was on board the *Olympia* Admiral Dewey said to the German officer: "One might almost think your ships were blockading Manila, and not mine." The lieutenant chuckled complacently, as though he thought it was a compliment to the activity of his commander-in-chief, but he was wholly unable to comprehend that, when Dewey became so sweetly suave, it was a good time to look out for squalls.

One night one of the German steam-launches came steaming toward our fleet at full speed. She was picked up by the search-lights of our squadron fully a mile away, and was kept in the focus of their rays until she came alongside. Our officers almost universally believed that the object of her unnecessary and untimely visit was to discover whether it would be possible for a Spanish torpedo-boat to get within range of our vessels without being discovered by us.

Then the *Princess Wilhelmina*, lying off Subig Bay, notified the insurgents that she would not permit them to attack the Spanish troops at that point. At another time one of the German ships tried to sneak into the anchorage off the city of Manila at night, all her lights being extinguished, and her course being an unusual one. She was detected, and promptly "brought to" by a shell across her bows from the United States cruiser that was on picket duty that night. Our courteous and courtly Commodore made no sign. He was waiting until he could put an end to the whole annoyance with one crushing blow. At last the opportunity came. He learned, on unquestionable authority, that one of the German vessels had landed provisions in Manila, thereby violating neutrality. I was not present when he sent his message to Admiral von Diederich, and therefore I do not speak from personal knowledge concerning it; but I learned the facts from a perfectly authentic source, as follows: "Orderly, tell Mr. Brumby I would like to see him," said Admiral Dewey, one forenoon. "Oh, Brumby," he continued, when the flag-lieutenant made his appearance on the quarter-deck, "I wish you to take the barge and go over to the German flagship. Give Admiral von Diederich my compliments, and say that I wish to call his attention to the fact that the vessels of his squadron have shown an extraordinary disregard of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse, and that finally one of them has committed a gross breach of neutrality in landing provisions in Manila, a port which I am blockading."

The Commodore's voice had been as low and sweetly modulated as if he had been sending von Diederich an invitation to dinner. When he stopped speaking, Brumby, who did not need any better indication of the Commodore's mood than the usually formal and gentle manner of his chief, turned to go, making the usual official salute, and replying with the customary, "Ay, ay, sir."

"And, Brumby," continued the Commodore, his voice rising and ringing with the intensity of feeling that he felt he had repressed about long enough, "tell Admiral von Diederich that if he wants a fight, he can have it right now!"

Brumby went with his message, and the Commodore paced the quarter-deck in silence for a considerable time, evidently working off some of the high pressure that had brought forth his emphatic message to the German Admiral. The latter sent back the extraordinary reply that he had not known anything about these actions of his captains, and that they would not be repeated. When one considers the rigidity of discipline that is supposed to exist in the German navy, the character of Admiral von Diederich's apology is all the more incomprehensible.

But whatever may have been the new methods adopted by Admiral von Diederich to prevent his captains from violating neutrality and showing bad manners, they were entirely efficacious. There was never the least further need to refer to the possibility of giving Commodore Dewey the job of disciplining them.

IMPRESSIONS OF ADMIRAL GEORGE DEWEY.

On a beautiful May morning, a year after the events recorded in this chapter, I went down the harbor of Manila to visit the grand old man of the fleet, and to authenticate this part of our history. I found him an agreeable, chivalrous, courteous gentleman endeared to his countrymen by simplicity and honor. After giving me the information that I needed, and the confirmation of the data on which this chapter is based, the Admiral sat down on the quarter-deck and, looking away towards Cavite and the sunken ships of Spain, began to think about his home-going to America. He deeply appreciated the warmth and unanimity of the love his country bears him. But he said he was afraid of the great strain so many receptions would be upon his health.

The Admiral, though over sixty, still looks hale and stout, every inch a man, every wit a "gentleman unafraid." He thought that now, after his many voyages and battles, he would like to go up and rest among the green hills of Vermont. He wanted, he said, to settle down in Montpelier, his old New England home.

"If the folks up in Montpelier will give me a reception in the town hall, that will be enough," said this world-loved man. One could see that, after his long and honorable career, and after his superb successes, the old man longed for the spot of earth where he had been a boy. He looked at the far, fair mountains of Mariveles, and the green crown of Corregidor, but not to him like the wind-swept hillsides of dewy New England were these Southern scenes.

I spent the whole forenoon on board the *Olympia*, the officers and men showing me the wonders of their trig little cruiser. And one said this was where the

Admiral stood during the great fight; and one said that was a dent made in the ship by a cannon ball. The Lieutenant-Commander was busy writing a history of the battle. He told me that Dewey and he were schoolmates together in the Academy of Norwich, Vermont. He was going to have a sketch of the Admiral and himself made ready for the little school paper. It was a very grave matter, this country school, and the bulletin of it which was dignified by the name of a paper. He must have the best matter and the finest pictures for it, he said—that was the old place where he and the Admiral were schoolboys together.

This mood of Admiral Dewey and his chief officer gave me matter to ponder over. They did not think of the grand acclaims and the wonderful applause of the free, proud nation they had honored. But "How will the folk of Montpelier receive me?" and "Can I write an article worthy of the Norwich country school?" Men who would be welcomed as writers by the best magazines and gladly honored by the Czar, asking themselves these questions! It is only one more example of the old truth of how strong a grasp on men have the associations of a pure home life. It is this love of home, deep-rooted and enduring, this fondness for the earliest part of life, which followed these men through life and crossed the chasm of years and wars and stormy seas—this shall save the Republic when the battleships are futile and the cannon dumb.

CHAPTER II.

EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR WITH SPAIN.

IT is, of course, well known that neither the Philippine Islands nor the conditions therein were in any degree a consideration which led to our war with Spain. It is even true that after the naval battle at Manila, the people stood with finger-tips upon the little spots in the map of the Pacific and questioned one another as to where and what might be "Manila" Bay. It is proper, however, to complete this record of achievement by a brief account of the civil and military affairs antedating the action in Manila Bay.

In palliation of Spanish inhumanity to her colonial subjects, it may be said that her internal dissensions have been such that the government was powerless as against the will of certain classes of its subjects. A brief reference to the late successions to the Spanish crown may throw some light on this matter.

Ferdinand VII died in 1833, and his daughter, Isabella, was proclaimed Queen, with her mother, Maria Christiana of Naples, as Regent. Then Don Carlos, Ferdinand's brother, asserted that the choice of Isabella violated the Salic Law, which forbids the inheritance of women, and that he should have been preferred.

This pretension had much support in the north of Spain, and this was the origin of the "Carlist" party, which has been a constant menace to the government when not in open rebellion against it. The character of Isabella II, who was declared of age in 1843, added new elements of perplexity. A successful revolution drove her from the throne and, in 1870, (the ten years' war in Cuba being then in progress) Amadeus of Aosta, the second son of Victor Emanuel of Italy, was invited to govern as a constitutional king. Within three years he resigned the office. A provisional government was then created, with Castilla at its head, after which, for a brief time, a committee of officers undertook the administration. In 1874 Isabella's son, Alphonse XII, accepted the crown. He died in 1885, and his widow, Christiana of Austria, was made Regent. Their son was born May 17, 1886, and he is now known as the "Little King."

THE CUBAN ATROCITIES.

However, whatever might have been the origin or cause of Spanish misrule, the knowledge that Spain was helpless in the hands of its subjects only helped to goad into a frenzy the apprehension and alarm of her colonists in regard to the

intolerable barbarities practiced upon them. This was especially the case in Cuba, where the oppression was so grievous and so long continued that not only the Cubans were crying out against it, but the civilization of the world was aghast at the spectacle.

We of the United States were so placed that the appeals of these sufferers came to us with great force. Our own material interests had long paid tribute to the shrine of this intolerance, and to our private and public remonstrances the Spanish government paid no heed. Our benefactions to relieve the distresses had been treated with disdain by Spain, and our contributions largely diverted into Spanish hands. So universal and pronounced had public sentiment in this country become, that all the great political parties declared against further endurance of the evil, and the platform upon which President McKinley was nominated and elected, insisted that some solution must be made in the interests of humanity. For the purpose of verifying the rumors and reports, many private commissions visited Cuba, and all returned with the statement that the enormities there had only in part been told. Senator Proctor of Vermont, who was Secretary of War in Harrison's administration, was one of those who visited the island. On his return, at the earnest request of the Senate, in his place in the Senate Chamber, he made this remarkable statement:

SENATOR PROCTOR'S REPORT.

"Outside of Havana all is changed. It is not peace, nor is it war. It is desolation and distress, misery and starvation. Every town and village is surrounded by a trocha (trench), a sort of rifle pit, but constructed on a plan new to me: the dirt being thrown up on the inside, and a barbed wire fence on the outer side of this trench.

"These trochas have at every corner, and at frequent intervals along the sides, what are called forts, but which are really small block-houses, many of them more like a large sentry-box, loopholed for musketry and with a guard of from two to ten soldiers in each. The purpose of these trochas is to keep the reconcentrados in as well as to keep the insurgents out. From all the surrounding country the people have been driven into these fortified towns and held there to subsist as they can. They are virtually prison yards, and not unlike one in general appearance, except that the walls are not so high and strong, but they are sufficient, where every point is in range of a soldier's rifle, to keep in the poor reconcentrado women and children. Every railroad station is within one of these trochas, and has an armed guard. Every train has an armored freight-car, loopholed for musketry, and filled with soldiers,

TIDAL WAVE IN MANILA.

and with, as I observed and was informed was always the case, a pilot engine a mile or so in advance. There are frequent block-houses inclosed by a trocha, and with a guard along the railroad track. With this exception there is no human life or habitation between these fortified towns and villages and throughout the whole of the four western provinces, except to a very limited extent among the hills, where the Spaniards have not been able to go and drive the people to the towns and burn their dwellings. I saw no house or hut in the four hundred miles of railroad rides from Pinar del Rio province in the west, across the full width of Havana and Matanzas provinces, and to Sagua la Grande on the north shore, and to Cienfuegos on the south shore of Santa Clara, except within the Spanish trochas. There are no domestic animals or crops on the rich fields and pastures, except such as are under guard in the immediate vicinity of the towns. In other words, the Spaniards hold in these four western provinces just what their army sits on. Every man, woman, and child, and every domestic animal, wherever their columns have reached, is under guard within their so-called fortifications. To describe one place is to describe all. To repeat, it is neither peace nor war. It is concentration and desolation. This is the 'pacified' condition of the four western provinces.

WATER BUFFALOES.

"All the country people in the four western provinces, about 400,000 in number, remaining outside the fortified towns where Weyler's order was made, were driven into these towns, and these are the reconcentrados. They were the peasantry (many of them farmers) some land owners, others renting lands and owning more or less stock, others working on estates and cultivating small patches—and even a small patch in that fruitful clime will support a family. It is but fair to say that the normal condition of these people was very different from what prevails in this country. Their standard of comfort and prosperity was not high, measured by our own. But according to their standards and requirements their conditions of life were satisfactory. They live mostly in cabins made of palm, or wooden houses. Some of them had houses of stone, the blackened walls of which are all that remain to show that the country was ever inhabited. The first clause of Weyler's order reads as follows:

"'I order and command: First, all the inhabitants of a country (district) outside of the line of fortifications of the towns shall, within the period of eight days, concentrate themselves in the towns occupied by the troops. Any individual who, after the expiration of this period, is found in the uninhabited parts will be considered a rebel and tried as such.'

"The other three sections forbid the transportation of provisions from one town to another without the permission of the military authority; direct the

owners of cattle to bring them into the towns; prescribe that eight days shall be counted from the publication of the proclamation in the head town of the municipal districts, and state that if news is furnished of the enemy which can be made use of it will serve as 'a recommendation.'

"Many doubtless did not learn of this order. Others failed to grasp its terrible meaning. It was left largely to the guerrillas to drive in all who did not obey, and I was informed that in many cases a torch was applied to their homes with no notice, and the inmates fled with such clothing as they might have on, their stock and other belongings being appropriated by the guerrillas. When they reached the town they were allowed to build huts of palm leaves in the suburbs and vacant places within the trochas, and left to live if they could. Their huts are about ten by fifteen feet in size, and for want of space are usually crowded together very closely. They have no floor but the ground, no furniture, and after a year's

STREET SCENES IN MANILA.

wear, but little clothing except such stray substitutes as they can extemporize, and with large families or with more than can be accomodated in this little space, the commonest sanitary provisions are impossible. Conditions are unmentionable in this respect. Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water and foul food, or none, what wonder that one-half have died, and that one-quarter of the living are so diseased that they cannot be saved? A form of dropsy is a common disorder resulting from these conditions. Little children are still walking about with arms and chests terribly emaciated, eyes swollen, and abdomen bloated to three times the natural size. The physicians say these cases are hopeless.

"Deaths in the street have not been uncommon. I was told by one of our consuls that many have been found dead about the markets in the morning, where

they had crawled, hoping to get some stray bits of food from the early hucksters, and that there had been cases where they had dropped dead inside the market, surrounded by food. These people were independent and self-supporting before Weyler's order. They are not beggars even now. There are plenty of professional beggars in every town among the regular residents, but these country people, the reconcentrados, have not learned the art. Rarely is a hand held out to you for alms when going among their huts, but the sight of them makes an appeal stronger than words.

"Of these I need not speak. Others have described their conditions far better than I can. It is not within the narrow limits of my vocabulary to portray it. I went to Cuba with a strong conviction that the picture had been overdrawn; that a few cases of starvation and suffering had inspired and stimulated the press correspondents and they had given free play to a strong natural, and highly cultivated imagination. Before starting I received through the mail a leaflet published by the *Christian Herald*, with the cuts of some of the sick and starving reconcentrados, and took it with me, thinking these would be rare specimens gotten up to make the worst possible showing. I saw plenty as bad and worse; many that should not be photographed and shown. I could not believe that out of a population of 1,600,000, 200,000 had died within these Spanish forts, practically prison walls, within a few months past, from actual starvation and disease caused by insufficient and improper food. My inquiries were entirely outside of sensational sources. They were made of our medical officers, of our consuls, of city alcaldes, (mayors), of relief committees, of leading merchants and bankers, physicians and lawyers. Several of my informants were Spanish born, but every time the answer was that the case had not been overstated. What I saw I cannot tell so that others can see it. It must be seen with one's own eyes to be realized. The Los Palos Hospital in Havana has been recently described by one of my colleagues, Senator Gallinger, and I cannot say that his picture was overdrawn, for even his fertile pen could not do that. He visited it after Dr. Lesser, one of Miss Barton's very able and efficient assistants (in the Red Cross work), had renovated it and put in cots. I saw it when four hundred women and children were lying on the stone floors in an indescribable state of emaciation and disease, many with the scantiest covering of rags—and such rags! Sick children as naked as they came into the world. And the conditions in the other cities are even worse." In the United States this conservative, candid statement of Senator Proctor put feeling to a pitch, and there was loud clamor against Congress and the Executive for its unfeeling delay.

NATIVE DOG.

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE "MAINE."

At this time there was an occurrence which set the country aflame. On the night of February 15, 1898, while peacefully at anchor in the harbor

of Havana, the United States battle-ship *Maine* was sunk by an explosion and two officers and 264 of her crew killed or drowned. Prior to this, the Spanish government had protested against our sending cruisers with supplies to the reconcentrados, and there was much talk of the designs of the Spanish fleet upon our Atlantic Coast. The attitude and feeling in Spanish circles was such that this destruction of the *Maine* was at once charged to the perfidy and cruelty of the Spanish government. At once the President created a commission to consider and report upon the cause of the destruction of the *Maine*, but in the minds of the public there was an ample *casus belli*, and it would hardly brook the delay necessary for a report. The conservatism of Congress kept it well in check, but the importunities of constituents drove it to preparatory action. On March 8, 1898, the House, by unanimous vote, passed a bill appropriating $50,000,000 for national defense. By unanimous vote, and without debate, the bill passed the Senate on the same day, and was immediately signed by the President. On the 16th of March, a protest by the Spanish government against our measures of defense and our fleet in Key West was received. On March 28th the President sent to Congress the report of the Court of Inquiry on the *Maine* disaster. The following is its full text:

A FAMILIAR STREET SCENE.

REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY.

"United States Steamship *Iowa*.
First Rate.

"KEY WEST, Florida, Monday, March 21, 1898.

"After full and mature consideration of all the testimony before it the court finds as follows:

"1. That the United States battle-ship *Maine* arrived in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, on the 25th day of January, 1898, and was taken to buoy No. 4, in from five and one-half to six fathoms of water, by the regular government pilot. The United States Consul-General at Havana had notified the authorities at that place the previous evening of the intended arrival of the *Maine*.

"2. The state of discipline on board the *Maine* was excellent, and all orders and regulations in regard to the care and safety of the ship were strictly carried out. All ammunition was stowed in accordance with prescribed instructions, and proper care was taken whenever ammunition was handled. Nothing was stowed in any one of the magazines or shell-rooms which was not permitted to be stowed there. The magazines and shell-rooms were always locked after having been opened, and after the destruction of the *Maine* the keys were found in their proper place in the Captain's cabin, everything having been reported secure that evening at 8 P. M.

"The temperature of the magazines and shell-rooms was taken daily and reported. The only magazine which had an undue amount of heat was the after ten-inch magazine, and that did not explode at the time the *Maine* was destroyed. The dry gun-cotton primers and detonators were stowed in the cabin aft, and remote from the scene of the explosion. Waste was carefully looked after on the *Maine* to obviate danger. Special order in regard to this had been given by the commanding officer. Varnishers, dryers, alcohol and other combustibles of this nature were stowed on or above the main deck, and could not have had anything to do with the destruction of the *Maine*.

"The medical stores were stowed aft under the ward-room, and remote from the scene of the explosion. No dangerous stores of any kind were stowed below in any of the other store rooms.

SCENE ON THE RIO GRANDE

"The coal bunkers were inspected daily. Of those bunkers adjacent to the forward magazines and shell-rooms, four were empty, namely: 'B 3, B 4, B 5, B 6.' 'A 15' had been in use that day, and 'A 16' was full of New River coal. This coal had been carefully inspected before receiving it on board. The bunker in which it was stowed was accessible on three sides at all times, and the fourth side at this time on account of bunkers 'B 4' and 'B 6' being empty. This bunker, 'A 16,' had been inspected that day by the engineer officer on duty. The fire-alarms in the bunkers were in working order, and there had never been a case of spontaneous combustion of coal on board the *Maine*. The two after boilers of the ship were in use at the time of the disaster, but for auxiliary purposes only, with a comparatively low pressure of steam, and being tended by a reliable watch. These boilers could not have caused the explosion of the ship. The four forward boilers have since been found by the divers, and are in a fair condition.

"On the night of the destruction of the *Maine* everything had been reported secure for the night at 8 P. M. by reliable persons, through the proper authorities, to the commanding officer. At the time the *Maine* was destroyed the ship was quiet, and therefore least liable to accident caused by movements from those on board.

"3. The destruction of the *Maine* occurred at forty minutes past nine in the evening of the 15th day of February, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, she being at the time moored to the same buoy to which she had been taken upon her arrival. There were two explosions of a distinctly different character, with a very short, but distinct interval between them, and the forward part of the ship was lifted to a marked degree at the time of the first explosion. The first explosion was more in the nature of a report, like that of a gun; while the second explosion was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume. This second explosion was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the *Maine*.

"The evidence bearing upon this, being principally obtained from divers, did not enable the court to form a definite conclusion as to the condition of the wreck, although it was established that the after part of the ship was practically intact, and sank in that condition a very few minutes after the destruction of the forward part. The following facts in regard to the forward part of the ship are, however, established by the testimony.

SPANISH SOLDIERS AT PRAYER.

"4. That portion of the port side of the protective deck which extends from about frame 30 to frame 41 was blown up aft and over to port. The main deck from about frame 30 to frame 41 was blown up aft and slightly over the starboard, folding the forward part of the middle superstructure over and on top of the after part. This was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the *Maine*.

"5. At frame 17, the outer shell of the ship, from a point eleven and one-half feet from the middle line of the ship, and six feet above the keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about four feet above the surface of the water; therefore, about thirty-four feet above where it would be, had the ship sunk uninjured. The outside bottom-plating is bent into a reversed V-shape, the aft wing of which, about fifteen feet broad and thirty feet in length (from frame 17 to frame 25) is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same plating extending forward.

"At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom-plating. This break is now about six feet above its normal position.

"In the opinion of the court this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 18, and somewhat on the port side of the ship.

"6. The court finds that the loss of the *Maine*, on the occasion named, was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel.

"7. In the opinion of the court the *Maine* was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her forward magazines.

"8. The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the *Maine* upon any person or persons.

"W. T. SAMPSON, Captain U. S. N., President.
"A. MARIX, Lieutenant-Commander U. S. N., Judge-Advocate.

"The court, having finished the inquiry it was ordered to make, adjourned at 11 A. M to await the action of the convening authority.

"W. T. SAMPSON, Captain U. S. N., President.
"A. MARIX, Lieutenant-Commander U. S. N., Judge-Advocate."

"U. S. Flagship *New York*, off Key West, Fla., March 22, 1898.

"The proceedings and findings of the Court of Inquiry in the above case are approved.

"M. SICARD, Rear Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Naval Force
on the North Atlantic Station."

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

Accompanying this report was the following explanatory message of the President:

"For some time prior to the visit of the *Maine* to Havana harbor our Consular representatives pointed out the advantages to flow from the visit of national ships to Cuban waters, in accustoming the people to the presence of our flag as the symbol of good will, and of our ships in the fulfillment of the mission of protection to American interests, even though no immediate need therefor might exist.

"Accordingly on the 24th of January last, after a conference with the Spanish Minister, in which the renewal of visits of our war vessels to Spanish waters was discussed and accepted, the peninsular authorities at Madrid and Havana were advised of the purpose of this government to resume friendly naval visits to Cuban ports, and that, in that view, the *Maine* would forthwith call at the port of Havana. This announcement was received by the Spanish government with appreciation of the friendly character of the visit of the *Maine*, and with notification of an intention to return the courtesy by sending Spanish ships to the principal ports of the United States. Meanwhile the *Maine* entered the port of Havana on the 25th of January, her arrival being marked with no special incident besides the exchange of customary salutes and ceremonial visits.

"The *Maine* continued in the harbor of Havana during the three weeks following her arrival. No appreciable excitement attended her stay; on the contrary, a feeling of relief and confidence followed the resumption of the long-interrupted friendly intercourse.. So noticeable was this immediate effect of her visit that the Consul-General strongly urged that the presence of our ships in Cuban waters should be kept up by retaining the *Maine* at Havana, or in the event of her recall, by sending another vessel there to take her place.

"At forty minutes past nine on the evening of the 15th of February, the *Maine* was destroyed by an explosion, by which the entire forward part of the ship was utterly wrecked. In this catastrophe two officers and two hundred and sixty-four of her crew perished; those who were not killed outright by her explosion being penned between decks by the tangle of wreckage and drowned by the immediate sinking of the hull. Prompt assistance was rendered by the neighboring vessels anchored in the harbor, aid being especially given by the boats of the Spanish cruiser, *Alphonse XII*, and the Ward Line steamer, *City of Washington*, which lay not far distant. The wounded were generously cared for by the authorities of Havana, the hospitals being freely opened to them, while the earliest recovered bodies of the dead were interred by the municipality in a public cemetery in the city. Tributes of grief and sympathy were offered from all official headquarters of the island.

"The appalling calamity fell upon the people of our country with crushing force, and for a brief time an intense excitement prevailed, which, in a community less just and self-controlled than ours, might have led to hasty acts of blind resentment. This spirit, however, soon gave way to the calm processes of reason, and to the resolve to investigate the facts and await material proof before forming a judgment as to the cause, the responsibility, and, if the facts warranted, the remedy due. This course necessarily recommended itself from the outset to the Executive, for only in the light of a dispassionately ascertained certainty could it determine the nature and measure of its full duty in the matter. The usual procedure was followed, as in all cases of casualty or disaster to national vessels of any maritime state. A naval court of inquiry was at once organized, composed of officers well qualified by rank and practical experience to discharge the onerous duty imposed upon them. Aided by a strong force of wreckers and divers, the court proceeded to make a thorough investigation on the spot, employing every available means for the impartial and exact determination of the causes of the explosion. Its operations have been conducted with the utmost deliberation and judgment, and, while independently pursued, no source of information was neglected, and the fullest opportunity was allowed for a simultaneous investigation by the Spanish authorities.

MARKET WOMEN.

"The finding of the Court of Inquiry was reached, after twenty-three days of continuous labor, on the 21st of March instant, and, having been approved on the 22d by the Commander-in-Chief of the United States naval force of the North Atlantic Station, was transmitted to the Executive.

"It is herewith laid before the Congress, together with the voluminous testimony taken before the court. Its purport is, in brief, as follows:

NATIVES SAWING WOOD.

"When the *Maine* arrived at Havana she was conducted by the regular government pilot to buoy No. 4, to which she was moored in from five and one-half to six fathoms of water. The state of discipline on board and the condition of her magazines, boilers, coal-bunkers and storage compartments are passed in review, with the conclusion that excellent order prevailed, and that no indication of any cause for an internal explosion existed in any quarter.

"At eight o'clock in the evening of February 15th everything had been reported secure, and all was quiet. At forty minutes past nine o'clock the vessel was suddenly destroyed. There were two distinct explosions, with a brief interval between them. The first lifted the forward part of the ship very perceptibly; the second, which was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume, is attributed by the court to the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines.

"The evidence of the divers establishes that the after part of the ship was practically intact and sank in that condition a very few minutes after the explosion. The forward part was completely destroyed.

"Upon the evidence of a concurrent external cause the finding of the court is as follows:

"'As in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Report.'

"I have directed that the finding of the Court of Inquiry, and the views of the government thereon, be communicated to the government of Her Majesty, the Queen Regent, and I do not permit myself to doubt that the sense of justice of the Spanish nation will dictate a course of action suggested by honor and the friendly relations of the two governments. It will be the duty of the Executive to advise the Congress of the result, and in the meantime deliberate consideration is invoked.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY

Executive Mansion, March 28, 1898."

FURTHER OFFICIAL ACTS.

In both branches of Congress the next day bills were introduced on Cuban affairs, and on April 1st, Congress passed a naval appropriation bill. In the days following there was a tempered discussion in Congress on Cuban affairs.

On April 7th, a note was received from the representatives of foreign powers, expressing a hope "that further negotiations will lead to an agreement which, while securing the maintenance of peace, will afford all necessary guarantees for the establishment of order in Cuba." This was signed by the representatives of Germany, Austria, Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia. President McKinley's reply was diplomatic and conciliatory but not in harmony with the voice of the people.

STREET SCENE IN SAN FERNANDO.

On March 27th, President McKinley had submitted to the Spanish government propositions looking to an armistice between Spain and the Cuban insurgents until October, with a view of coming to an adjustment of Cuban affairs. Soon thereafter General Blanco issued this proclamation:

"His Majesty's Government, yielding to the reiterated wish expressed by His Holiness, the Pope, has been pleased to decree a suspension of hostilities, with the object of preparing and facilitating the restoration of peace on this island, in virtue whereof I believe it convenient to order:

"Article 1. From the day following the receipt in each locality of the present proclamation hostilities are ordered to be suspended in all the territory of the Island of Cuba.

"The details for the execution of the above article will be the subject of special instructions that will be communicated to the several commanders-in-chief of the army corps for easy and prompt execution according to the situation and circumstances of the case.

BLANCO."

An ineffective revocation of Weyler's reconcentrado orders had been issued and Spain appropriated $600,000 for Cuban relief. However, all came to naught. The conditions mentioned in the Blanco proclamation were such that the insurgents could not comply—one being that they must surrender their arms. The appropriation failed of its ostensible intent, one of the conditions being that no one who was a relative of an insurgent in arms could have the benefit, and this would include nearly the whole Cuban population.

In a message to Congress, during this time, President McKinley used this significant language: "I need not speak of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression."

On the 11th day of April, President McKinley submitted his message to Congress, which put an end to controversy, and brought Congress to immediate and definite action. Its great length precludes a recapitulation of the whole. It dwelt upon the policies of his predecessors in regard to the vital questions involved; told of the Spanish aggressions in Cuba, and the great menace to our material interests,

while this government had practiced the utmost prudence at enormous expense, having in view international relations, to protect Spanish interests in spite of their career of intrigue and destruction, and concludes:

"In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests, which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop."

"In view of these facts and these considerations, I ask Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity, and the security of its citizens as well as our own; and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.

"And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of the starving people of the island, I recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.

"The issue is now with Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the constitution and the law, I await your action."

CONGRESS RECOGNIZES THE INDEPENDENCE OF CUBA.

In this there was no mincing of words. It had the true ring. It was a center shot, and hit a vital part. At once Congress made its response and it likewise came in no uncertain terms. On the 13th of April, the House of Representatives passed a resolution directing the President to intervene in Cuban affairs at once, and authorized him to use the land and naval forces of the United States in his effort to stop the war. The Senate passed a substitute for the House resolution. Not that all did not concur in its spirit, but it was thought to be too loose in its wording. The Senate substitute was adopted by the House, and the measure as finally passed is the following:

A FILIPINO HUT

"Joint resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect.

'Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, and have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot be longer endured, as had been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was invited; therefore, be it resolved:

SPANISH FORT AT CAVITE.

"FIRST—That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

"SECOND—That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the government of the United States does demand, that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

"THIRD—That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several states to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

"FOURTH—That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

WAR DECLARED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN.

On April 20th the United States government presented its ultimatum to Spain to, before noon on April 23rd, relinquish authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw both land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. Spain protested and refused compliance, and at once our North Atlantic squadron was ordered to Cuban waters to blockade Havana and other port cities.

At noon on April 23rd the President issued his proclamation calling for 125,000 men for service in the military and naval forces of the government in the war with Spain. It is as follows:

"Whereas, by a joint resolution of Congress, approved on the 20th day of April, 1898, entitled 'Joint resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain relinquish its

authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry this resolution into effect,' and,

"Whereas, by an Act of Congress entitled 'An Act to provide for temporarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in time of war and for other purposes,' approved April 22, 1898, the President is authorized, in order to raise a volunteer army, to issue this proclamation calling for volunteers to serve in the army of the United States.

"Now therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, by virtue of the power vested in me by the constitution and the laws, and deeming sufficient occasion to exist, have thought it fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth, volunteers to the aggregate number of 125,000, in order to carry into effect the purpose of the said resolution; the same to be apportioned, as far as practicable, among the several states and territories and the District of Columbia, according to population, and to serve for two years, unless sooner discharged. The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the proper authorities through the War Department.

"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"Done at the City of Washington this twenty-third day of April, A. D. 1898, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second.

"By the President: WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

"JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State."

Upon the issuance of this proclamation, Chairman Dingley, of the Ways and Means Committee, introduced in the House a War Revenue Bill. At the instance of the President, Congress, on the 25th day of April, made the following formal declaration of war:

"A bill declaring that war exists between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain. Be it enacted, etc.

"1. That war be, and the same is hereby declared to exist, and that war has existed since the 21st day of April, 1898, including said day, between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.

A FILIPINO FUNERAL.

"2. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into active service of the United States the militia of the several states to such extent as may be necessary to carry this act into effect."

On the same day a bill passed the Senate increasing the regular army. Pursuant to the call for troops, the enlistment of men exceeded all expectations, and tenders were made by the governors of many states largely in excess of their quotas. By the 16th of May, 70,000 volunteers had been mustered in, and by the 18th, 92,580, and the following States had completed their quotas: California, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming and District of Columbia.

On May 25th the President issued his proclamation, calling for 75,000 more volunteers, making a total force of regulars and volunteers of 278,500 men. A statement from the Treasury Department of June 2d showed that for April the expenditure for a navy was $12,557,000, and for the army, $6,223,000. For May it was, navy, $9,093,000, and the army, $17,093,000. Congress passed a deficiency bill, appropriating $17,845,000 for war expenditures, and on June 10th, the War Revenue bill and the Secretary of the Treasury asked for subscriptions to the $200,000,000 three per cent bonds.

CHAPTER III.

AFTER THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.

AFTER the destruction of the Spanish fleet the holding of Manila Bay was a military necessity. The American fleet was 7000 miles from an American port, and among all the hundreds of Asiatic ports which would have been available in time of peace there was not one which was open to an American war-vessel except for temporary refuge from stress of weather, and once only for each ship for such repairs and coal supply as might enable her to reach the nearest home port. It was therefore a military necessity to hold the bay and the naval docks and shops which had been wrested from the Spaniards. To this extent Admiral Dewey's duty was clear. What should be done with the city of Manila was a different, and far more difficult problem. That it was within his power, by bombardment, to compel the capitulation of the city there could be no doubt. Had a Spanish fleet been approaching with the intent to attack him in Manila Bay, it would have doubtless been a military necessity to promptly reduce the city, no matter at what hazard, that in the event of another naval battle, his ships might not be subject to the fire of shore batteries. This condition, however, for the time being, did not exist. The only Spanish fleet in Oriental waters had been destroyed. Dewey's fleet was safe in Manila harbor, with full possession of the stores, docks and shops of Cavite, and it was perfectly certain that so long as he did not attack Manila its batteries would not fire upon the American ships. If, on the other hand, he should take possession of Manila, international law would hold the United States responsible for the protection of non-Spanish persons and property in the city, and the law of humanity would hold them equally responsible for the protection of all other non-combatants. For this duty Admiral Dewey had no force, and his obvious course, therefore, was the one adopted—to leave things as they were, pending instructions and reinforcements, for which he promptly applied, meanwhile, of course, maintaining a close blockade of the port.

THE AMERICAN POLICY UNDETERMINED

Whether or not the opening thus made should be followed by the conquest and annexation, or other disposal of the Philippines, was a matter to be determined at Washington, and for the present the authorities there had no means of forming an opinion. There was absolutely no public sentiment upon the subject other than the general desire to seize everything belonging to the enemy, which

prevails in all countries in time of war; nor was there any such special information immediately available to the President and Congress as would warrant the formation of any fixed judgment by them. The decision was made, however, and put into execution as rapidly as possible, to despatch troops to the islands in sufficient numbers to capture and hold the city of Manila, and be prepared to enforce, as to the remainder of the territory, whatever decision might ultimately be reached.

SPANISH TARGET PRACTICE ON THE LUNETA.

As a matter of fact the most important factor in the ultimate solution of the problem was the character and disposition of the inhabitants of the islands, and the probability of a satisfactory affiliation between them and the Americans. It is, perhaps, even yet too early to form definite opinions on this subject, but the following resumé of some of the events which have occurred upon the islands during the past few years will throw some light upon the subject, and is at any rate essential to a proper understanding of the course of events since the American occupation.

CONDITIONS UNDER SPANISH RULE.

The Philippines, like all other Spanish colonies, were ruled with an iron hand. All authority was concentrated in the Governor-General, residing at Manila. There were provincial and municipal governments, but all subject to review by the central authority. To what extent the Governor-General was directed from Madrid does not appear, but apparently it depended upon his personal influence with the home government. It is stated that the Governor-Generals always went to the islands as poor men, and returned very rich. If this were true, and it is common report, their riches were obtained by peculation, because it is impossible to become rich from the legitimate emoluments of public office. There is no authentic statement known to us of the exact forms of tyranny practiced by the Spaniards upon the Filipinos, but in general it appears to have taken the form of corrupt administration rather than of oppressive laws. Both the fiscal administration and the courts are said to have been corrupt. The rich oppressed the poor, and divided the plunder with officials. There appears to have been cases of enforced colonization, in which natives were compelled to leave their homes and settle in other islands. Those forms of oppression, however, which most directly affected the masses, seem to have been connected with the church. During the course of the three centuries of Spanish control, Christianity has become firmly implanted among the natives. With the exception of some Mohammedans in the southern islands, and the few tribes which are entirely uncivilized, all Filipinos are good Catholics. Those who know them best have least doubt as to the sincerity of the belief of the masses in the tenets of the Catholic faith. The Catholic church, as is well known, is a hierarchy with the parish priest as the unit, locally

directed by his bishop and archbishop. But within the church there are a large number of religious orders, supposed to be devoted to good words and works, and actually so, so far as we in America know them, but independent of the authority of the priests and bishops, and responsible mainly to their own superiors, and through them, like the parish priests and bishops, to the Pope. The testimony is universal that in the Philippines these "friars" were wholly unlike the good men whom we know as such in this country, and, to a very great extent, were ignorant, brutish, licentious and rapacious. Educational affairs, at least in the rural districts, were largely in their hands, and in many ways they were employed by the Governors in connection with the civil administration, in which capacity they could, and, as alleged, did practice all forms of petty extortion, while leading, as is stated, in many cases, grossly immoral lives. At any rate, the one clear and emphatic demand which stood out above all others from this sincerely Catholic people was that the friars should be banished from the islands, and all religious work committed to the parish priests, as to whom no complaint was made, and who appear to have acquired and deserved the entire respect of the people.

SOCIETY OF THE KATIPUNAN.

As the result of misgovernment there have been, since 1868, several Filipino insurrections, none of them attaining any great measure of success until that of 1896, which was coincident with the rebellion in Cuba. During all these years, however, the spirit of discontent has been spreading, and the art of secret organization acquired. It is said that educated Filipinos residing in European capitals were initiated as Freemasons, and introduced into the islands many of the methods of that organization in the formation of the society of the "Katipunan"—a Tagalo word meaning "brotherhood"—which was devoted to the attainment of the independence of the islands. This brotherhood became very strong on the island of Luzon, and gradually spread over most of the islands of the archipelago, largely aided, it is said, by the enforced colonization schemes of the government, from the fact that the suspected persons who were selected for deportation became new centers of conspiracy in the islands to which they were taken.

REBELLION OF 1896.

Warfare between the Spaniards and their subject people has always been savage on both sides, and the preparations for the revolt which broke out on August 20, 1896, are said to have included a conspiracy for the massacre of the entire Spanish, and perhaps foreign population. The night attack, on the 20th of August, in which the Spaniards were to have been slaughtered, was frustrated through the confession of the wife of a member of the Katipunan to a priest, and this led to the arrest and

imprisonment at once of some 300 of the suspects. Some time before this, a petition, signed by 5000 of these natives, had been presented to the government of Japan, asking for annexation to that government, and this was at once forwarded by the Japanese government to that of Madrid. This action of Japan only added fuel to the fire. While the Spanish government was for the time lenient with these petitioners, it was compulsory lieniency, as there were then in the Philippines only about 1500 Spanish soldiers, and 6000 auxiliaries (natives). By the 1st of December following, this force had been increased to 10,000 Spanish regulars, with the addition of some small war-craft. Arrests followed, and discontent became rampant. On the 26th of August, 1896, Caloocan was raided by the insurgents, some Chinese killed and others captured. The Spanish cavalry started in pursuit, but all had vanished. On the morning of August 30th the first battle of the insurrection occurred at San Juan del Monte, just outside Manila, the rebels making the attack at four o'clock in the morning.

BRIDGE OF SPAIN. A FIESTA DAY.

They had no military skill or leadership, Sancho Valenzuela being in command, and he, by occupation, a ropemaker. One Spaniard was killed and several wounded. There were eighty of the rebels killed. On September 4th four of the leaders of the San Juan fight were executed on the Luneta. This was followed by the execution of others. The rebellion now spread like an infection, reaching into the provinces, the populace being quite universally allied with the rebellion. Everywhere, however, the little conflicts were favorable to the Spanish.

AGUINALDO APPEARS.

The province of Cavite soon attracted most attention from its connection with Don Emilio Aguinaldo. He was there teaching school at Silan, a small place, but a hotbed and resort of rebels. He was born in this province on the 22d of March, 1868, at Cauit.

Aguinaldo at once sprang into prominence by issuing an address to the people, counseling resistance. There was not formulated in this proclamation a plan of government. At San Francisco de Malabon he organized the revolutionary movement, and at once marched to Imus, in the province of Cavite. Here there was a slight engagement, and several priests were captured and cruelly tortured to death. Aguinaldo fortified Imus. The insurgents also held Paranaque and Las Pinas, and built trenches one and one-half miles long, south of Cavite fort and arsenal; they were splendidly entrenched. Here the Spaniards, with a large force, sought to dislodge them, but were defeated with the loss of nearly the half of a whole regiment of auxiliaries; sixty Spanish regulars were killed and fifty wounded. The Spaniards retired behind trenches. In the meantime executions were the order of the day; in Manila thirteen of the "promoters" were executed at one time.

There was an organized force of insurgents north of Manila, in the provinces of Bulacan and Pampanga. Their estimated strength was 3000. Against these the Spaniards had a cavalry detachment of 500 men. Nothing effective, however, was done. With the augmentation of the Spanish forces an attempt was made to capture the insurgents, but everywhere the rebels seemed victorious. At Carmona, Silan, Imus, Binicayan—all were Spanish defeats, but still these defeats served the purpose of keeping the rebel forces out of Manila. It was a savage warfare and no mercy shown by either faction.

CHANGES IN THE GOVERNOR-GENERALSHIP.

Governor-General Blanco, not being in harmony with the archbishop, was recalled to Spain in December. At this time the insurgent force was practically in possession of the whole province of Cavite, except the fortifications of Cavite, and there were in the province about 7000 insurgent troops, mostly equipped with Mauser rifles. They were well entrenched, but with no sufficient artillery. Their total fighting force at this time was about 35,000 men.

General Camilo Polavieja succeeded General Blanco. His available force was increased to 28,000 men, and a vigorous campaign was at once inaugurated. General Lachambre was his deputy commanding in the field, and a large number of small engagements followed, the result of which, for the time, re-established Spanish rule in Cavite province. General Polavieja and his deputy resigned and left for Spain, April 15, 1897. He was succeeded in command by General Fernando Primo de Rivera, who arrived later in the spring in Manila.

At this time, Aguinaldo had united his forces with Llaneras, and they overran a number of the northern provinces, including Tarlac. General Monet conducted the Spanish campaign against these forces, but his barbarities were such that the rebellion only spread and strengthened. His native auxiliaries, and the native priests, almost in a body joined the rebellious army. The rebellion, from now until the making of that remarkable pact of peace which so long brought Aguinaldo and his

party into obloquy, took on the form of guerrilla warfare. There were no actions known as battles, between the forces, but a series of raids and assaults by small detachments.

THE PACT OF PEACE.

On August 6, 1897, General Rivera commissioned a Filipino to negotiate terms of peace with the insurgents; and an agreement or treaty, known as the "Pacto de Biac-na-bato," was made, on the part of the Spanish government, by Pedro A. Paterno, the Filipino mentioned, and Aguinaldo and thirty-four of his leaders; in which among other stipulations, it was agreed,—that the rebels should be paid $1,000,000, and the families who had been damaged by the war $700,000; that Aguinaldo and his associates should leave the islands, and not return without the consent of the Spanish government; all arms and ammunition of the rebels were to be surrendered, and they were to evacuate all places and fortifications held by them by force of arms. An armistice for three years was provided for, in which certain promised reforms were to be made, and the rebels should not again engage in rebellious acts.

A SORE CROWD.

There has been much dispute as to the full terms of that compact, the insurgents claiming that many reforms were provided for, which the Spaniards deny. As the treaty or agreement has never been published or made known by any of those who were party to it, there is cause for suspicion, that in its scope, and afterwards in its execution, there was that which would compromise those connected with it. On the 15th of December, 1897, however, the General-in-Chief, and his mediator, Pedro A. Paterno, signed the following agreement which appears to be a part of the unpublished compact:

"In the peace proposals presented by the sole mediator, Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno, in the name and on behalf of the rebels in arms, and in the Peace Protocol which was agreed to and submitted to His Majesty's Government, *which approved of the same*, there exists a principal clause relating to the sums of money which were handed over to the rebels and their families as indemnity for the loss of their goods consequent on the war, which sums amounted to a total of $1,700,000, which the mediator, Señor Paterno, was to distribute absolutely at his

BRIDGE AT BULACAN.

discretion, but the payment of the said sum will have to be subject to the conditions proposed by the representative of the government, H. E. the General-in-Chief of this army. These conditions were agreed to be as follows, viz:

1. For the rebels in arms a draft for the sum of $400,000 will be handed to Señor Paterno, payable in Hongkong, as well as two cheques for $200,000 each, payable only on the condition of the agreement being fulfilled on the other part.

2. For the families of those who were not rebels in arms, or engaged in rebellion, but who likewise suffered the evils of war, the balance of the sum offered shall be paid in three installments, the last to be paid six months after the date on which the Te Deum shall be sung, assuming the peace to become an accomplished fact. Peace shall be held to be effectively concluded if, during the interval of these installment periods, no party of armed rebels, with recognized leader, shall exist, and if no secret society shall have been discovered as existing here or abroad with the proved object of conspiracy by those who benefit by these payments. The representative of the rebels, Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno, and the representative of the government, the Captain-General Don Fernando Primo de Rivera, agree to the above conditions, in witness whereof each representative now signs four copies of the same tenor and effect, one being for the government, another for the archives of the Captain-Generalcy, and one copy each for the said representatives.

ENTRANCE TO FORT SAN FILIPA.

*Done in Manila on the 15th of December, 1897.

Fernando Primo de Rivera,
The General-in-Chief.
Pedro A. Paterno.

MONEY PAID BY THE SPANISH TO THE INSURGENTS.

Pursuant to this agreement certain sums were paid by the Spanish to the rebels. Aguinaldo and his party embarked for Hongkong on December 27, 1897, escorted by Spanish officers, and counseling submission to Spanish authority. The rebels delivered up their arms, the Spanish government sent home 7000 of its troops and there was an interval of peace.

It is claimed on one hand, and has generally been believed in America, that in this transaction Aguinaldo and his leaders were bribed by the Spanish

*The original of the above document was read in public session of Congress in Madrid, on the 14th of June, 1898, by the Deputy Señor Muro.

government to desert their cause, and that as matters turned out they were guilty of the double infamy of accepting a bribe and refusing to "stay bought."

On the other hand it is insisted by the friends of Aguinaldo that the money paid by the Spaniards was in no sense a personal matter, but constituted a trust fund, to be employed as circumstances might determine; if the pledges alleged to have been made by the Spanish in connection with the payment were kept, the money was to be distributed among those who had suffered loss by the rebellion; if otherwise it was to be used in a renewal of the revolutionary movement.

NATIVE THEATER.

What the real intent was cannot now be known. There can be little doubt that the Spanish authorities believed that whatever the ostensible purpose for which the money was paid, it would in the end be retained by Auginaldo and his leaders, who would thereby be discredited and incapable of further mischief. Whether this would have been the case can now never be known, as the advent of the Americans made a complete change in the situation, opening as it did to the imagination of Aguinaldo, possibilities of which he could not have dreamed.

It is interesting to note in this connection what General Francis V. Greene, of the United States Army in the Philippines, thought of the bribery phase of the affair and of Aguinaldo. In his official report to the Secretary of War, dated August 30, 1898, he says:

"Aguinaldo and his associates went to Hongkong and Singapore. A portion of the money, $400,000, was deposited in banks at Hongkong, and a lawsuit soon arose between Aguinaldo and one of his subordinate chiefs named Artacho, which is interesting on account of the very honorable position taken by Aguinaldo. Artacho sued for a division of the money among the insurgents according to rank. Aguinaldo claimed that the money was a trust fund, and was to remain on deposit until it was seen whether the Spaniards would carry out their promised reforms,

and if they failed to do so, it was to be used to defray the expenses of a new insurrection. The suit was settled out of court by paying Artacho $5000. No steps have been taken to introduce the reforms. More than 2000 insurgents who had been deported to Fernando Po and other places are still in confinement, and Aguinaldo is now using the money to carry on the operations of the present insurrection."

A SOLDIER HAS VARIED EXPERIENCES.

General Whittier's statement shows that Aguinaldo even refused to take money for his personal expenses when asked to return to Manila by the American Consul at Singapore, Spencer Pratt, who offered him money for that purpose. Did the Spanish government keep its pact? It is known before General Rivera left Manila in April, 1898, the chiefs in Hongkong had been paid $300,000. What further pacification they have received is not clear.

THE TRAGEDY OF THE CALLE DE CAMBA.

It now became apparent that the government, believing that the rebellion was conquered, the forces scattered, the fortifications surrendered, and the rebels without arms, thought it could treat with impunity the rights of the people in utter disregard of its promises and pledges. The public mind was soon again in a ferment, and the agitation was becoming tense. At this time, March 25th, occurred what is known as the "Tragedy of the Calle de Camba." A large number of Viscayan sailors were assembled in one of the outskirts of Manila, and in a little carnival, were vehemently discussing the national wrongs. A passer-by informed the police; the civil guard attacked the place, and, without warning, shot down seventy of the Viscayans. Within nine days from this time an army of insurgents in Cebu, in the Viscayan group, 5000 strong, organized and took the city, except the fort, Government House, college and the foreigners' houses; the government places were kept in a state of siege. Reinforcements came from Manila and the rebels were driven from the city. At Labangan another great battle was fought, in which the rebel loss was reported at 1000.

In Luzon Island rebellion was again rife. In the provinces adjoining and north of Manila the looting and killing was like that of savages. A Spanish force of about 1000 men, under General Monet, was sent against the rebels; but still the violence and destruction was not abated. General Basilio Augustin now succeeded Rivera in command in the Philippines.

Upon the breaking out of war with this country the Spanish policy towards the natives was at once changed, and every effort made to attach them to the Spanish cause. Relying upon their attachment to the Catholic church, the strongest appeals were made to them by the church authorities. The following "allocution," issued by the archbishop of Madrid, may serve as an example of these documents which were strongly reinforced by the resident prelates and the press. It was sought to convince the Filipinos that a Protestant army was coming to devastate their homes and destroy their religious liberty.

ALLOCUTION BY THE ARCHBISHOP OF MADRID

"VERY BELOVED SONS:

The cursed hunger for gold and the unquenchable thirst for power have combined to tarnish that flag which the great Queen Isabella raised, by the hand of Columbus, in the West Indies. With justice trodden under foot, the voice of the Pope unheeded, and the interventions of the nations despised with arrogance, every road to the counsels of peace has been barred, and the horrors of war have become a necessity. Let heaven be witness that we are not the authors of this disaster, and let the responsibility before God be on that vain people whose dogma seems to be that money is the god of the world. . . . . There, ploughing the seas, go our soldiers and our sailors. Have no fear, let no one weep, unless, indeed, it be for fear of arriving too late for the fray. Go, braves, to fight with the blessing of the Fatherland. With you goes all Spain, from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, from Irun to Tarifa. With what envy do we contemplate you weighing anchor to leave our shores! Oh! why does juvenility, or decrepitude, or duty deprive us of the joy of taking part in your enterprise? But no! with you goes our Spanish heart. . . . . May the Immaculate Virgin, whose scapulary hangs around your necks and whose blessed image floats on your flags, protect you under her mantle in the moment of danger, deliver you from all evil, and shower blessings upon you! May Saint James, patron of Spain, and the martyr Nicodemus and Saint Telmo and Saint Raymond and the King Saint Ferdinand, go before you and ever march in the vanguard wherever you may go and make you invulnerable to the bullets of the enemy, so that you may return victorious to tread once more this noble soil and kiss the cheek of the weeping mother who bore you! . . . . We, who cannot go to take part in the battles, will hold and brandish the arms of prayer, like Moses, who prayed on the mountain whilst Joshua slew his ferocious enemies in the valley. . . . . God has triumph in His hand and will give it to whom He pleases. He gave it to Spain in Covadonga, in Las Navas, in El Salado, in the river of Seville, on the plain of Granada, and in a thousand battles which overflow the pages of history. Oh, Lord, give it us now! Let the nations see that against the right of might there is the might of right!

To all beloved sons, from our heart we have pleasure in sending you our pastoral benediction, in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Amen.

Given in our palace in Madrid on the 23d of April, 1898. JOSE MA,
Archbishop of Madrid-Alcalá."

AGUINALDO MEETS THE AMERICAN CONSUL-GENERAL.

At Hongkong, in the meantime, there had been established by Aguinaldo and his self-exiled followers, a junta known as the "Philippine Patriotic League." In view of the alleged Spanish violation of the pact, it was seeking foreign help and recognition with the intent to again attack Spanish rule in the Philippines. The breaking out of the American war seemed to open a new prospect for the

attainment of Philippine independence. Aguinaldo at once sought to open communication with the American representatives at Hongkong, who were of course ready to forward any enterprise directed against Spain. The manner in which this meeting was brought about, with a summary of the agreement alleged to have been made, is given as follows by John Foreman, F. R. G. S., an English author then in Hongkong:

"The Filipinos were now anxious to co-operate with the Americans in compelling the Spaniards to evacuate the archipelago. The American Consul in Hongkong, Mr. Wildman, accepted the honorary post of treasurer of the Patriotic League Fund. Emilio Aguinaldo and suite went to Singapore, where they found Mr. Howard W. Bray, an Englishman and old personal friend of mine, who had resided some years in the islands. Aguinaldo and his party were obliged to travel *incognito*, because secret paid agents were on his track to endeavor to fetter his movements, and in

MAN WHO DIDN'T PAY RENT.

PACO CEMETERY.

MAGELLAN'S MONUMENT

Singapore a Malay police sergeant was illegally employed to investigate the private acts of a Filipino. The editor of the *Singapore Free Press* and Mr. Bray had become acquainted. The editor introduced Mr. Bray to the American Consul-General, Mr. Spencer Pratt, and Mr. Bray presented Emilio Aguinaldo to the Consul-General. The midnight meeting of the above-named four persons took place at 'The Mansion,' River Valley Road, Singapore, on the 24th day of April, the day following the outbreak of American-Spanish hostilities. The original idea in making Aguinaldo and the Consul-General known to each other was to utilize Aguinaldo's services and prestige with the armed natives to control them and prevent reprisals when the American forces should appear before Manila. It was hoped that, in this way, the lives of many Spaniards in the islands would be spared. The result of this Singapore meeting was that a draft agreement between Consul-General Pratt and Emilio

Aguinaldo was drawn up, subject to the approval of Commodore Dewey and subsequent confirmation from Washington. The essence of this provisional understanding was as follows, viz:

THE TERMS OF AN ALLEGED AGREEMENT.

1. Philippine independence to be proclaimed.
2. A Federal republic to be established by vote of the rebels; pending the taking of this vote Aguinaldo was to appoint the members of that government.
3. The Federal republic to recognize a temporary intervention of American and European Administrative Commissions to be appointed by Commodore Dewey.
4. The American Protectorate to be recognized on the same terms as those fixed for Cuba.
5. Philippine ports to be open to all the world.
6. Precautionary measures to be adopted against the influx of Chinese.
7. The existing judicial system to be reformed.
8. Liberty of the press and right of assembly to be proclaimed.
9. Ample tolerance of all religions and sects, but abolition and expulsion of all monastic orders.
10. Measures to be adopted for working up the natural resources of the archipelago.
11. The wealth of the country to be developed by the construction of high roads and railways.
12. The obstacles operating against the development of enterprises and employment of foreign capital to be removed.
13. The new government to preserve public order and check all reprisals against the Spaniards.
14. Spanish officials to be transported to another safe and healthy island until there shall be an opportunity for their return to Spain.
15. This agreement is subject to ratification (by telegraph) by Commodore Dewey and President McKinley.

AGUINALDO'S HEADQUARTERS IN THE MOUNTAINS.

Consul-General Pratt then sent Emilio Aguinaldo with his staff to Hongkong with instructions to Consul Wildman to put him in communication with Commodore Dewey, which he did, and Commodore Dewey, before he left China for Manila, gave orders to Consul Wildman to see that Aguinaldo and his staff followed on in an American war-ship."

Whatever the actual facts attending this meeting, they have never been officially disclosed by the United States government. There can be no doubt that what Aguinaldo had in mind was the independence of the islands, with himself as the President or Sovereign. It would be very natural to suppose that with the Spanish fleet still safely at Manila, the fighting powers of Spain still undetermined, and no thought of the conquest of the Philippines in the mind of any American, our Consular and other officers might have assumed that the policy of the United States towards those islands would be precisely that solemnly announced with reference to Cuba—the independence of the islands under the friendly supervision, and possibly, the protectorate of the United States. That Consul-General Pratt made any promises is impossible, for he had no authority, and Aguinaldo knew that he had none. The summary as given by Mr. Foreman in fact expressly provides for the ratification of the agreement at Washington. It is very likely indeed, however, that both Consul-General Pratt and Commodore Dewey believed at the time that the agreement was desirable on the part of the United States, and would be ratified at Washington. It may be considered as certain that this was expected by Aguinaldo.

MISSION HILLS.

Neither President McKinley and his advisers, however, nor Congress were apparently prepared to say yes or no. They knew little of Aguinaldo and less of the Filipinos. They did know that hostilities in the Philippines had been conducted by the most brutal methods, and were probably not willing to become responsible before the world for a warfare conducted with savage barbarity, and certainly no conditions existed—nor did they exist before the ratification of the Treaty of Paris—which would warrant the President in acknowledging independence or even belligerency on the part of the Filipinos. Beyond this, the President himself had no authority except during war, as a military commander. He could not pledge the course of the United States except as to the conduct of military affairs during the existing war with Spain, and for whatever Aguinaldo and the Filipinos might do while serving under the direction of an American commander, the United States would be responsible, pecuniarily and otherwise to neutral nations, and morally to the Spanish government and the world, for the treatment of Spanish citizens.

What apparently happened was this: Admiral Dewey, and subsequently the commander of the army, were given, or assumed, the authority to make whatever use they deemed possible of the Filipinos against Spain, so long as it could be assured that the war would be conducted in accordance with the usages of

civilized nations. The proposals of Aguinaldo looking to the independence of the islands apparently received no definite answer until the signature of the Treaty of Paris. The result was that Aguinaldo, as previously arranged with Commodore Dewey, proceeded to Cavite, where he arrived on May 19, 1898, on the despatch boat *McCulloch*. The object of Aguinaldo was to work and fight for independence. On the part of the American authorities there was no policy as to this subject, and doubtless no direct reply made to Aguinaldo. The conditions of trouble existed, and in due time developed.

Previous to his arrival, Aguinaldo had prepared and sent forward the following proclamation which seems to have been distributed in the islands by the American generals:

PROCLAMATION OF THE PHILIPPINE JUNTA.

"Philippine Patriots. A nation which has nothing good can give nothing. It is evident we cannot depend on Spain to obtain the welfare we all desire. A country like Spain, where social evolution is at the mercy of monks and tyrants, can only communicate to us its own instincts of calumny, infamy, inquisitorial proceedings, avarice, secret police, false pretences, humiliation, deprivation of liberties, slavery and moral and material decay which characterize its history. Spain will need much time to shake off the parasites which have grown upon and cling to her; she has no self-dependence so long as her nationality is composed of inquisitorial monks, ambitious soldiers, demoralized civil servants, and a populace bred to support this state of things in silence. It is, therefore, useless to expect anything from Spain.

"During three and a half centuries Spain's policy has been a delusion. Is there a conflict between Spain and England or Holland? Then the friars come and relate to us preposterous absurdities of the miracles of Saint Francis and of the Image of the Virgin of the Rosary, whilst Simon de Anda calls the Pampango natives his brothers so long as they fight to save the Spanish flag falling into the hands of English or Dutch *savages!* Is the foreign invasion ended? Then the friars, through their salaried agents in the press, reward us with epithets such as monkey, buffalo, etc. Is there another conflict imminent between Germany and Spain? Then the friars call the natives Spaniards and the military officers own us as their sons, and they dub us brave soldiers. Is the conflict finished? Then we are again overgrown boys, beings of inferior race and incapable of being civilized. Is there now to be a struggle with Americans? Then General Augustin, who is the living symbol of Spanish authority, who ought to be the most prudent of the prudent, the most cultivated of the cultivated, points at America as a nation composed of all social excrescences; the friars and their enslaved Spaniards want to again cajole and cheat us with offers of participation in public affairs, recognition of the military grades of ex-rebel chiefs, and other twaddle degrading

COOKS' QUARTERS.

to those who would listen to it. In fact, they have called into their councils the sons of the country, whilst they exclusively carry out their own ideas, and reserve to themselves the right to set aside all the resolutions at a stroke. They offer to enroll in their ranks the insurgents of yesterday, so that they can have them all shot on the morrow of the present difficulty. What irrision? Do you want another trick exposed? Now that Spain is in danger of losing the Philippines, the executioners of the other day—the everlasting tyrants—tell us that America will sell the islands to England. No, America has its past and its present. America will preserve a clear intelligence; she is not dominated by friars and tyrants like Spain; she is liberal; she has liberated her slaves against the will of the Spaniards who were, for the most part, their owners. A country is known by its national character,—review its past history and it is easy to understand the

RURAL SCENES. *Little Photo.*

PICCANINNIES.

calumny launched against the Americans. But even though we became English should we not gain by it? The English have conceded self-government to many of their colonies and not of the frail delusive sort that Spain granted to Cuba. In the English colonies there are liberties which Spain never yielded to hers in America or Philippines.

"Our country is very rich, and as a last resource we can buy it from the Americans. Do not be deceived by the Spaniards! Help the Americans, who promise us our liberty. Do not fall into the error of taking Spain to be a civilized country. Europe and America consider her the most barbarous of the century. There the weakest is the most persecuted. In no country to-day but Spain is the inquisition tolerated. It is proved by the tortures imposed on the prisoners of Montjuich, of the Philippines, and of Cuba. Spain did not fulfill the agreement entered

into with Maximo Gomez at Zanjon, nor that made with Aguinaldo at Biac-na-bato. Spain is a nation always more ready to promise than to perform. But ask for friars, soldiers and state dependents to come and devour our wealth and instantly you will get them. Spain has nothing else to give, and God grant she will keep what she has. Spain will flatter you under the present circumstances, but do not be deceived. Submit every fawning offer to your conscience. Remember the execution of the innocents, the tortures and atrocities which have been the means of covering with decorations the breasts of those who took the blood of your fathers, brothers, relations and friends. Providence will aid the Americans in their triumph, for the war is a just one for the nation elected to lead us to the goal of our liberty. Do not rail against the designs of Providence; it will be suicidal. Aid the Americans!"

EFFECT OF SHELLS ON CONVENT AT CAVITE. *Darcey Photo.*

At once upon the arrival of Aguinaldo, he was found at the head of 30,000 "insurrectos," and on such terms of amity with Admiral Dewey, that the latter furnished him, two cannon, 500 rifles, and 200,000 rounds of ammunition. Aguinaldo was found to have retained his oldtime prestige with his countrymen, and at once began an active campaign to cripple and harass the Spanish forces. There now followed a series of small engagements between the Spaniards and the insurgents, in which the Spaniards were driven into a small radius in and around Manila; and there was an effective blockade of that city from the interior. As the result of six days' campaign they captured 1500 prisoners, including Brigadier-General Garcia Pena of the Spanish forces, a colonel, and many staff officers, and 500 Filipino volunteers, as prisoners. General Monet, who was now operating north of Manila, against the "insurrectos," lost practically his whole command, and was fortunate to get into Manila himself, without his followers. Aguinaldo had been ordered not to attack the city of Manila.

During this period there was a comparative tranquillity in the outlying districts of Manila, and the country reclaimed by the rebels. Aguinaldo, at the time of his return from Hongkong, declared a dictatorship for the islands, and this government was in control in the territory mentioned. Within two months this jurisdiction had been so effective, that Aguinaldo convened a Provisional Congress, on June 23d, giving the government the name of "Revolutionary," instead of "Dictatory," and proclaimed a constitution. The lines of the insurgent army were gradually drawn round the city of Manila, and in this condition affairs remained until the arrival of the advance of the American army.

"DON EMILIO AGUINALDO Y FAMY,

"President of the Philippine Revolutionary Government and
Commander-in-Chief of its Army,

"This government, desirous of demonstrating to the Philippine people that one of its objects is to abolish with a firm hand the inveterate vices of Spanish administration, substituting a more simple and expeditious system of public administration for that superfluity of civil service and ponderous, tardy and ostentatious official routine, I hereby declare as follows, viz:

CHAPTER I.

OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.

"Article 1. The Dictatorial government shall be henceforth called the Revolutionary government, whose object is to struggle for the independence of the Philippines until all nations, including Spain, shall expressly recognize it, and to prepare the country for the establishment of a real republic. The dictator shall be henceforth styled the President of the Revolutionary government.

"Article 2. Four government Secretaryships are created: (1) of Foreign Affairs, Navy and Trade; (2) of War and Public Works; (3) of Police, Public Order, Justice, Public Education and Health; (4) of Finance, Agriculture and Manufactures. The government has power to increase the number of secretaryships when experience has shown that the above distribution of public offices is insufficient to meet public requirements.

"Article 3. Each Secretary shall assist the President in the administration of affairs concerning his particular branch. The Secretary at the head of each respective department shall not be responsible for the Presidential decrees, but shall sign the same to give them authenticity. But if it should appear that the decree has been issued on the proposal of the Secretary of the corresponding branch, then the Secretary shall be jointly responsible with the President.

"Article 4. The Secretaryship of Foreign Affairs shall be divided into three centers, one of Diplomacy, one of Navy, and another of Trade. The first center shall study and execute all affairs which concern the direction of diplomatic negotiations with other powers and the correspondence of this government connected therewith. The second shall study all that relates to the formation and organization of our navy, and the fitting out of whatever expeditions the circumstances of the revolution may require; and the third shall attend to all matters concerning home and foreign trade and the preliminary work in connection with the treaties of commerce to be made with other nations.

"Article 5. The Secretaryship of War shall be divided into two centers, the one exclusively of War and the other exclusively of Public Works. The first center shall be divided into four sections, one of Campaign, one of Military Justice, one of Military Administration, and the other of Military Health.

The Campaign section shall draw up and attend to all matters concerning the service and enlistment of the Revolutionary militia, the direction of campaigns, the making of plans, fortifications and the editing of the announcement of battles, the study of military tactics for the Army, and organization of the respective staffs, artillery, and cavalry corps, and all other matters concerning campaigns and military operations.

The section of Military Justice shall attend to all matters concerning court martials and military sentences, the appointment of judges and assistant judges in all military-judicial affairs. The Military Administrator shall take charge of the commissariat department and all Army equipment, and the Military Health department shall take charge of all matters concerning the health and salubrity of the militia.

"Article 6. The other Secretaryships shall be divided into so many centers corresponding to their functions, and each center shall be sub-divided into sections as the nature and importance of the work requires.

"Article 7. The Secretary of each department shall inspect and watch over the work therein and be responsible to the President of the government. At the head of each section there shall be a director, and in each section there shall be an official in charge assisted by the necessary staff.

"Article 8. The President shall have the sole right to appoint the Secretaries, and in agreement with them he shall appoint all the staff subordinate to the respective departments. Nevertheless, in the election of individuals, favoritism must be avoided on the understanding that the good name of the Fatherland and the triumph of the revolution need the services of the most really capable persons.

"Article 9. The Secretaries can take part in the sessions of the Revolutionary Congress, whenever they have a motion to present in the name of the President, or on the interpellation of any deputy, but when the question under debate, or the motion on which they have been summoned is put to the vote, they shall retire and not take part in that voting.

"Article 10. The President of the government is the personification of the Philippine people, and as such he cannot be held responsible for any act whilst he holds that position. His position is irrevocable until the revolution shall triumph, unless extraordinary circumstances should compel him to tender his resignation to Congress, in which case only Congress shall elect whomsoever is esteemed most fit.

CHAPTER II.

Of the Revolutionary Congress.

"Article 11. The Revolutionary Congress is the assembly of those deputies from the Philippine provinces, elected in due form, as prescribed in the decree of the 18th inst. Nevertheless, if any province could not elect deputies because the majority of its towns had not yet been able to free themselves from Spanish dominion, the government can nominate provisional deputies chosen from the persons of highest consideration by reason of their education and social position up to the number fixed by the said decree, always provided that such persons shall have been born or have resided for a long time in the provinces to be represented.

"Article 12. When the deputies shall have met in the town and in the building to be provided by the Revolutionary government, the preliminary act shall be the election by majority of votes of a commission of five persons who shall examine the documents accrediting the personality of each person, and another commission of three persons who shall examine the documents exhibited by the first commission of five.

"Article 13. The next day the said deputies shall again meet and the two commissions shall read their respective reports on the validity of the said documents, all doubts on the same to be resolved by an absolute majority of votes. They shall then at once proceed to the election, by absolute majority, of a President, a Vice-President, and two Secretaries, to be chosen from among the same deputies, after which the Congress shall be held to be constituted, and notice of the same shall be given to the government.

"Article 14. The meeting place of Congress is sacred and inviolable, and no armed force can enter therein except on the summons of the President of the Congress for the purpose of restoring order, should the same have been disturbed by those who know not how to honor themselves and their solemn functions.

"Article 15. The powers of Congress are: To look after the general interests of the Philippine people and the fulfillment of the Revolutionary laws; to discuss and vote laws; to discuss and approve before ratification, all treaties and loans; to examine and approve the accounts of the general expenses which shall be presented annually by the Finance Secretary and to fix the extraordinary taxes, and others which, in future, may be imposed.

"Article 16. The voice of Congress shall also be heard in all matters of grave importance the resolution of which will admit of delay, but the President of the government can resolve questions of an urgent character, rendering an account of his acts to Congress by means of a message.

"Article 17. Any deputy can present a bill in Congress and any Secretary can do so by order of the President of the government.

"Article 18. The sessions of Congress shall be public, and only in cases where reserve is necessary shall secret sessions be held.

"Article 19. The order of debate and parliamentary usages shall be determined by instructions to be formulated by Congress. The President shall lead the debate, but shall not vote unless there fail to be a majority, in which case he shall give his casting vote.

"Article 20. The President of the government cannot, in any manner, impede the meeting of Congress nor interfere with the sessions of the same.

"Article 21. Congress shall appoint a permanent judicial commission, to be presided over by the Vice-President, assisted by one of the Secretaries, and composed of these persons and seven assessors elected by a majority of votes from among the deputies. This commission shall revise the sentences given in criminal cases by the provincial councils, and shall judge and sentence, without right of further appeal, cases brought against the Government Secretaries, Provincial Chiefs and Provincial Councilors.

"Article 22. In the office of the Secretary to Congress there shall be a book of honor, in which shall be noted the great services rendered to the Fatherland and esteemed as such by Congress. Any Filipino, military or civil, can solicit of Congress inscription in the said book on producing the documents which prove the praiseworthy acts performed by him for the good of the Fatherland since the present revolution began. For extraordinary services which may in future be rendered, the government will propose the inscription, the proposal being accompanied by the necessary justification.

"Article 23. Congress shall determine, on the proposal of the government, the money rewards to be paid, once for all, to the families of those who were victims to duty and patriotism in the execution of heroic acts.

"Article 24. The resolutions of Congress shall not be binding until they have received the sanction of the President of the government. When the said President shall consider any resolution undesirable, or impracticable, or pernicious, he shall state his reasons to Congress for opposing its execution, and if Congress still insists on the resolution the said President can outvote it on his own responsibility.

CHAPTER III.

Of Military Justice.

"Article 25. When any commandant of a detachment shall receive notice of an individual in the service having committed a fault or having performed any act reputed to be a military misdemeanor, he shall inform the commandant of the district of the same, and this officer shall appoint a judge and secretary to constitute a Court of Inquiry in the form prescribed in the instructions dated 20th instant. If the accused held the rank of lieutenant, or a higher one, the same commandant shall be the judge, and if the commandant himself were the accused, the Superior Commandant of the province shall appoint as judge an officer of a higher rank, and if there were none such the same commandant of the province shall open the inquiry. The judge shall always hold the rank of chief.

"Article 26. When the Court of Inquiry has finished its labors, the Superior Commandant shall appoint three assistant judges of equal or superior rank to the judge, and a court martial shall be composed of the three assistant judges, the judge the assessor, and the president. The commandant of the district shall be the judge if the accused held the rank of sergeant, or a lower one, and the Superior Commandant shall be judge if the accused held the rank of lieutenant, or a higher one. This court shall pass sentence in the same form as the Provincial Courts, but the sentence can be appealed against before the Superior Council of War.

"Article 27. The Superior Council of War shall be composed of six assistant judges, who shall hold the minimum rank of Brigadier-General, and the War Office Adviser. If the number of generals residing in the capital of the Revolutionary government are insufficient, the number shall be made up by deputies to be appointed on commission by Congress. The president of this council shall be the general of the highest rank among them, and if there is more than one of the same rank, one shall be elected by themselves by majority of votes.

"Article 28. The Superior Council shall judge and sentence, without right of further appeal, Superior Commandants, Commandants of Districts, and all officers who hold rank of Commandant, or a higher one.

"Article 29. Military misdemeanors are the following:

1. Violation of the immunity due to foreigners, both as to their persons and their goods, and violation of the privileges appertaining to sanitary establishments and ambulances, as well

as the persons and effects in, or belonging to, one or the other, and persons employed in the service of the same so long as they commit no hostile act. (2) Want of respect for the lives, money, and jewelry of the enemy who surrenders his arms, and for prisoners of war. (3) The entry of Filipinos into the service of the enemy as spies, or to discover war secrets, make plans of the revolutionists' positions and fortifications, or present themselves to parley without proving their mission or their individuality. (4) Violation of the immunity due to those who come with this mission, duly accredited, in the form prescribed by international law.

The following persons also commit military misdemeanors:

(1) Those who endeavor to break up the union of the revolutionists, fomenting rivalry between chiefs, and forming divisions and armed bands. (2) Those who collect taxes without being duly authorized by government, or misappropriate public funds. (3) Those who, being armed, surrender to the enemy or commit any act of cowardice before the same; and (4) Those who sequester any person who has done no harm to the revolution, or violate women, or assassinate, or seriously wound any undefended persons, or commit robbery or arson.

"Article 30. Those who commit any of the above-named misdemeanors shall be considered declared enemies of the revolution, and shall be punished in the highest scale of punishment provided for in the Spanish Penal Code. If the misdemeanor were not provided for in the said code, the culprit shall be confined until the revolution has triumphed, unless his crime shall have caused an irreparable injury, which, in the opinion of the court, would justify the imposition of capital punishment.

ADDITIONAL CLAUSES.

"Article 31. The government shall establish abroad a Revolutionary committee, composed of an indefinite number of the most competent persons in the Philippine archipelago. This committee shall be divided into three sections, viz: Of diplomacy; of the navy and of the army. The diplomatic section shall negotiate with the foreign cabinets the recognition of belligerency and Philippine independence. The naval section shall be entrusted with the study and organization of Philippine navy and prepare the expeditions which the circumstances of the revolution may require. The army section shall study military tactics and the best form of organizing staff, artillery and engineer corps, and all that is necessary to put the Philippine army on a footing of modern advancement.

"Article 32. The government shall dictate the necessary instructions for the execution of the present decree.

"Article 33. All decrees of the Dictatorial government which may be in opposition to the present one are hereby rescinded.

Given at CAVITE, 23d of June, 1898. EMILIO AGUINALDO."

A MESSAGE OF AGUINALDO TO HIS PEOPLE.

One week before the arrival of the first American troops at Manila, Aguinaldo promulgated the following "message" to the people explanatory of the objects of the revolution:

"It is an established fact that a political revolution, judiciously carried out, is the violent means employed by nations to recover the sovereignty which naturally belongs to them, when the same has been usurped and trodden under foot by tyrannical and arbitrary government. Therefore, the Philippine revolution cannot be more justifiable than it is, because the country has only resorted to it after having exhausted all peaceful means which reason and experience dictated.

"The old Kings of Castile were obliged to regard the Philippines as a sister nation, united to Spain by a perfect similarity of aims and interests, so much so that in the constitution of 1812, promulgated at Cadiz, as a consequence of the Spanish War of Independence, these islands were represented in the Spanish Parliament. But the monastic communities, always unconditionally propped up by the Spanish government, stepped in to oppose the sacred obligation, and the Philippine Islands were excluded from the Spanish constitution, and the country placed at the mercy of the discretional or arbitrary powers of the Governor-General.

"Under these circumstances the country clamored for justice, demanding of the metropolis the recognition and restitution of its secular rights through reforms which should gradually assimilate it to Spain. But its voice was soon stifled, and its children were rewarded for their abnegation by punishment, martyrdom and death. The religious corporations, whose interests were always at variance with those of the Filipinos and identified with the Spanish government, ridiculed these pretensions, calmly and persistently replying that liberty in Spain had only been gained by the sacrifice of blood.

"What other channel, then, was open to the country through which to insist upon the recovery of its lawful rights? No other remedy remained but the application of force, and, convinced of this, it had recourse to revolution.

"Now its demands are no longer limited to assimilation with the Spanish constitution. It asks for a definite separation therefrom; it struggles for its independence, with the certainty that the time has arrived when it is able and ought to rule itself.

"Hence, it has constituted a Revolutionary government, based on wise and just laws, suited to the abnormal circumstances it is passing through, preparatory to the founding of a real Republic. Accepting right as the only standard of its acts, justice as it sole aim, and honorable labor as its sole means, it calls upon all Filipinos, without distinction of birth, and invites them to solidly unite with the object of forming a noble society, not by bloodshed nor by pompous titles, but by labor and the personal merit of each one; a free society where no egoism shall exist, where no personal politics shall overthrow and crush, nor envy, nor partiality debase, nor vain boasting, nor charlatanry throw it into ridicule.

"Nothing else could be expected from a country which has proved by its long suffering and courage in tribulation and danger, and industry and studiousness in peace, that it is not made for slavery. That country is destined to become great; to become one of the most solid instruments of Providence for ruling the destinies of humanity. That country has resources and energy sufficient to free itself from the ruin and abasement into which the Spanish government has drawn it, and to claim a modest, though worthy place in the concert of free nations.

"*Given at* CAVITE, 23d of June, 1898.

EMILIO AGUINALDO."

TRAIN CAPTURED FROM THE INSURGENTS AT BATTLE OF CALOOCAN.

This train did splendid work in carrying supplies to MacArthur's Division. This picture was taken shortly before the battle of Quinga, and shows our photograph wagon going to the front.

CHAPTER IV.

THE REINFORCEMENT OF DEWEY.

THE news of the battle of Manila Bay came to the American people like a thunder clap out of a clear sky. Few of our people knew that there was in the United States service an officer named George Dewey, and many, and possibly the majority, had no idea where Manila was situated, or that there had been a Spanish fleet there. The first that was known of any of these things was that a Commodore Dewey had destroyed the fleet, was holding the bay, and had called for soldiers to occupy the city. Certainly he should have them. Whoever Commodore Dewey might be and wherever Manila might be could be determined later, but if there were an American like that afloat and calling for soldiers he should have what he wanted, and have it quick. On such distant service of indefinite duration it might possibly seem best to send regiments of the regular army, but regular troops were very scarce at that time, and the volunteer regiments then forming were anxious to go. San Francisco was the natural point of departure from the United States to the Philippines, but at the outbreak of the war the entire Pacific Coast had been almost denuded of regular troops, which had been hurried to Cuba, and the few volunteer regiments which formed the quota of the Pacific States were not yet in readiness. One regiment—the Fourteenth Infantry—remained on the coast, whose colonel, Thomas N. Anderson, was ordered to San Francisco, made brigadier-general of volunteers, and put in charge of the preliminary arrangements, pending the selection of the officer to command the expedition. Assignments of volunteer regiments, mostly from the Western States, were rapidly made, and such regular troops as were available were concentrated at San Francisco. The transportation and commissary service was organized as rapidly as possible, and every exertion made to get help to the victorious Commodore—already made Admiral—at the earliest possible moment.

THE STRENGTH OF THE REINFORCEMENT DETERMINED.

At first a force of 5000 men was contemplated. This was very soon increased to 10,000, and when the command in the Philippines was offered to Major-General Wesley Merritt, second in command in the United States Army, his estimate of the number required was 20,000 men, of whom a large portion should be regulars. This number was finally agreed upon to comprise the expedition, of which number

471 officers and 10,432 enlisted men actually reached Manila before the capture of the city on August 13, 1899. At the end of this chapter will be found a complete statement of the forces despatched to the Philippines up to June 30, 1899, with dates of sailing and arrival.

GENERAL MERRITT ASSIGNED TO THE COMMAND.

On May 20th, Major-General Elwell S. Otis, U. S. V., assumed command at San Francisco of "All United States troops now assembled and upon arrival of such troops as are to be assembled at this point for contemplated expeditionary purposes." On May 21st, General T. N. Anderson, U. S. V., was assigned to the command of the First Expedition to the Philippine Islands. On May 29th, a locality in the "Bay District Track" was designated by order as 'Camp Merritt." On May 30th, Major-General Wesley Merritt, U. S. A. assumed command of the expeditionary forces at San Francisco, and on the same day assigned General Otis to the command of Camp Merritt as an independent division for administrative purposes.

LOADING HORSES ON TRANSPORT.

June 2d, General Otis assumed command of this division and put in force a strict camp discipline. On June 23d, General Merritt assumed command of the Eighth Army Corps, composed of forces comprising the Philippine Expedition, and on June 29th, General Otis assumed command at San Francisco of "All the Philippine Islands' Expeditionary Forces in this locality, and, upon arrival, of all troops directed to the port for further expeditionary purposes." On July 11th, Brigadier-General N. P. Miller, U. S. V., assumed command of all troops at Camp Merritt and the Presidio, including the so-called "Expeditionary Forces," General Otis relinquishing command to serve in the Philippines.

DEPARTURE OF THE FIRST EXPEDITION.

Prior to the arrival of General Merritt at San Francisco in command, as noted, the First Philippine Expedition had sailed for the islands with General Anderson in command. General Anderson in speaking of conditions then, said: "I was ordered to Manila, when things were very unsettled, with a few regiments. I was hurried away with no explicit instructions. 'Do the best you can' were the orders I received."

The cruiser *Charleston* had preceded this expedition to Honolulu from which place it was to convoy the expedition to Manila. At Honolulu the expedition disembarked, where it was received with much enthusiasm by all classes, and most hospitably entertained. The expedition left Honolulu in good condition on the 15th, under convoy of the *Charleston*, Captain Glass being in command of the cruiser. On this date, while at sea, according to instructions, Captain Glass

opened his sealed orders, and at once signaled General Anderson, then on board the *Australia*: "My instructions require me to capture the Spanish forts and vessels at the Island of Guam, en route to Manila. The transports will accompany this ship as only two or three days' delay will occur. This may be made public. GLASS."

THE CAPTURE OF GUAM.

Guam was reached June 20th, after an uneventful voyage. Soon after the battle the press of the country was filled with tales of the heroism of the capture of Guam, but it should be said no one in the command thought of it especially as an exploit. This may be said—it was not known exactly in what the fortification consisted, the condition of the force, or the strength of the Spanish military occupation; and such precaution was taken as would be observed had they been of a formidable nature. In Guam there were two forts, St. Iago and Santa Cruz, and the ruins of an old fort called San Luis. The fort St. Iago was also at the time an old, unoccupied fort. The *Charleston* left the convoy so as to be unexposed to shells from the fort, and proceeded to the attack. She passed the old fort St. Iago in silence and moved up against fort Santa Cruz to shell the fort. There was no response and it was unoccupied. In all, the *Charleston* discharged thirteen shells at the fort, seven shells from the starboard three pound battery, and three from the port battery. The "battle" lasted four and a half minutes. By this time the Spanish settlement was aroused, and the captain of the port came aboard the *Charleston* and said he had recognized the salute but could not answer as he had no battery, but would try in the future to have one so salutations could be answered.

Authorities in Guam had no knowledge that a declaration of war had been made. Upon being apprised of this, they parleyed for delay, but were notified that they were prisoners of war; that the Governor and garrison must surrender and become prisoners. The garrison consisted of 108 men, 54 Spanish regulars and the balance natives Chamorros. The garrison surrendered its arms, the Chamorros being allowed to remain on the Island of Guam, which condition they gladly accepted. The regulars were, with the Governor and staff, taken aboard ship. After the necessary preparation the expedition set sail for Manila. There are a dozen and perhaps more of the Mariana or Ladrone Islands, Guam being the largest. The capital

CAMP EQUIPAGE.

of the group is Agana. These islands were given the name Ladrone by the Spaniards because of the thieving propensities of the natives. In 1668, the name of Mariana was given them in honor of Maria Ana of Austria, the widow of Philip IV of Spain. The population of the group is estimated at 27,000; that of Guam 12,000; and Agana 4000. The soil is very productive and well adapted to the culture of all tropical plants. The harbor of San Luis d' Apra could easily be made a fine coaling station, being nearly in direct line between Honolulu and Manila, at which place the expedition arrived on June 30, 1898, and the reinforcement of Dewey had begun.

NAVAL REINFORCEMENTS.

It is proper to state in this place that while, as had been demonstrated, the Admiral had a naval force quite sufficient to take care of any Spanish ships then in eastern waters, there was no heavy armed battle-ship in his fleet, and there was always a possibility of the despatch of heavy armed vessels from Spain by way of the Suez Canal, which later grew into a strong probability when Admiral Camara's fleet sailed for the east. It was also not impossible that complications might arise with European powers having interests in the Philippines, and whose naval forces on the Asiatic station were far in excess of Dewey's. It was, therefore, highly important that his fleet should be promptly strengthened. The cruiser *Charleston*, as already stated, accompanied the first expedition, and the monitors *Monterey* and *Monadnock*, although intended for coast defense and not for long voyages, were made ready as soon as possible and despatched from San Francisco, the *Monterey* arriving safely at Manila on August 4th, and the *Monadnock* later. They would have been a few days too late to meet Camara's fleet had it continued its voyage from Suez and met no mishap, and it is said to have been Dewey's intention, had the Spanish fleet continued its course, to leave Manila Bay and cruise until his reinforcements were met, after which he would have returned for another battle for the possession of the bay. The necessity of this was prevented by Admiral Camara's return to Spain. Upon the arrival of the monitors Admiral Dewey was equipped for any emergency, and the subsequent changes in his fleet did not affect the course of events, and do not fall within the scope of this narrative.

WAITING FOR TENTS.

MORE REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE.

The troops of the second expedition, under command of Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, reached Manila on July 17th, and those of the third expedition, in

command of Major-General Merritt, on July 25th. The fourth expedition, under Major-General Otis, reached Manila on August 21st, a few days after the fall of the city.

DIFFICULTIES OF RAPID MOBILIZATION.

To people not familiar with military operations the despatching of an army to the Philippines may seem a simple matter. There were plenty of men to go, and officers, more or less inexperienced, in superabundance. Apparently in the popular mind, there was nothing to hinder their going—but there were many things. There were no modern guns, no smokeless powder, no suitable clothing, no commissary stores, no hospital equipment, and no ships. The organization of the supply and transport service took far more time than the organization of the troops, but while waiting for these essentials of warfare to be provided there was time for drill. A newly organized regiment is but one remove from a mob, and to unnecessarily lead such a force against a disciplined enemy is to invite disaster. Fortunately most of the volunteer regiments were largely composed of National Guardsmen, and had had valuable training, but real war is very different from a militia encampment in time of peace, and there was a large number of recruits who had received no training at all. The organization of the staff services seemed slow to the people, but in reality it was rapid, and such delay as there was was turned to good purpose in training the officers and men for service in the field. It is desirable that the public be better informed as to the details of the various services upon whose effective administration the success of campaigns so largely depends, and it is convenient, in connection with the movement of an army to the Philippines, to give some account of the transport service which accomplished it.

LINED UP FOR DINNER.

The energies of the government, at the beginning of the war, were directed toward the preparation for the invasion of Cuba, and in pursuit of this plan, officers and men were taken from all sections and mobilized at points accessible to the Eastern seaboard. When finally attention was given to the situation in the Philippines, it was found that a base must be established on the Pacific Coast, and San Francisco was made the place. From the fact that supplies had been diverted eastward to furnish and equip the army for Cuba, the difficulty of the work of furnishing and equipping this new army was largely augmented. To house, clothe and feed the troops was not the only factor. The men had to be disciplined and drilled, and then arose the problem of transportation. In this it was not only to secure suitable transports, but to determine how best to feed and furnish, not only for the long voyage, but for the needs of the new and untried climate.

THE TROOPS IN SAN FRANCISCO.

Soon after the troops began to arrive from the different States at San Francisco, this question of climate effects became serious. Men heretofore strong and vigorous were attacked with divers' ailments, mostly of a pulmonary nature, and soon fatalities were alarmingly frequent. From May 23d to September 2d, inclusive, there were ninety-one deaths in the military hospitals in the city.

ROLL CALL.

The first camp was located in the western outskirts of the city, on a sandy piece of ground, and fearing that the locality might contribute to the mortality, a new camp was established at the Presidio. Here, by choosing the locality least exposed to the ocean winds, and with every precaution of sanitation, the death rate decreased. With improved sanitary conditions came restored health, so that the army sent to the Philippines was in excellent condition. It should be borne in mind that, at this time, the government owned no transports on the Pacific Coast and they must be obtained, either by charter or purchase, and in every instance refitted and made suitable for transporting the troops. Already commerce on the Pacific had received such an impetus that ships were difficult to get, and for some time could only be had after threatened seizure by the government.

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT SYSTEM ORGANIZED.

After much effort transportation was secured for the first expedition, and in time, by dint of great energy and perseverance, an excellent transport system was perfected. It grew with the requirements, and met emergencies. A table will be found at the end of this chapter which includes the transport service performed by this department, from the time of departure from San Francisco of the first expedition to June, 1899, showing the number of officers and men and organizations carried. Something of the magnitude of the supplies carried in connection with this transportation may be inferred when it is stated that, outside of clothing and other essential supplies, including tents, camp equipage and medical supplies, there accompanied each man in the expedition 400 rounds of ammunition and four months' rations, and as their stay prolonged beyond this time, their future supplies were to be subsequently added. The public eye seldom looks beyond the glamour of the battle-field to find merit in military life, but

SHIPPING HORSES TO MANILA.

the exigencies of the staff services require equal ability and devotion, while yielding none of the glory, so dear to the soldier's heart. Up to the present time about 53,000 troops with their supplies have been forwarded to the Philippines and preparation is now well in hand to forward soon, and as required, about 30,000 more, besides the return of the volunteer troops from the islands.

THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM.

This work has been and now is under the direct supervision and management of Colonel Oscar F. Long, Quartermaster of the department. As indicative of the ability with which it has been managed, it should be mentioned that at no time has there been a lack of supplies in the Philippines for the troops, and these have been commended both for quantity and quality. Not a life has been lost

BREAKING CAMP AT THE PRESIDIO.

attributable to defects in the Quartermaster's Department and, with 3500 horses forwarded, the loss is less than that which occurred in their transit from the place of purchase to the place of shipment. It will not exceed two per cent. The business done exceeds five times the whole of the five great commercial lines from the city. Stevedoring costs about 15 cents a ton. Private firms pay from 25 to 30 cents for the same kind of service. It is thought that about $15,000,000 have been expended for supplies in the transport service at the port of San Francisco, and the total number of men employed in the various departments, including manufacturing, approximates 11,000. The expense is about 40 per cent of what it costs private companies. But one ship has had an accident worthy of note—and this occurred in a fog on the coast of Japan.

In the English transport system, each man is allowed a minimum of 70 cubic feet of air in his berth and a maximum of 77 cubic feet. In the system which Colonel Long supervises, every man is allowed a minimum of 80 cubic feet and

a maximum of 100 cubic feet. Take the *Scandia* as further illustration. In the Russian service she carried 2400 men. In our service she carries 1100. Colonel Long has had four commissioned assistants in this work, his staff being Captains N. P. Bachelder, John L. Barneson, C. G. Lyman and J. H. Humphreys.

The sub-joined table in a condensed form shows:

First—The cost of the transport service on this coast since the war began to July 1, 1899; second, the cost of charters; and third, the time not in transit.

COST OF TRANSPORT SERVICE.

Cost of charters (of 22 vessels)	$4,223,400
Cost of Arizona (Hancock)	600,000
Cost of Scandia (Warren)	200,000
Tug Fearless	150,000
Tug Active	75,000
Tug Vigilant	60,000
Fitting up transports up to June 30, 1898	88,268
Fitting up transports subsequently (estimated)	50,000
Cost of water (estimated)	40,000
Cost of coal	443,550
Total cost of transport service	$5,930,218

COST OF CHARTERS.

NAME OF VESSEL	DATE OF CHARTER	DURATION OF CHARTER	COST
City of Peking	May 1, 1898, to Sept. 1	$1,500 per day, 123 days	$184,000
City of Sidney	May 10 to August 30	1,500 per day, 112 days	112,000
Australia	May 10 to August 29	20,000 per month, 3¼ months	72,000
Colon	May 27 to Sept. 7	750 per day, 104 days	78,000
China	May 27 to Sept. 22	1,500 per day, 119 days	178,500
Zealandia	May 27	20,000 per month, 13 months	260,000
Senator	June 8	100 per day, 390 days	390,000
Morgan City	June 7 to Nov. 3	660 per day, 150 days	99,000
Morgan City	January, 1899	550 estimated, 180 days	90,000
City of Para (just rechartered)	June 7 to Nov. 26	1,000 per day, 172 days	172,000
Indiana	June 7, 1898	25,000 per month, 13 months	325,000
Ohio	June 7, 1898	25,000 per month, 13 months	325,000
Valencia	June 19	650 per day, 380 days	247,000
Newport	June 30	1,000 per day, 379 days	379,000
Peru	June 25 to Nov. 2	1,000 per day, 131 days	131,000
City of Pueblo	June 23 to June 2, 1899	900 per day, 345 days	310,500
Pennsylvania	July 7	25,000 per month, 12 months	300,000
Rio de Janeiro	July 7 to October 22	1,000 per day, 108 days	108,000
St. Paul	July 19 to Nov. 1	1,000 per day, 105 days	105,000
St. Paul	Nov. 6 to June 12, 1899	700 per day, 219 days	153,300
Tacoma (sailing)	July 11, 1898, to July 3, 1899	200 per day, 358 days	71,600
Centennial	February, 1899	500 per day, 150 days	75,000
Cleveland	March, 1899, to June 24	300 per day, 116 days	34,800
Portland	March to May, 1899	300 per day, 74 days	22,200
Total cost of charters			$4,223,400

DAYS NOT IN TRANSIT.

Vessels	Left San Francisco	Arrived Manila	Lay Over in Manila	Awaiting Cancellation of Charter in San Francisco	Out of Transit	Charter Price per Day or Month	Cost
City of Sidney	May 25	June 30	20 days	17 days	37	$ 1,000 per day	$37,000
City of Peking	May 25	June 30	30 "	11 "	41	1,500 " "	61,500
Australia	May 25	June 30	23 "	12 "	35	20,000 " mo.	23,333
Colon	June 15	July 17	21 "	3 "	24	750 " day	18,000
China	June 15	July 16	44 "	.....	44	1,500 " "	66,000
Zealandia	June 15	July 17	37 "	.....	..	.....	.....
	Oct. 30	Nov. 28	57 "	.....	94	20,000 " mo.	62,666
Senator	June 25	July 17	38 "	.....	65	.....	.....
	Oct. 17	Nov. 21	27 "	.....	..	1,000 " day	65,000
Morgan City	June 27	July 31	59 "	.....	..	.....	.....
	Jan. 26	Mar. 2	12 "	1 day	72	660 " day	47,520
City of Para	June 27	July 31	87 "	.. ..	87	1,000 " "	87,000
Indiana	June 27	July 31	30 "	.....	30	25,000 " mo.	25,000
Ohio	June 27	July 31	35 "	.....	35	25,000 " "	29,166
Valencia	June 28	July 31	34 "	.....	34	650 " day	22,100
Newport	June 29	May 25	50 "	..	50	1,000 " "	50,000
Peru	July 15	Aug. 21	45 "	1 day	46	1,000 " "	46,000
City of Puebla	July 15	Aug. 21	30 "	.....	30	900 " "	27,000
Pennsylvania	July 19	Aug. 24	20 "	.....	20	25,000 " mo.	16,666
Rio de Janeiro	July 27	Aug. 24	28 "	.....	28	1,000 " day	28,000
St. Paul	July 29	Aug. 31	27 "	.....	27	1,000 " "	27,000
						Total cost	$738,951

It should be said in explanation of the last table that any delay in San Francisco was caused by the transports being refitted, refurnished and repaired, and often a little delay in waiting for cargo or the arrival of troops. Similar conditions may be considered as existing in Manila.

The following is a statement of the troops despatched to the Philippines up to September 15, 1899, with date of sailing and arrival:

FIRST EXPEDITION—158 Officers and 2386 Men.

Australia left San Francisco May 25, 1898, and arrived at Manila June 30, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, U. S. V.; Elmer W. Clark, 2d Lieut., 14th Inf., Aid-de-Camp; Henry P. McCain, 1st Lieut., 14th Inf., Adjutant-General; Samuel R. Jones, U. S. V., Chief Quartermaster; Sydney A. Cloman, 1st Lieut., 15th Inf., Chief Commissary; Harlan E. McVay, Capt., Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A., Commissary Sergeant; 1st and 2d Battalions and Company C, 2d Oregon, 38 officers and 732 men, making a total of 44 officers and 733 men.

City of Sidney left San Francisco May 25, 1898, and arrived at Manila June 30, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Companies F, I, and M, 3d Battalion, 2d Oregon Inf., U. S. V., detachment of Batteries A and D, California Volunteer Heavy Artillery, band and Companies A, C, D, E and F, 14th Inf.; Hospital Corps; Commissary Sergeant, making a total of 22 officers and 674 men.

City of Peking left San Francisco May 25, 1898, and arrived at Manila June 30, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: 1st Regiment California Volunteer Inf. and Commissary Sergeant, making a total of 49 officers and 979 men.

SECOND EXPEDITION—158 Officers and 3404 Men.

China left San Francisco June 15, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 17, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, U. S. V., W. G. Bates, Capt. Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V., Adjutant-General; Frank S. Bourns, Maj., Chief Surgeon,

U. S. V.; W. H. Anderson, Capt., Chief Surgeon, U. S. V., Chief Commissary; Schuyler Schieffelin, 2d Lieut., 47th New York Volunteers, Aide-de-Camp. Attached: Lieutenant-Colonel C. L. Jewett, Judge-Advocate, U. S. V.; Maj. J. F. Bell, Engineer Officer, U. S. V.; Capt. W. A. Tucker, Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.; 1st Lieut.; J. B. Clayton, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; 1st Lieut. R. H. Allen, 14th Inf., Aide-de-Camp; 1st Regiment Colorado Inf., U. S. V.; Company A, 18th Inf.; Company G, 18th Inf.; Sections 3, 4 and 5, Battery B, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery; detachment Company A, Engineer Battalion, U. S. A.; Detachment Hospital Corps, making a total of 61 officers and 1208 men.

Senator left San Francisco June 15, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 17, 1898, carrying the 1st Regiment Nebraska Inf., U. S. V.; Detachment Hospital Corps, making a total of 43 officers and 950 men.

Zealandia left San Francisco June 15, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 17, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: 10th Regiment Pennsylvania Inf., U. S. V.; Sections 1, 2 and 6, Battery B, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery; Detachment Hospital Corps, making a total of 34 officers and 665 men.

Colon left San Francisco June 15, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 17, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Companies B and E, 18th Inf.; Companies D, E, F, and H, 23d Inf.; Battery A, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery; Detachment Hospital Corps, making a total of 20 officers and 581 men.

THIRD EXPEDITION—198 Officers, 4642 Men and 34 Civilians.

Newport left San Francisco June 29, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 25, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Major-General Wesley Merritt, U. S A.; John B. Babcock, Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Adjutant-General, Department of the Pacific; Lewis H. Strother, Maj., U. S. V., Aide-de-Camp; Harry C. Hale, Maj., U. S. V., Aide-de-Camp; T. Bentley Mott, Capt. Aide-de-Camp; C. A. Whittier, Lieutenant-Colonel, Inspector-General, U. S. V.; James W. Pope, Lieutenant-Colonel, Chief Quartermaster, U. S. V.; David L. Brainard, Lieutenant-Colonel, Chief Commissary Sergeant, U. S. V.; W. A. Wadsworth, Maj., U. S. V., Assistant to Chief Quartermaster; Charles McClure, Maj., Paymaster, U. S. A., Chief Paymaster; Charles E. Kilbourne, Maj., U. S. A., Paymaster; Charles H. Whipple, Maj., U. S. A., Paymaster; R. B. C. Bement, Maj., Engineer Officer, U. S. V.; William A. Simpson, Maj., U. S. V., Chief of Artillery; Samuel D. S. Sturgis, Maj., U. S. V., Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Pacific; Enoch H. Crowder, Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. V., Judge-Advocate; Henry Lippencott, Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. A., Chief Surgeon; Charles E. Woodruff, Maj., U. S. V., Attending Surgeon, Department of the Pacific; Julian M. Cabell, Capt., (retired), Assistant Surgeon; Charles L. Potter, Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. V., Chief Engineer Officer; Richard E. Thompson, Maj., U. S. V., Chief Signal Officer; Frank R. Keefer, Capt., Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; G. W. Daywalt, Acting Surgeon, U. S. A ; G. W. Matthewes, Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Astor Battery, Batteries H and K, 3d Art.; Detachment Hospital Corps attached to Headquarters, making a total of 15 civilians, 33 officers and 548 men.

Astor Battery left Manila for San Francisco, Cal., December 15, 1898, on transport *Senator*. Armament and ammunition of Battery turned over to Light Battery D, 6th United States Art.

Indiana left San Francisco June 27, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 31, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V.; F. J. Kernan, 1st Lieut., 21st Inf., Acting Assistant Adjutant-General; C. G. Sawtelle, Jr., Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V., Quartermaster; Pegram Whitworth, 2d Lieut., 18th Inf., Aide-de-Camp; Herbert M. Lord, Maj., Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; William B. Rochester, Jr., Maj., Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; Henry C. Fitzgerald, Maj., Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; Timothy D. Keheler, Maj., Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; William B. Gambrill, Maj., Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; John M. Sears, Maj., Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; R. H. Fitzhugh, Maj., Commissary Sergeant, U. S. V.; W. A. Harper, Capt., Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V.; Dr. Titus, Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Dr. Henry Brodek, Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; 19 civilian clerks; 1 newspaper correspondent; Headquarters band and Companies B, C, G and L, 23d Inf.; recruits for 1st Battalion, 23d Inf.; Companies D and H,

Photo by Hudson

TRANSPORT "SHERMAN."
One of the largest and best troopships in Uncle Sam's service

Photo by Hudson

'TWEEN DECKS ON THE SHERMAN
Showing sleeping quarters occupied by the rank and file of our soldiers

CAPTAIN J. H. MATHEWS,
Superintending Engineer.

CAPTAIN N. P. BATCHELDER, A. Q. M., U. S. V.,
Assistant to General Superintendent, A. T. S.,
San Francisco, Cal.

CAPTAIN JOHN BARNESO
Marine Superintendent.

COLONEL OSCAR F. LONG, U. S. A.,
General Superintendent Army Transport
Service, San Francisco, Cal.

JAS. H. HUMPHREYS,
Asst. to Superintending Engineer.

C. G. LYMAN,
Asst. to Marine Superintend

OFFICERS ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.

18th Inf; recruits for 1st Battalion, 18th Inf.; Detachment U. S. V. Signal Corps; Company A, Engineer Battalion, U. S. A.; detachment Company H, North Dakota Volunteer Inf.; Hospital Corps making a total of 36 officers, 944 men and 20 civilians.

Morgan City left San Francisco June 27, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 31, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: 1st and 2d Battalions, 1st Idaho Inf., U. S. V.; privates, 1st Nebraska Volunteer Inf.; Detachment Signal Corps; Detachment Hospital Corps, making a total of 32 officers and 677 men.

Ohio left San Francisco June 27, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 31, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Headquarters band and Companies C and F, 18th Inf.; recruits for 1st Battalion, 18th Inf.; Batteries G and L, 3d Art; 1st Battalion, 1st Wyoming Inf., U. S. V.; Detachment Signal Corps; Detachment Hospital Corps, making a total of 24 officers and 886 men.

Valencia left San Francisco June 28, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 31, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: 1st and 2d Battalion, 1st North Dakota Inf., U. S. V.; Detachment Signal Corps; Detachment Hospital Corps, making a total of 29 officers and 606 men.

City of Para left San Francisco June 27, 1898, and arrived at Manila, June 31, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Forty-four officers, 963 men; 13th Regiment, Minnesota Inf., U. S. V.; Detachment Signal Corps, 2; Detachment Hospital Corps, 16, making a total of 44 officers and 981 men.

FOURTH EXPEDITION—172 Officers, 4720 Men and 17 Civilians.

Peru left San Francisco July 15, 1898, and arrived at Manila August 21, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Major-General Elwell S. Otis, U. S. V.; Thomas H. Barry, Lieutenant-Colonel, Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V.; Fred W. Sladen, 1st Lieut., 4th Inf., Aide-de-Camp; Capt. C. H. Murray, 4th Cav., Aide-de-Camp; R. P. Hughes, Brigadier-General, Inspector-General, U. S. V.; J. S. Mallory, Maj., Inspector-General, U. S. V.; Charles McClure, Capt., 18th Inf., Judge-Advocate. Attached: G. P. Scriven, Maj., Sergeant Quartermaster, U. S. V.; P. B. Strong, Capt., Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V.; C. du P. Coudert, Capt., Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.; C. A. Devol, Capt., Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. A.; G. H. Richardson, A. S. S., U. S. A.; Clarence W. Quinan, A. S. S., U. S. A.; C. M. McQuestin, A. S. S., U. S. A.; 9 civilians; Troops C, I, K, L, E and G, 4th Cav., Batteries D and G, 6th Art., detachment 3d Art; Engineer Corps, attached to 3d Art.; 13th Minnesota, attached to 3d Art., Detachment Signal Corps; Detachment Hospital Corps, making a total of 34 officers, 916 men and 9 civilians.

Puebla left San Francisco July 15, 1898, and arrived at Manila August 21, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: S. O. L. Potter, Maj., Brigade Surgeon, U. S. V.; H. C. Cabell, Capt., Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V.; S. B. Bootes, Capt., Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.; P. S. Kellogg, Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. A.; C. C. Pierce, Chaplain, U. S. A., Franklin M. Kemp, 1st Lieut., Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Non-Commissioned Staff, 14th Inf.; General Staff, Naval Engineer Officers, 10; Companies G, I, K, L and M, 14th Inf., recruits of 14th Inf., detachment 23d Inf., United States Signal Corps, 1st California Volunteers; 1st Wyoming Volunteers, making a total of 16 officers and 822 men.

Pennsylvania left San Francisco July 18, 1898, and arrived at Manila August 24, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: John D. Merit, Maj., Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; G. Tilley, Lieut., U. S. V., Signal Corps. Attached 14th Inf., 1st Regiment Montana Inf., U. S. V.; recruits, 1st California Volunteer Inf., Hospital Corps, making a total of 51 officers and 1654 men.

Rio de Janeiro left San Francisco July 23, 1898, and arrived at Manila August 24, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Brigadier-General H. G. Otis, U. S. V., George F. Shields, Maj., Brigade Surgeon, U. S. V., Edward Murphy, 2d Capt., Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V.; A. W. Kimball, Capt., Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V.; Seth M. Milliken, Capt., Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.; L. P. Sanders, 1st Lieut., 1st Montana, Aide-de-Camp to Brigadier-General Otis; Charles W. Whipple, Lieutenant Colonel, Inspector General, U. S. V., A. W. Bradbury, 2d Lieut., 1st California, Aide-de-Camp to Brigadier General Otis, S. W. Bechtel, Capt., Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V.; 2d and 3d Battalions, 1st South Dakota

Volunteer Inf.; recruits, Utah Light Artillery Volunteers; band of 1st Battalion, 1st South Dakota Volunteer Inf.; Detachment Volunteer Signal Corps; Detachment Hospital Corps; Ordnance Department, U. S. A.; 1st Montana Inf.; 1 Red Cross steward; 8 civilian clerks, making a total of 46 officers and 820 men.

St. Paul left San Francisco July 29, 1898, and arrived at Manila August 31, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: J. G. Blaine, Capt., Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V.; Lee Linn, Capt., Chief Surgeon, U. S. V; Raymund Sulzer, Capt., Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V.; C. C. Walcutt, Capt., Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V. (from Honolulu). Attached: 1st Battalion, 1st South Dakota Volunteer Inf.; recruits for the 13th Minnesota Volunteers; recruits for 1st Colorado Volunteers; Detachment U. S. V. Signal Corps; Detachment of Hospital Corps, making a total of 25 officers and 788 men.

Scandia left San Francisco August 27, 1898, and arrived at Manila October 2, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: William A. Kobbe, Maj., 3d Art.; W. O. Owen, Maj., Brigade Surgeon, U. S. V.; H. Pahe, 1st Lieut., U. S. A.; E. K. Johnstone, Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; H. du R. Phelan, Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; William B. Schofield, Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; M. F. Sheary, Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; T. Sternberg, Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; E. A. Wedgwood, 1st Lieut., Battery B, Utah Volunteer Art.; N. T. Messer, Capt., Acting Chief Surgeon, U. S. V., Acting Assistant Quartermaster; 4 civians; Detachment Hospital Corps; detachment 1st Montana; detachment California Volunteer Heavy Artillery. Attached: CommissarySergeant, U. S. A.; Red Cross nurses, male, making a total of 11 officers and 166 men.

FIFTH EXPEDITION—233 Officers and 6258 Men.

Senator left San Francisco October 17, 1898, and arrived at Manila November 21, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Companies A, I, K and M, 23d Inf.; detachment 14th United States Inf.; detachment 18th United States Inf.; detachment Battery D, California Heavy Artillery Volunteers; recruits for 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf.; 10th Pennsylvania Volunteer Inf.; 1st South Dakota Volunteer Inf.; 1st Montana Volunteer Inf.; 1st Nebraska Volunteer Inf.; 13th Minnesota Volunteer Inf.; 20th Kansas Volunteer Inf.; 1st Tennessee Volunteer Inf.; U. S. V. Signal Corps; Acting Assistant Surgeons, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 20 officers and 747 men.

Valencia left San Francisco October 17, 1898, and arrived at Manila November 22, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Companies F, G, I and L, 1st Washington Volunteer Inf.; Batteries A and D, California Heavy Artillery Volunteers; Commissary Sergeant, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 18 officers and 491 men.

Arizona left Honolulu November 10, 1898, and arrived at Manila November 25, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Brigadier-General Charles King, U. S. V.; 2d Lieut. Henry M. Meriam, 3d Art., Aide-de-Camp; 2d Lieut. James R. Goodale, 1st New York Inf. Volunteers, Aide-de-Camp; Maj. E. R. Morris, Brigade Surgeon, U. S. V.; Capt. J. B. Handy, Chief Surgeon, U. S. V., Chief Commissary; Companies I, K, L and M, and recruits, 18th United States Inf.; recruits, 1st Nebraska Inf., U. S. V.; recruits, 1st Colorado Inf., U. S. V.; recruits, 10th Pennsylvania Inf., U. S. V.; Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 18 officers and 1006 men.

Ohio left San Francisco October 28, 1898, and arrived at Manila November 26, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Headquarters and Companies A, B, C, D, E, H, K and M, 1st Washington Inf., U. S. V; detachment California Heavy Artillery, U. S. V.; 4th United States Cav.; 23d United States Inf.; 2d Oregon Inf., U. S. V.; 1st Montana Inf., U. S. V.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 27 officers and 759 men.

Zealandia left San Francisco October 30, 1898, and arrived at Manila November 28, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Headquarters and Companies A, B, C, E, F, L and M, 1st Tennessee Inf; U. S. V.; 23d United States Inf.; 13th Minnesota U. S. V.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 25 officers and 534 men.

Indiana left San Francisco October 27, 1898, and arrived at Manila November 30, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Headquarters and Companies C, D, E, G, H, I, K, and M, 20th Kansas Volunteer Inf.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 30 officers and 717 men.

City of Puebla left San Francisco November 6, 1898, and arrived at Manila December 6, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Companies D, G, H, I and K, 1st Tennessee Volunteer Inf.; Troop A, Nevada Cav., U. S. V.; detachment California Heavy Artillery, U. S. V.; 2d Oregon Inf., U. S. V.; 1st Tennessee Inf., U. S. V.; 23d Inf.; 18th Inf.; Battery D, 6th United States Art.; Commissary Sergeant, U. S. A.; 13th Minnesota Inf., U. S. V.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 24 officers and 572 men.

Newport left San Francisco November 8, 1898, and arrived at Manila December 7, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Brigadier-General M. P. Miller, U. S. V.; 1st Lieut. C. G. Woodward, 3 1 United States Art., Aide-de-Camp; 1st Lieut. M. K Barroll, 3d United States Art., Aide-de-Camp; Capt. John B. Jeffrey, Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V., Chief Quartermaster; Capt. Daniel Van Voorhies, Chief Surgeon, U. S. V., Chief Commissary; Companies A, B, F and L, 20th Kansas Inf., U. S. V.; Light Battery A, Wyoming Art., U. S. V. Attached: Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A.; California Heavy Artillery, U. S. V.; 1st Washington Inf., U. S. V.; 23d United States Inf.; Commissary Sergeants U. S. A.; making a total of 24 officers and 466 men.

Pennsylvania left San Francisco November 3, 1898, and arrived at Manila December 7, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: 51st Iowa Inf., U. S. V.; 14th United States Inf., 18th United States Inf.; 2d Oregon Inf., U. S. V.; 1st Colorado Inf., U. S. V.; 20th Kansas Inf., U. S. V.; 1st Nebraska Inf., U. S. V.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 47 officers and 964 men.

SIXTH EXPEDITION—.9 Officers, 2505 Men and 3 Civilians.

Scandia left San Francisco January 26, 1899, and arrived at Manila February 23, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Brigadier-General Loyd Wheaton, U. S. V.; Maj. C. E. Stanton, Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; Acting Assistant Surgeon W. R. Van Tuyl, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon T. M. McCullom, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon B. L. Johnson, U. S. A.; 4th United States Cav.; 14th United States Inf.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A.; 51st Iowa Volunteer Inf.; 20th United States Inf., making a total of 34 officers, 1193 men and 3 civilian clerks.

Tacoma, sailing ship, (supplies,) left Honolulu January 21, 1899, and arrived at Manila March 1 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Acting Assistant Surgeon C. Y. Brownlee, U. S. A.; 4th United Stated Cav.; 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., making a total of 2 officers, 2 men, 19 civilians, also 81 cavalry horses and 119 mules.

Morgan City, (supplies,) left San Francisco January 26, 1899, and arrived at Manila March 2, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: 1st Lieut. W. J. Kirkpatrick, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps; 20th United States Inf., making a total of 5 officers and 7 men.

Senator left San Francisco February 1, 1899, and arrived at Manila March 4, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Capt. J. S. Kulp, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon, I. W. Brewer, U. S. A.; Capt. E. H. Fitzgerald, Chaplain, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A.; 22d United States Inf., Headquarters and Companies A, B, D H, K and M, making a total of 18 officers and 602 men.

Ohio left San Francisco February 1, 1899, and arrived at Manila March 5, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: 1st Lieut. R. P. Strong, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; C. N. Andrews, Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; 4th U. S. Cav.; 10th United States Inf.; 31 United States Art. (recruits); 6th United States Art. (recruits); 14th United States Inf. (recruits.); 18th United States Inf. (recruits); 23d United States Inf. (recruits); Hospital Corps, U. S. A.; 22d United States Inf., Companies C, E, F, G, I and L, making a total of 17 officers and 710 men.

Grant left New York January 19, 1899, and arrived at Manila via Suez Canal, March 10, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Major-General H. W. Lawton, U. S. V., Maj.

C. R. Edwards, Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V.; Maj. C. G. Starr, Inspector-General, U. S. V.; Capt. R. Sewell, Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V., Aide-de-Camp to General Lawton; 1st Lieut. W. Brookes, 4th United States Inf., Aide-de-Camp to General Lawton; 2d Lieut. E. L. King, 8th United States Cav., Aide-de-Camp to General Lawton; Brigadier-General R. H. Hall, U. S. V., commanding 4th United States Inf.; Capt. E. Reichman, Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. V., commanding Company G, 17th Inf.; Capt. G. de Shon, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon P. M. Ashburn, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon A. C. Ghiselia, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon L. F. Hess, U. S. A.; 14th United States Inf.; 18th United States Inf.; 23d United States Inf.; Signal Corps, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A.; 4th United States Inf.; 17th United States Inf., making a total of 53 officers, 1688 men and 4 civilian clerks.

Sherman left New York February 3, 1899, and arrived at Manila, via Suez Canal, March 22, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Capt. J. D. Poindescter, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; 1st Lieut. R. B. Westnedge, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon G. S. Pitcher, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon J. B. Darling, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon F. B. Bowman, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon A. B. Smith, U. S. A.; Capt. P. J. Hart, Chaplain, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A.; 3d United Stated Inf.; 17th United States Inf., making a total of 39 officers, 1689 men and 1 civilian clerk.

Sheridan left New York February 19, 1899, and arrived at Manila, via Suez Canal, April 14, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Capt. F. A. Winter, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; 1st Lieut. E. W. Pinkham, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon O. C. Heise, U S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon T. L. Lowe, 12th United States Inf.; 17th United States Inf., Headquarters and Companies A, C, E and F; 3d United States Inf.; 4th United States Inf.; 14th United States Inf.; 18th United States Inf.; 20th United States Inf.; 22d United States Inf.; Hospital Corps, making a total of 57 officers and 1786 men.

Roanoke, (supplies,) left San Francisco February 26, 1899 and arrived at Manila March 29, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Miley, Inspector-General, U. S. V.; Acting Assistant Surgeon S. F. Fraser, U. S. A.; 14th United States Inf.; 20th United States Inf.; 22d United States Inf.; 23d United States Inf.; Hospital Corps, making a total of 3 officers, 100 men and 1 civilian clerk.

Portland, (supply ship,) left San Francisco March 2, 1899, and arrived at Manila April 10, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Capt. J. A. Logan, Jr., Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.; Acting Assistant Surgeon T. A. McCulloch, U. S. A.; 2d United States Inf.; 14th United States Inf.; 18th United States Inf.; 22d United States Inf.; 23d United States Inf.; 3d United States Art.; Hospital Corps, making a total of 11 officers and 95 men.

Connemaugh (supply ship,) left San Francisco March 11, 1899, and arrived at Manila April 20, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Capt. E. R. Butler, Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 1 officer, 2 men; and also 1 civilian clerk, 32 civilian teamsters and 284 mules.

City of Puebla left San Francisco March 24, 1899, and arrived at Manila April 23, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: 9th United States Inf., Headquarters and Companies A, F, G, I, L and M; Hospital Corps, making a total of 14 officers and 680 men.

Zealandia left San Francisco March 28, 1899, and arrived at Manila April 27, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Acting Assistant Surgeon H. W. Elliott, U. S. A.; 9th United States Inf., Companies B, C, D, E, H and K; Hospital Corps, making a total of 12 officers and 524 men.

Nelson (supply ship,) left San Francisco March 30, 1899, and arrived at Manila May 2, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Acting Assistant Surgeon S. Wythe, U. S. A.; 18th United States Inf.; 3d United States Inf.; 6th United States Art.; Signal Corps; Hospital Corps; General Staff, making a total of 2 officers and 60 men.

Hancock (formerly *Arizona*) left San Francisco April 18, 1899, and arrived at Manila May 11, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Maj. W. P. Kendall, Surgeon, U. S. V.; 1st Lieut. H. E. Wetherill, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon J. H. Hepburn, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon C. M. Drake, U. S. A.; 21st United States Inf., 9th United

States Inf.; Light Battery E, 1st United States Art.; 7th United States Art.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 40 officers and 1450 men.

Warren (formerly *Scandia*) left San Francisco April 20, 1899, and arrived at Manila May 18, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Brigadier-General E. B. Williston, U. S. V.; Maj. G. L. Edie, Surgeon U. S. V.; 1st Lieut. W. J. Calvert, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; 1st Lieut. E. H. Hartness, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; 1st Lieut. P. C. March, 5th United States Art., Aide-de-Camp to Major-General MacArthur; Acting Assistant Surgeon E. E. Persons, U. S. A., Acting Assistant Surgeon W. P. Benta, U. S. A.; 6th United States Art.; 3d United States Art.; 4th United States Cav.; 3d United States Inf.; 9th United States Inf.; 12th United States Inf.; 14th United States Inf.; 17th United States Inf.; 20th United States Inf.; 22d United States Inf.; Hospital Corps, making a total of 28 officers and 1182 men.

Newport left San Francisco April 20, 1899, and arrived at Manila May 23, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Acting Assistant Surgeon E. F. Robinson, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon H. L. Coffin; 1st United States Art.; Light Battery F, 4th United States Art.; Light Battery F, 5th United States Art.; General Staff; Hospital Corps, making a total of 11 officers, 224 men and also 15 officers, 258 enlisted men, Marine Corps; 6 government female nurses, 8 Red Cross female nurses, 2 women and 4 civilians.

Morgan City left San Francisco April 25, 1899, and arrived at Manila May 27, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Acting Assistant Surgeon J. G. Reifsnydeer, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon J. M. Williams, U. S. A.; 4th United States Cav.; 6th United States Art.; 9th United States Inf.; 12th United States Inf.; 14th United States Inf.; 18th United States Inf.; 21st United States Inf.; 22d United States Inf.; 23d United States Inf.; Signal Corps, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 10 officers and 606 men.

Ohio left San Francisco April 27, 1899, and arrived at Manila May 29, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Acting Assistant Surgeon P. W. Beckman, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon H. E. Stafford, U. S. A.; 13th United States Inf., Companies B, D, E, K, L and M; recruits; Signal Corps, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A.; Commissary Sergeants; making a total of 15 officers and 763 men.

Senator left San Francisco April 27, 1899, and arrived at Manila May 29, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Maj. H. I. Raymond, Surgeon U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon G. W. Roberts, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon C. B. Mittelstaedt; 13th United States Inf., Headquarters and Companies A, C, F, G, H and I; recruits Hospital Corps, U. S. A.; 9th United States Inf.; 14th United States Inf., making a total of 19 officers and 679 men.

Sherman left San Francisco May 22, 1899, and arrived at Manila June 18, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Brigadier-General J. C. Bates, U. S. V.; Brigadier-General F. D. Grant, U. S. V.; Capt. S. E. Smiley, 15th United States Inf., Aide-de-Camp to General Bates; 1st Lieut. C. W. Fenton, 5th United States Cav., Aide-de-Camp to General Grant; Maj. B. Halloway, Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; Maj. J. A. Canby, Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; Capt. J. Baxter, Jr., Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. A.; Capt. J. A. Randolph, Post Chaplain, U. S. A., Capt. and Assistant Surgeon C. Lynch, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon H. E. Manage, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon B. F. Van Meter, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon W. L. Whittington, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon J. T. Halsell, U. S. A., 4th United States Cav.; 3d United States Art.; 6th United States Art., 3d United States Inf., 4th United States Inf., 6th United States Inf.; 9th United States Inf., 12th United States Inf., 13th United States Inf.; 14th United States Inf.; 17th United States Inf., 18th United States Inf., 20th United States Inf.; 21st United States Inf.; 23d United States Inf., Company A Engineer Battalion, U. S. A., Signal Corps, U. S. A., Hospital Corps, U. S. A., Commissary Sergeant, U. S. A., making a total of 46 officers, 1743 men and 5 civilian employees.

Grant left San Francisco May 30, 1899, and arrived at Manila June 26, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Maj. Henry S. T. Harris, Brigade Surgeon, U. S. V., Acting Assistant Surgeon W. H. Dade, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon C. D. Lloyd, U. S. A., Acting Assistant Surgeon S. Richmond, U. S. A.; Capt. M. M. McMillan, Acting Quartermaster, U. S. V., Capt. Walter Marvine, Post Chaplain, U. S. A., 10th United States Inf.; 1st

United States Art.; 6th United States Art.; 9th United States Inf.; 12th United States Inf.; 18th United States Inf.; 21st United States Inf.; 13th Minnesota Inf.; Signal Corps, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps; Post Quartermaster Sergeant; recruits, making a total of 42 officers and 1655 men.

VESSELS SAILED FROM SAN FRANCISCO SINCE JUNE 1, 1899.

June 22, *Zealandia;* June 24, *Sheridan;* June 28, *Valencia.* July 1, *Pennsylvania;* July 3, *Wyefield*, freight and 140 horses; July 11, *Covenaugh*, freight and 300 horses; July 13, *City of Para;* July 24, *Tarter;* July 26, *New York;* July 27, *Ohio;* July 27, (Ship) *Tacoma*, 260 horses. August 10, *Indiana;* August 10, *Morgan City;* August 14, *St. Paul;* August 15, *Senator;* August 18, *City of Sidney;* August 19, *Siam*, 373 horses and freight; August 29, *City of Puebla;* August 29, *Leelanaw*, 260 horses and freight. September 2, *Warren;* September 8, *Columbia;* September 16, *Aztec*, 364 horses and freight; September 16, *Belgian King.*

CHAPTER V.

THE CAPTURE OF MANILA.

HE arrival of the first detachment of American troops on June 30, 1898, found Dewey in possession of Manila Bay and of all the shore fortifications from Corregidor to Malate. The Filipinos had possession of all the interior of Luzon Island, and the Spanish forces, numbering about 5600 men, under Governor-General Augustin, were hemmed in Manila.

With the American fleet in possession of the bay and the Filipinos holding the interior, there was but one possible outcome of the siege, and yet the Spanish position in the city was by no means weak. If well defended by a force sufficient to man the fortifications, it was well nigh impregnable to troops unsupported by heavy artillery. The defenses consisted of two walls surrounding the old town, known as the "Walled City," and numerous outlying works. The attack of the American forces was directed against the fortifications on the south and east of the city, and a description of these will serve for a description of the whole.

THE FORTIFICATIONS OF MANILA.

The west wall was built to ward off a sea attack; the south and east an attack by land. The total length of the south and east wall is 4900 feet, the south wall being 3300 and the east wall 1600 feet long. There are two of these walls, known as the inner and the outer wall. The outer wall is 15 feet high, on an incline from the top to the bottom on the outside, and the inner wall has a height of 25 feet, and is so arranged that firing is done over the heads of those occupying the outer wall. These walls are built of heavy masonry and are from 15 to 25 feet in width on the top, and so arranged that a large force can occupy them and be sheltered from a front fire. For instance, on the top of the inner wall there is a space about 20 feet in width which the troops occupy in action. In front of them is a stone wall 6 feet high, through which are loopholes. There is a moat surrounding the outer wall 100 feet wide, now nearly filled with debris and offal, in which water stands the year round. Between the walls is another moat varying in width from 125 to 150 feet, in a condition like the outer moat. In this inside moat are three bastions, built in the same manner as the walls and connected with the inner wall by foot bridges. All these bastions and walls are surmounted by guns, some modern and heavy, others ancient and comparatively useless in modern warfare.

THE SPANISH DUNGEONS.

Beneath these walls and covering their length underground are the "dungeons." They are built in three apartments, the first 50 by 25 feet, the other two 30 by 25 feet. All are connected by stone causeways and built of solid masonry.

SPANISH TRENCHES AT CAVITE.

The guard-room to these is a little structure 8 by 12 feet. From this is an entrance to dungeon No. 1 by a series of stone steps, and the end of this descent is the gate of entrance, 2 feet high and 1½ feet wide. The exit to the next dungeon was of the same size and kind, and here another descent of a number of stone steps through a stone causeway and the same kind of entrance to dungeon No. 2. From dungeon No. 2 was a like causeway and descent to No. 3, which was located below sea level. There was a gate with iron grates opening from the third dungeon, which, when raised, would permit the water from the sea or Pasig River to flow into the dungeon. In this last dungeon it was the habit of the Spanish authorities to keep the Filipino prisoners, and when they failed to die of starvation or become too numerous, they could raise the gates. When the Spanish sought diversion in their executions they would take out the prisoners and publicly shoot them by the score. Two places were specially appropriated for this. One at the northwest corner of the wall, near the barracks and arsenal, and another across the street, south of the moat. Here most of the civilians were shot.

THE GATES, FORTS AND BARRICADES.

There are six gates leading into the walled city, one of these being in the south wall mentioned, another in the east wall, and the remainder opening upon the bay or river. Nearly opposite the south gate and a little west of Luneta barracks is another fort similar in construction to the old wall, with moat and double walls. It covers nearly an acre of ground, and is 900 feet inland from the shore. Here was a powder magazine. At the place called Ermita, 1500 feet south of the city wall, were strong earthworks mounting a battery of Krupp guns, built as a defense against naval attack. Through this place extended the street or Calle Real from the wall southward to Malate, a distance of one mile. It runs nearly parallel to the shore and distant therefrom 200 to 500 feet. Here, extending across the street, was a strong barricade. It was 6 feet high and 6 feet wide at the top, with substantial buildings at either end, with openings between the sandbags on the top.

At different places between this and Fort San Antonio, Abad, or Fort Malate, were three of these street barricades. In this suburb of Malate, all the streets or roads were crossed with these barricades. All through this section, also, were such barricades in the open, covering all approaches to the city. Twenty-four hundred feet south along the Calle Real Road, was another trench, commencing at the beach and extending eastward 700 feet. This barricaded the approach to Malate, the last suburb of the city south. The beach formed the west flank of this trench, and an impassable swamp the east flank. Five hundred feet south from this trench, is Fort Malate. This was a stone fort, built of solid masonry and mounted with modern guns. Instead, however, of a moat in front, there was a slough or waterway, 100 feet wide and varying in depth, depending upon tide and rain. The slough approached the fort from the east, thence deflected southward, and thence westward into the bay. The approaches to this were swamps and brush. A stone bridge crosses this stream by the fort on the Calle Real Road, and the approaches to this bridge were covered by strong stone walls. Connecting with this stone bridge and the fort, was a strong line of trenches. They extended from the fort to the beach, west, a distance of 200 feet, and from the fort eastward, a distance of 3000 feet to block-house No. 14, which was flanked on the east by an impassable swamp, and by the bay on the west.

THE SPANISH BLOCK-HOUSES.

All over the country wherever the Spaniards had outposts, is found the block-house. They are all on the same plan, although of different material. Some are of stone, some stone in part and partly wood, and some are all of wood. Block-house No. 14 was the kind known as the wooden block-house. It was thirty feet square, two stories high, built on raised ground, sloping from the base outward at an incline of about fifty degrees. At the corners are ten-inch timbers to which heavy planks are nailed, extending from one corner to the other, both on the inside and outside, making a double wall of plank. The space between these walls is filled with a mixture of earth and stone, forming a kind of cement or macadam, though not hardened. Each story has loopholes suitable for rifle firing; the holes are six inches in diameter, have an incline of thirty-five degrees, the bottom of which is steel-lined, so that a shot entering the hole would strike the steel plate and glance upward above the heads of the men behind the guns. There was a trench around

SPANISH BARRICADED STREET IN MALATE.

block-house No. 14, so built that it intercepted and commanded the Cingalon Road, hereafter mentioned, also another highway, these two roads being the only approach to Manila from this district.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE SPANISH TRENCHES.

The Spanish trench is always about the same. There is a ditch in front about six feet wide and three feet deep, and the earth back of this is thrown up five feet high. They are five to seven feet thick on the top, and slope from this outward to the ground. They are usually covered with sandbags, between which are loopholes. Sometimes the breastwork is made entirely of sandbags. The approach to the trench at block-house No. 14 is a swamp, almost impassable, and brush. South of this trench along the Calle Real Road, and reaching to the trench, is the Spanish cemetery. The wall has a stone base and was a good protection against an assault. Adjoining this on the south is the American cemetery, where our soldiers are interred. South of this last trench, at an average distance of 1100 feet, runs a highway extending eastward at right angles from the Calle Real Road, which here intercepts it from the north. This highway bears northward and passes block-house No. 14, and from there on forms what is known as the Cingalon Road. On both sides of this road were Spanish trenches commanding open spaces where attacks could be made. South of the above intersection of the highway was another line of entrenchments extending from the Calle Real Road to the beach, the distance being 650 feet. This was the last Spanish outpost entrenched in front of the American line. All these fortifications, under the plan of battle of August 13th, were to be attacked and overcome by Gen. Greene's Brigade, known as the 2d Brigade of the division, with Gen. MacArthur's Brigade in supporting distance to the right. Gen. MacArthur's Brigade, under the plan of battle, was to move directly against other Spanish strongholds, with Greene's brigade in supporting distance on the left. These fortifications remain to be noticed. For this purpose we go back to block-house No. 14. The distance of block-house No. 13 from block-house No. 14 is 425 yards, air-line, varying north by ten degrees east, and between these two were a number of short trenches and rifle-pits, and a stone house and barricades, all so situated as to enfilade the approaches from different directions. This was a formidable place.

COMPANY OF INSURGENTS.

Block-house No. 13 rested on the west side of the Cingalon Road and was strongly built, and from this eastward and extending across the highway to an impassable swamp was a strong barricade. On the west of this fortified line was also a swamp. The only traveled way between these two block-houses was the Cingalon Road, which ran eastward from block-house No. 14 255 yards and thence turned at right angles to block-house No. 13, 360 yards. Between this highway and the fortified line were cultivated fields. Back of block-house No. 13 and extending northeast towards block-house No. 12 were numerous trenches which gave protection against an advance from the south by a swamp and slough. The distance between these two block-houses is 750 yards, and between them there is no direct traveled way. The only connection is by highway eastward to Cingalon, where it is intersected by a road leading past block-house No. 13, and thence extending to Paco. The distance from Cingalon to block-house No. 12 is 440 yards, and from block-house No. 13 to Cingalon 600 yards. The highway continues from Cingalon to Paco and intersects the main highway from Malate to Paco, a distance of 830 yards. From this intersection to Paco bridge is 180 yards. The main traveled highway to the walled city gates from this locality intersects this highway 80 yards from the bridge, and this would be the line of approach to the south gate of the city. On this line of road lies the Paco cemetery, distant from intersection 700 yards. From Paco cemetery there are two ways to the city gates. By direct way to the south gate it is 1200 yards; the other makes a circuit northward. The gate also may be reached by a road going west to Ermita and thence north. The extent of the fortifications held by the Spaniards against the American troops was from the city wall to the south line of the entrenchment, two miles, and from east to west at the furthest point in width, one mile.



LANDING OF TROOPS AT CAVITE.

THE FILIPINO INSURGENTS.

In front of the Spanish fortifications, and surrounding the city, the Filipinos had thrown up trenches, many of them skilfully constructed, and were occupying them on the arrival of the American forces. They were very deficient in military discipline, and did not hold the trenches with any regularity. The trenches were often inadequately guarded, and at times an entire trench might be vacated. It was evident to our commanders that the Filipinos would be utterly unreliable as an auxiliary, or even a supporting force. In the event of their entering Manila with our forces it was evident that neither their own officers nor the Americans could control them. There were arms and equipments but for a small part even of the actual soldiers, and in case of success there would be no limit to the number of vengeful and bloodthirsty followers who would rush into the city, and who could not be distinguished from those actually under military discipline, or from the inhabitants of the city. It was certain that under such circumstances it would

be impossible for the small American army to prevent the sack and burning of the city, with accompanying horrors such as the world has not seen since the days of Attila, and for which, if permitted, America would be held responsible.

FILIPINOS NOT TO SHARE IN THE ATTACK.

It was determined from the first, therefore, that the Filipinos should have no part in the attack, or recognition as an army in entering and occupying the city. Not the least difficult of the tasks assumed by the American commanders, was the inducing of Aguinaldo and his army to peacefully assent to this program. On the other hand they were doubtless aided in the negotiations for the final surrender by the fear of the Spanish and foreign residents of Manila of the terrible scenes which would follow the entrance of armed Filipinos, and the knowledge that the American commanders would probably not be able to restrain them if the city were taken by assault. Spanish military tradition, if not law, forbids the surrender of a fortified place, no matter what the force brought against it, until there has been such an exercise of that force as to actually demonstrate the futility of resistance. Some bad things have been done in the Philippines, as in all wars, but too much praise cannot be given to the American commanders for the care and tact displayed in so managing, in the interest of humanity, that open rupture with the Filipinos was avoided, while giving to the brave Spanish officers in command the opportunity to save themselves from the rigor of Spanish military law, while assuring to non-combatants in Manila the protection which civilization demands.

CAMP DEWEY ESTABLISHED.

The first duty of Gen. T. N. Anderson, upon the arrival of the first expedition, was to reconnoiter the position of the enemy, and decide upon his base of operations, and the nature of his campaign. His base must be under the protection of the fleet, in the most healthful position possible, and easily accessible with supplies and reinforcements to the trenches, where the fighting must be done. For this purpose he settled upon a place, afterwards called Camp Dewey, by wagon road twenty-one miles from Cavite, and by boat six miles. The place was formerly a peanut field; the soil is sandy loam and about four feet above sea level. It was a mile and a quarter in length, by two hundred and fifty to three hundred yards in width. The place was protected from sea winds by trees and shrubs. The 1st Battalion of California Volunteers first went into camp here July 15th, and was soon followed by the other troops. Upon the arrival of the next expedition, Gen. Greene made his headquarters at Camp Dewey, Gen. Anderson still retaining his headquarters at Cavite. Camp Dewey was located on the now famous Calle Real Road, which continued its way south from the place we last left it on the Spanish

GRAVES OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN SAN FRANCISCO.

line. The distance from headquarters northward towards the Spanish line to the entrenchments occupied by the insurgents was one mile and a half, these extended from the beach to the Calle Real Road, the length of the trench being three hundred yards. The distance from this trench to the next insurgent trench was three hundred and fifty yards. This also extended from the beach to the Calle Real Road. East of these lines were the swamps in which the army could not operate. It was this last trench that was finally vacated by the insurgents for the Americans, and then, afterwards, the line was advanced by the Americans from fifty to one hundred and fifty yards, and a new line constructed, extending from the beach to a highway westward, and thence to a swamp seven hundred yards. It was built for enfilading, and to cover approaches from the north. The left rested on the bay, and the right was covered by an impassable swamp.

CHURCH AT MALABON.

POSITION OF THE AMERICAN TROOPS.

At the time of the advance on Manila, Gen. Greene's Brigade held this line of entrenchments with his reserve within supporting distance. Two hundred and fifty yards north on the Calle Real Road, is the intersection of the highway to Pasai, the distance being 700 yards. At Pasai, the road turns at right angles and extending northward, forms the Cingalon Road. Along this road were the trenches held and covered by MacArthur's Brigade, at the time of the advance, the first of which is 700 yards from Pasai. The trench here extends west 300 yards and 100 yards east from the road. The west approach is covered by a swamp, and the left by a trench held by Greene's Brigade. All along this highway were a number of short earthworks extending northward a distance of 650 yards to another main trench 200 yards long. Here was a strong barricade built for enfilading. This was north and east of Greene's last trench, and in advance of it 350 yards, and 300 yards south of block-house No. 14, occupied by the Spanish force. In front of this was a strong outpost about 60 yards distant. Here began the insurgent trenches, extending northeast 350 yards. Their left had for support the American line and their right an impassable swamp. These were strong earthworks and would be effective in making an assault on the strong Spanish position which was supported by the block-houses. It was these trenches which our forces wished to occupy before making the advance on Manila. Our operations prior to this advance taking Camp Dewey as a base, covered three-quarters of a mile east and west, and two

and a half miles north and south. The west was protected by the bay and the east by an impassable swamp, and the whole was covered by the guns of the fleet.

EMBARRASSMENTS OF THE AMERICAN COMMANDERS.

The position of the American commanders, previous to the arrival of a military force sufficient to make them masters of the situation, was very trying. There were large foreign interests in Manila, and the well known temporary lack of power on the part of the Americans to give due protection to non-combatants and their property from the possible excesses of the Filipinos was a legitimate cause of anxiety to the governments whose citizens were in Manila. The result was a speedy gathering of British, French, Japanese and German war-ships to observe events, and afford such protection to their own citizens and other non-combatants as the exigencies of the case might require.

MISCONDUCT OF THE GERMAN ADMIRAL.

The number of German ships, however, was unnecessarily large.* There were five in all, two of which were armored and outclassed any ship of Dewey's fleet; and considering their number and size the German squadron in Manila Bay

GRAVES OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN PACO CEMETERY.

almost constituted what is called a "naval demonstration," a term which is used to describe a naval force sufficient in strength to control an existing situation, and which is very seldom displayed under such circumstances, except for the purpose of a warning against some possible action. The actions of the German squadron were very peculiar. The rules of naval etiquette in a blockaded port, or in the presence of belligerents, are very closely drawn and perfectly understood by all naval commanders. It was the constant practice of the ships of the German squadron to strain these rules to the utmost, and in some cases they certainly overstepped them. There was a studied discourtesy, which could apparently have no object except to irritate the Americans and engage them in a controversy. As naval commanders are always presumed to be acting in pursuance of instructions, it was difficult for Admiral Dewey to interpret the actions of the German admiral except upon the supposition that he desired to provoke a contest which would serve as an excuse for Germany's intervention in affairs in the Philippines. Admiral Dewey endured these petty annoyances with such patience as he might,

*Mr. Stickney's account of this matter has already been given, (see page 16) but it seems proper to make the narrative complete in this place.

until, what he deemed a sufficient occasion arising, he is said to have sent, in connection with a protest against an improper action, a request to Admiral Von Diederich to be informed "Whether Germany and the United States were at peace or at war, in order that he might take measures accordingly," with the added notification that "If Admiral Von Diederich wanted a fight he could have it right now." No official report of any such message has been published, but unquestionably some message was sent which relieved the situation, for there was no more trouble from that source. What instructions Admiral Von Diederich may have had, or what designs, if any, the German government may have had, is not likely to be known, but so far as we can now see, whatever trouble there was grew out of the fact that the German commander was an impertinent and foolish man. At any rate he was quietly recalled by his government.

RUMORED COMING OF CAMARA'S FLEET.

In addition to this cause of anxiety, and the strain of managing the Filipinos, there was a very possible danger from a Spanish fleet. The battle-ships of the American navy were all in the Atlantic, while Spain had at home a good number of formidable vessels, from which a squadron, far more powerful than that of Dewey, might easily be fitted out, and reach Manila, by way of the Suez Canal long before any American battle-ship, even if it could be spared from the Atlantic, could reach there. In anticipation of this, and as the only thing possible to be done, the monitors *Monterey* and *Monadnock*, then lying in San Francisco, were fitted out for the Philippines, and the *Monterey* was promptly got off. As a matter of fact, as is well known, a squadron, including the battle-ship *Pelayo*, was made up in the Mediterranean, and despatched eastward under Admiral Camara. Dewey knew this, and also that the *Monterey* had sailed to his assistance. The anxiety and strain which grew out of this situation is well described in the following language of Gen. F. V. Greene:

"We had been thirty days without news from the outer world. The *Boston* brought us the latest information by way of Hongkong, which was dated July 31, and consisted of a few brief telegrams, to the effect that Admiral Camara's fleet had passed through the Suez Canal, was coaling in the Red Sea, and as soon as this was completed would continue its voyage to Manila; and that Gen. Merritt had sailed from San Francisco in the steamer *Newport* on June 28th.

CAPTURED SPANISH GUNS.

"These telegrams showed that a most interesting race was in progress on two sides of the globe, each of the contestants with about 7000 nautical miles to go. Camara was coming east, and Merritt was coming west; and the monitor *Monterey*, which

we had left coaling at Honolulu, and the arrival of which was of such vital importance to Dewey, was also coming west, all having the same objective—Manila Bay. As we steamed down the coast of Luzon, I spent several hours figuring on a time table to see who would come in first. Allowing the *Monterey* six knots, Camara's fleet ten knots, and the *Newport* twelve knots, I figured out that Camara would reach Manila July 26th, Merritt July 28th, and the *Monterey* August 4th. Would Camara come straight to Manila? Would he sail east to intercept Merritt? Would his arrival be delayed beyond August 4th? Would he come at all?

"I handed the time table to Admiral Dewey, and he spent most of the night and the following day studying over it. On the morning of the third day (July 19) he came to the *China* in his barge, and asked me to go ashore with him to see Gen. Anderson, who, with 2500 men of his expedition, was quartered in the barracks at Cavite. The Admiral was convinced that if Camara continued his voyage he would reach Manila before the *Monterey*. Having no battle-ship in his command, he was outclassed by the *Pelayo*. The safety of the army and the transports, at such an enormous distance from America, depended upon keeping his fleet intact. He therefore came to the determination, in case news was not received in less than a week that Camara had turned back, to take his fleet and the transports to the north of Luzon, and then to cruise eastward until he met the *Monterey* and the *Monadnock*, which was following her; then he would return and destroy Camara's fleet. He felt reasonably confident that he would be gone not longer than August 10th, and he asked Gen. Anderson, who was the senior officer, what he would do. The latter promptly replied that he would take thirty days' rations, march into the hills about twenty miles east of Cavite, entrench and await the return of the fleet. My opinion was asked, and I fully concurred in the wisdom of the departure of the fleet, and the propriety of taking the troops inland to await its return.

BONES OF THE DEPARTED.

"If Camara's nerve had held out, the result would have been a very interesting campaign in the Philippines. Merritt arrived three days ahead of schedule time, and the *Monterey* arrived on the very day calculated, but Camara did not come at all. Definite information that Camara had turned back reached the Admiral on July 22d, just as it was becoming necessary to take steps to carry the above plan into operation."

Such is the fortune of war. Conceding the arrival of Camara with the *Pelayo* and his fleet as expected, the destruction of the transport fleet, with Gen. Merritt,

MAJOR GENERALS AND CHIEF OFFICERS OF THE ARMY.

Wesley Merritt, first Governor of the Philippines, Major General U.S.A., Paris Commissioner to Paris. 2. Nelson A. Miles, Lieutenant General U.S.A. 3. Thomas M. Anderson, Major General U.S.A. 4. Frederick D. Grant, Major General U.S.A. 5. Arthur MacArthur, commanding 8th Army Corps, Major General U.S.A. 6. Henry C. Merriam, Brigadier General U.S.A.



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MAP SHOWING POSITION OF AMERICAN, SPANISH AND FILIPINO TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF AUGUST 13, 1898.

was among the probabilities. Among the certainties would have been the Spanish occupation of all the fortifications from Corregidor to Manila, the American forces, twenty miles inland, the insurgents driven out of every fortified place in and about Manila, and this powerful *Pelayo* and the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay under the protection and support of the heavy guns on the fortified walls of Manila. But none of these things happened.

THE PLAN OF ATTACK.

On the arrival of the second expedition Gen. Anderson and Gen. Greene deliberated on the plan of attack, Greene having brought information to Anderson from Gen. Merritt that, if he was certain of success, he might make the attack before his (Merritt's) arrival; otherwise, to await his coming. Gen. Anderson and Gen. Greene had under con-

GATES TO THE WALLED CITY.

sideration two plans of attack. One, to make San Pedro Macati the base, and the other to proceed direct against the Spanish position on the Manila Bay side. In this there were two considerations. From the San Pedro Macati base, the eastern and less fortified part of the city could be easily reached. On the east, the insurgents already held the city water-works, and effectually blockaded the city from all egress into the interior. But to attack from the San Pedro Macati base involved the great difficulty of hauling the artillery by hand to the place, and moving the army so that it would practically be detached from the present base, while the San Pedro Macati base would be out of effective range of the fleet, and without its support. Gen. Anderson, according to Gen. Greene, favored the San Pedro Macati base, while he favored the bay side attack. In any case, it was considered that the attack should be

postponed until the arrival of Gen. Merritt, and he, upon his arrival, ordered the attack on the Greene plan. At that time, the reputed strength of the Spanish force was 10,000 men, but Gen. Greene says that at the time of the surrender it was found to be 13,000.

Opposed to this force was that of the insurgent forces which, while not allowed to co-operate with the Americans in their aggressive movements, still held strong defensive positions against the Spaniards. Gen. Anderson was the ranking officer prior to the arrival of Gen. Merritt, and the American forces being formed into a division, Gen. Anderson was placed in command, and upon the arrival of Gen. MacArthur with the third expedition, the whole command was divided into two brigades, Gen. MacArthur being assigned to the command of the 1st Brigade and Gen. Greene to the 2d Brigade.

ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN FORCES.

The formation of the force into brigades and the assignment of the different regimental and other organizations for the brigades was made by Gen. Merritt, by general order, August 1st, as follows:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 2.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

MANILA BAY, P. I., August 1, 1898.

I. The United States forces assembled at Cavite, Camp Dewey and in transports off Cavite are hereby organized as the 2d Division of the 8th Army Corps, composed of two brigades. Brigadier-General T. M. Anderson, U. S. V., is assigned to the command of the division:

The brigades are organized as follows:

FIRST BRIGADE—Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., commanding: 23d U. S. Inf., two battalions; 14th U. S. Inf., one battalion; 13th Minnesota Volunteer Inf.; 1st North Dakota Volunteer Inf., two battalions; 1st Idaho Volunteer Inf., two battalions; 1st Wyoming Volunteer Inf., one battalion; Astor Battery.

SECOND BRIGADE—Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, U. S. V., commanding: 18th U. S. Inf., two battalions; battalion four-foot batteries, 3d U. S. Art.; Company A, Battalion U. S. Engineers; 1st California Volunteer Inf.; 1st Colorado Volunteer Inf.; 1st Nebraska Volunteer Inf.; 10th Pennsylvania Volunteer Inf.; Light Battery A, Utah Volunteer Art.; Light Battery B, Utah Volunteer Art.

II. The 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf. and detachment of California Volunteer Heavy Artillery, now at Cavite, will remain at that place on their present duties, the commanding officers reporting direct to division commander.

III. The Signal Detachment will remain at Cavite, and will report to the chief signal officer at these headquarters.

By command of Major-General Merritt.

J. B. BABCOCK, Adjutant-General.

THE NATURE OF THE GROUND COVERED BY OUR ARMY.

The first expedition under Gen. Anderson, had arrived in the bay on June 30, 1898, and landed next day at Cavite. This city and fortifications are on a narrow neck which connects with the main peninsula. This neck is a mile long to a point where it is so narrow that only a single wagonway connects with the peninsula. This road always overflows at high tide. The large peninsula to

which this neck connects, is five miles long to a point where it connects with the mainland, and here there is only room for a single wagonway, and during the rainy season this roadway is quite impassable. In the interior, and north and east of the Cavite peninsula, and extending to within a short distance of where Camp Dewey was afterwards located, the country is composed largely of swamps and rough, uneven ground, through which many small streams flow, which have their sources in the innumerable swamps, the larger ones taking their rise in the mountain range, which lies inland near the Lake Laguna de Bombon, and thence flowing westward and emptying into Manila Bay. Over this whole region was a rank tropical vegetation. Luckily this district, at the time of the first debarkation, had been cleared of the Spaniards by the insurgents, and thus all possibility of opposition in landing prevented. There is practically but one wagon road through this region from Cavite northward towards Manila, to a place where Camp Dewey was subsequently established, and this, most of the year in an almost impassable condition. The distance is about twenty miles. The Spaniards on their official maps, designate their public travel ways as "roads," "bridle paths" and "paths." The first is something of an improved way, the streams bridged or supposed to be so, and the road-beds thrown up much after the manner of our Western country roads, and averaging about twenty-five feet in width. The "bridle path" is a way over which a carabao may haul a sled. The "path" is suitable only for travel by foot or on horseback. From the roads, notably that which leads from Cavite to Manila, there are many of these bridle paths and paths leading back into the interior. This interior, after leaving the plain south and east of Manila, over which the campaign was made, consists of foothills merging into a mountain range, the highest peaks of which are from 5000 to 7000 feet, and this range extends from the southwest border of Lake Laguna de Bombon to the Pasig River, making a circuit much in the form of a half moon.

FLAG RAISED OVER FORT SAN ANTONIO, AUGUST 13, 1898.

It became at once evident to Gen. Anderson that Cavite could not, for the reason stated, be made a base of operations in an active campaign against Manila, and, luckily again, to enable him to establish his base as he desired, the insurgents had driven the Spaniards out of the locality which he wished to occupy. That is to say, at the time of the arrival of the first expedition, the insurgents occupied San Francisco de Malabon, Cavite Viejo, Imus, Bacoor, Las Pinas, Paranaque and Malibay. After a further reconnaissance, Gen. Anderson selected as a new base of operations in the active campaign a plot of ground near Paranaque. The plan of his campaign had for its objective, first, the capture of the entrenchments and strongholds of the Spanish positions south and eastward

of the walled city, many of which, owing to the obstacles shutting them from view of the fleet and other causes, could not be bombarded successfully by the fleet, and second, the capture of the walled city.

DIFFICULTIES IN LANDING TROOPS.

Debarkation when once begun on the part of the troops, was pushed with vigor, although under unpropitious conditions. The rainy season was on. There was a heavy downpour and the men were heavily loaded with rations. Personal supplies and ammunition were carried ashore by lighters called "cascos." This was the only kind of craft obtainable. The casco is a kind of hybrid affair, unwieldy and cumbersome, without sail or steam; neither Chinese junk nor American scow, but partaking of the characteristics of both. They are built of heavy timbers, with outlying riggers and towed from one position to another. Without any material mishaps the expedition was thus landed at Cavite, as were likewise the second and third expeditions, the only troops which took part in the campaign of Manila.

COL. HALE DIRECTING MOVEMENTS IN THE FIELD.

THE HEALTH OF THE COMMAND.

Few can realize the conditions at the time that the first expedition cast anchor in Manila Bay. With the best that could be done, it was impossible, in the hurried departure from the States, and the many hindrances unavoidable in securing transports, to properly equip and supply the troops. As a consequence, the members of the first expedition endured many discomforts which were largely avoided in the subsequent expeditions. The germs of disease, which soon after landing became widespread and alarming, were undoubtedly fostered on board the transports. The 2d Oregon were the worst sufferers. It was reported that within thirty days after debarkation, not more than one-half of the regiment was fit for camp duties. There was much complaint on shipboard of improper food supply and clothing, and shoes were not up to the standard. Hygienic conditions aboard ship were doubtless neglected. The change from civil to military life brings new and untried conditions, which usually put to the test the best physical conditions. Add to this climatic change, improper diet and bad sanitation, and many break down under the strain. As the transport and supply service became better organized, and the troops got under better discipline, these conditions gradually disappeared.

The most prevalent disease, especially in the second expedition, was measles. Gen. Greene, accounting for this, says that there was a great strife among the regiments at San Francisco to be the first in taking transports; that at the time

his expedition left San Francisco a number of the members of the different regiments were in hospitals, some afflicted with measles, and about a dozen of these men by stealth escaped from the hospital, and secreted themselves on shipboard, and were not found until far out at sea.

AGUINALDO ADDRESSES THE POWERS.

Gen. Wesley Merritt arrived at Manila on July 25th. He at once assumed command, and on August 1st issued the order, already quoted, organizing the brigades of his army. On the 6th day of August, Aguinaldo, as President of the Revolutionary government, addressed a note to the Powers, asking their recognition of his government. In this he did not consult any representative of the United States, nor had he the concurrence or consent of any such representative. It was a plain, unequivocal act, indicating a determination to no longer act in concert with the United States. He said in his note: "The revolution has about 9000 prisoners of war, and a regularly organized army of 30,000 men, and they are now besieging Manila, the capital."

On the 12th of August, 1898, the protocol between Spain and the United States was made, and among other recitals it provided: "That the United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines." The issue was thus plainly drawn. Aguinaldo demanded the recognition of his government. The United States decided that the status of the Philippines should be settled between them and Spain by a treaty yet to be made.

GROWING ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND FILIPINOS.

Ante-dating these events, a gradual antagonism between the personnel of the two armies had grown up. An indistinct, undefined color-line had been drawn between the armies. At first the Filipino sought fraternity, but his overtures fell on barren ground, and he was taught that there could be no social affinity between him and the Americans When once the breach began, it was but a step to open insults. Before and during the engagement which ended in the capture of Manila, animosities between the Americans and Filipinos became very manifest. During the advance, Aguinaldo was ordered out of his trenches, then to cease firing, and at a time during the advance, a part of the two commands stood opposed to each other at the "fire" command. At the surrender the Filipinos were not allowed to participate, and,

GUNS IN THE ARSENAL AT MANILA.

with the exception of their commanding officers, were excluded from the city while bearing arms.

Some time before this Aguinaldo's headquarters were at Bacoor, in close proximity to the American land and naval forces. It was to free himself from this supposed dangerous proximity that he removed his headquarters to a place three miles north of Manila. To this Gen. Otis demurred, and Aguinaldo, paying no heed, on the 13th of September he was ordered peremptorily by Gen. Otis to evacuate by the afternoon of the 15th. On the 14th Aguinaldo, in consequence, moved his force to Malolos, where he established his headquarters and that of the Provisional government, making Malolos its capital. At this time, as stated, his forces, in part, were distributed as follows: At Caloocan, 3000 men; his cannon were pointed towards Binondo; at Pasig, 400; south of Malate, 1200, and at Pasai, Pandacan, Paco and Santa Ana, about 500 each.

During this time, and up to the signing of the treaty of peace between Spain and the United States, the insurgents claim that they had so conducted their campaign that the Spanish soldiery had been practically driven out of the Philippines, with the exception of Manila and its suburbs, and there was no civil control outside of this limit for the Spanish government to transfer to the United States.

On August 9th the following general order was issued by Gen. Merritt:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 3.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

MANILA BAY, P. I., August 9, 1898.

In view of the extraordinary conditions under which this army is operating, the commanding general desires to acquaint the officers and men composing it with the expectations which he entertains as to their conduct. You are assembled upon foreign soil, situated within the western confines of a vast ocean separating you from your native land. You have come, not as despoilers and oppressors, but simply as the instruments of a strong, free government, whose purposes are beneficent, and which has declared itself in this war the champion of those oppressed by Spanish rule.

It is, therefore, the intention of this order to appeal directly to your pride in your position as representatives of a high civilization in the hope and with the firm conviction that you will so conduct yourselves in your relations with the inhabitants of these islands as to convince them of the lofty nature of the mission which you have come to execute.

It is not believed that any acts of pillage, rapine or violence will be committed by soldiers or others in the employ of the United States, but should there be persons with this command who prove themselves unworthy of this confidence, their acts will be considered not only as crimes against the sufferers, but as direct insult to the United States flag, and they will be punished on the spot with the maximum penalties known to military law.

By command of Major-General Merritt.

J. B. BABCOCK, Adjutant-General.

WORK OF AMERICAN TROOPS BEFORE THE FALL OF MANILA.

It was a vigilant command during the six weeks intervening between the landing of the first expedition and the fall of Manila, and during this interim both the officers and rank and file, without murmur, endured the hardships and vicissitudes of campaign life in the trenches. The rainy season was at its height, and the downpour was almost incessant. Life in camp, aside from the exposures on duty, was almost intolerable. Resort was had to every device to provide some

comfort in tent life, but to little avail. The ground was in an overflow, and the continued tramping to and fro made a mixture of mud which rendered passage almost impossible. To cook, eat and sleep, to live, to endure, put to the test all their fortitude. The work of the soldiers consisted, aside from the duties in camp, in doing service in the trenches, sometimes to fight, always under the enemy's aim and always in mud and rain. Usually the trench filled with water as it was dug, and often the upthrown dirt washed down as fast as placed. The trenches were held and the work there done in relays, the relays serving for twenty-four hours.

ARRANGEMENTS WITH AGUINALDO.

It was to make more effective our own operations that a request was made of the insurgents to vacate their trenches, giving place to the Americans. This caused much parleying, the matter being referred to Aguinaldo, who then had his

AGUINALDO AND FILIPINO LEADERS' HEADQUARTERS.

headquarters eleven miles inland, and whose consent was obtained, the condition being that the transaction should be put in written form. Our troops occupied this insurgent trench the next morning. Express instructions were given by Gen. Merritt in this negotiation that no force should be used or threatened. This removed the whole insurgent force from the line desired to be occupied by the Americans. This was not the first instance in which the insurgents hesitated to comply with the requests of the American commanders. Soon after the arrival of the first troops, land transportation facilities were badly needed by the Americans. All of these facilities were in the hands of the insurgents, who refused to allow their use by the Americans upon any consideration. Gen. Anderson thereupon seized such animals and means as he required, but in all instances paid far more than their worth. The treatment of the Spanish prisoners at Cavite by the insurgents was so barbarous that our general in command interfered and

called the attention of the insurgent officers to the starving condition of their prisoners, and asked that they be accorded more humane treatment. This being refused, the prisoners were suitably furnished by our army.

AMERICANS OCCUPY FILIPINO TRENCHES.

The trench vacated by the Filipinos was occupied by one battalion 18th Regulars, one battalion 1st Colorado Inf. and four guns, two from each of the Utah Batteries. Owing to defects in profile and location, it was determined to remove the trench to a new location, which would better command the Spanish position and could be better strengthened and extended so as to cover the whole line of the Spanish trenches. Lieutenant-Colonel McCoy surveyed the ground and determined upon the location and character of the trench, and it was placed under his direction. The construction of this trench went on for two days and nights, and during this time the change of occupants had apparently not been noticed by the Spaniards. The first day, the 18th Inf. and Colorado Inf. were relieved by two battalions of California Inf., and on the next morning, being July 31st, the two California battalions were relieved by two battalions of the 10th Pennsylvania Volunteers, one of the Nebraska Volunteers and by 200 of the 3d Regular Artillery as infantry. During this day there was occasional picket firing. The trench at this time had been built to and from the Capuchin chapel, a total distance of about 300 yards, extending from the beach to the Calle Real, and was nearly completed. It had a height averaging about seven feet.

A wide hall runs through the center of the Capuchin chapel, east and west. The trench began just north of the chapel door, which opened into this hall-way and thence direct to the road. Connecting on the west corner of the building, the trench extended to the beach, connecting the trench with this corner. The earth was piled high against the iron-barred window. Near the beach, the trench inclined forward a short space, and thence a few yards across to a wrecked caisson. During the day there had been slight desultory firing by the Spaniards, but not sufficient to materially interfere with the construction of the trench. It was seen, however, that the Spaniards had become extremely watchful of the work going on. The insurgents in the trenches had a habit, prior to this, of a "hit-or-miss" fashion of firing, as the spirit caught them. One or several would elevate their guns and blaze away, without any aim and no special object. The Spaniards seemed to have a like faculty of random firing, but seemingly always firing high. As a result, the insurgents in the trenches were not in danger, but our troops occupying positions in their rear were exposed. Gen. Merritt had requested Aguinaldo to stop this firing and, after much persuasion, they desisted.

SIXTH ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

The particular danger to our troops occupying these trenches, in consequence of the Spanish high firing, was not so much in the trench as in going to and from it. It is indisputable that had our troops in the trenches paid no heed to this firing,

it would have been an accident if any loss of life had occurred prior to August 13th, and even then there would have been no loss had the program, as arranged, been strictly followed. It was Admiral Dewey's desire and plan to effect the capture of Manila without the loss of a single man. But our soldiers could not resist the temptation, although against orders, to now and then take a shot. It was always the case, if they kept quiet behind the trenches, that the Spaniards would fire a few shots or volleys and then subside.

THE BATTLE IN THE RAIN.

On the night of July 31st, however, the tension reached a climax, and there occurred between the forces what is known as the "Battle in the Rain." It was one of those typical tropical night storms in which there was a raging wind and a furious downpour, and, in the darkness, objects were not discernible beyond your reach. In the rush and roar of the storm you could neither see nor hear. It was



CONVENT OF GUADALUPE BEFORE DESTRUCTION.

certainly a reckless enthusiasm which could drive our soldiers out on such a night against orders and at the hazard of their lives. Exactly what occurred when the conflict was at its height would be difficult to learn. At the time it was supposed and believed, and the order of the command so stated, that the Spaniards had left their trenches and attempted to turn our right flank. It is now conceded this was not so, and the Spaniards, after their surrender of Manila, said they never left their trenches. The Spanish trench was much longer than our own, and their left extended far eastward of our right.

The 10th Pennsylvanians were the chief sufferers. They might have been in error in supposing the enemy were turning their flank, but there can now be no doubt as to their own position and actions in the affair. While conflicting statements are made in official reports and by those not participating, the narration given in the Tenth Pennsylvania Regimental History in the Pennsylvania edition of this volume puts the question at rest. It says: "On the morning of July 31st it fell to the lot of the 10th Pennsylvania Inf. to be detailed for outpost duty for the next twenty-four hours. Col. Hawkins and the entire command was at or near this advanced line, except Company B, which was posted on guard on a

road near the village of Pasai, nearly two miles to the right rear of the line occupied by the rest of the regiment. Maj. H. C. Cuthbertson, in command during the day, placed the 2d Battalion, composed of Companies A, C, H and I, Maj. Everhart Bierer commanding, and the Utah Light Artillery in the entrenchment and Companies E and D of the 1st Battalion in reserve about 200 yards in the rear of the center of the advanced line. Company K's position was about the same distance in the rear of the right of the line east of the Manila Road, and it furnished outposts and pickets from a point seventy-five yards east, distant and in a curved line to the north and west. During the day there was no movement or firing of any account, and most of the time the Keystone State soldiers were busy strengthening their earthworks.

"That night about eleven o'clock the Spanish forces opened a heavy fire of shell from four pieces of artillery at Fort Malate, which continued for a half hour, the Pennsylvania Regiment being the first American troops to be fired upon in the Philippines. The attack caused no material damage to the regiment's works, nor casualties to its members. The enemy then advanced, delivering a heavy round of infantry firing by squads until within about 400 yards of our line, when, halting, he formed a line and delivered many volleys. This lasted for about three hours. When this volley firing had continued nearly a half hour the enemy evidently relieved a part of his line from the extreme right at the beach and again opened fire from two pieces of artillery with shell and shrapnel. The casualties of the regiment behind the entrenched line during the entire engagement were one man killed and four wounded. About 11:30 P. M. the enemy advanced a line of infantry toward the point east of the entire prolongation of the 10th's entrenched line with the evident intention of turning the regiment's right flank. Seeing this, Maj. Cuthbertson withdrew the pickets and outposts and advanced the reserve line under the command of Maj. Bierer, who made his disposition as follows: Company K (Capt. Thomas S. Crago), about sixty feet to the right of the road, the eastern end of the entrenched line, the left resting on a dense thicket of heavy timber, the line extending east of the entrenched line and about thirty feet in advance of the same; the right resting about five degrees north of the entrenched line. Companies E (Capt. James A. Loar), and D (Capt. F. B. Hawkins), prolonged this line to the right in the order mentioned.

RAID ON OPIUM DEN BY THIRTEENTH MINNESOTA POLICE.

"When this new line had been placed in position the enemy, firing volleys, had advanced to within 200 yards of the same. The three companies of the 10th Pennsylvanians which were deployed on the right of the Calle Real Road numbered about 200 men, and they made the assault upon, at the lowest estimate, 1000 of the enemy.

"The Pennsylvanians made this advance with continuous volley firing and the enemy continued his movements until within about 100 yards from our front."

Their account, however, must be in error as to the enemy's position and movements. If they left their trenches and were in such close proximity to our line, there would have been dead or wounded there after their retreat to their trenches, and no such were found after the firing ceased. The Spanish fire was mostly by heavy volleys, which would not have been the case had the force been deployed and scattered. Again, the outposts of the second platoon of Battery K, 3d U. S. Art., were not driven in, and did not come in until they were relieved at their station the next morning. This platoon, which was stationed on the Pasai Road, Lieut. Kessler in command, sent forward four or five cossack posts, composed of four men and a non-commissioned officer. These outposts were to the right and ahead of the Pennsylvania line. They did not participate in the fight. The enemy was not seen nor heard firing outside of their trenches, and there was no approach to their outposts.

A SCOUTING PARTY UNDER FIRE.

In order to determine to a greater certainty from whence came the fire upon our men, it is necessary to consider the disposition of our forces and what they did. The force occupying the trenches has been noted. The Pennsylvania troops also had the cossack outposts in front of the line. Back of the trenches and in reserve was the following disposition of troops: One company of the 3d Art. was in the rear of the trenches, and promptly moved forward into them when the firing began, and apprised the command of the movement. The other company of the 3d Art. was ordered forward, but before the order reached them they had already left camp for the scene of action. The 1st California Inf. was sent forward—one battalion to the trenches, the second battalion to halt in reserve about 1,200 yards in the rear, and the third battalion just in the rear of the second, and out of the range of the Spanish fire. The 1st Colorado occupied like positions in rear of the Californias.

Between ten and eleven o'clock, Fort Malate and the whole Spanish entrenched line opened fire on our little line of trenches. The infantry did mostly volley firing. The Pennsylvania cossack outposts came in and reported their belief that the Spaniards were flanking our right. At once the whole camp was aroused, and the troops went forward. It is readily seen that with both wings of the Spanish line focusing their fire on the trench it would seem to the occupants like an enfilading or flanking fire. Many thought by the sound of the shots that they were nearer than the entrenched Spanish line. But it has since been thought, in accounting for this, that these sounds were made by the "spats" of the bullets against the bamboo trees. The approach to our trenches during this fire was a hot zone, owing to the high-firing habit of the Spaniards. For about 700 yards

back from the trench, along the Calle Real, owing to the focus of the Spanish range, there was a perfect maelstrom of firing. During the "battle" our forces fired 60,000 rounds, and it may be safely estimated that the Spanish during the same time fired nearly double that quantity, the heavy firing, including the cannonading, being centered in this locality. How it happened that so few were killed or wounded is inexplicable.

The bullets were falling like a torrent, and the shells were bursting in a continuous roar, and this continued for about four hours. With all this the only casualty reported, caused by the shells, was the wounding of Lieut. Buttermore of the Pennsylvanians. He was knocked down by a piece of shell striking him over the eyes. He got up at once and went on with the fight. The Pennsylvanians in going into this position were undoubtedly in the thickest of the fight. Here the first soldier in the Philippines was killed in battle. He was Corp. N. E. Brown of Company D. Many were wounded here, and a little beyond this others were killed. In the trenches the men were standing two to the yard, and no more men could be worked there. The reserves were in position and chafing to get to the front. In their anxiety a serious mistake was made. Maj. Boxton's Battalion of California Inf., under orders, rushed to the front under a heavy fire. Capt. Reinhold Richter, of Company I, was the first to fall, hit on the top of the head, on the right side, by a bullet. In the further advance, 1st Sergt. Maurice Justh of Company A, was instantly killed by a shot through the body. A number were wounded. Coming to the old trench, complying, as they supposed, with their order, they saw the flash of guns in their immediate front, which was our firing line in the new trench. Mistaking this for the reported advanced line of the Spaniards, they at once opened fire by volleys, and discharged three volleys straight into the backs of the Pennsylvanians and Regulars. Col. Smith of the 1st Californias, had caught up with the Regulars of Battery H, and was with Capt. O'Hara in the trench, and at once sent one of his officers back to warn Maj. Boxton of his mistake. The officer ran with the message, but before it could be delivered the three volleys had been fired. The result of these volleys is not known. The surgeons, however, believe that no man was killed by a shot from the rear.

SPANISH TRENCHES NEAR FORT SAN ANTONIO.

When the California Battalion finally got into position, it was sent to the relief of the Pennsylvanians. The cruiser *Boston* was at anchor in position to rake the whole Spanish trench, but Admiral Dewey did not wish to bring on an

engagement unless from necessity, and it was arranged that the *Boston* should not be signaled to open fire, unless as a last resort. Gen. Greene says he became convinced, after watching the Spanish fire, although reports were continually coming in of the Spanish advance, that they were still in their trenches, and hence did not signal the *Boston*.

GOOD CONDUCT OF THE VOLUNTEERS.

There were many heroic acts done during this engagement, but there is no space here for incidents. It was amply shown, however, that the old-time American valor was not wanting in the command. While Gen. Greene truthfully says, that when compared with the battles of the Civil War, this was an unimportant skirmish, and that during that war there were many affairs much larger in fatalities than this, of which no record was made, still he says the conditions were such as usually create consternation among green soldiers, and the Veterans of the Civil War could not have done more thoroughly what was required that night than did these young men from Pennsylvania, California, Colorado and Utah, and from the various States whose men were found in the 3d Regular Artillery.

CHURCH AT MALATE.

On the night of August 1st, the Colorado Regiment held the trenches, but under strict orders not to return the enemy's fire unless they quit their trenches. With few exceptions this order was observed, but in the darkness the men would find an excuse for firing, alleging as a pretense that the Spaniards were advancing. In consequence of this unnecessary exposure one was killed and three wounded. Up to August 4th, the time when the *Monterey* arrived, our total loss while in these defensive tactics, was twelve killed and fifty-four wounded. At this time, Gen. MacArthur and his command had arrived, but not landed, being prevented by a rough sea. On the night of August 5th, occurred other conflicts between the lines, the usual excuse being that "the Spaniards were advancing." The trenches were held by one battalion each of the 14th and 23d Regulars and 1st Nebraskas. Firing began at half-past seven o'clock, and lasted till ten. About 20,000 rounds were fired by our men. The loss was three killed and seven wounded.

Gen. Merritt and Admiral Dewey now hit upon a plan to end this skirmish firing, and the Governor-General at Manila was notified that within forty-eight hours, if these attacks on our lines did not cease, an attack by the land and naval forces on the city would take place, and that this notice was given so that

non-combatants and women and children might be removed. This had the desired effect, and from thenceforth until the final attack on the city, on August 13th, there was no further molestation of our outposts, and the Spaniards were to be seen on their parapets with impunity.

The third expedition arrived on July 31st, but did not go into camp until the 9th of August. The Astor Battery was among the first to land. One of their cascos was capsized, her ammunition ruined, and most of the rations lost. Another boat was upset, but no one was drowned.

THE AMERICANS READY TO ATTACK MANILA.

With the arrival of Gen. MacArthur and the *Monterey*, the complement of men and equipment was at hand, and work was pressed for an attack on Manila. On the 10th, Gen. Anderson came over from Cavite and assumed command of the division, and their work went hurriedly on. Every point of weakness was considered and strengthened; the troops were looked carefully after, and every vantage ground and stragetic maneuver determined. The brigade commanders

GATE TO LA LOMA CHURCH.

urged the necessity of occupying the strong insurgent trenches by a part of Gen. MacArthur's Brigade prior to the advance, but Gen. Merritt persisted in his policy of not using force, strictly forbidding anything being either said or done that would give offense to the insurgent command, and further ordered that the trenches should not be extended. There were but two important objective points against which the forces should move—MacArthur's Brigade against the stronghold which included block-houses Nos. 13 and 14, in the first attack, and Greene's Brigade against the rest of the Spanish line west, resting on Fort Malate. For this purpose the forces were massed as follows: Against Fort Malate's front, and in Gen. Greene's Brigade, were seven battalions in the trenches and eight in reserve, the reserve being at Pasai cross-road, before described, under Gen. Anderson's immediate command. Seven guns of the Utah Battery were placed in the trenches at intervals, and in addition three guns of the navy, manned by a volunteer detachment of the 3d Art. These were on the extreme right of the column. MacArthur occupied a position, as seen, with a narrow front, owing to the fact that no further trenches were allowed and no interference with the insurgents, so that his force was massed in support of this narrow line back along the Pasai

Road. His front lay between impassable swamps, and back of this, to the Pasai Road, the brigade occupied invulnerable positions. The Astor Battery was on the right, one Utah gun in an insurgent emplacement on the Cingalon Road, the 13th Minnesota on the right, and the 23d Regulars on the left.

THE FLEET TAKES POSITION.

Having thus located the land forces at the time of the attack, we must now take up the matters pertaining to the fleet, which was to join in a joint attack on the Spanish positions at Manila on the 13th. In the preparations for this attack, Admiral Dewey and Gen. Merritt acted in concert. At this time there was a large fleet of foreign war-ships in Manila Bay, composed of four English, five German, two Frenchman, and a Japanese. Admiral Dewey wanted the place occupied by them in which to maneuver, and they moved out of the way. Every precaution was taken by the fleet for bombardment as though it actually might occur.

EFFORTS TO INDUCE SURRENDER.

For some time before this, negotiations had been going on to effect a surrender without the loss of property or life. In this the Spanish held to their tradition of requiring defeat before surrender. They had, too, been watching and hoping for Camara's fleet and the *Pelayo*, and the 3000 men which the fleet was said to be convoying from Spain; but when Camara turned back, the last hope of holding the Philippines by force vanished; consequently, they were inclined to consider terms of surrender. The Belgian consul, M. Andre, had been for some time occupying a Belgian craft in the bay, and put forth his good offices as an intermediary between Admiral Dewey and Gen. Merritt and Captain-General Augustin, looking to a pacific capitulation. The Spanish authorities, however, held out for honor, and it required no little strategy to perfect the plan of mimic battle without it verging into the real. The American commander would not permit this if the play should go so far as to imperil the life of a single man. Still, if Spanish pride could be assuaged and no evil follow, it would be far better than to incur the loss of life and property which was sure to follow should a general engagement be precipitated. Augustin became so convinced of the folly of resistance that he was prepared to surrender without further show, and even, as is stated, hoisted the white flag. It was pulled down, however, and subsequently he was called to Madrid, and Fermin Jaudenes made Captain-General, which position he held when the "ultimatum" was made to him, as before stated, on August 7th. When the final demand was made for surrender, the Captain-General got twentyfour hours' time, but after a conference, refused to surrender without an attack. In the meantime the Belgian consul was busy, and his trips were frequent between the fleet and the Captain-General's office. During this time the fleet had cleared for action and was ready at a moment to commence the attack. Gen. Merritt, at the time it was arranged the attack

SIGNAL CORPS GOING TO THE FRONT

should be made, came on board the *Olympia* and stated that the American forces were not in position sufficiently eastward to protect the city from the incoming insurgents at the time of surrender, so a little time was taken to accomplish this.

ALLEGED ARRANGEMENT FOR A SHAM BATTLE.

By the 12th of August, the full details of the coming "battle" were arranged between Admiral Dewey, Gen. Merritt and Captain-General Jaudenes. In this, on the part of the American forces, such display was to be made as would satisfy an observer that further resistance on the part of the Spaniards would not only be futile, but ground for censure by all non-combatants; when this point was reached the white flag of surrender was to be hung out from the Spanish fort, when further assault should cease. So definite were the details as to this, that the maneuver of the fleet was specified, the time when the attack should begin, where it should be made, its continuance and character; that the Spaniards should fire no shots in return, the exact time when the flag of surrender should be raised, the proceedings pertaining to this and the place and disposition of the American and Spanish forces after this, until the American occupation was made complete, so as to prevent looting and destruction, and ward off the insurgents from the city.

All the principal officers in both commands were fully apprised, and specific instructions given so that no mistakes be made or loss of life occur. Pursuing this plan, the American fleet was put as fully in readiness as when it first went into the engagement in Manila Bay.

THE FLEET BEGINS THE ATTACK.

At nine o'clock on the morning of the 13th, the fleet commenced to maneuver into position for the attack, and within one-half hour the *Olympia* was in position for shelling Fort Malate, followed by the *Raleigh* and *Petrel*, the *Callao* and the little *Barcelo* closer in shore; and back of these was Gen. Merritt and staff on a transport, and the *Kiowa* with the Oregon troops. The *Boston*, *Charleston* and *Baltimore* were on the port quarter of the *Olympia*. The *McCulloch* was on the starboard quarter, while the *Monterey* moved up close in shore, where her twelve-inch muzzles stood grinning at the heavy Krupp batteries at the Luneta; and on the north the *Concord* lay at the mouth of the Pasig. The threatening array would have amply justified the Spanish surrender without a shot, but the play went on, with the head of the army and escort in the rear, waiting for the white flag and the peals of victory, which should call him from his seclusion to receive the capitulation of the city as per arrangement.

OUR PHOTOGRAPH WAGON, A QUILESA USED AS A DARK ROOM FOR CHANGING PLATES AT THE FRONT.

The *Olympia* opened fire at 9:30 in the morning on the old Fort Malate; her shells falling short, the *Raleigh* and *Petrel* took it up. The shots improved, the *Olympia* changed position, and then did more effective work, as did the others.

In the meantime, the remnants of the Spanish forces that had been about the fortifications had withdrawn toward the city. The firing continued till 10:30, when the order to cease firing was given to the fleet, and the surrender signals shown to the Spanish fort. There not being an immediate answer, the fleet was ordered to close up. Every captain in the fleet, it is stated, was watching for the white flag. Capt. Lamberton was on the afterbridge of the *Olympia* with the Admiral and said: "I don't see that white flag yet over that red roof." They were to raise the flag on the southwest corner. The Admiral said it had been there for some time, and by close observation all discovered it, raised at the appointed place. The Spanish signaled back and asked a conference, and negotiations forthwith were begun and completed as per agreement.

FLAG RAISING AT GUAM ISLAND.

During all this time not a shot was fired from a Spanish gun, and the Spaniards remained within the walled city.

GEN. MERRITT ORDERS AN ATTACK.

Turning now to the land forces, it should be noted that on the afternoon of Friday Gen. Merritt had issued this general order:

"A combined land and naval attack will be made on the enemy's works to-morrow, the 13th inst., at noon.

"It will consist of a naval and artillery attack. Our lines will make no advance, but will hold the trenches, the infantry covering the artillery.

"The 1st Brigade will hold the right of the line, and, operating on the Manila-Pasai Road, have for its immediate objective the Spanish block-house No. 14 and adjoining trenches.

"The 2d Brigade will hold the left of the line, operating along the beach and the trenches adjoining.

"The 1st Brigade will put eight battalions in the firing line, and hold three in reserve. The 2d Brigade will put three battalions in the firing line, and hold eight in reserve. The reserves of both brigades will be held in column of battalions in the open field to the west of Camino Real and 500 rods south of the intersection of the Camino Real and the road to Pasai. The reserves will be under the general direction of the division commander, whose position will be on the Camino Real near the reserves.

"The men will take one day's cooked rations, canteens filled with water, and a minimum of 100 rounds of ammunition for the Springfield rifle and 150 for the Krag-Jorgensen. The reserve ammunition will be held with the reserves.

"Brigade commanders will distribute necessary entrenching tools among the several organizations.

"The general hospital will remain in camp. Ambulance stations will be established on the beach in the rear of the left, one at Pasai, in the rear of the right, and one on the Camino Real, near the reserves.

"All positions should be taken up by 9 A. M., the 13th inst., except the reserves, which will take position at 11 A. M. Our line will not advance except under orders of the commanding general in the field."

This order, however, was not fully observed, as shown by the following:

All instructions to division and brigade commands were of the nature that precluded a determined assault, although the men were equipped for a long, hard struggle. Besides his gun and accouterments, each man carried 200 rounds of ammunition, two days' rations of meat and hard bread, and mess kit. The front rank filled their canteens with coffee and the rear rank with water. Distributions of spades and axes were made to the companies, so that each set of fours had an entrenching tool. A hatchet and ax was provided for each section and one pick for each platoon. The sergeants were provided with a wire cutter. Strict instructions as to fire, so that waste of ammunition and time should be avoided, and for the movements of regiments, had been given. If an assault was ordered, it was to have been made by successive battalions in extended order, each regiment covering a battalion front and the distance between the battalions to be about 200 yards. The whole command were intact and silent for some time, while the bombardment from the fleet of Fort Malate was going on, its effects being in plain view of most of the command. Then the Utah Battery opened fire at 1000 yards' range, aiming just below the crest of the parapet of the fort, as directed. The shots were very effective. A six-inch shell from the *Olympia* now pierced through the three-foot wall of the fort and exploded in the magazine, wrecking it completely.

TRANSPORT LEAVING SAN FRANCISCO.

THE ALLEGED PEACEFUL PROGRAM MISCARRIES.

In the morning, just before the attack, Gen. Merritt sent instructions to Gen. Greene to send forward one regiment as soon as the bombardment had produced any effect, and without waiting for the signal given on the fleet to surrender, he now ordered the Colorados to advance. The advance was made through an open field in front of the trench, and partly along the beach in the water. Upon this advance the Spaniards opened fire from the woods and trenches back of the fort. It is claimed that had the advance not been made there would not have been a

single rifle shot fired that day. The program was that the advance should not be made till after the surrender signal was given. The Spaniards, therefore, not knowing of this late order, could not understand this advance, and opened fire. The Colorados continued their advance, wading up the beach and entered the now vacant fort, Lieutenant-Colonel McCoy of the Colorados being in command. The Spanish flag was hauled down and the Stars and Stripes ran up in its stead. The exhibition brought a round of hurrahs from the troops. Here the color-bearer of the Colorados was killed.

HELIOGRAPHIC WORK BY THE SIGNAL CORPS.

Gen. MacArthur was shut off from the view of the fleet, but seeing the flag raised on the fort, he ordered the attack on block-house No. 14. The two batteries, Astor and Utah, quickly made this a ruin. The 13th Minnesota rushed in and captured part of the forces there and in the trenches. The command pressed on to block-house No. 13, which took fire, a great quantity of small cartridges therein exploding. The whole front of the column now moved rapidly onward, the 13th Minnesota being in advance, and with them the Astor Battery, dragging their guns by hand and pushing on along the Cingalon Road, and the 23d Inf., pressing forward on the road which parallels this west. All through this locality a hot fire was being poured into the ranks. The locality was such that a view of the signal of surrender could not be seen, and the Americans continued advancing and firing by volleys. At Cingalon cross-road was a strong position held by the enemy, and from this a galling fire was being poured into our advance, also an enfilading fire from a block-house about 200 yards east. Capt. Sawtelle, of Gen. MacArthur's staff, reconnoitered the position while the troops were massing for assault, and, with Lieut. March of the Astor Battery, then led the charge against this position with detachments from both the battery and the 13th Minnesota, they volunteering for the purpose. The artillerymen, leaving their guns and charging with revolvers, the Spaniards were quickly driven from their positions.

It is difficult to reconcile all this with the theory that the program was entered into which should provide for the surrender of Manila without loss of life, unless it be that some of the subordinate commands were not apprised of the arrangement and that the Spaniards resisted under a misapprehension. They were on the alert to hold positions against the insurgents, and as the insurgents were known to occupy advanced positions here, they might have mistaken our advance for that of the insurgents.

This ended the fighting of MacArthur's Brigade, which had instructions, after this place had been secured, to move westward and eastward and occupy the approaches to the city from Paco, locating the forces at the bridges near Paco, and also in the suburbs of Ermita and Malate. Greene's instructions were, if no great resistance was met in the advance, to go on through Malate and Ermita, and thence move the columns around the city walls and occupy the suburbs east

and south of the city and cover all approaches. None of the force was to enter the walled city. After carrying the first line of the Spanish entrenchments and fort, the advance columns of Greene's Brigade moved forward toward the city and deployed from the Calle Real, the 18th Infantry and the 3d Artillery to the right, and, moving against the Spanish trenches back of the first line, uncovered the forces in the thick woods and brush and marsh. The 1st California and the 1st Colorado held positions covering the Calle Real barricades and thence to the shore line west. In this way they moved up to Malate, where the force was reformed in the open square about Malate church. Up to this time the advancing column had met sharp random firing from the enemy, much of it coming from the houses and places of cover, which the Californias and those exposed routed, often by assault. Reforming, the 18th Inf. and the 1st California were to move through the main streets, the 1st Colorado in the parallel streets on the right and the 1st Nebraska along the beach. The *Callao* kept slightly in advance in the bay and in position to rake all lines of trenches in advance of the moving columns. The 3d Art. and the 10th Pennsylvania occupied the reserve. The Pennsylvanians had been in the trench for twenty-four hours, but were pressing hard for an advance position. Desultory firing met this advance, and when the open near the Luneta was reached, the firing was sharp from the right.

AN EFFECTUAL METHOD OF COLLECTING RENT.

For use of vaults in cemeteries in Manila, a certain rental fee is charged, and when this is not paid by the estate or friends of the occupant he is taken out and left in the manner shown.

THE FALL OF THE CITY.

At this time the white flag was flying from the southwest bastion of the city wall. Some of the insurgents had gone through by some of the approaches at Paco, and it was thought the firing came from them. There were now several thousand Spanish regulars within the city walls, and no firing came from any of this body. The day's work was done. What remained to be done was to take and hold possession of the approaches to the city and distribute the forces according to previous instructions. The capitulation was now going on.

After hoisting the white flag, the Spaniards signaled for a conference. Flag-Lieutenant Brumby and Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier, representing the army and

navy, were despatched in response to this, and the preliminary terms of surrender were arranged between them and Captain-General Augustin, Acting Governor-General Jaudenes and Admiral Montejo. This occurred in the City Hall.

Gen. Merritt, on the return of the American representatives, went ashore to the City Hall with escort of the 2d Oregon. Two other battalions of the Oregon followed and took position in front of the Government Building at 2:36 P. M.

On return of Lieut. Brumby to the flagship with the preliminary terms of surrender, Admiral Dewey hoisted the signal, "Enemy has surrendered." With some modification, the preliminary terms as drawn were signed, and the Spanish flag hauled down and replaced with the Stars and Stripes. The following are the articles of capitulation:

ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION.

The undersigned, having been appointed a commission to determine the details of the surrender of the city and defenses of Manila and its suburbs, and the Spanish forces stationed therein, in accordance with agreement entered into the previous day by Major-General Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., American Commander-in-Chief in the Philippines, and His Excellency Don Fermin Jaudenes, Acting General-in-Chief of the Spanish army in the Philippines, have agreed upon the following:

1. The Spanish troops, European and native, capitulate, with the city and defenses, with all honors of war, depositing their arms in the places designated by the authorities of the United States and remaining in the quarters designated and under the orders of their officers and subject to the control of the aforesaid United States authorities until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the two belligerent nations. All persons included in the capitulation remain at liberty, the officers remaining in their homes, which shall be respected as long as they observe the regulations prescribed for their government and the laws in force.

2. Officers shall retain their side arms, horses, and private property. All public horses, and public property of all kinds, shall be turned over to staff officers designated by the United States.

3. Complete returns, in duplicate, of men by organizations, and full lists of public property and stores shall be rendered to the United States within ten days from this date.

4. All questions relating to the repatriation of officers and men of the Spanish forces and of their families and of the expenses which said repatriation may occasion, shall be referred to the government of the United States at Washington. Spanish families may leave Manila at any time convenient to them. The return of the arms surrendered by the Spanish forces shall take place when they evacuate the city, or when the American army evacuates.

5. Officers and men included in the capitulation shall be supplied by the United States, according to their rank, with rations and necessary aid, as though they were prisoners of war, until the conclusion of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain. All the funds of the Spanish treasury and all other public funds shall be turned over to the authorities of the United States.

6. This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army.

F. V. GREENE, Brigadier-General of Volunteers, U. S. A.
B. P. LAMBERTON, Captain U. S. N.
CHARLES A. WHITTIER, Lieutenant-Colonel and Inspector General.
V. E. H. CROWDER, Lieutenant-Colonel and Judge-Advocate.
NICHOLAS DE LA PENA, Oidor General de Ejercito.
CARLOS REYES, Coronel de Ingenieros.
JOSE MARIA OLAQUEN, Jefe de Estado Mayor.
WESLEY MERRITT, Major-General.

By the capture of Manila, there was surrendered to our command about 5600* prisoners, 22,000 small arms, 10,000,000 rounds of ammunition, 70 pieces of modern artillery of various calibers and several hundred ancient bronze pieces, and $900,000 of public money, besides the city and fortifications.

The day previous to the capture, the protocol of peace between Spain and the United States had been signed at Washington.

*There seems to be some uncertainty about the number of Spanish troops surrendered with the city. We have been able to find no official report. If, as stated on page 82, Gen. Greene gave 13,000 as the number, he must have included prisoners in the hands of insurgents. The figures in the list are those of Mr. Foreman, who appears to have had access to official records.

ARMS USED BY NATIVES OF MINDANAO.

CHAPTER VI.

FROM THE CAPTURE OF MANILA TO THE REVOLT OF THE FILIPINOS.

THE situation in Manila at the time of the capitulation was chaotic. Civil government was disrupted and the only law in force was military law. It is remarkable with what celerity the military authorities brought order out of confusion, so that within a few days a system of government was established, as effective as that which obtains in most of our large cities. From the hour of surrender, there was not a hostile demonstration against the American army. The Spaniards, whatever their regret for the defeat of their arms, were ready to co-operate heartily in establishing and maintaining order. For twenty-four hours, and until it suited the pleasure of the Americans to disarm them, they held their positions with their guns. The great batteries on the Luneta were still in their possession, and Admiral Dewey next day sent Lieut. Calkins ashore to learn the situation, fearing that there might be some danger unforseen, his attention having been directed to these batteries, and Lieut. Calkins still finding the Spaniards in possession, he took from the guns the breech-plugs and brought them to the ship. In the eastern part of the city, the next day still found the Spaniards on duty, and, upon their notifying the American commander that they could not hold their positions against the insurgents, were relieved by the Americans and ordered to surrender their arms. So universal within the city was the feeling that order would be maintained, that within two days business was generally resumed.

The disturbing force was far less in the city proper than in its surroundings, and the danger was not from the Spaniards within, but the insurgents without. On the 14th of August, the day the capitulation was signed, Gen. Merritt issued the following proclamation:

PROCLAMATION OF GEN. MERRITT.

MANILA, August 14, 1898.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES:

1. War has existed between the United States and Spain since April 21st of this year. Since that date you have witnessed the destruction by an American fleet of the Spanish naval power in these islands, the fall of the principal city, Manila, and its defenses, and the surrender of the Spanish army of occupation to the forces of the United States.

2. The Commander of the United States forces now in possession has instructions from his government to assure the people that he has not come to wage war upon them, nor upon any

party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, by active aid or honest submission, co-operate with the United States in its effort to give effect to this beneficent purpose, will receive the reward of its support and protection.

3. The government established among you by the United States army is a government of military occupation, and for the present it is ordered that the municipal laws, such as affect private rights of persons and property, regulate local institutions, and provide for the punishment of crime, shall be considered as continuing in force, so far as compatible with the purposes of military government, and that they may be administered through the ordinary tribunals substantially as before occupation, but by officials appointed by the government of occupation.

4. A Provost Marshal-General will be appointed for the city of Manila and its outlying districts. This territory will be divided into sub-districts, and there will be assigned to each a Deputy Provost Marshal. The duties of the Provost Marshal-General and his deputies will be set forth in detail in future orders. In a general way, they are charged with the duty of making arrests of military, as well as civil offenders, sending such of the former class as are triable by court martial to their proper commands, with statements of their offenses and names of witnesses, and detaining in custody all other offenders for trial by military commission, provost courts or native criminal courts, in accordance with law and the instructions hereafter to be issued.

5. The port of Manila, and all other ports and places in the Philippines which may be in actual possession of our land and naval forces, will be open, while our military occupation may

CHINESE CATHOLIC CHURCH NEAR MANILA.

continue, to the commerce of all neutral nations, as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, and upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation.

6. All churches and places devoted to religious worship and to the arts and sciences, all educational institutions, libraries, scientific collections and museums, are, so far as possible, to be protected, and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places or property, of historical monuments, archives or works of science, is prohibited, save when required by urgent military necessity. Severe punishment will be meted out for all violations of this regulation.

The custodians of all properties of the character mentioned in this section will make prompt returns thereof to these headquarters, stating character and location, and embodying such recommendations as they may think proper for the full protection of the properties under their care and custody, that proper orders may issue enjoining the co-operation of both military and civil authorities in securing such protection.

7. The commanding general, in announcing the establishment of military government and in entering upon his duties as military governor, in pursuance of his appointment as such by the government of the United States, desires to assure the people that so long as they preserve the peace and perform their duties toward the representatives of the United States, they will not be disturbed in their persons and property, except in so far as may be found necessary for the good of the service of the United States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines.

WESLEY MERRITT,
Major-General U. S. A., Commanding.

This proclamation was rapidly followed by a series of orders, having in view the establishment and maintenance of law and order in the city. Under the terms of the capitulation, the Spanish authority surrendered to the American command "the Spanish troops, European and native, with the city and defenses," and there were now within this area approximately 4000 insurgent troops and occupying fortified positions held by the Spaniards at the time of surrender. There was no question as to the limits of the territory held by the Spanish forces at the time of surrender, and no question that the insurgents were not included by the terms of the surrender as one of the victors, and under its terms the Americans succeeded alone to the Spanish possession. The insurgents, however, insisted that they also had a claim of rights, and based their claim upon the assumption that they were allies of the American force. It was not claimed by them that they were such allies by express stipulation or even recognition, but they did insist that the circumstances of their investment of the city made them so. It was their claim that their participation forced the surrender of the city and that they had the right to participate in its control, independent of the terms of the surrender or the parties to it. The insurgents surrounded the city, except where the Americans were entrenched, holding most of the block-houses and all the outlying Spanish trenches and the approaches to the city.

CAPTURED GUNS.

THE FILIPINOS IN CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY.

The business of Manila depended largely upon its commercial intercourse with the interior, and this could not go on without the consent of the insurgents. They also held possession of the city water-works. Their possession and retention was considered dangerous to our command. Aguinaldo afterward complained that he was not notified of the time or plan of the American attack. In this he was in part correct. He was not informed of the plan, but he knew of the time, and intended to force his command into recognition at the time of surrender, as is plainly evident by events preceding the attack.

COMPLICATIONS WITH THE FILIPINOS.

The evening of the 12th, under instructions from Gen. Merritt, Gen. Anderson had telegraphed to Aguinaldo, in substance that the Americans would proceed to the attack without his forces, and that his command should be kept out of the city. This Aguinaldo answered with the memorable despatch, "Too late." This was but a pretense, for there was ample time for him to countermand any

previous instructions he might have given. One of the first acts of Gen. Merritt, then, after the surrender, was to take measures to rid the city of the armed insurgents. On the day of the surrender many of them had been intercepted and turned back, and others, having gotten within the city, were disarmed. Gen. Anderson was ordered by Gen. Merritt to rid the city of the insurgents, and Anderson telegraphed Aguinaldo to withdraw his men at once. Aguinaldo answered him, that he had already sent a commission to present the matter to the Americans, and asked that Gen. Anderson consider the matter with them. There has been some censure of Gen. Anderson from military sources because he recognized this condition, but he had precedent for so doing all through the campaign. Even Gen. Merritt's proclamation had been read to Aguinaldo's commission in parts, and was made in part to conform to their protest. As it was originally drawn, it provided that the Spanish laws governing civil affairs, property rights and the punishment of crime, should remain in force and be administered by local Spanish officers. The commissioners said they could not submit to Spanish officials, and Gen. Merritt provided that American officers should be appointed to hold important offices. Also, when the staff officer brought the order to Gen. Anderson, he asked if he was authorized to use force. The officer did not know, and if it were simply to be a matter of persuasion, it is difficult to see what other course was open to him. When the commissioners met Gen. Anderson, they submitted to him ten propositions, as follows:

INTERIOR OF SAN SEBASTIAN CHURCH.

1. That the insurgents would retire to a line running from Malate to Paco, thence down the Paco Creek to the Pasig, up the Pasig to the bridge of Aviles, along the Calle Aviles to Santa Mesa; thence through Sampaloc, San Lazaro and Tondo, to the beach at the north. (This would have given them Malate and Paco and important positions on the east and north of the city.)

2. That the Filipinos should retain certain convents in Malate, Paco and the northern suburbs, and should have the palace of the Captain-General in Malacañan.

3. That the Filipinos should have the free navigation of the Pasig for their vessels and the "protection of the Patria." (Nobody knows what the Patria is, or has been able to find out, but subsequent negotiations showed that it had something to do with our protection of their ships in all waters under our control.)

4. That the Filipinos share in the booty of war.

5. That the civil offices be filled entirely by North Americans. (If Gen. Merritt desired to appoint Filipinos to any such places, Aguinaldo suggested through the commissioners that he

would be glad to consult Gen. Merritt about such appointments and to recommend men for them whom he knew to be fit for the places.)

6. That the Filipinos should retain control of the reservoir and pumping station of the water-works.

7. That the Filipino officers should be permitted to enter the city at all times wearing their side arms.

8. That the arms taken from the Filipinos on the night of August 13th should be returned

9. That the American troops should retire within the lines proposed by Aguinaldo, and should not pass beyond those lines with arms.

10. That all regulations should be in writing, and to be binding should be confirmed by the commanders-in-chief of the two forces.

Gen. Anderson, in reply, said he had just one condition to make, and that was that the insurgents should withdraw at once to the line he then drew, before there should be any further negotiation. The line ran from the Bocano de Vista to San Lazaro, Cemeterio de Sampaloc to block-house No. 5, block-house No. 6, the Depot des Aguas Patables, the Spanish works beyond San Juan del Monte; thence in a straight line to San Pedro Macati; thence in a straight line to block-house No. 14, on the Pinda Road; thence in a straight line to the beach at Maytubig, south of the Polvorin at Malate. Gen. Anderson yielded to the commissioners in their request to have the matter submitted to Gen. Merritt, and all appeared before Gen. Merritt. Now, while Gen. Anderson had been told to take sole charge of the matter, Merritt listened to the commissioners and asked for time in which to consider their proposal, promising an answer later.

NEBRASKA REGIMENT MARCHING INTO MANILA, AUGUST 13, 1898.

GEN. MERRITT CONSULTS ADMIRAL DEWEY.

Leaving Anderson at headquarters, and in waiting, Merritt went out to consult Admiral Dewey. On his return, he ordered Anderson back to Cavite in charge of his command. After much deliberation, Gen. Merritt consented to the following: That, as the insurgents had captured the water-works, they should retain them; that the insurgent officers should enter the city with side arms, but suggested that they should do so without revolvers; that the arms captured from the Filipinos should be returned to them when they left the city. The answer was delayed in getting to Aguinaldo. The insurgents in the meantime were strengthening their positions. Aguinaldo, on receipt of Merritt's communication, sent three propositions in lieu of those previously sent. They asked, first, that the first line designated by his commissioners be the line of separation between the forces; second, that the insurgent vessels be protected by our navy in American waters, or waters

under our control; third, that in case the Americans should return the city to Spain in consequence of the impending treaty, the insurgents should be placed in possession of all they now hold.

THE PRESIDENT GIVES INSTRUCTIONS.

Gen. Merritt left for Paris on August 30th, leaving this letter unanswered. Gen. Merritt had been in the Philippines, or, to speak definitely, on the *Newport*, in the bay most of the time, a little over a month, and during this time he had announced the policy of the government, and in a large part formulated its measures. Whether wise or unwise, however, the responsibility must rest with his superiors. On August 13th, the day of the surrender, the following despatch was sent to the Adjutant-General at Washington: "Since occupation of town and suburbs the insurgents on the outside are pressing demand for joint occupation of city. Situation difficult. Inform me at once how far I shall proceed in forcing obedience in this matter and others that may arise. Is government willing to use all means to make natives submit to the authority of the United States?

MERRITT.
DEWEY."

The answer was the following:

"MAJOR-GENERAL MERRITT, Manila, Philippines: The President directs that there must be no joint occupation of the insurgents. The United States, in possession of Manila City, Manila Bay and Harbor, must preserve the peace, and protect persons and property within the territory occupied by their military and naval forces. The insurgents and all others must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the President. Use whatever means, in your judgment, is necessary to this end. All law-abiding people must be treated alike.

By order of Secretary of War.

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General."

GEN. MERRITT REPORTS ON AGUINALDO.

The official report of Major-General Merritt, dated August 31, 1898, has the following bearing upon the relation of the two commands:

As Gen. Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that "the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political conditions of the inhabitants," I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs.

For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed, and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently established by the fact that when the troops of my command carried the Spanish entrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasai Road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under no obligations by prearranged plans of mutual attack to turn to the right and clear the front still held against the insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs.

After the issue of my proclamation and the establishment of my office as military governor, I had direct written communications with Gen. Aguinaldo on several occasions. He recognized my authority as military governor of the town of Manila and suburbs, and made professions of his willingness to withdraw his troops to a line which I might indicate, but at the same time asking certain favors for himself. The matters in this connection had not been settled at the date of my departure. Doubtless much dissatisfaction is felt by the rank and file of the insurgents that they have not been permitted to enjoy the occupancy of Manila, and there is some ground for trouble with them owing to that fact; but, notwithstanding many rumors to the contrary, I am of the opinion that the leaders will be able to prevent serious disturbances, as they are sufficiently intelligent and educated to know that to antagonize the United States would be to destroy their only chance of future political improvement.

OTIS SUCCEEDS MERRITT IN COMMAND.

Gen. Elwell E. Otis arrived in Manila on August 20th, and when Gen. Merritt was ordered to Paris, he succeeded to the command. He had to take up the unfinished work of Gen. Merritt and he required some little time to familiarize himself with the situation. The insurgent occupation continually increased in

SIGNING DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AT MALOLOS.

aggressiveness—their entrenching and fortifying continually went on, and with it the show of resistance increased. Orders had been issued to the effect that no interference should be made with them, while they did not disturb our lines or positions. There was a prospect that the city water supply might be shut off. Americans desiring to pass the insurgent lines required a pass from the insurgent commander, and the demonstrations of the soldiers became insolent. A few companies of the Colorados were ordered to the water-works, but met with resistance so that they were about to use force when the situation was reported to headquarters and they were ordered back.

THE FILIPINOS ORDERED TO REMOVE.

When Gen. Otis assumed command, the insurgents while infesting the whole city, had some especial strongholds, notably, Tondo, Paco, Sampaloc, Ermita, and Malate. Gen. Otis sent word to Aguinaldo that it would take some time for him to

familiarize himself sufficiently with the matter to answer his last letter to Gen. Merritt. The insurgents had now been infesting the city for a month; and Gen. Otis determined that the only solution compatible with the duties and obligations of the command was to order the removal of the insurgents from their position, and to such distance that there would be no interference with the occupation of the Americans in the territory surrendered by the Spaniards. After submitting to the War Department his views of the situation he was instructed to proceed, and, if need be, use force to effect a removal. Gen. Otis now addressed a letter to Aguinaldo in which the exigencies of the case were set forth, and closed by giving Aguinaldo notice to remove his forces from the jurisdictional limits of Manila by September 15th on penalty of being forcibly removed by the Americans. Aguinaldo was at this time establishing his headquarters and seat of government at Malolos, with communication by railroad north and south, and a country of large resources tributary.

BRIDGE NEAR FORT SAN ANTONIO.

Aguinaldo demurred and again sought his favorite method of doing business by commission. An encounter seemed likely to occur, and the Americans strengthened their positions and prepared for the worst. In the conference which followed, the insurgent leaders still professed their cordial amity towards the American occupation, but wanted an agreement made that in case Manila was put back into Spanish control, they should have the same positions before Manila that they now held. They desired also to know whether the Spaniards would have returned to them the guns and supplies captured by the Americans, and be re-instated in the position they occupied before the attack of August 13th. Gen. Otis in reply said, "If the Americans quit control the Spaniards will be re-instated in their defensive positions and their arms restored to them." There was intense dissatisfaction on the part of a large element of the insurgent command with this disposition of the matter, and an open rupture was imminent. Gen. Pio del Pilar was the leader of this faction.

THE FILIPINOS EVACUATE.

After acceding to all requirements the Filipinos made a last request that in removing from their position they be allowed to march up the Luneta with their arms and pass the ground of the many bloody executions of their friends by the Spaniards. To this Gen. Ovenshine in command of the Ermita and Malate precincts consented. On the morning of the 14th, there were indications of a move

and all our sentries were on the keen lookout for events. Early on this morning, that part of the insurgent forces which would make their departure by the Luneta, began to move. The columns passed from the Calle Real into the Calle San Luis, the rank and file in blue drilling led by the famous Pasig band of ninety pieces and the column headed by Col. Callis. Down the Paco Road they went to the Calle Bagumbayan where they soon stood beside the wall where so many of their comrades had endured Spanish execution. As they passed the Wyoming Regiment, cheer upon cheer was given by the Wyoming boys. It was an incident long remembered by the insurgents. With the removal of the insurgents there was no further immediate opposition to American control.

THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

The withdrawal of the Filipinos from the immediate vicinity of the city left the commanding general free to arrange the details of the civil administration. The most important orders upon this subject will be found at the end of this chapter. Military rule required first, order; next, justice. As has been said, the people of Manila were anxious for the maintenance of order, but there were many adverse conditions to be met. During the interregnum the constabulary and all administrative functions had been suspended. It was a meeting of strangers in method, manner, and tongue, and the purposes of each were difficult of understanding by the other. Some misunderstandings and mistakes, under these circumstances, were unavoidable. That none which were serious occurred may be attributed to the forbearance of all parties concerned. Our habits and customs were so unlike those of the inhabitants that often our intent was in doubt, and the requirements under our rule were, in many essentials, so unlike those which preceded us that they were often considered severities. Our design was the betterment of the social life of the citizen and the security of his personal and property rights; but the two civilizations were so unlike that those intended to be benefitted were often disposed to rebel. Spanish custom approved much that is not only distasteful, but iniquitous, under our laws and civilization, and the interference with native habits naturally brought enmity and discontent. This was especially the case as to gambling, which was a national habit.

AN ENGAGEMENT IN A BAMBOO THICKET.

THE FILIPINOS OBJECT TO CLEANLINESS.

The many restrictions put upon the citizens in social life and essential to the maintenance of military rule were irksome, and our sanitary measures brought our rule squarely in conflict with the daily life of the great mass of people.

When our army took possession of the city it seemed that the rot and ruin of centuries were within its borders. Degeneration and decay were everywhere. It was essential that this be remedied, but the enforced cleanliness was very distasteful.

BAMBOO THICKET CUT DOWN BY BULLETS.

The orders hereafter given show the character of our government. The system of constabulary was in the hands of the Provost Marshal-General's Department, and was apportioned into districts, and these again into precincts. The Provost Marshal had direct supervision of the patrol, which, by details, was constantly on the guard, and thus the whole area of the city was constantly under the scrutiny of the military eye. This patrol was composed of the rank and file of the army, and it was the only part of the army that came directly in personal contact with the mass of the people. Every act of this strange people was to be interpreted by this patrol; their methods learned, their intentions measured, their purposes understood.

NEWS OF THE COMING PEACE.

News of the signing of the peace protocol arrived in Manila on the 15th of August, and the Spaniards now asked for re-instatement into their position held before the attack of August 13th, claiming that the protocol was in force at the time of the attack, and it was in its violation that the attack and capitulation were made.

The provisions of the protocol affecting the situation in the Philipines were as follows:

Third. The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.

Fifth. The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five commissioners to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace. The commissioners are to meet at Paris not later than the 1st of October.

Sixth. On signing the protocol, hostilities will be suspended, and notice to that effect will be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.

The protocol was immediately circulated extensively among the native population, and was not only read, but "read between the lines," and from this on the native temperature, which for a time had been cool, fast lowered towards the freezing point. Notwithstanding this tendency to frigidity, the patrol, with trifling exceptions, had no conflicts with the people. From the 20th of August to February 4th, eight people had been shot in the city. These were cases where there was either open hostility or attempted escape from arrest, and in every case, after full consideration, were approved by the Provost Marshal-General. A number of

minor offenses were treated, but the percentage of crime was no greater than other American cities of like size. The crimes committed were mostly charged to a party of Macabebees, who, seventy-five in number, entered the city by the Pasig River, and for a time kept their haunt secret from the patrol. When once discovered they were readily disposed of, but for a time they terrorized the city. A number of patrolmen were injured by these tribesmen. Their habit was to approach their victim with their head bared, their wide hats held to their breasts, and when within striking distance, thrust the hat into the face of and plunge the dagger into the victim.

THE FILIPINOS ACCUMULATE ARMS.

It soon became known that the insurgents without the city were being supplied with arms and ammunition. On the 31st of August the steamer *Abbie* landed a cargo of these supplies at Batangas, and afterwards landed a second cargo before being detected, when she was seized by order of Admiral Dewey. After a time the death rate of the Filipinos became surprising, and the frequency of burials led to further investigation, whereby it was learned that the putative corpse was in

AGUINALDO'S CARRIAGE.

reality arms and ammunition, being carried through the lines for the insurgents. These arms had, at some prior time, been secreted, largely in the cathedrals and monasteries, by the Spanish authorities to be distributed in case of emergency and used against the Filipinos in an uprising.

On August 16th, soon after the surrender, the *Monadnock* had arrived, and on the 20th, the expedition under Gen. Elwell E. Otis. This expedition brought about 5000 men, which somewhat served to dampen the warlike ardor of the insurgents.

SANITARY REGULATIONS ENFORCED.

Sanitation received immediate attention after the American control began, and a series of orders were issued, formulated by Deputy Surgeon-General Lippincott, prescribing the methods of averting disease. These orders prescribed cleanliness of person and surroundings, proper diet and abstinence from drink, and caution as to intercourse with the native class. These regulations were rigidly enforced. Smallpox of a mild type is very common among the natives, and few attain their majority not having had the disease. If not closely watched and well treated the malignant type sets in. Fevers of various types were prevalent, especially typhoid.

THE SPANISH PRISON-HOUSES OPENED.

There were 2900 prisoners left by the Spaniards in the Presidio and Bilibid Prisons. In the Bilibid Prison were 28 women and 1300 men, mostly "suspects," that is, they had been arrested and incarcerated upon the suspicion of being in league with the enemies of the realm, and there many had remained for years without a trial or the formality of indictment. Most of the women were charged with insurrection and open revolt against the government. It was a very common thing to find that their property had been confiscated by officials, and the victims left penniless. Every case was promptly taken up and considered. Many of the men were held upon suspicion of being in sympathy with the revolution of 1896, and had been entitled to their liberation for a long time. Some, whose property had been confiscated, were detained long after their sentence had expired. With few exceptions, they were all Filipinos. Over 1200 were summarily discharged by the American authorities, which went far to pacify the Filipinos in their distrust of the Americans. One of the first acts after investigating prison affairs was the arrest of some prison officials on the charge of embezzling prison funds. They were tried and found guilty of thus embezzling $1600.

THE FISCAL ADMINISTRATION.

One of the first duties of the military governor was to provide a revenue. This was derived from the customs, internal revenue, licenses, water rents, fines and miscellaneous sources. The revenue was honestly collected and disbursed, and the following statement of the receipts and disbursements for the first two months of American occupation will give an idea of the sources of income and expenditure:

RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FOR TWO MONTHS.

Receipts.

Seized fund	$ 890,144.25	Fines—Provost Court	$10,455.81
Internal revenue collections	156,378.97	Water rents	37,060.82
Customs	1,811,358.21	Markets	13,966.98
Captain of Port—fees	1,823.24	Butchers	23,075.04
Quartermaster	58.00	Cemeteries	4,167.43
Subsistence Department	3,150.15	Licenses	11,039.91
Refund	90.16		

Disbursements.

Treasury	$ 1,000.00	Captain of the Port, for clearing river of obstructions and for launch hire	$24,870.88
Provost Marshal-General, for schools, street cleaning, Sanitary Department and Fire Department	193,963.47	General expenses, stationery and printing	495.66
Internal Revenue Office, including $7,000 re-fund of taxes illegally collected	10,182.24	Medical supplies for Spanish prisoners	1,284.95
Custom House, general expenses.	17,754.16	Chief Quartermaster, general expenses, mostly transportation	300,424.75
Chief Commissary, for support of Spanish prisoners	537,244.74	Chief Ordnance Officer, arsenal repairs	1,200.00

A COMMISSION APPOINTED.

A commission appointed by the President of the United States had been for some time endeavoring to come to an understanding with Aguinaldo that should form the basis of a settlement satisfactory to himself and to the United States. The commissioners were men as well qualified for the task as in the President's judgment could be found, combining a knowledge of civil, military and legal affairs far beyond the common—namely, Gen. R. P. Hughes, Provost Marshal-General, and Inspector-General of Manila; Col. Enoch H. Crowder, Judge Advocate General, and Col. (now General), James F. Smith of the 1st California Regiment.

These men met the Filipino commissioners appointed by Aguinaldo—namely, Florentine Flores, Ambrosio Flores, and Manuel Arguieles, many times in the attempt to secure a frank statement of their views—how they were to establish a stable government, and how to meet the just demands of the United States, which in the eyes of the civilized world was bound to protect the Philippines from the rapacity of other nations until they were strong enough to protect themselves. Such protection as it seemed, could only be afforded by the United States assuming the responsibility of establishing a provisional government, which was to lead up to complete autonomy as rapidly as the lesson of self-government was learned. To this proposition Aguinaldo had not consented—would not consent. Whatever of patriotism was in his heart, his brain seemed to be inflamed by the ambition to rule.

The following short colloquy at a session of the commission brings out very clearly some of the difficulties of the case:

Col. Crowder asked the insurgents:

Has any foreign power recognized your government?
No.
Have you been recognized even as belligerents?
No.
Then the United States and Spain are the only powers recognized here?
Yes.
Then the United States is responsible to other nations for these islands?
Yes.
If we should leave you, what would happen to you?
Don't leave us, for other powers would come in and take possession of the islands.
Then if our remaining here is essential, why do you insist on making trouble?
The people are beyond control.

THE TREATY OF PEACE SIGNED.

On the 10th of December, 1898, the treaty of peace between Spain and the United States was signed, containing in the third article those fateful words ceding the Philippine Islands to the United States.

The treaty in so far as it relates to the Philippines is as follows

ARTICLE III.

Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprising the islands lying within the following lines:

A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of

Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes (4° 45′) north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes (4° 45′) north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes (119° 35′) east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes (119° 35′) east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40′) north, thence along the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40′) north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning.

MOVING ARTILLERY TO THE FRONT.

The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000), within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

ARTICLE IV.

The United States will, for the term of ten years from date of exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States.

ARTICLE V.

The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be restored to them.

Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions are completely executed.

The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the two governments. Stands of colors, uncaptured war-vessels, small arms, guns of all calibers, with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, live stock, and material and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defenses, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months, to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between the two governments on the subject shall be reached.

ARTICLE VI.

Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisioners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offenses, in connection with the insurrections of Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States.

Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines.

The government of the United States will, at its own cost, return to Spain and the government of Spain will, at its own cost, return to the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, according to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this article. (Other articles of the treaty provide for the protection of the inhabitants of the ceded territory in their civil rights.)

THE PRESIDENT DECLARES THE UNITED STATES SOVEREIGN IN THE PHILIPPINES.

A few days after the signing of the treaty of peace, Gen. Otis made public the following instructions of the President:

Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C., December 21, 1898.

To the Secretary of War. Sir: The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States naval squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein.

With the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th inst., and as the result of the victories of the

BLOCK-HOUSE NO 2 LA LOMA CHURCH IN THE DISTANCE

American arms, the future control, disposition and government of the Philippine Islands is ceded to the United States. In fulfillment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired and the responsible obligations of government thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible despatch to the whole of the ceded territory.

In performing this duty the military commander of the United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that, in succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former political relations of the inhabitants and in establishing a new political power, the authority of the United States is to be exerted for the sovereignty of the persons and property of the people of the islands and for the confirmation of all their private rights and relations.

It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or honest submission, co-operate with the government of the United States to give effect to these benefits and purposes, will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed with firmness, if need be, but without severity so far as may be possible.

Within the absolute domain of military authority, which necessarily is and must remain supreme in the ceded territory until the legislation of the United States shall otherwise provide, the municipal laws of the territory in respect to private rights and property and the repression

of crime are to be considered as continuing in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals so far as possible. The operations of civil and municipal government are to be performed by such officers as may accept the supremacy of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance, or by officers chosen as far as may be practicable from the inhabitants of the islands.

While the control of all the public property and the revenues of the State passes with the cession, and while the use and management of all public means of transportation are necessarily reserved to the authority of the United States, private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected except for cause fully established. The taxes and duties heretofore payable by the inhabitants to the late government become payable to the authorities of the United States unless it be seen fit to substitute for them other reasonable rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of the government, whether general or local. If private property be taken for military use it shall be paid for, when possible, in cash at a fair valuation and when payment in cash is not practicable receipts are to be given.

All ports and places in the Philippine Islands in the actual possession of the land and naval forces of the United States will be opened to the commerce of all friendly nations. All goods and wares, not prohibited for military reasons by due announcement of the military authority, will be admitted upon payment of such duties and other charges as shall be in force at the time of their importation.

Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring to them in every possible way that full measures of individual rights and liberty which is the heritage of free people and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and the right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress the disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States.

WILLIAM McKINLEY.

AGUINALDO REPLIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

Within two days after the promulgation of the foregoing by Gen. Otis, Aguinaldo issued the following statement:

The government of the Filipinos has concluded that it is obliged to expound the reasons for the breaking off of friendly relations with the army of the United Seates in these islands, so that all can be convinced that I have done everything on my part to avoid it, and at the cost of many rights necessarily sacrificed.

After the naval combat of May 1st, the Commander of the American squadron allowed me to return from Hongkong, and distributed among the Filipinos arms taken from the arsenal at Cavite, with the intention of starting anew the revolution (that had settled down in consequence of the treaty made between the Spaniards and the Filipinos at Biak-na-bato) in order that he might get the Filipinos on his side.

The different towns now understand that war was declared between the United States and Spain and that it was necessary for them to fight for their liberty, sure that Spain would be annihilated and would be unable to do anything to put the islands in the way of progress and prosperity.

My people rejoiced at my return, and I had the honor to be chosen as chief for the services I had rendered before. Then all the Filipinos, without distinction of class, took arms, and every province hurried to turn all the Spaniards outside the lines of its boundary.

So it is easy to understand how my government would have had the power over the whole island of Luzon, Bisayas and a portion of Mindanao had the Americans taken no part in the military operations here, which have cost us so much blood and so much money.

My government is quite aware that the destruction of the Spanish fleet and giving of arms to them from the arsenal has helped them much in the way of arms. I was quite convinced

that the American army was obliged to sympathize with a revolution which had been crushed so many times, had shed so much blood, and was again working for independence. I had all confidence in the American tradition and history, for they were willing to fight for independence and the abolition of slavery until it was attained.

The Americans, having won the good disposition of the Filipinos, disembarked at Paranaque and took the position occupied by our troops in the trenches as far as Maytubig, taking possession as a matter of fact of many trenches that had been constructed by my people.

They obliged the capitulation of Manila, and the city, being surrounded by my troops, was obliged to surrender at the first attack. Through my not being notified, my troops advanced to Malate, Ermita, Paco, Sampaloc and Tondo. Without these services in keeping the Spaniards in the city they would not have given up so easily.

The American generals took my advice regarding the capitulation, but afterwards asked me to retire with my forces from Port Cavite and the suburbs of Manila.

I reminded the Generals of the injustice they were doing me and asked them in a friendly manner to recognize in some expressed way my co-operation, but they refused to accord me anything. Then not wishing to do anything against the wishes of those who would soon be the liberators of the Filipino people, I even ordered my troops to evacuate the port of Cavite and all the suburbs of Cavite, retaining only one, the suburb of Paco.

After all these concessions, in a few days Admiral Dewey, without any motive, took possession of our steam launches that were circulating, by his express consent, in the bay of Manila.

Nearly the same time I received an order from Gen. Otis, Commander-in-Chief of the army of occupation, obliging me to retire my army outside certain lines which were drawn and given me, and in which I saw included the town of Pandacan and the village of Cingalon, which never have been termed suburbs of Manila.

In the actual sight of the two American generals I ordered a consultation of my military generals, and I consulted my assistant counselors and generals, and the two bodies conformed in a desire to appoint a commissioner to see Gen. Hughes.

The General received my commissioner in a poor way and would not allow him to speak, but I allowed it to pass, by a friendly request from Gen. Otis, and withdrew my troops outside the given lines so as to avoid trouble and waited for the conclusion of the peace commission at Paris.

I thought I would get my independence, as I was promised by the Consul-General of Singapore, Mr. Pratt, and it would come in a formal, assured, friendly proclamation by the American generals who had entered these waters.

But it was not so. The said Generals took my concessions in favor of friendship and peace as indicative of weakness, and, with growing ambition, sent forces to Iloilo with the object of taking that town, so they might call themselves the conquerors of that part of the Philippines, which is already occupied by my government.

This way of proceeding, so far from custom and practice observed by the civilized nations, gives me the right to proceed, leaving them out of consideration. Notwithstanding this, and wishing to be in the right to the last, I sent to Gen. Otis a commissioner with a request to desist from this fearful undertaking, but he refused to do so.

My government cannot remain indifferent in a view of violent and aggressive usurpation of its territory by a people who claim to be the champions of liberty, and so it is determined to begin hostilities if the American forces intend to get, by force, the occupation of Visayas.

I denounce these transactions before the world in order that the universal conscience may give its inflexible decision. Who are the manslaughters of humanity? Upon their heads be all the blood that will be wasted!

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

January 6, 1899.

The crisis was fast approaching. At Iloilo the expedition, under Gen. Marcus P. Miller, was resisted, with arms, by the natives, and under instructions he desisted from using force. When the manifesto of Aguinaldo was posted on the

walls of the city, the native population very largely quit the city for the provinces and the insurgent army, the Spaniards sought safety in the walled city, the American forces doubled its guards, and the men were kept in quarters and under arms.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES.

The following is the series of orders organizing the administration of civil affairs in the Philippines, under military authority.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 4.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

MANILA, P. I., August 15, 1898.

I. In addition to his duties as Division Commander, Brigadier-General T. M. Anderson, U. S. V., is hereby assigned to the command of the district of Cavite, and will remove his headquarters to that point. The garrison of the district of Cavite will be augmented upon the arrival of the next transports containing troops for this command.

II. In addition to his duties as Brigade-Commander, Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., is hereby appointed Military Commandant of the walled city of Manila, and Provost Marshal-General of the city of Manila, including all the outlying districts within the municipal jurisdiction. Gen. MacArthur will remove his headquarters within the walled city, and will bring with him one strong regiment of his command to take station within the walled town. The commanding officer of the 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf., now stationed in the walled city, will report to Gen. MacArthur, and the companies of the 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf., now at Cavite, will, upon being relieved by other troops, be sent to Manila to join the regiment. Gen. MacArthur will relieve the Civil Governor of his functions, and take possession of the offices, clerks, and all machinery of administration of that office, retaining and employing the present subordinate officers of civil administration until, in his judgment, it is desirable to replace them by other appointments.

III. Col. James S. Smith, 1st California Volunteer Inf., in addition to his duties as Regimental Commander, is appointed Deputy Provost Marshal for the district of the city north of the Pasig River, and will report to Gen. MacArthur. Col. S. Ovenshine, 23d U. S. Inf., is appointed Deputy Provost Marshal for the districts of the city, including Ermita and Malate, outside of the walled town and south of the Pasig River, and will report to Gen. MacArthur.

IV. Under paragraphs 3 and 4 of the terms of capitulation, full lists of public property and stores, and returns, in duplicate, of the men by organizations, are to be rendered to the United States within ten days, and public horses and public property of all kinds, are to be turned over to the staff officers of the United States designated to receive them. Under these paragraphs, the chief of artillery at these headquarters and the chiefs of the staff departments, will take possession of the public property turned over, as above, pertaining to their respective departments.

The returns of the prisoners will be submitted to the Military Commandant of the city, who will assign the men for quarters in such public buildings and barracks as are not required for the use of the United States troops. The horses and private property of the officers of the Spanish forces are not to be disturbed. The Chief Paymaster at these headquarters will turn over such portion of the Spanish public funds received by him, by virtue of this order, to the Military Commandant above designated, as may be necessary for the administration of his office.

V. All removals and appointments of subordinate officers of civil administration, and transfer of funds authorized by this order, must receive the approval of the commanding general before action is taken.

VI. The Chief Quartermaster and Chief Commissary of Subsistence at these headquarters will establish depots of supply in Manila, with as little delay as possible.

Quartermaster and subsistence depots will also be retained at Cavite.

By command of Major-General Merritt.

J. B. BABCOCK, Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 8.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

MANILA, P. I., August 22, 1898.

I. For the maintenance of law and order in those portions of the Philippines occupied or controlled by the army of the United States and to provide means to promptly punish infractions of the same, Military Commissions and Provost Courts, composed and constituted in accordance with the laws of war, will be appointed from time to time, as occasion may require.

II. The local courts, continued in force for certain purposes in proclamation from these headquarters, dated August 14, 1898, shall not exercise jurisdiction over any crime or offense committed by any person belonging to the army of the United States, or any retainer of the army, or person serving with it, or any person furnishing or transporting supplies for the army, nor over any crime or offense committed on either of the same by any inhabitant or temporary resident of said territory. In such cases, except when courts martial have jurisdiction, jurisdiction to try and punish is vested in Military Commissioners and the Provost Courts, as hereinafter set forth.

III. The crimes and offenses triable by Military Commission are murder, manslaughter, assault and battery with intent to kill, robbery, rape, assault and battery with intent to commit rape, and such other crimes, offenses or violations of the laws of war as may be referred to for trial by the commanding general. The punishment awarded by Military Commission shall conform, as far as possible, to the laws of the United States, or of either of the States, or the custom of war. Its sentence is subject to the approval of the commanding general.

IV. The Provost Court has jurisdiction to try all other crimes and offenses referred to in Section II of this order, not exclusively triable by court martial or military commission, including violations of orders of the laws of war, and such cases as may be referred to it by the commanding general. It shall have power to punish with confinement, with or without hard labor, for not more than six (6) months, or with fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars ($250), or both. Its sentence does not require the approval of the commanding general, but may be mitigated or remitted by him.

V. The Judge of the Provost Court will be appointed by the commanding general. When, in the opinion of the Provost Court, its power of punishment is inadequate, it shall certify the case to the commanding general for his consideration and action.

By command of Major-General Merritt. J. B. BABCOCK, Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC.

MANILA, P. I., August 25, 1898.

I. Until such times as by orders from these headquarters it shall be declared that the local courts are re-organized, under proclamation from Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, dated August 14, 1898, and have resumed their criminal jurisdiction, all crimes and offenses committed by inhabitants or temporary residents and not triable by court martial, are triable by Military Commissions and Provost Courts. The graver of these offenses, such as are usually punishable under the laws of the United States or either of the States, or under the laws of war, by death or long terms of imprisonment, will be referred for trial to Military Commissions, and charges in all such cases will be sent to the Judge Advocate at these headquarters for such reference. To the Provost Courts the Provost Marshal-General is authorized to refer for trial all other crimes and offenses of the class referred to above which may, in his opinion, be adequately punished within the punishing power of such courts, as hereinafter established.

II. So much of paragraph IV, G. O. 8, c. s., Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps as limits the punishing power of the Provost Court for the city of Manila to confinement, with or without hard labor, for not more than six months, or to a fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) or both, is revoked, and the punishing power of said court is fixed at confinement, with or without hard labor, for a period of one year, or fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1000), or both.

III. An Inferior Provost Court with jurisdiction to punish by confinement, with or without hard labor, for a period of two (2) months, or by fine not exceeding fifty dollars ($50), or both, is hereby established.

IV. Capt. Thomas R. Hamer, 1st Idaho Volunteers, is hereby appointed Judge of the Inferior Provost Court. He will hold the sessions of his court at such times and places as may be directed by the Provost Marshal-General. The procedure of this court will conform to that of the Provost Court for the city of Manila, and a record of all cases tried, assimilated to that of the Summary Court, will be kept.

V. Upon the last day of each month transcripts of all cases tried by the Provost Courts during the month will be rendered by the Judges thereof, through the Provost Marshal-General, to these headquarters, setting forth the offenses committed and the penalties awarded.

By command of Major-General Merritt. THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 8.

OFFICE OF THE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

MANILA, P. I., October 7, 1898.

I. Until otherwise directed from these headquarters the civil courts, as composed and constituted by the laws of Spain, which were held and administered prior to August 13, 1898, within Philippine territory now subject to United States military occupation and control, are permitted to resume at once the exercise of the civil jurisdiction conferred by Spanish laws within the limits of that territory, subject, however, to such supervision by the military government of the United States, here instituted, as in its judgment the interests of that government may demand. This privilege does not extend to or embrace permission to institute criminal proceedings or to exercise criminal jurisdiction of any nature or character whatsoever.

II. The provisions of orders heretofore issued by the authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands inconsistent with the foregoing instructions and directions are hereby revoked.

By command of Major-General Otis. THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 21.

OFFICE OF THE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

MANILA, P. I., June 5, 1899.

I. The Courts of First Instance of the province of Manila, and the Courts of the Peace, heretofore held in the city of Manila, P. I., are hereby re-established and will exercise the jurisdiction, civil and criminal, possessed by them prior to August 13, 1898, in so far as compatible with the supremacy of the United States in the Philippine Islands and the exercise of military government therein, and will administer the laws recognized as continuing in force by proclamation from these headquarters dated August 14, 1898, except in so far as these laws have been, or hereafter may be, modified by the authority of the United States.

II. The division of the province of Manila into the four judicial districts of Binondo, Tondo, Quiapo and Intramuros, as such districts existed prior to August 13, 1898, is continued. The territorial jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace in each of these districts shall be coextensive with that of the Court of First Instance therein.

By command of Major-General Otis. THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 22.

OFFICE OF THE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

MANILA, P. I., June 17, 1899.

I. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands and the Courts of First Instance and of the Peace for the province of Manila, re-established in General Orders Nos. 20 and 21, c. s., this office, are announced as open and in the exercise of their jurisdiction, civil and criminal,

on and after Wednesday, June 21, 1899. The sessions of the Supreme Court will be held in the building known as the "Audiencia;" those of the Courts of First Instance and of the Peace, in the building known as the "Casa de la Moneda," Intramuros.

II. The jurisdiction of the courts, specified in paragraph I of this order, and of other civil courts which may hereafter be re-established, shall not extend to and include crimes and offenses, committed by either citizens of or persons sojourning within the Philippine Islands, which are prejudicial to military administration and discipline, except by authority specially conferred by the Military Governor. Jurisdiction to try and award punishment in the class of cases designated remains vested in the provost courts, court martial or military commissions.

By command of Major-General Otis.

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

K. K. K. FLAG,
CAPTURED AT POLO.

LIEUT. NAYLOR AND MEN OF BATTERY B, UTAH LIGHT ARTILLERY.

CHAPTER VII.

THE REVOLT OF THE FILIPINOS.

FOR some time previous to the 4th of February, 1899, the tension between the Americans and the natives had been great, both in the city of Manila and along the lines of the army surrounding it. Within the city incidents were continually occurring which made it evident to the Provost Guard that important events were anticipated by the natives. Without the city the American outposts were subjected to continuous insults which daily were more marked as the Americans continued to endure them with patience. The restraints of discipline were misunderstood by the natives as manifestations of cowardice, and there was an evident and growing desire on the part of the natives to provoke a conflict in which they anticipated an easy victory. Upon the part of the rank and file of the Americans, and doubtless, also, upon the part of many of the officers, there grew up a feeling of intense personal hatred of their tormentors, and an earnest desire to be turned loose upon them and kill them. While many refused to believe that Aguinaldo would really reach the point of ordering an attack upon the American army, it was a general opinion among the officers of the Provost Guard that existing conditions could not long continue, and that they would end in a fight. The commanding generals, however, while fully alive to the danger of the situation, were powerless, until actually attacked, to make any movement to end it. It was felt that the Americans must not make the first hostile move against those who had been so lately their allies, and of whose liberty they had been proclaimed the champions. They could and did, however, take every precaution not to be taken unawares at any point. The little army was disposed in a thin line completely encircling the city, and facing the natives at all points. The division, brigade and regimental commanders all had their instructions, and were prepared to act at a moment's notice. If an outbreak should occur, signals were arranged for directing the fire of the fleet.

THE MILITARY SITUATION.

The military situation was a very simple one. The old Spanish line of defense against native attacks was a series of block-houses, more or less connected by trenches or other works, completely enclosing the city on an irregular semi-circle extending from the shore of the bay on the north to the shore on the south, and with a radius of from two and a half to three and a half miles from a center in the

mouth of the Pasig River. These block-houses were from one-half to three-fourths of a mile apart, and were numbered regularly from 1, on the railroad, near the shore on the north, to 15, a little south of Malate, on the shore on the south. All the block-houses, from 1 to 9 inclusive, were north of the Pasig River, and all numbered higher than 9, were south of the river. The natives had taken possession of most of these defenses, all the block-houses, except Nos. 8, 10, 11 and 12, which were within the general line of the semi-circle, being occupied by them, on February 4th.

UTAH LIGHT ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

The American army was disposed on a much smaller irregular semi-circle within these lines and facing outward from the city. The object of the natives, in any attack, would be to find a weak place in our line, break through it and rush into the city, where their compatriots were all ready to rise, join them, and begin an orgie of massacre and plunder. The object of the Americans, on the contrary, should an attack be made, would be to repel it, maintain their line intact, assume the offensive, and pursue the natives wherever they might go, so far as they could do so without exposing the city to an attack from a new army which might spring into existence at any moment from the dense population of hostile natives. The natives had the advantage of overwhelming numbers, and better arms for their infantry, but the Americans had the advantage of discipline, good artillery and the smaller interior line, permitting rapid re-inforcement of threatened points, but again the disadvantage of operating from a city the great majority of whose inhabitants were intensely hostile and treacherous. The guns of the ships commanded all the entrenchments of the natives as far inland as they could reach, and really rendered any attack upon our lines hopeless, except in the event of a sudden rush, overpowering our troops in their defenses, and so mingling the men that the ships would not dare to fire. This was doubtless what was expected by the natives. But it did not happen.

DISPOSITION OF OUR TROOPS.

Our army was divided into two divisions of two brigades each, the first division, under Major-General T. M. Anderson, being stationed south of the Pasig River, and the second division, under Major-General Arthur MacArthur, on the north.

Beginning on the north, in the Tondo district, on the shore of the bay, the troops of the second, or MacArthur's Division, were distributed as follows:

The 1st Brigade, under Brigadier-General H. G. Otis, extended from near the shore of the bay easterly to a point about 400 yards southwest of block-house No. 4, in the following order: 20th Kansas, 3d U. S. Art., 1st Montana, 10th Penn-

sylvania, facing northerly; on their right, and facing northeasterly, was the 2d Brigade, under Brigadier-General Irving Hale, extending from its connection with the 1st Brigade to block-house No. 8, near the junction of the San Juan and Pasig Rivers, in the following order: 1st South Dakota, at San Miguel, occupying the line about half way to block-house No. 5; 1st Colorado, at Sampoloc, opposite block-houses Nos. 5 and 6; 1st Nebraska, from the right of the Colorados, through Santa Mesa and McLeod's Hill to block-house No. 8, near the river.

The two brigades were supported by the Utah Light Artillery.

On the south of the river, Anderson's Division was disposed as follows:

The 1st Brigade, under Brigadier-General Charles King, was made up of the 1st California, 1st Washington, 1st Idaho, and during February 5th, a Wyoming Battalion. This brigade occupied a line from near the river to block-house No. 12, and faced easterly or southeasterly; the 2d Brigade, under Brigadier-General Samuel Ovenshine, was composed of the 14th U. S. Inf., 1st North Dakota, and six troops of the 4th U. S. Cav., and occupied the line from block-house No. 12 to Fort Malate, on the bay, and faced southward.

There were also in this division, two batteries of artillery, one, of six guns, under Capt. A. P. Dyer, 6th Art., and four mountain guns of the Astor Battery. The artillery was under the direction of the division commander. There was also one company of U. S. Engineers, acting as infantry

A PERIOD OF SUSPENSE.

During all the latter part of January, the two armies had faced each other substantially as has been described. The Filipinos were gathering their forces, organizing, drilling and fortifying, undisturbed by our generals. The orders against foraging or other misdemeanors were strictly enforced in the American army, and every effort made to avoid cause of collision. The Filipinos freely came and went through our lines, and were fully informed of the disposition of our troops and their entrenchments. The attitude of the natives and their insulting actions and words have been described,

ON THE FIRING LINE.

and gradually it was felt that the lines must be drawn a little closer, and the armed Filipinos be somewhat restricted in their movements. A line of delimitation was arranged between the American and Filipino commanders which should not be crossed by armed men of either side. As the Americans, however,

did not in all cases fully occupy the ground assigned to them, the Filipinos were disposed to pass the limit and themselves occupy the ground. This led to correspondence between Gen. MacArthur and the Filipino commander, who agreed to order the withdrawal of his troops.*

* The details of this correspondence are interesting and are given, as follows:

[From the report of Gen. MacArthur.]

"The pertinacity of the insurgents, in passing armed parties over the line of delimitation into American territory, at a point nearly opposite the pipe-line outposts of the Nebraska Regiment, induced a correspondence which, in the light of subsequent events, is interesting, as indicating with considerable precision, a premeditated purpose, on the part of somebody in the insurgent army, to force a collision at that point. The original note from these headquarters, which was prepared after conference with the Department Commander, was carried by Maj. Strong, who entered the insurgent lines and placed the paper in the hands of Col. San Miguel. The answer of Col. San Miguel was communicated in an autograph note, which was written in the presence of Maj. Strong, who also saw Col. San Miguel write an order to his officer at the outpost in question, directing him to withdraw from the American side of the line. This order Maj. Strong saw delivered to the officer on the outpost. The correspondence referred to is as follows, the original of Col. San Miguel's note, which was written in the Spanish language, being enclosed herewith:

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION,
EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

MANILA, P. I., February 2, 1899.

"COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE TROOPS IN THIRD ZONE—SIR: The line between your command and my command has been long established, and is well understood by yourself and myself.

It is quite necessary under present conditions that this line should not be passed by armed men of either command.

"An armed party from your command now occupies the village in front of block-house No. 7, at a point considerably more than 100 yards on my side of the line, and is very active in exhibiting hostile intentions. This party must be withdrawn to your side of the line at once.

"From this date, if the line is crossed by your men with arms in their hands they must be regarded as subject to such action as I may deem necessary. Very respectfully,

(Signed) ARTHUR MACARTHUR,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

SAN JUAN DEL MONTE, February 2, 1899.

"MAJOR-GENERAL MACARTHUR—MY VERY DEAR SIR: In reply to yours dated this day, in which you inform me that my soldiers have been passing the line of demarcation fixed by agreement, I desire to say that this is foreign to my wishes, and I shall give immediate orders in the premises that they retire. Truly yours,

(Signed) L. F. SAN MIGUEL,
Colonel and First Chief.

"At about 8:30 P. M., February 4th, an insurgent patrol, consisting of four armed soldiers, entered our territory at block-house No. 7 and advanced to the little village of Santol, which was occupied from the pipe-line outpost of the Nebraska Regiment. This, it will be observed, was precisely the point referred to in the correspondence above quoted. The American sentinel challenged twice, and then, as the insurgent patrol continued to advance, he fired, whereupon the patrol retired to block-house No. 7, from whence fire was immediately opened by the entire insurgent outpost at that point.

"At 9 P. M., Col. Stotsenburg, 1st Nebraska Inf., U. S. V., reported considerable firing at his outposts, which extended gradually along the entire front of the division. At 10:10 P. M., it was evident that hostilities had been commenced in earnest by the insurgents, and accordingly an order was issued from these headquarters to call out everything on the firing line according to a program which had been pre-arranged for such an emergency."

BRIGADIER GENERALS IN THE REGULAR ARMY

1. Brigadier General Lloyd Wheaton.
2. Brigadier General Charles King.
3. Brigadier General Frank S. Gardner.
4. Brigadier General Henry C. Hasbrouck.
5. Brigadier General Marcus P. Miller.



Map showing position of our troops at the outbreak of hostilities, February 4th, and their position on the lines that were held around the city after February 10th.

The position on February 4th is shown close in around the city.

The position of gunboats of Dewey's fleet, which took part in the operations of February 5th, is

At 8:30 P. M. on the night of February 4, 1899, a squad of four armed Filipino soldiers, attempting to pass the American line near block-house No. 6, and refusing to halt when challenged, was fired upon by Private Grayson of the Nebraska Regiment, and war with the Filipinos was begun. Before the echo of the Nebraskan's Springfield rifle had died away, volleys were pouring from the Filipino earthworks, and a call to arms was ringing through the Nebraska camp. The Tagalos had intended to draw our fire and they drew it.

SIGNAL CORPS IN THE JUNGLE.

The action began at three principal points on our line—block-houses Nos. 1, 2, and 3 on the north, Santa Mesa on the northeast, and Santa Ana on the southeast of the city.

The fighting thus begun, while at first having the character of a general engagement, which might have had a beginning and end, with certain definite results immediately following, degenerated, after February 5th, into a series of detached combats and independent operations which cannot well be described as a whole, except to say that the rebels were not successful in breaking our line at any point, but were promptly defeated everywhere, and immediatlly put upon the defensive.

Our lines were constantly pushed outward as the rebels retreated, and the fighting continued on some part of the line almost continuously for weeks, and can best be understood by following the operations of the different divisions or brigades, until one by one they reached a period of rest.

OTIS' BRIGADE OF MACARTHUR'S DIVISION

Of the second division, the 1st Brigade, under Gen. H. G. Otis, was more or less under fire during the night of the 4th, but it was the 20th Kansas and the 1st Montana Regiments chiefly which replied to the enemy's volleys before daylight. On the 5th, an advance of the entire line was made, the 10th Pennsylvania on the right, the 3d U. S. Art. next, the Montana next, and the 20th Kansas on the left, all pressing gallantly forward under fire. The losses sustained were considerable, but the Filipinos were driven out at every point, with a much larger loss. In this advance the 3d Art. suffered more heavily than the other regiments of the 1st Brigade, having five killed and nineteen wounded.

Col. Kessler, with the 1st Montanas, advanced to and captured the Chinese hospital and the adjacent walled cemetery, both of which were occupied as military posts. The position of the 20th Kansas, on the extreme left, near the bay, was covered by a thick wood in front, which concealed the Filipinos, to dislodge whom Col. Funston resorted to volley firing. The 10th Pennsylvania with the 3d Art. advanced upon La Loma church. As the artillery approached the church and walls, Col. Hawkins divided his small command, throwing one wing to the right and the other to the left of the walls, which his men passed on the run.

driving the enemy before them, and occupying the block-house in front. The new position was immediately entrenched, three guns of the Utah Battery taking position at the northeast corner of the churchyard, and two at the stone block-house. A company of the 20th Kansas was sent by Gen. MacArthur to this point to strengthen the 3d Art. line, and two companies of the 10th Pennsylvania to the churchyard, where they remained until the 7th, and two companies of the Montanas under Maj. Drennen, from the city, to fill the gap in the 10th Pennsylvania made by the withdrawal of two of its companies.

When the first advance was made on the afternoon of the 5th from the position where the left of the line rested on the block-house peninsula at the mouth of the Vitas Creek, one Kansas company was left to occupy this entrenched position, and guard details of about sixty men continued to hold this block-house.* Later, this point was held by a company of the 23d Inf., taken from the Provost Guard.

During the forward movement of MacArthur's Division on the afternoon of the 5th, the Kansas Regiment advanced beyond the line intended for it by the Division Commander, and captured two strong earthworks thrown up across the

VIEW OF AMERICAN TRENCHES.

road to Caloocan, and two adjacent block-houses. In this operation the Kansas lost several men, but inflicted much greater loss on their opponents. When Gen. MacArthur became apprised of this action, fearing that the regiment would come into the zone of firing from the fleet which had been agreed upon, he immediately recalled it. It was, however, ordered forward again on the 6th, when the earthworks and the block-houses were found unoccupied. A position still further to the front, about on a line with block-house No. 1, on the railroad was then taken up, and a new alignment was perfected with the other regiments of the 1st Brigade, running from the stone block-house No. 2, westward, across the ravine adjacent, an intervening plain, and through a wood near the shore of the bay, all promptly and strongly entrenched.

The Kansas did no more fighting until the evening of the 7th, when a captain of that regiment who had entered the woods with about half a company, near block-house No. 1, came unexpectedly upon the enemy, and Col. Funston with

* This block-house is not numbered. It was on the bay shore to the left, and west of block-house No. 1 which was on the railroad.

three companies was directed to go to his assistance. A severe but brief engagement followed, the Kansas losing one officer killed, and six enlisted men wounded. The Filipinos left thirty dead upon the field.

Nothing further of importance from a military point of view occurred on this brigade's front for several days. Reconnaissances were made by the various commands, and the usual outpost and trench duty performed with the alacrity of professional soldiers, until the 10th, when by order of Gen. MacArthur, a general advance was made upon the Filipino position in and about Caloocan. The action was preceded by firing from the fleet, and also from field guns planted near La Loma church, lasting for thirty minutes, after which the infantry advanced, making a broad sweep to the right by a half turn, begun by the 20th Kansas on the left, followed by the 1st Montana on their right, and the 3d Art. in the open. During this operation the 10th Pennsylvania stood fast to the right of the block-house No. 2, the pivotal point. The line was supported by two battalions of the 1st Idaho Inf. under Maj. Figgins, one of which was placed in the Montana, and one in the rear of the Kansas Regiment. These troops advanced with those of the 1st Brigade, remaining on the line throughout the action. The movement resulted in placing, by night, the left in advance of Caloocan, with the new line extended to block-house No. 2. Five guns from the Utah Battery, and two from the 6th U. S. Art. one rifled mortar, and a Nordenfeld, constituted the artillery force acting in conjunction with the infantry in the advance on Caloocan.

HALE'S BRIGADE OF MACARTHUR'S DIVISION.

Gen. Hale in his report says: "About 8:30 P. M. a patrol from Nebraska outposts on the water-pipe line, opposite block-house No. 7, was compelled to fire on insurgents who advanced this side of their line and refused to halt. The fire was returned, and the exchange of shots for a few minutes continued and then ceased. Sometime afterwards the insurgents renewed the attack all along the line." "Firing," he says, "continued at intervals during the night, the insurgents always taking the initiative." But no definite plan of battle could be adopted before daylight. Soon after daybreak the two Utah guns on Sampaloc Hill opened fire on block-house No. 5, the earthworks and the villages in the vicinity. At 8:10 A. M. Companies B, K and L, 1st Colorados, under Maj. Anderson, with Col. McCoy in general command, charged and captured the places just mentioned; and immediately afterwards a battalion of the 1st Colorado, composed of Companies E, F and G, under Lieutenant-Colonel Moses, advanced and captured the line between block-houses Nos. 5 and 6. About the same time the Nebraskas, with Colorado Companies D and I attached, all under Col. Stotsenberg, captured block-houses Nos.

WHERE THE MONTANAS FELL HEAVEN ON EARTH, 1899.

6 and 7, advancing afterwards to and across San Juan Bridge, taking the powder-house and Deposito on San Juan Hill, the entire movement being completed by a little after 12 o'clock noon. A Tennessee Battalion co-operated with the Nebraskas and Colorados in the capture of San Juan Hill, afterwards exploring and occupying San Filipe and Mandalayan between San Juan and Pasig Rivers. About 9 o'clock A. M. the 1st South Dakota Regiment under Col. Frost charged and took block-house No. 4 and vicinity, and about 3 o'clock P. M. they co-operated with troops of the 1st Brigade in the capture of La Loma church, about two and a half miles west of the block-house. In all these brilliant charges and captures the various regiments were greatly assisted by the Utah guns.

FILIPINO TRENCHES AT FORTSON'S KNOLL AFTER BATTLE OF FEBRUARY 5, 1899.

The casualties in the 2d Brigade during the night of February 4th and the day of February 5th, were twelve enlisted men killed, and twenty-eight enlisted men and one officer, Lieut. Haughwout of the 1st Colorados, wounded. Lieut. Haughwout was hit by one of the first shots, while dressing to go to the front, at the Colorado headquarters in the city, more than a mile from the Filipino lines. The staff officers of Gen. Hale, Capt. Brooks, Capt. Krayenbuhl, Lieut. Perry, and Lieut. Connor of the Engineers, who volunteered his service, had three miles of firing line with which to keep in touch, and this they gallantly did, being under fire most of the time. On Monday morning, February 6th, Gen. Hale applied for some additional troops to assist in holding his long line so that he could make an advance on the water-works, the immediate capture of which he urged before the enemy could destroy them. One battalion of the 23d U. S. Inf., and one battalion of the 2d Oregon were attached to the brigade to co-operate with the Nebraskas, and two attached companies of the Colorados and the Utah guns—all of which were placed under the direct command of Col. Stotsenberg. The Tennessee Battalion had been ordered by the Department Commander to rejoin the Provost Guard in the city, but when Gen. Hale reached the firing line they had taken the field on the extreme right, and he was unable to communicate the order to them until after the capture of the water-works, when they were returned to the city.

Col. Stotsenberg moved on the water-works, three and a half miles east of the Deposito or reservoir, with the following troops: Two companies of the Colorados, as advance guard; one battalion of the Tennessee in extended order on the extreme right; one battalion of the Nebraska as a reserve, and four Utah guns to follow the advance guard and clear the woods and roads to the right and left. The Oregon Battalion guarded the Deposito, while the 23d Battalion proceeded along the road from the Deposito toward Mariquina, about a mile north of the water-works, to cover the attack on the latter place from a flank movement from the north.

At intervals on the way to the water-works, skirmishing occurred, in which one of the Nebraskas was killed, and three wounded. A considerable number of the insurrectos were killed, and a few taken prisoners. A short distance back from the road, the body of Assistant-Surgeon Young, of the Utah Battery, was found, with a powder-stained bullet hole in his head, showing that he had been captured and afterwards killed. He had intended to meet Maj. Young at the Deposito, but missed his way. A little while before his murder he had gone across the line to attend to some Filipino wounded, which errand of mercy cost him his life.

Maj. Goodale, with a battalion of the 23d, proceeded meanwhile along the road from the Deposito towards Mariquina, his advance being much retarded by the cane-brakes, ridges, and a generally rough country. As they reached the rising ground on the south side of the river, staggering under the heat and their heavy loads, the air was fanned by a musketry discharge from the enemy. But the artillery on a high cliff, a mile to the south of them, opened a fire for their protection, which soon silenced the Filipino small arms, and our troops took possession of a ready-made trench and lay on their arms until morning.

Gen. Hale had determined to clear the front of his right wing from the annoyance of constant bushwhacking. On the morning of the 7th, the gunboat *Laguna de Bay*, under Maj. Grant, began shelling the Filipino position, while detachments of the 20th Inf. and 1st Nebraska swung in from the road to the water-works, driving the Filipinos towards the Pasig River. At the same time the Wyoming Battalion advanced on the enemy's front. Attacked on three sides, the insurrectos were driven back and the country between the reservoir and the pumping station swept clean. In this engagement one man was killed and three wounded on the American side, and considerable loss suffered by the Filipinos. Gen. Hale was in command during this action and directed a movement on Mariquina, as a part of his plan. The town was surrounded, only to find white flags on all the houses. On being assured that they would not be injured in person or property, if they showed a friendly disposition, the natives readily shouted "Vive Americanos," and declared their desire to become American citizens. Subsequently, under similar circumstances, Mariquina was many times taken and abandoned, the insurrectos returning and occupying the town as soon as it was evacuated. It was at this point that Señor Paterno had collected 25,000 soldiers for a revolution, before Aguinaldo returned from Singapore.

WORK OF THE KANSAS BOYS.

On February 8th and 9th the lines were straightened and the 2d Brigade then covered the front of block-houses Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 to San Juan River Bridge, two and a half miles; San Juan Bridge to the Deposito, one mile; Deposito south to Mandalayan on Pasig River, two miles; Deposito east to water-works on the Mariquina River, three and a half miles, making a total front of nine miles. This was afterwards increased, by covering the Mariquina Road, north of the water-works, to ten and a half miles.

Col. Stotsenberg on February 8th took three companies of the Nebraska Regiment and advanced on Cainta and Taytay, which surrendered to him, the first of their many surrenders. The insurrectos were at that time in full retreat towards Antipolo.

On February 8th, the 23d Inf. was relieved by the Wyomings, and Gen. Hale had then in his command the South Dakotas, the Colorados, the Nebraskas, the Wyomings, one battalion of the Oregons and four guns of the Utah Battery.

PREPARING TO ADVANCE ON THE ENEMY.

This remained the status of the brigade till March 14th. Then the Colorados and Nebraskas exchanged places on account of the exhausted condition of the latter regiment, due to the constant skirmishes in their vicinity. On March 17th, the 10th Pennsylvania, which held the line on the left of the South Dakota Regiment, was added to the brigade. On March 20th one battalion of the 13th Minnesota was attached and placed on the water-works road, and on March 22d another battalion of the same regiment relieved the battalion of the Oregons near the Deposito.

All through the days of battle, Batteries A and B, Utah Light Artillery, had been of inestimable service. In response to the first alarm on the night of the 4th, it had proceeded to the various places assigned in the districts east and north of Manila and the Pasig River, and participated in the first repulse of the insurrectos, as well as in the general advance and the battle of the 5th. Two platoons of four guns, under Lieuts. Gibbs and Webb, assisted in the important capture of the water-works.

The strongest attack upon MacArthur's Division developed at Santa Mesa and Caloocan. The native troops fought bravely, but they were no match for the stronger and more skilled warriors from over the seas. Aside from their physical superiority, the Americans who had for so long held in leash their resentment at

the indignities to which they had been compelled to submit, were inspired by a personal feeling which would not brook further restraint and became implacable foes, fighting not only to repulse but to kill. Steadily they advanced, driving the Filipinos before them from Santa Mesa to San Juan del Monte, capturing those villages.

Gen. MacArthur's estimate of the losses in his division from the 4th to the 10th of February, was two officers, and forty-six enlisted men killed, and thirteen officers and two hundred and twenty-three enlisted men wounded.

OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE PASIG RIVER.

It will be remembered that the district south of the Pasig was occupied by the first division, under Major-General Anderson. At 3:40 A. M., on the morning of the 5th, the insurrectos opened fire on block-house No. 11, on the south side of the Pasig. Concerning the movements of Gen. Anderson, he says in his report of February 18th to the Adjutant-General:

"I had just ridden up to my headquarters in the city, from which I had telegraphic communication with every post of my command. I first telegraphed Corps Headquarters for permission to take the offensive when it became light enough to do so. At seven o'clock I directed Gen. Ovenshine to open artillery fire on block-house No. 14, and the wood near by, and to be prepared to drive the enemy from Malate front, and if they yielded easily, turn to the left with part of his command and sweep the enemy from his entire front; if successful, to be ready to re-inforce King's right and turn to the left of the insurgent force operating from Santa Ana. This project was not carried out until later in the day, as permission was not given to assume the offensive until eight o'clock.

"In the meantime the firing on King's line became heavier as the day advanced. The Washingtons, the Idahos, six companies of the California Regiment, and Hawthorne's Mountain Battery were put on the firing line, on the Paco front. Four guns of Dyer's Battery, and four companies of Californias were sent to Battery Knoll on the right. A battalion of Wyoming Volunteers which had reported the night before, was brought up to the intersection of the Paco and Cingalon Roads, so that it could re-inforce either brigade as occasion required. The troops of the 4th Cav. were kept in reserve.

INSURGENT ARMY AT MALOLOS.

"The artillery soon began to do effective service, and drove the insurgents from several strong positions near our line. Toward eight o'clock I learned that neither the fire from the navy, nor our guns on Malate had shaken the hold of the

enemy on Ovenshine's front, and the volume of fire beyond Cingalon, and the demand for ambulances showed that a desperate battle was being waged there. At last at eight o'clock, a telegram came from Major-General Otis, authorizing an advance, if not made too far. I went at once to Battery Knoll, taking with me the Wyoming Battalion. Finding there three companies of Californias, I placed these seven companies under the command of Col. Smith of the 1st. California, and directed him to deploy and advance in line with the rest of King's Brigade substituting this for the intended co-operation of Ovenshine. Smith's right was a little later re-inforced by Company A, Battalion of Engineers, under Lieut. Haan. Gen. King was present, and was ordered to advance as soon as Smith deployed.

SKIRMISH LINE UNDER HEAVY FIRE, BEHIND RICE "PADDIES."

"These officers received this order with delight, and their troops with enthusiasm. The movement began at 8:20 A. M. with a rush over the creek on our front, a cheer, and rattling volleys as the whole line advanced, not by rushes, but with a rush. The insurgent line fell back before our advance, fighting, however, with spirit. The rice-fields in our front were intersected by little irrigating dykes, and behind each of these, a stand was attempted, the Filipinos firing from behind them. Our men disdained these shelters and moved steadily on until raking fire was opened on them from the redoubt on the neck of the bend between Pandacan and Santa Ana. The Idaho Regiment made a turn to the left, charging the reboubt, carrying it at the point of the bayonet, and driving a regiment of the insurgents to the bank of the river.

"The California companies in Pandacan at the same time crossed Concordia Creek and captured the smaller earthwork on the further bank. On the lower side of Santa Ana, on the river, was another earthwork in which two Krupp guns were placed, bearing on the river, but with embrasures also on the land side, and to one of these one of the Krupp guns was transferred, when an advance was made. To its fire, Hawthorne's Battery replied with good effect, until its fire was masked by the advance of our line. This earthwork was also carried, and both Krupp guns captured.

"At the redoubt the Filipinos made a brave defense, as the Scotch guard at Flodden Field formed an unbroken line around their king. So these misguided insurgents fell where they fought, filling the trenches with an unbroken line of killed and wounded. Apparently a whole battalion was driven to the bank of the river. They attempted to cross in boats and by swimming, but not a man was seen to gain the opposite bank. Their bodies have been floating down the stream

ever since.* Maj. Figgins, of the Idahos, estimates the enemy's loss in this movement in the neighborhood of 700 killed, wounded, drowned and captured.

"At the same time the California Battalion charged and drove the enemy out of Santa Ana, driving them from stone walls and convents, churches and houses, and fighting their way through blazing bamboo huts from which the natives were firing. This could not have been accomplished, had not Col. Smith's command broken the left of the insurgents' line and carried the English cemetery which was enclosed with a strong stone wall. The Regular Engineer Company, under Lieut. Haan, volunteered for this service, and did yeoman's work.

"The Wyoming Battalion, on the right of the line, did not advance with the energy of the rest of the line. Had they done so, the enemy's forces might have been captured in Santa Ana. Retreating on San Pedro Macati, they attempted to make a stand. A number attempted to hold the church and cemetery of San Pedro Macati. Then the Wyomings came up, at last, and did good service. By a skilful, tactical movement of the Engineer Company this strong position was taken in reverse and carried. The insurgents finally broke and ran, and our forces advanced and captured the church and monastery of Guadalupe, a mile beyond.

"Brigadier-General Ovenshine, commanding the 2d Brigade, had the North Dakota Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, occupying the old Spanish trenches, from Fort Malate, on the bay, to an almost impassable swamp which divided his line into two sections. From the further east side of his line was block-house No. 13, on the Tripa de Gallina. His line was held by nine companies of the 14th Inf., under Maj. C. H. Potter, and three dismounted troops of the 4th Cav., under Capt. F. Wheeler, on the extreme left. There our men had to fight in dense woods and bamboo thickets. The enemy had strong entrenchments, and fired on us from ditches and tree tops. The fight waged here more fiercely than anywhere else.

GEN. HALE AND COL. STOTSENBURG CONFERRING WITH COL. MILLER ON THE SAN JUAN HEIGHTS A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR.

"The left of our line could not advance because the enemy had a flank fire on it. When I sent Smith's improvised command to the left of King's line, I kept only one company in reserve in support of the artillery at Battery Knoll, but finding that two companies which had been out on outpost duty during the night had been left behind in the advance, I ordered them over to the right to

* This report is dated February 18th.

support Wheeler. This gave him one battalion of the 14th Infantry, his three troops of cavalry, and one company each of Washingtons and Californias.

"At about ten o'clock, Ovenshine ordered an advance. The North Dakotas drove the enemy from their front back to the Carmelita convent. Maj. Potter, with Mantile's Battalion, 14th Inf., advanced through the woods to the right of block-house No. 14, and Capt. John Murphy, with his battalion of the 14th Inf.. charged block-house No. 14 and the adjoining trenches. After a desperate fight, the enemy were driven out, but not without inflicting serious loss on us. Capt. Mitchell was mortally wounded leading his company.

"Lieut. Miles, 14th Inf., was first in the enemy's trenches, and followed by only six men, charged into the smoking ruins of the block-house. This was a daring and brilliant feat of arms. At the same time Capt. Wheeler advanced from block-house No. 13, but after coming in view of the enemy's trenches, fell back. A gun of Dyer's Battery was sent to him, but on account of the dense bamboo thicket, it could not do satisfactory service. Shortly before 2 P. M., Maj. Rucker, 4th Cav., joined the cavalry battalion, and relieved Capt. Wheeler of

UTAH BATTERY IN ACTION AT BLOCK-HOUSE NO. 2.

command. Hearing of the successful advance of the North Dakotas, I telegraphed Gen. Ovenshine to carry out the project I had arranged with him, to attempt to roll up the enemy by a movement from right to left. As there was a long delay in carrying out this order, I repeated it several times by telegraph, and aides were sent with oral orders. It was at last found that he was under a false impression that he had received orders from the Corps Commander. When this misapprehension was removed, he made the movement with complete success. In the meantime I had sent a battalion of the 1st Tennessee, under Lieutenant-Colonel Gracey Childers, to the Cingalon front. They reached that point just as the North Dakotas were clearing the front and driving the enemy into the woods beyond the Tripa. The Tennessee Battalion, crossing said stream, opened on them, as also did Dyer's guns on Battery Knoll. Ovenshine then advanced with his brigade to Pasai, which he found abandoned. Leaving part of his command there, he marched with the rest up the Pasai Macati Road and opened communication with Gen. King at San Pedro Macati, and returning picketed the road. This ended the fighting at the front, but soon after King's Brigade had advanced

beyond Paco a number of insurgents, who had lain concealed in the town, began to fire on the ammunition carts and hospital ambulances going to the front.

"Anticipating the possibility of this treachery, a small force had been left in Paco under Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce. For a time there was a lively contest in the town. The insurgents were so persistent that nearly all their "nipa" houses had to be burned to dislodge them. Forty-three prisoners were taken, all in ordinary clothing, but unquestionably participants in the savage warfare. While this was going on in the town, a sharp musketry fire was opened on us from a large stone church near the Paco Bridge. I directed Dyer's Battery on the Knoll to reverse his guns and open on the church. It was soon in flames, yet a number of desperate men took refuge in the church tower. It was several hours before they could be dislodged, and they kept up their resistance to the last.

TRENCH SHOWING WORK OF WASHINGTON REGIMENT.

"During the engagement, the telegraph men of the Signal Corps did effective service, carrying their lines to the extreme front at San Pedro Macati, Fort Malate and Pasai. Lieut. Kilbourne, who was with the headquarters party, did a brave act in climbing a telegraph pole at the Paco Bridge to string a broken wire, under a cross-fire between desperados in the tower and our artillery. New troops are generally demoralized by firing from flanks and rear. In this contest bullets seemed to come from all directions, but our men continued unconcerned. When I had my headquarters on Battery Knoll, the artillery men and my staff of officers and orderlies were subject to this cross-fire during the entire engagement, and as the enemy used smokeless powder it could only be surmised from what direction the fire came.

"At two o'clock I rode to King's front and found his lines satisfactorily established; then went to Cingalon front and found everything satisfactory there. In this engagement we lost two officers and ninety-five soldiers wounded, and one enlisted man killed. We can only estimate the enemy's loss. Our burial parties interred in their own trenches two hundred and thirty-eight insurgent dead. We took about three hundred and six prisoners, and two very fine Krupp guns, besides a large number of small arms, ammunition and ordnance stores.

"This division had on the firing line in the battle of the 5th instant about 3850 officers and men. We were opposed, as I believe, by about 5000 insurgent Filipinos. Of these, I estimate that 2000 were killed, wounded, captured or scattered. Within two days we had captured Pasig and Pateros, and our scouting parties had gone to the *Laguna de Bay*."

THE TROOPS OF THE PROVOST GUARD.

The troops of the Provost Guard were glad of an opportunity to go to the front. At the call to arms, on the night of the 4th, the 2d Oregon Inf. took positions assigned them at the gates and on the streets of the walled city. On the 6th, three companies, C, G, and K, under Maj. Eastwick, took the field in Paco

district for the day. On the following day they were stationed at the water-works, where they remained until the 10th. Company F was on guard at department headquarters; Company H on duty at the Custom House.

The 13th Minnesota Inf., on the 4th, was under arms, patrolling the streets in their respective districts and guarding the bridges and river front. Filipinos, detected in signaling with lights from house-tops, were fired on. On the 5th, patrols of Company C were attacked by 150 insurrectos, armed with bolos and machetes, when they were re-inforced by the entire company, under Capt. Robinson, and the natives dispersed. Company M was transferred to a station in a church in the Tondo district.

The 2d Battalion, 1st Tennessee, on the 5th, left camp and proceeded in the direction of the water-works, having an engagement with the enemy and returning to station. The 1st Battalion of the same regiment, on the 5th, took part in an engagement with the Filipinos in Paco district, returning to station on the 6th. The 3d Battalion of the same regiment proceeded to the Presidio of Manila and Bilibid Military Prison, remaining there until the evening of the 6th. The 23d Inf., as already mentioned, participated in the taking of the water-works, under command of Maj. Goodale, on the 7th.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FLEET.

When firing began, on the night of February 4th, the signals agreed upon by the army and navy commanders could not be given until daylight, and firing from the fleet without them would have been as dangerous to the American forces, whose positions could not be known, as to the Filipinos. On the coming of day, the Admiral's ship lay directly in front of Manila, between the city and the German cruiser *Irene* and the Spanish transport *Alava*. The *Monadnock* lay about one mile off Fort Malate, and with the coming of day commenced firing ten-inch shells on the enemy's south line, blowing out the breech-block of one of her guns during the engagement, having one man killed and two wounded. Her fire, directed by Lieut. E. E. Kelly, 1st Company U. S. V. Signal Corps, lasted through the forenoon of the 5th, and was very effective, destroying villages and killing many Filipinos. In the afternoon, the *Charleston* relieved the *Monadnock* and continued the firing during the remainder of the day and night, and the day of the 6th, using six and eight-inch guns. She was again joined by the *Monadnock*, when they patrolled the beach as far south as Paranaque, setting villages on fire and driving the Filipinos from their trenches. The *Charleston* remained in this service until the 9th of February, when she was relieved by the *Buffalo*, which held the position throughout the

GEN. MACARTHUR AND STAFF WATCHING BATTLE OF CALOOCAN FROM LA LOMA CHURCH.

remainder of the campaign. On the morning of the 5th, the *Charleston* was lying off the block-house near the mouth of the Vitas River, on the north side, about 1000 yards from shore, and during the forenoon, with ten-inch shots, enfiladed the Filipino line in front of the Kansas Inf. until she relieved the *Monadnock*, the *Concord* taking her position. The *Callao*, "Tappan's battle-ship," as Admiral Dewey was fond of calling this little boat, patrolled the beach on this side, her firing being directed by Lieut. C. M. Gordon, 18th Company, U. S. V. Signal Corps. The *Callao* patrolled close in shore, using three-pounders and rapid-fire guns, her fire being directed on the block-house. During the afternoon, the *Concord* fired six-inch shells on the Filipinos in front of the Kansas lines, continuing the bombardment on the 6th. An eight-inch shell from the *Concord* was thrown into the church at Malabon, occupied as headquarters by the enemy, and exploding, completely demolished it. By ten o'clock of the 6th, the *Callao* had so destroyed the block-house at the mouth of the Vitas River that it was taken with a detachment of twenty men under Lieut. Ball.

The *Concord* and *Callao* held their positions until the 9th of February, when, an advance being made on Caloocan, the *Monadnock* came up to assist in shelling the Filipino lines. In this engagement the *Concord* and *Callao* fired about thirty

LIEUT. WEBB'S GUNS ON SANTA MESA HILL, SHELLING BLOCK-HOUSE NO. 7 AND SAN JUAN BRIDGE.

shots. On the 25th of February, these two ships were relieved by the *Bennington* and the *Helena*. The latter was, like the *Callao*, a light draft boat, and with her did patrol service, intercepting and capturing many of the insurrectos' boats carrying supplies to their lines.

The activity of the land forces made it difficult to direct the fire, but the moral effect, as well as the destructive energy of the navy guns was of very great assistance to the Americans. The fleet in the harbor had a reputation for invincibility which of itself was as valuable as regiments of fighting men in sustaining the splendid courage of our troops, and disconcerting the confidence of the Filipinos. Not only in the first two or three days of battle was the navy of such consequence, but all through the weeks of campaigning in the vicinity of Manila which followed.

As a result of the operations of the first week the American lines had been advanced in all directions outward from the city, and extended from a point beyond Caloocan southeasterly to the San Juan River, and thence easterly to the pumping

station which it was a vital necessity to hold firmly. The towns of Pasig and Pateros, situated in a marshy district on the river, had been occupied and our southern line pushed forward to Malate. The Corps Commander, Gen. Otis, however, had not the force to occupy and adequately guard so large a district, and on the south of the river the line was gradually moved back to San Pedro Macati. Pending the arrival of re-inforcements nothing could be done except to hold such territory as was deemed absolutely essential, with occasional extensions to chastise the insurgents when they became too bold. This involved constant changes of position of our troops, especially on the south side of the river, which it would be confusing to attempt to follow, and the taking, abandoning, and retaking of many villages. The behavior of the natives was very trying. They were practically all sympathizers of Aguinaldo, and the men were with the army so far as they could be furnished with arms. As there were many more men than arms there seemed to be a constant change in the personnel of the rebel army, a simple change of clothing sufficing to transform a ferocious warrior to a peaceful citizen, and vice

BATTLE-FIELD OVER WHICH OUR TROOPS PASSED IN THE CAPTURE OF CALOOCAN.

versa. When our army approached a town everything that could be made to do duty as a white flag was displayed. When we entered, all the inhabitants declared themselves "amigos," and blessed the Americans. When we departed the white flags came down and they were all "insurrectos" again. The rules of civilized warfare were disregarded. If, in skirmishing, the Filipinos killed an American cut off from his command, they shot him to pieces, often so that his body could not be recognized. The natives were not altogether united, however. On the 12th of February the Macabees and other natives of the Pampanga province near Malolos, sent a messenger to Gen. Otis, offering to desert Aguinaldo, and join the Americans with 3000 organized troops, armed and equipped, and needing only rations. They claimed that they had fought against Aguinaldo as allies of the Spanish. For prudential reasons the overtures were not accepted. At a later period some of the Macabees were employed as scouts.

A LULL PENDING ARRIVAL OF RE-INFORCEMENTS.

After the establishment of our lines as described, there was nothing further to be accomplished until re-inforcements should arrive from the United States. The natural defenses of Manila having been reached, and a defensive line established about the city, the fighting was only such as resulted from the meeting of scouting parties. On the 15th of February, a portion of the 4th Cav., on a reconnaissance, encountered a party of Filipinos near Paranaque, and in an exchange of shots had one of its men wounded. The cruiser *Buffalo*, later on the same day, fired a few small shells to arrest the operations of another party of natives who were attempting to mount a battery near Paranaque, causing them to withdraw their guns to the tower.

BRINGING IN A WOUNDED MAN.

Frequent small affairs like these simply kept alive the embers of war during February and early in March. Rumors, however, were rife of the intensions of Aguinaldo, and there was a growing impression that a crisis for the city was impending. The natives in Manila had been greatly affected by the disastrous results which followed the attack upon the Americans, of the 4th and 5th. They had been buoyed up ever since the capitulation of Manila in the previous August, by the hope that when the Americans should withdraw from the city, whether compulsorily or not, they would, in the confusion which was sure to ensue, have the long desired opportunity of looting the city and wreaking vengeance upon the Spanish population. But this expectation had not been realized, and they were disappointed and wrathful, looking upon the new invaders as taking the place of the old. Considering the miscarriage of this part of the revolt, and the heavy losses they had sustained, they were in a condition bordering on frenzy. That condition had been met with tact by a strong hand, but American troops were eager to avenge their fallen comrades; the Filipinos were sullenly awaiting an opportunity to repeat their first revolt.

THE FILIPINOS PREPARE FOR A MASSACRE

That there was ground for alarm was made evident by the finding at Malabon, of the following order which was to have been executed on the 15th, its execution being only delayed by the capture of Caloocan and succeeding events.

First, you will dispose so that at eight o'clock at night the individuals of the territorial militia at your order will be found united in all of the streets of San Pedro, armed with their bolos and revolvers, or guns and ammunition if convenient.

Second, Filipino families only will be respected. They should not be molested but all other individuals, of whatever race they be, will be exterminated without any compassion after the extermination of the army of occupation.

Third, the defenders of the Philippines in your command will attack the guard at Bilibid and liberate the prisoners and "presidarios," and having accomplished this they will be armed saying to them, "Brothers, we must avenge ourselves on the Americanas, and exterminate them that we may take our revenge for the infamy and treachery which they have committed upon us, have no compassion upon them; attack with vigor. All Filipinos en masse will second you —long live Filipinos' independence."

Fifth, the order which will be followed in the attack will be as follows: The sharpshooters of Tondo and Santa Ana will begin the attack from without, and these shots will be the signal for the militia of Troso, Binondo, Quiapo and Sampaloc to go out into the street and do their duty; those of Paco, Ermita, Malate, Santa Cruz and San Miguel will not start out until twelve o'clock, unless they see their companions need assistance.

Sixth, the militia of Tondo will start out at three o'clock in the morning; if all do their duty our revenge will be complete. Brothers, Europe contemplates us. We know how to die as men shedding our blood in the defense of the liberty of our country. Death to the tyrants! War without quarter to the false Americans who have deceived us! Either independence or death!

The fourth paragraph was not furnished to the press, but its substance could be conjectured.

Following the discovery of this plot, the tension in the city was high. The guards were doubled, and squads of soldiers searched the suspected houses. Notwithstanding this watchfulness, a secret conference of 100 Filipinos at midnight was discovered, adding to the general apprehension. Day by day, incidents more or less alarming were occurring.

THE ATTEMPT TO LOOT MANILA.

On the evening of the 22d of February, a considerable body of Filipinos, leaving their entrenchments at Malabon, forded the swamps on Gen. MacArthur's left and entered the city. At eight o'clock, an incendiary fire broke out in the Calle la Coste, in the Santa Cruz district, where, owing to the inflammable nature of the native houses, the flames spread rapidly. The city fire department being

AT THE BATTLE OF TONDO.—WORK OF MINNESOTA MEN.

unable to deal with a serious conflagration, the English fire brigade was summoned from Santa Mesa, and after several hours brought the fire under control. In the meantime, confusion reigned, notwithstanding the thorough police arrangements directed by Gen. Hughes. The district was, by the closing of the electric circuit, deprived of light, except that from the burning buildings. In the semi-darkness the hose of the fire brigade was several times cut, causing the issuing

of an order to drive the natives into vacant lots, and guard them there. This action stopped the placing of impediments in the way of the firemen, although in their anxiety to save their furniture and property, such of the inhabitants as were not participating in the plot to burn the city, had crowded the streets for a quarter of a mile. The flames in Santa Cruz district had hardly been subdued, when another conflagration was started in Tondo district, where there were three miles of "nipa" houses. When the firemen and soldiers made an attempt to extinguish the burning houses, they were met with a fusilade from the windows and roofs of the buildings passed. The firemen, then, in connection with the soldiers, directed their efforts to clearing these houses of the assassins, while the fire was unheeded.

INSURGENT OUTPOST.

GREAT DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY BY FIRE.

The fires and the frequent shots spread terror through Manila. It was remarked that immediately before the first fire-alarm, the sounding of a native bugle had startled the city. Timid persons, men and women, hoping to find safety on board one of the men-of-war, hastened from their houses or hotels into the streets, only to be turned back at the first corner, by a guard. The Chinese population hurried across the bridges, into the city, to seek the protection of their consulate; and all night long the fire spread, devastating the Tondo district and destroying property, valued at a million dollars, which belonged to the natives themselves. So nearly had Aguinaldo's plot, to destroy the lives and pillage the property of the foreigners in Manila, succeeded.

THE ATTEMPTED MASSACRE FAILS.

The failure did not deter the insurrectos from making a concerted attack on MacArthur's front during the forenoon. At the first sign of hostilities the artillery was brought into action, the insurrectos replying not only by volley firing, but with six shots from a battery. The signal was then given from the station to the *Monadnock*, which hurled ten-inch shells, as indicated by the Signal Corps, over the American lines into the Filipino positions. About eleven o'clock there were sharp engagements at the Chinese cemetery and at San Pedro Macati, with the apparent design of withdrawing attention from the city. In this intention the enemy was checked by the artillery of the Americans. The *Monadnock's* shells, also, added to the extent of fires still burning in Tondo, Santa Cruz, San Nicolas, and other environs. Early in the afternoon the Filipinos, becoming convinced of the futility of their present efforts, abandoned their designs on Manila and retired.

Numerous arrests had been made in the Tondo district, and two carloads of arms, with accoutrements, captured, together with sixty of the enemy, guarding them. Early on the afternoon of the 23d, one battalion of the 23d Inf., under Maj. Goodale, three companies of Minnesotas, three of the Oregons, and a battalion of the 4th Cav. were ordered to this position. Proceeding along the road they were fired on from house-tops, making their advance slow. At Tondo Bridge they encountered about 250 of Aguinaldo's army, who, during the night, had built fine trenches across the road and taken possession of the bridge, cutting the line of communication with MacArthur's front wing. Here occurred one of the fiercest engagements of the campaign, the insurrectos making a stubborn resistance, but being overcome by superior strength. In this battle Capt. N. C. Robinson, of the Minnesotas, a non-commissioned officer, and six privates were wounded. The Filipino loss was twenty killed and many wounded, to whom the American surgeons gave their services as kindly as to their own people. Hundreds of refugees afterwards came into the American lines—soldiers, who had thrown away their uniforms, weeping women, bearing their children in their arms, and sullen, hopeless men.

FOURTH CAVALRY AT SAN PEDRO MACATI.

On MacArthur's right the Filipino army had pressed the American lines closely, looking for a point of the least resistance, but Col. Frost of the South Dakotas, by a flank movement drove them back, with a loss of Lieut. Eugene S. French, 1st Montana Volunteers, and one private of the South Dakotas, killed, and two other Dakotas wounded.

Threats to burn the walled city on the night of the 23d were current, and fearing the attempt, the wives of army officers and other Americans were taken on board the transport *St. Paul* to remain until order should be restored. To the gloom of the situation was added the shadow of heavy clouds of smoke hanging over the city and its environs. This element of discomfort had indeed driven many of the natives to the beach, where they were exposed to artillery firing, and where many were killed. Extraordinary precautions were taken by Gen. Otis to prevent a recurrence of incendiarism, one of which was the establishment of a curfew regulation, by which all persons without orders or passes were confined to their houses after seven o'clock in the evening. This seriously interfered with the comfort and convenience of all classes of people, but was recognized as necessary to their safety.

THE INSURRECTOS ASK A CONFERENCE.

Following the re-establishment of comparative quiet in and about the city, there was but little fighting. On February 27th, under a flag of truce, the insurrectos asked for a conference, and prominent Filipinos attempted to open negotiations with Gen. Otis, but were met with a demand for unconditional surrender. During the week following February 27th, there was no general attack from either side of the contending armies. But on the 2d of March an unsuccessful attempt

BATTLE OF SANTA MESA, SHOWING BLOCK-HOUSE NO 8, AND THE ROPE FACTORY WHICH WAS AFTERWARDS BURNED BY THE NEBRASKANS

was made to dislodge the American outposts in front of San Pedro Macati, resulting in a severe loss to the Filipinos. On the 4th of March, the U. S. gunboat *Bennington* was fired upon by the insurrectos, and replied by shelling the suburbs of Malabon. The arrival about this time, of several transports with troops materially strengthening our position, may have given the Department Commander a greater confidence in the army, a crushing blow to the rebellion being promised about this date.

RENEWED ATTACKS ON THE WATER-WORKS.

On the night of March 5th, the Filipinos attacked Gen. Hale's front, but were driven off after a short encounter. This action centered about Mariquina. No sooner was the fight well under way than the Filipinos, knowing that Hale's force had been weakened by sending troops to Mariquina, attacked the water-works in the rear. They thus attempted to recapture the pumping station, but without success. This continued attempt on the part of the enemy to recapture the water-works caused Gen. Hale, on March 7th, to move forward for the dislodgment of the Filipinos on his front. Throwing forward detachments from the 20th Inf., 1st Nebraska and 1st Wyoming, supported by a gunboat under the command of Capt. Grant, the enemy was attacked on three sides and rapidly driven back, leaving the country free between the reservoir and pumping station.

The brigade of Gen. King, which had been placed temporarily under the command of Gen. Wheaton, during the interval between February 27th and March 13th, had been much annoyed by this desultory fighting. So also were the troops in front of Caloocan. On the recovery of Gen. King from his illness, he was returned to his command and Gen. Wheaton was assigned to the command of a

flying column, with orders to drive out the enemy along the Pasig River, and thereby break all communication between the northern and southern wings of Aguinaldo's army.

WHEATON'S FLYING COLUMN.

Reference to the map will show that the American position at the water-works, which it was essential to maintain, was much in advance, on the eastward, of the general line of our army, and greatly exposed to flank attacks from Pasig and vicinity where the insurrectos were encamped. The repeated attempts on the water-works have been mentioned, and there was a constant feeling of insecurity with so vital a point so greatly exposed. Added to this was the easy communication of the insurgents south of the Pasig with Aguinaldo's headquarters and army at Malolos. The army having been strengthened by the arrival of re-inforcements, it was determined to put an end to these conditions by driving the insurrectos out of the Pasig district. To this end a "Provisional Brigade" was organized, which has been known as "Wheaton's Flying Column," and placed under the command of Brigadier-General Lloyd Wheaton, with instructions to clear the Pasig country. The following account of the operations of this brigade is given in the language of an officer who accompanied the expedition:

"By general orders No. 11, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Gen. Wheaton was assigned to the command of "A Provisional Brigade," composed of the 20th and 22d Regiments of U. S. Inf., two battalions of the 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., seven companies of the 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf., a platoon of 6th U. S. Art., and a squadron of three troops 4th U. S. Cav. His instructions were to clear the enemy from the country to Pasig and to strike him wherever found. The brigade was formed on the night of March 12th, and bivouacked in line in rear of the entrenched position extending from San Pedro Macati on the Pasig one mile and a half in the direction of Pasai from right to left in the following order: Squadron 4th U. S. Inf., Lieutenant-Colonel

TAKING SUPPLIES TO THE FRONT.

McCaskey; seven companies 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf., Col. Summers; one platoon, two guns, 6th U. S. Art., Lieut. Scott; two battalions 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., Col. Wholley. Soon after daylight on the morning of March 13th, the brigade moved by Echelon, from the right, the cavalry and the 22d U. S. Inf. moving first, then the 20th U. S. Inf., followed by the 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf.

When the cavalry and 22d Inf, had advanced one mile and a half, the line wheeled to the left and marched toward the river road along the Pasig. Scott's guns had now opened fire upon the position of the enemy at Guadalupe, and the left of the line advancing, forced him out, the 20th Inf. and the 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., reaching the church at Guadalupe at nearly the same time. The right of

VIEW OF CALOOCAN, SHOWING BURNT DISTRICT.

the 22d Inf., struck the enemy as he was retreating in the direction of Pasig, inflicting heavy loss. The whole line moved on and occupied the Pasig Road, and then marching east along the road, soon came under fire of the enemy from his entrenched position at Pasig, on the north side of the river; opened fire upon his entrenchments from one gun on the road, and placed the other upon a cliff or ridge, extending at right angles to the Pasig; occupied the ridge with infantry, and extended the 20th and 22d U. S. Infs. to the right on the high ground in the direction of Pateros. One battalion of the 22d Inf., under Capt. Lockwood, and the squadron of 4th Cav., under Maj. Rucker, attacked a force of the enemy in the direction of Pateros and drove him beyond Taguig. The gunboat *Laguna de Bay*, under Capt. Grant, came up, and night closed in with the enemy driven to the north side of Pasig. March 14th Gen. Wheaton extended his line to the south and west of Pateros, and reconnoitered the country to the west and south. The cavalry engaged the enemy in force in the direction of Taguig and drove him beyond that place.

"The enemy being entrenched in the bamboo thickets across the channel near Pateros, the 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., one battalion under Maj. J. J. Weissenburger, crossed the channels in canoes and by swimming, stormed the entrenchments and captured or killed all the rebels there. The town of Pateros took fire and burned. March 15th one battalion of the 20th U. S. Inf. was ordered across the river at Pasig under command of Maj. Rogers; a gun was brought up and the entrenchments in front of Pasig and to the left shelled. The battalions of the 20th Inf. carried the city by storm. A part of the 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf. were crossed below Pasig and when the rebels fled from Pasig they were exposed to a heavy flank fire from this detachment. The whole of the 20th Inf. was then sent over to Pasig, the regiment being carried across upon the steam launch *Morrow*. The 1st Washington was advanced on the right to Taguig and captured about 400 prisoners. Night came on with the enemy in the front, and on the

right killed, captured or dispersed. The enemy lost at least 1000 men this day. March 16th Lieutenant-Colonel McCaskey, 20th U. S. Inf. at Pasig, was instructed to clear the country in his immediate vicinity of any of the insurgents who might be lurking near, and soon after he sent a despatch that he had sent out two battalions to be deployed as skirmishers to clear the island of Pasig. Soon after a heavy and continued firing was heard to the east and north of Pasig. At 12 M. it was learned that Maj. William P. Rogers, commanding 3d Battalion 20th Inf., had come upon the enemy entrenched, 1000 strong, at the village of Cainta and that he had carried the entrenchments and burned the town, the enemy flying in the direction of Taytay. Maj. Rogers returned with his battalion to Pasig. In this affair he lost two killed and fourteen wounded.

On the 17th of March, by direction of the Corps Commander, the 20th U. S. Inf. returned to Manila, being relieved at Pasig by a part of the 1st Washington Volunteer Inf. On the afternoon of March 18th a force of the enemy appeared in the vicinity of Taguig, which was held by one company of the 1st Washington Volunteer Inf. The place was re-inforced with two companies of infantry, and the colonel of the 22d Inf. directed to send a battalion south of the position, held by his regiment, and to the west of Taguig to ascertain the force of the enemy. The latter was found about 800 strong, occupying the crests of the ridges, and a spirited combat ensued, which was terminated by darkness. The 22d Inf. had twenty men killed and wounded in this affair. Among the wounded was Capt. Frank B. Jones, 22d Inf., commanding the battalion. The enemy fell back toward the south.

"The morning of March 19th, soon after daylight, Gen. Wheaton formed line, deployed in the extended order, facing to the south as follows: 22d U. S. Inf., six companies, center; 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., six companies, left. The line advanced and struck the enemy four miles south of Taguig; wheeling to the left the enemy was partly enclosed toward the lake and completely routed with great loss. The left of the line pursued him down the lake for fifteen miles from

VIEW OF BURNING OF TONDO DISTRICT, SHOWING DEPOT OF MANILA & DAGUPAN RAILROAD.

Taguig as far as San Pedro Tunasan, all the houses along the lake to that point being burned. The enemy's entrenchments on the left and in front of the 1st Washington Volunteer Inf. were carried, the enemy leaving more than 200 dead upon the field. The command returned to the vicinity of Pateros and bivouacked there, receiving orders to return to their respective former encampments near

Manila, excepting that the 1st Washington Volunteer Inf. was designated to hold Pasig, Pateros and Taguig and adjacent country. This ended the operations of the "Provisional Brigade." In one week all the enemy's positions, that were attacked, were taken and his troops killed, captured, or dispersed. The towns,

TRENCHES OVER WHICH THE PENNSYLVANIA REGIMENT PASSED IN CHARGE ON LA LOMA CHURCH.

from where he brought over troops or in which he resisted, were burned or destroyed; he burned them himself. The enemy's loss in killed, wounded and captured was not less than 2000 men.

"Gen. Wheaton was ably supported and assisted by the several regimental commanders through the series of operations. He calls attention to the energetic conduct of Col. J. H. Wholley, 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., and the gallant conduct in action of Maj. William P. Rogers, 20th U. S. Inf., and Maj. J. J. Weissenburger, 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., and to the gallant and meritorious services of Capt. Frank B. Jones, 22d U. S. Inf., 2d Lieut. E. D. Scott, 6th U. S. Art., rendered most efficient service with his guns, showing skill and intrepidity. He also calls attention to the very gallant conduct of Capts. Herbert S. Foster, James A. Irons and Benjamin Alrord, 20th U. S. Inf., in the storming of Pasig and in the combat of Cainta. First Lieuts. F. D. Webster and Chas. R. Howland, 20th U. S. Inf., Aides, gave valuable assistance, also 1st Lieut. Wm. D. Connor, Corps of Engineers, Acting Aide. Service, both efficient and gallant, was rendered by Capt. Elmore McKenna and Lieut. Charles E. Kilbourne, Volunteer Signal Corps."

About Manila, all was quiet, with the exception of a little skirmishing, until the morning of March 25th. During this time the insurgent army had massed its forces at Malolos, and Gen. MacArthur, by command of Major-General Otis, was preparing for an advance for the capture of that stronghold.

RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY CORPS.

At this time the American force was re-organized as follows. Major-General H. W. Lawton on March 18th, replaced Gen. Anderson in command of the first division, the latter returning to the United States according to orders. Gen. Lawton's Division consisted of the following: The Washington, North Dakota and California Volunteers, under Gen. King; six troops of the 4th Cav., the 14th

Regiment, the Idaho Volunteers and a battalion of the Iowa troops, under Gen. Ovenshine; the 3d and 22d Regiments Inf., and the Oregon Regiment, under Gen. Wheaton, and Dyer's and Hawthorne's Light Batteries.

Gen. MacArthur's Division,—two batteries of the 3d Art.; the Kansas and Montana Volunteers, under Gen. H. G. Otis; the Colorado, Nebraska and South Dakota Regiments, and six companies of the Pennsylvania Regiment, under Gen. Hale; the 4th and 17th Regiments; the Minnesota and Wyoming Volunteers, and the Utah Art., under Gen. Hall.

A separate brigade was assigned to provost guard duty, consisting of the 20th Regiment, and eight companies of the 23d Regiment Inf.

THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION.

President McKinley, by appointment, had created a "Philippine Commission." This consisted of five members as follows: Admiral Dewey; Gen. Elwell S. Otis; President J. G. Schurman, of Cornell University; Prof. Dean C. Worcester and Chas.

"LAGUNA DE BAY" BOMBARDING CONVENT OF GUADALUPE.
This was the largest of four small boats, known as the "mosquito fleet," used to patrol the lake and rivers, where they did most effectual work.

Denby. This commission was advisory to the Executive Department of the government, and was vested with the authority to proclaim to the people of the Philippine Islands a Modus Vivendi in their civic affairs, pending the action of Congress in the premises. This was a strong commission and well constituted to deal with the matter in hand. Mr. Denby had thirteen years' experience, as Minister to China, in dealing with Oriental questions. Prof. Worcester had spent years in the Philippines in the study of the people and the country. Pres. Schurman was deeply learned in civic affairs and constitutional questions, and the military and naval situation could not have been in abler hands.

This commission could not exceed the prerogative of the President, and the Executive only had such power as accrued by the treaty of peace and the military occupation of the country. The most this commission or the President could do was to arrange a temporary government, leaving to Congress the future government or final disposition of the islands, and to make a general study of the situation,

for the information of the President and Congress in determining our ultimate policy with reference to the islands. Nothing came of any effort to establish a temporary government, and the report of the commission on the general situation was not published when these pages were printed. The commission arrived in Manila, March 4, 1899, and on March 20th, organized in session with Pres. Schurman, President, and T. R. McArthur, Secretary. On April 4, 1899, the commission issued a proclamation to the Filipinos and after many recitals therein, showing the obligations of the government to establish and maintain order in the islands and its good wishes and desires in the interest of the people, it declared the intentions of our government as follows:

FLAGS OF TRUCE IN STREETS OF CALOOCAN.
The appearance of some of the streets resembled a back yard on washday

1. The supremacy of the United States must and will be enforced throughout every part of the archipelago. Those who resist can accomplish nothing except their own ruin.

2. The amplest liberty of self-government will be granted which is reconcileable with just, stable, effective and economical administration, and compatible with the sovereign rights and obligations of the United States.

3. The civil rights of the Filipinos will be guaranteed and protected, their religious freedom will be assured, and all will have equal standing before the law.

4. Honor, justice, and friendship forbid the exploitation of the people of the islands. The purpose of the American government is the welfare and advancement of the Philippine people.

5. The United States government guarantees an honest and effective civil service, in which, to the fullest extent practicable, natives shall be employed.

6. The collection and application of taxes and other revenues will be put upon a sound, honest and economical basis. The public funds, raised justly and collected honestly, will be applied only to defraying the proper expenses of the establishment and the maintenance of the Philippine government, and such general improvements as public interests demand. Local funds collected for local purposes shall not be diverted to other ends. With such prudent and honest fiscal administration, it is believed the needs of the government will, in a short time, become compatible with a considerable reduction in taxation.

7. The establishment of a pure, speedy and effective administration of justice, by which the evils of delay, corruption and exploitation will be effectively eradicated.

8. The construction of roads, railroads, and other means of communication and transportation and other public works of manifest advantage to the people, will be promoted.

9. Domestic and foreign trade and commerce and other industrial pursuits, and the general development of the country, in the interest of its inhabitants, will be the constant objects of solicitude and fostering care.

10. Effective provision will be made for the establishment of elementary schools, in which the children of the people will be educated. Appropriate facilities will also be provided for higher education.

11. Reforms in all departments of government, all branches of the public service, and all corporations, closely touching the common life of the people, must be undertaken without delay and effected conformably with common right and justice, in a way to satisfy the well-founded demands and the highest sentiments and aspirations of the Philippine people.

The Filipino Junta, at Hongkong, issued in reply its manifesto, in substance denying the rights, claimed by the American commission, on the part of the United States, to govern or control the islands, or that the United States acquired any right with reference thereto by virtue of the treaty of peace, and said further: "The proclamation is a tissue of generalities, bristled with pharisaism and cant, and vaguely promises much and grants nothing to the Filipinos, who are tired of promises and servitude, what Spanish promises seem to the Americans."

A HOT ENGAGEMENT ON THE PASIG RIVER, NEAR GUADALUPE.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE MARCH ON MALOLOS.

N the latter part of March, there had arrived at Manila a force consisting of about 950 officers and 23,000 men, with more on the way, and allowing for sickness and the defense of Manila, Gen. Otis felt strong enough to assume the offensive. Aguinaldo had established his headquarters and the civil capital at Malolos, on the railroad, about twenty-five miles northwest of Manila, where he was maintaining some sort of a civil government, with a Congress and executive departments as prescribed by the constitution which he had "proclaimed."*

Funds were derived from a revenue system which, including customs and a poll tax, was rigidly enforced in all parts of the territory held by the insurrectos. There were also large donations, voluntary or enforced, from wealthy Filipinos. These funds were used for the purchase of arms and ammunition, which were obtained from foreign sources, our fleet being insufficient to entirely prevent their landing. There was little artillery except some old-fashioned pieces of little use in modern warfare. The strength of the insurgent army was not very well known, but was supposed to be about 30,000 men. It doubtless fluctuated from week to week. The general in direct command of the insurrectos in front of Gen. MacArthur was Gen. Antonio Luna.

It was generally believed that with sufficient force the rebel army could be surrounded and captured, and with this capture of Aguinaldo there was good reason to suppose that the rebellion would come to end. At any rate it would be possible to dislodge and disperse the army and capture the capital, which of itself, and without the capture of Aguinaldo, might end the trouble. Thus Malolos was the obvious objective of the American army as soon as it should be strong enough to move at all, and preparations to that end were accordingly made. Major-General MacArthur, being in command upon the north of the Pasig River, was naturally assigned to the command of the movement.

POSITION OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES.

MacArthur's Division lay substantially where we left them at the close of Chapter VII, facing northerly, and extending from a point on Manila Bay, near Cabuican; easterly by La Loma church to the Deposito and water-works; Otis' Brigade on the left, by the bay, occupying about two and a half miles of the line, and Hale's Brigade on the right, occupying, with its extension to the Pasig River

* See page 40.

opposite San Pedro Macati, about ten and a half miles. The line of the insurrectos extended along the front of MacArthur's Division from Polo, through Novaliches, to the Nanca River, with strong outposts at important points nearer the American line.

RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION.

For the purposes of this movement MacArthur's Division was re-organized on March 17th, as follows:

The Wyoming Battalion, the 13th Minnesota, occupying the line from the San Juan River to the water-works, with the 4th and one battalion of the 17th U. S. Inf., were formed into a new 3d Brigade, under command of Brigadier-General R. H. Hall, who had arrived on March 10th, and were left upon Hale's old line to guard the water-works and Manila, and make such demonstrations as were found desirable to keep the enemy occupied on its front.

The remainder of Hale's old brigade, consisting of the 10th Pennsylvania, 1st South Dakota, 1st Colorado, and 1st Nebraska Regiments, remained under Hale's command and formed the right of the line in the advance. There were also with this brigade two Nordenfeldt guns and a detachment of the Utah Light Artillery. At the left of Hale, the brigade of Gen. H. G. Otis, consisting of the First Montana, 20th Kansas, and two battalions, 3d U. S. Art., (as infantry) occupied a portion of the front hitherto held by this brigade, while to the left of Otis, and next to the bay, was stationed a new brigade transferred from the first division, consisting of one battalion, 3d U. S. Inf., the 22d U. S. Inf., and eleven companies of the Oregon Regiment. This brigade was commanded by Brigadier-General Lloyd Wheaton, who had arrived at Manila on February 23d. It was the intention that Wheaton's Brigade should march in the rear as a support to the other brigades as needed. The total number of troops under Gen. MacArthur at the beginning of the movement was 11,578 officers and men, including Hall's Brigade. The total of the three brigades engaged in the movement was 8682. The number of effectives, however, was rapidly reduced.

AN OLD SMOOTH-BORE CANNON CAPTURED FROM INSURGENTS AT CALOOCAN.

THE NATURE OF THE COUNTRY.

The line of advance to Malolos ran parallel with the shore of the bay, near which the ground was low and marshy and cut up by a large number of interconnecting tidal estuaries called "esteros." From these lowlands there is a gradual rise to a line of foothills which, near Caloocan, are about two and a half

rom the bay shore, but gradually retreat, leaving a broad plain, intersected, er, by frequent rivers and esteros, for the operations of the armies. The l defenses of the insurrectos were along the lines of the rivers which flow from the foothills to the These lines were fully l, as well as rises of l, timber, and all other l points of defense. The y except where it was swamp, was densely popu- and in a high state tion. It was mostly rice- intersected by low dykes taining the irrigating . During the rainy season e-fields are flooded, and at that time military movements over such lands t merely difficult but impossible. There are quagmires with no bottom the soldiers can reach. In the dry season the earth, thrown up in making ches, affords partial protection to troops lying down. There were roads, s they were, traversing the plain, and the railroad embankment was of utilized for troops, but as the ground was contested at all points from the he army moved forward, for the most part, over the fields, and for much way in line of battle. The line of advance at the beginning of the move- overed about eight miles.

SUPPLY TRAIN ON PONTOON BRIDGE, AT MARILAO RIVER.

NO GENERAL ENGAGEMENT.

ile there was constant fighting along the whole line of the army, there was eral engagement between large bodies of massed troops. In a general way e of advance was marked out for each brigade by the Division Commander, shed forward or restrained the different brigades, to conform to his general hich was quite carefully supervised by the Corps Commander at Manila; actual fighting was under the direction of the Brigade Commanders, who harged with the duty of fighting their way to the points designated by lacArthur. The Signal Corps kept the division and brigade headquarters h by the field telegraph, so that general directions could be promptly given eived, but all details were necessarily in charge of the Brigade Commanders. ovement began on March 25th, and our army entered Malolos on March ut the details of our operations can be best understood by following the for- of the different brigades. The accounts of the movements of Hale's and Brigades, as here given, are by a member of the staff of this book, who anied the column, and are given as written, for the picture they give of the work of the troops. The account of the operations of Wheaton's Brigade itten by an officer of the brigade, and, as will be seen, is a concise state- f the military movements and their results. The narrative will be more understood, if it is stated here, that on March 27th, Wheaton's Brigade tached from MacArthur's Division and assigned to protecting the railroad

communications, reporting directly to the Corps Commander. On April 2d, Gen. Wheaton was assigned to the temporary command of the 1st Brigade, relieving Gen. H. G. Otis, resigned, Gen. Wheaton retaining command of the troops on the railroad.

OPERATIONS OF HALE'S BRIGADE.

With the 2d Brigade, as stated, were two Nordenfeldt guns and a detachment of the Utah Light Battery, under Lieut. Naylor, accompanied by Lieut. Perry, of the brigade staff. These advanced on March 25th up the Masambong sunken road, under cover of the infantry fire. Very soon the Filipinos, who were well entrenched, opened on the infantry and artillery. The Americans advanced almost on a run, and in less than an hour drove the insurgents from their trenches. The Nebraskas, along the San Juan River, at San Francisco del Monte, rushed into a hand-to-hand fight. The South Dakotas and Pennsylvanias gallantly forced the barricades on the Masambong Road. Naylor's guns did effective work, keeping abreast of the infantry firing line throughout the advance.

CALIFORNIA TRENCHES NEAR CONVENT OF GUADALUPE.

As the writer crossed the field that morning, half an hour after the troops, he found that the Americans had thrown away their rations and blanket rolls, and that ambulance wagons were gathering up what could be found of the soldiers' belongings; also, however, they were bringing in the wounded of both forces, and, while the Americans exhibited more tenderness towards their own wounded, yet they did not neglect those of the enemy. A dozen Filipino prisoners had been captured, and these were given stretchers and made to carry their injured companions to the ambulances. Neither were correspondents overlooked. The Hospital Corps gave to us "first aid" bandages, and asked us to do what we could for the wounded rebels, who were scattered through the woods and in the rice-fields. Behind the breastworks were appalling sights. Here an old man lay weltering in his blood; there a boy, his strong limbs shattered by Springfield bullets, and yonder in the rice-fields were rebel soldiers in all attitudes of pain—the life-blood bedewing the land they died to free. Some cried for water, and some for cigarettes, and some for death. The fields were brown and unsown, but the next year, how this red rain would nourish a harvest!

In the woods was an old man from Tarlac, who cried for water and a priest. His leg was shattered by a Springfield bullet, and he said he felt the chill of death. Through an interpreter we listened to his confession. He told us he had a wife and five children at Tarlac, and his last words were, "Forgive me for fighting the Americans, I did not know the kind of people they were." Meanwhile the brigade kept advancing along the Novaliches Road. After a fierce struggle the insurrectos gave up the villages of Cabataon and Talinapa. The day was extremely hot, and many men fell out of the march, overcome by the sun. About noon, the advance was ordered in a northwesterly direction along the Tuliahan River. At a ford of this river, where there was an uncompleted bridge, a small body of the 4th Cav. attached to the division, ran into a strong position of the enemy. In a few minutes twelve of the cavalrymen had fallen. Gen. MacArthur immediately sent the Utah Battery to their aid. The rebels were driven out after a short fight, and the brigade bivouacked for the night along the river, the Nebraskas, South Dakotas and Pennsylvanias guarding the ridges. The insurgents came in force towards the rear of our army that night, but were held in check by Maj. Allison's Battalion of the South Dakotas, sent back as rear outpost. At the Tuliahan Bridge in one rail which had been used in an entrenchment, were found ninety-six bullet marks.

REFUGEES COMING DOWN THE RIO GRANDE.

On the 26th of March, Gen. Hale marched northwesterly across the country towards Polo, a town on the Dagupan railroad, supposed to contain a strong force of rebels. Near the railroad he effected a junction with the 1st Brigade, and soon after Gen. MacArthur directed him to deploy north of the 1st Brigade and take such action against the town of Polo as circumstances might render advisable. While he was deploying the Pennsylvanias, facing west towards Polo, the Filipinos opened a brisk fire on that regiment from the north, and the South Dakotas were directed to form on the Pennsylvanias' right in a semi-circle around the crest of a hill facing north and east, while the Nebraskas, as a general reserve, were placed in the rear.

By three o'clock in the afternoon, Hale was ready to begin operations on Polo, or rather, on Meycauayan, as it turned out, the enemy having retreated to the strong entrenchments south of the latter town. The insurrectos kept continually harassing the brigade from the right flank, and Maj. Howard's Battalion of the South Dakotas was sent into the woods in that direction to drive them off. The main attack began by the discharge of the Utah Battery guns, followed by the Nebraska Hotchkiss gun, which did effective work on the eastern entrenchments. The Filipinos fought valiantly, and covered their retreat with considerable skill. At four o'clock the Pennsylvanias and South Dakotas advanced on the entrenchments, the Nebraskas following as a reserve. Gen. Hale cleverly placed his men so that the South Dakotas' right flanked the insurgents' left, demoralizing the

enemy and driving him back all along the line. While Gen. Hale was thus engaged, riding along the firing line, he came upon the South Dakotas while they were under a hot fire from the rebels, entrenched in woods and villages across the Meycauayan railroad bridge. In endeavoring to ascertain the position of the enemy he was exposed to a brisk fusilade and received a painful, though not serious wound on the knee.

Seeing that it was necessary at once to flank the enemy's trenches across the river, he sent Capt. Krayenbuhl to bring up Lieutentant-Colonel Stover's Battalion for this work. Capt. Krayenbuhl had just brought up the battalion, under heavy fire, when he was fatally wounded. Col. Stotsenberg came up with part of his Nebraska troops and reported that it would be necessary to flank the entrenchments from the railroad bridge, and was told that the South Dakotas' left had just swung around to this, and to co-operate with them in this work which he did gallantly and effectively.

Gen. Hale, his knee having been bandaged, conducted the companies on the right up the railroad, and personally directed the fire from the embankment against the trenches across the river. After capturing the railroad embankment, the river bank and the bridge, the South Dakota and Nebraska men drove the enemy from their earthworks and killed many of them as they ran across the plain. Ninety-six Filipino dead were counted in the vicinity.

The Nebraska troops were then directed to take possession of the Meycauayan railroad station, about 1000 yards north of the bridge, and extend their line 500 yards eastward into the plain. The South Dakotas were deployed across the plain on the Nebraskas' right, with their own right thrown back on the river. After locating the troops, Gen. Hale returned across the river, reconnoitered the town of Meycauayan and esteros to the west, and placed the Pennsylvanias on the Nebraskas' left, extending westward through Meycauayan. This arrangement put the brigade in a crescent, with its right flank on the river and its left flank on an estero.

THE SUPPLY TRAIN FOLLOWING UP TROOPS ON THE ADVANCE ON MALOLOS.

This crescent formation prevents flanking by the enemy, and enables a skilled commander cleverly to change his formation to meet all exigencies.

During the forenoon of the 27th of March, the 2d Brigade advanced toward the Marilao River, the South Dakotas acting as advance guard, the Nebraskas and Pennsylvanias as the main body. At noon the insurrectos opened fire upon the



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THIS MAP SHOWS THE OPERATIONS OF MACARTHUR'S DIVISION IN THE ADVANCE FROM CALOOCAN TO MALOLOS.
Made by P. E. Lamar, the official map maker for this division.

COLONELS OF VOLUNTEER REGIMENTS WHO WON THEIR STAR IN THE JUNGLES OF LUZON.

1. Brigadier-General Irving Hale (Colorado Regiment), appointed August 13, 1898. 2. Brigadier-General Frederick Funston (Kansas Regiment), appointed May 4, 1899. 3. Brigadier-General Owen Summers (Oregon Regiment), appointed (Brevet) May 24, 1899. 4. Brigadier-General James F. Smith (California Regiment), appointed April 25, 1899. 5. Brigadier-General Harry C. Kessler (Montana Regiment), appointed (Brevet) October 4, 1899. 6. Brigadier-General C. McC. Reeve (Minnesota Regiment), appointed August 13, 1898. 7. Colonel John H. Wholley (Washington Regiment) recommended for Brevet.

advance skirmish line of the South Dakotas (Maj. Howard's Battalion) from entrenchments in the woods south of the river. This line pressed on, and Lieutenant-Colonel Stover and Maj. Allison rushed forward their battalions to its support, Col. Frost personally superintending the advance of the entire line. The Filipinos contended foot by foot for the ground. From one line of trenches to the next,

SAN JUAN BRIDGE—TAKEN SOON AFTER THE BATTLE OF SANTA MESA.
(Regiments of the Tennessee, Colorado and Nebraska Brigades charged across this bridge in the face of murderous fire.)

they fell back. Then they crossed the river and formed in strong trenches there. Again the victorious Americans pursued them, the South Dakotas wading waist-deep in the stream, and with wild cheers, charged up the opposite bank on the sullen foe. After one of the hardest fought battles of the campaign, the Filipinos were again routed, the South Dakota Regiment losing three officers and six men killed and twenty-three men wounded. Admiration is divided between the wild valor of the Americans and the courageous defense of the Filipinos. All through the afternoon they kept up a desultory fire from the woods across the plain to the north and a bitter enfilading fire along the north bank of the river, wounding several of our men, who returned their attacks with spirit, the enemy evidently covering in this way his obstinate retreat.

As night came on, large bodies of insurrectos, apparently brought from the north by trains, formed and deployed along the north side of the plain 2000 yards away, covering the entire front of MacArthur's Division. These at once [illegible] a hot fusilade all along our lines. The 3d Art., 1st Brigade, on the left of the railroad replied with Krage-Jorgensens. Gen. Hale found his [illegible] right to a galling enfilading fire and instructed his troops to [illegible] entrenchments until the enemy were within 600 yards [illegible]. This order was given in view of the fact that the Springfield [illegible] in range to the Mauser of the Filipinos. On this [illegible] pressed very closely upon the right flank of the Nebraskas [illegible] the order was given. The rest of the regiment, seeing [illegible] the foe, joined in the charge and drove the insurrectos [illegible] to a wooded ridge. The South Dakotas were [illegible] plain to support the Nebraskas, who were [illegible] where the whole brigade encamped [illegible].

The next day the whole of MacArthur's Division remained at Marilao recuperating, bringing up the supply trains and issuing rations and ammunition. On reconnoitering, the patrols found that the ridge captured by the Nebraskas the day before, was still unoccupied, although some insurrectos were found near the railroad. On March 29th, the brigade advanced on the east side of the railroad track. The Nebraskas then moved on the right of the brigade against the ridge which they had captured on the night of the 27th. They swung to the left, and flanked the enemy in front of the Pennsylvanias and Dakotas. The Nebraskas engaged the enemy at 7:30 in the morning, and pursued them across the Bocaue River towards Santa Maria. A company of Nebraskas then caused the town to be evacuated. The South Dakotas and Pennsylvanias crossed the river without serious opposition, and the whole command arrived at the Bigaa River about noon, where the enemy had partially destroyed the railroad and the bridges. A fire had been set to the bridge, and 100 feet of the railroad track torn up, but the Yankee troops came up too rapidly, and the fire was extinguished leaving the bridge practically uninjured, while the road was easily repaired.

PENNSYLVANIA AMBULANCE WAGON AT LA LOMA CHURCH.

These marches were usually commenced just after daylight. The morning hours in the tropics are the coolest and the men can then work without suffering from the heat. The hours from four to six in the afternoon are also favorable for hard work. Accordingly, at half past three o'clock the march from Bigaa was assumed and the Guiguinto River reached about five. As there was no sign of a concealed foe the Pennsylvanias began to cross the bridge. When about fifteen men had passed over and deployed, the insurrectos, from a ridge at some distance, opened a hot fusilade on the bridge and the railroad track. Col. Hawkins, who was with his advanced line when the attack was made, gallantly returned the fire and the few men who were already on the ground deploying, the others as they came up held the position until enough troops were on the line to repulse the enemy, the Pennsylvanias standing well to their guns while Gen. Hale hurried the remainder of the regiment across, while Maj. Howard's Battalion of South Dakotas quickly came up and took a position on the right. The 20th Kansas, of the 1st Brigade, and the Utah guns and rapid fire guns also crossed and came into the action. A barricade across the railroad track was demolished by the artillery. At this bridge the Filipinos were doing very good work with their Mausers with

which they fired on our men, armed with Springfields, without coming into effective range of the latter. But when the cannon began to speak, the enemy gave up their position on the hill. Lieut. Perry of the Brigade Staff, was slightly wounded in this engagement. As darkness was drawing on, the troops camped for the night on the river bank. The men enjoyed their evening meal in peace, and many of them had a swim in the mild waters.

The forenoon of the following day was passed in bringing up the train, and issuing rations and ammunition. In the afternoon preparations were made to renew the march on the Filipino capital. When the brigade had reached a point west of the Guiguinto River, it met with a scattering, insurrecto fire. The General perceived soon after that a party of Filipinos were coming down the railroad track, apparently with the intention to surrender. He sent out a man to meet them, but as he approached, the Filipinos ran back towards their own lines. Sometime later a second party appeared on the track, and this time a Filipino was sent out to interview them. They, however, made some paltry excuse for their action, and it became evident that they were trying to spy upon our lines, or lead our troops into a trap. No further attempt was made to communicate with them, but, as a precaution, Hale advanced one company of Pennsylvanias, and one company of Kansas (1st Brigade), to take possession of entrenchments, supposed to be unoccupied. But the wily enemy, from his cover where he had been watching like a panther, sent his fire into our men the moment they advanced. Nothing daunted, however, the two companies with great dash and elan went at the position and took it, without the loss of a man. Then camp was made once more. In all our marching, fighting and bivouacking, it was cheering to see how readily the troops adapted things to their comfort. Thus, one swam into a river to catch some ducks for his evening meal; another boy had a game-cock, captured at the last village, while the rank and file fell upon the pigs and chickens and made a vast slaughter of them. In fact, it soon came to be a settled thing that no self-respecting hen would trust herself inside the American lines. When we entered a captured place, the first question asked, was: "Well, comrade, are hens flying high?" If there were a

BACALOR CHURCH, SHOWING EFFECT OF BOMBARDMENT AND GUN THAT FIRED ON THE MONADNOCK

few shacks, or some bamboo tables, or Filipino stretchers, the boys would get at these things and put them to use in the most ingenious way. They sometimes entered the abandoned houses, but there was little left to take away. If there was a white flag or any sign of peaceful inhabitant, they were invariably left unmolested. All "pacificos" were encouraged to return to their homes, and to pursue their peaceful avocations.

On the night of March 30th, a reconnaissance was made by Gen. Hale, and trenches with insurrectos in them, were found at Santa Isabel, the eastern suburb of Malolos. Outposts were placed along the edge of the woods, the Utah Battery and the infantry detachments built emplacements for guns on each side of the railroad, and preparations were made to attack Malolos in the morning.

Shortly after dawn, on March 31st, the 2d Brigade advanced up the right side of the railroad in the following order: The Nebraskas on the right moved fifteen minutes after the Utah Battery had opened fire; the South Dakotas marched in the center five minutes after the Nebraskas; the Pennsylvanias, with their left near

WARD IN FIRST RESERVE HOSPITAL. *Photo by Lillie.*

the railroad, moved five minutes later than the Dakotas. This made a crescent formation concave toward the enemy, enveloping his left flank, and compelling him to abandon his trenches and the town of Malolos, thus facilitating the entrance of the 1st Brigade which moved up the west side of the track into the town itself.

At half past six the Filipinos began to fire. The fire at this time was not heavy nor long continued, and it soon became evide t either that Malolos was being evacuated by the enemy, or Aguinaldo was holding fire for stragetic reasons.

The first supposition turned out to be the true one. After the brigade had crossed the Malolos Creek and the Malolos-Quingua Road it wheeled to the left across a broad open plain under a galling Mauser fire from the railroad embankment, which could not be effectively returned by our men, armed mostly with Springfield rifles. The Hotchkiss gun of the Nebraskas fired three shots at the foe, retreating up the railroad track 2000 yards away. The shots seemed to strike right among the fleeing insurgents. At half past ten, Gen. Hale's command reached Barasoain Station, the northwest suburb of Malolos. In accordance with

instructions from Gen. MacArthur, it was afterwards swung back upon the Malolos-Quingua Road, where it remained until the advance upon Calumpit began.

In the advance from Manila to Malolos, the losses on the staff were four; in the Pennsylvanias, thirty-eight; in the South Dakotas sixty-two; in the Nebraskas, eighty-seven, making a total of one hundred and ninety-one. One officer on the staff was killed, and two officers and one orderly wounded; in the Pennsylvanias four enlisted men were killed, and two officers and thirty-two men wounded; in the South Dakotas three officers and four men were killed, and two officers and fifty-three men wounded; in the Nebraskas six enlisted men were killed, and four officers and seventy-seven men wounded. This is the most eloquent tribute to the bravery of these regiments.

The total distance marched by the right flank from March 25th to 31st was sixty-six miles, or over three times the air-line distance from Caloocan to Malolos. This was due to the repeated turning movements executed by the 2d Brigade to flank the enemy out of entrenched positions, and render the advance along the railroad less deadly. As the result of this arduous and dangerous campaign, in addition to those already mentioned, one officer and four enlisted men died from the effects of their wounds before the march on Calumpit, and large numbers were obliged to return to Manila sick and suffering from heat prostration. This is not surprising, when we consider the heavy weight which the men had to carry in this rough country. Each soldier was loaded with gun, with strap and bayonet, belt, haversack, mess-kit, canteen full of water or coffee, one day's rations, 100 to 150 rounds of ammunition, and poncho hung in belt.

OPERATIONS OF GEN. OTIS' BRIGADE.

At 6 P. M. on the 25th, the column, consisting of 2184 officers and men, advanced from near the La Loma church and to the right and left of it—at right angles to Caloocan and the Balantasig Road. The word was whispered down the Kansas line, "Let us throw away our rations and blankets and go at the niggers with guns, canteens and ammunition alone." The writer crossed the field of war half an hour after the engagement. The boys had dropped their cans of beef and salmon, their blankets and camp kit; they kept their canteens and guns, and went at the foe. With such a brigade of fighters, the Filipinos thought all pandemonium was after them. They fought bravely at the first onset, but it was soon evident that the white man's nerve and the white man's science were too much for the wild valor of Aguinaldo's mountain men. Before two hours had passed the 3d Art. and the Kansans had gained the north bank of the Tuliahan River, the men intrepidly swimming the stream in the face of a severe fire. It was a short range, and the brave little regiment, the 3d Art., lost heavily. But the loss they inflicted was greater still.

COL. STOTSENBERG, TAKEN SHORTLY BEFORE HE WAS KILLED.

Lieut. Abernethy of the 3d Art. distinguished himself for gallantry, but every man in the command was equally worthy of high praise. In a trench in front of the Kansans, there were thirty Filipinos. These men fought till twenty-six were dead, two mortally wounded, one slightly wounded, and only one man got away. Owing to the thorny thickets, dense jungles, bamboo belts, difficult streams and deep morasses, the Montanas were delayed, but they fought a terrific fight, and joined the line as the evening lights were beginning to soften the land. In the first day's fight our loss in this brigade was sixty-eight killed and wounded. Information of the burning and evacuation of Malabon came to us here among the cane brakes. The brigade bivouacked at the Tuliahan River.

STREET IN TONDO DISTRICT AFTER BATTLE OF FEBRUARY 23d.

On the morning of the 26th as we started out towards Polo and Malinta we saw a cloud of smoke like a great volcano towering up into the air. All along the sun-beaten track of road our men reclined in the shade where they could get it; or tried their luck in the empty houses along the march looking for water. The natives usually left a fine supply of good water in earthern jars. We lay still for several hours in a hot tropic forenoon. A party of correspondents found two bushels of ripe tomatoes. They happened to be in the Pennsylvania lines just then and went down the lines with the tomatoes, the excellent find lasted till they had gone along a line of 200 men.

At last the order was given to advance. I saw one old grizzly captain, if I remember rightly it was Capt. Baltwood of the 20th Kansas, watching his men and carefully keeping them under the trees whenever there was a chance to find retreat from the pursuing rays of the sun. I noted also, that he and his men were like untamed panthers when the battle was on. Well, down a hot dusty road we rushed; soon firing, and by the tack-tack sound we knew that it was a Mauser; then an angry roar as of unchained lions where the penned martyrs are; then a confusion of such sounds punctuated by the snarl of the cannon—then a hush. In the headquarters a party are waiting. Around are the officers and the reporters and foreign attachés. The attaché from Japan is making careful notes; of how the Krag penetrates, of how the Mauser carries, of how the Springfield kicks, of how superb and accurate is the firing of the American soldier. He starts suddenly and well he may; death came near enough his door to have made a call. A Remington in an angry way drilled a hole on the under side of his leg and after burrowing in the ground came out a foot away from him. The men across in the

reserve are lying low, for bullets are barking the trees all around them—yet they talk and joke as if this was only an April holiday.

The reserves are ordered up. Out of the woods and into the wide rice-fields they go; they deploy to the right; Wheaton's Brigade is on their left cutting its way through woods afire and fields aflame. Already the brave Col. Egbert of the 22d Regulars, is down with his death wound, and other hearts are going to break in far away America. Down the road we looked in the edges of the woods and the grass for any man that might need help. On a cot a man lay full six feet, a big brave boy ten minutes ago. He drew a few breaths and then reported for duty in other fields.

Smashing us from one side and another the insurrectos retreated inch by inch stubbornly contesting the ground. At the close of day we had Polo and Malinta. Both towns had been fired by the signed order of Gen. Luna.

This day the brigade lost eleven in killed and wounded. We passed the night near Polo. The 10th Pennsylvanias were detached for service in the 1st Brigade.

BRIDGE AT MALABON, SHOWING SPAN BLOWN OUT BY INSURGENTS.

On the 27th of March the brigade advanced at 7 A. M. When they reached the next town, Meycauayan, they found it in flames, fired by the orders of Gen, Luna. Passing on up the railroad track in the direction of the insurrecto capital, they arrived at Marilao early in the day. The enemy was here discovered in unknown strength, and Col. Funston with three battalions went after him. It was a hot fight but the indomitable Colonel and the unsubdued Kansans drove him back. As before, the enemy fought well at first, but was overcome by the white man's nerve, skill and staying power, and by his immense superiority in weapons.

In the afternoon the Kansans crossed the bridge which had already been crossed by the 3d Art., which Gen. Otis calls "a small, but effective regiment," with the loss of eighteen in killed and wounded. The Montanas, as a train and artillery guard, came up to mend the bridge. Camp was made for the night at the Marilao River. The loss of the command at the bridge was four.

On the following day the Bocaue and Bigaa Rivers were crossed. The horses were made to swim. The column flanked Bulacan, lying west near the bay, and reported to be occupied by Aguinaldo's troops. The leader here was said to be Gen. Gregorio del Pilar with 500 men.

Guiguinto was reached on the afternoon; the 10th Pennsylvania and the Kansans crossed the bridge, and the 3d Art. and Montanas camped on the south side of the river. Indications of demoralization among the enemy were frequent. Yet from later knowledge of them, they were evidently conducting a rear guard fight and doing it with great skill, as they had done on former occasions.

SQUAD OF MONTANA MEN ON THE FIRING LINE NEAR MALOLOS. *Photo by Lillie.*

All the bridges were saved, but many houses were destroyed. Sometimes the rebels set fire to them; sometimes they were burned after our army came into the towns. March 30th, we marched to the rebel trenches, two miles from Malolos. There we found a small party strongly entrenched near the railroad. The railroad had been the vertebra, as it were, of the advancing division. On either side of this were long, low stretches of level grounds, dotted with villages and settlements, and interspersed by bamboo belts about every mile of the way. On this railroad then, the insurgent forces suddenly opened on Otis and his staff. Gen. MacArthur was also on the ground at the time with his staff. One company of the 10th Pennsylvania and one company of the Kansans repelled this attack; the 2d Brigade with the rest of MacArthur's Division marched on Malolos at the break of day on March 31st. The 20th Kansas were on the right of the brigade, the Montanas in the center, and the 3d Art. on the left. The advance uncoiled itself slowly, like a great python, across the lagoons and marshes. On the right there was some heavy firing, but Malolos was taken with scarcely a blow, the army of Aguinaldo having evacuated the place. Smoke and flames were seen issuing from the palace of the President of the Filipino Republic. The "nipa" huts were also in flames. The frenzied inhabitants were determined to destroy their homes and die for what they considered their sacred liberties.

The Montanas were nearest the town, and Otis sent them forward to occupy it, which they did at 9:40, according to Gen. Otis' report. At 9:45 the Montanas came to the public square. The house of the Filipino Congress was in flames. Col. Kessler, of the 3d Art., came up at once; Col. Funston and the Kansans had entered at 9:30, going in at a point near the railroad line. At ten o'clock the Kansans reported, and shortly after the 1st Brigade flag, surmounted by the

[illegible]ationaal colors, floated from the staff, erected in front of the headquarters of the [illegible]surgent government. The flag was given by Company G of the Montanas. [illegible]hen it was raised a mighty cheer went up.

No burning by our troops was allowed. Looting was strictly forbidden, and [illegible]l public and private property was put under guard. Perfect order was main[illegible]ained in the city. The Montanas and the 3d Art. were sent to guard the town. [illegible]couting parties and outposts were posted.

The total loss of the brigade in the march to Malolos was 285 killed and [illegible]ounded, being more than ten per cent of the strength of the whole command.

Col. Funston, Col. Kessler, and Maj. Kobbe were mentioned for gallant conduct, and special distinction was asked for them from the War Department. After seven days of hard fighting the insurgent capital was taken. Of the men under him Gen. Harrison Gray Otis writes: "They have shown in an eminent degree the qualities of good soldiers, obedient to discipline, enduring in courage, in steadiness, in patriotism, and magnificent order in battle."

OPERATIONS OF WHEATON'S BRIGADE.*

On March 22d, Gen. Wheaton received orders from Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps to report for temporary duty with his brigade to Major-General MacArthur. The brigade consisted of one battalion 3d U. S. Inf., just landed from transport, 22d U. S. Inf., and eleven companies 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf., in all 2241 officers and enlisted men effective for duty. The night of March 24th, this brigade relieved the 1st Brigade, second division, Brigadier-General Otis, in the trenches extending from the left, west of Caloocan, to the vicinity of La Loma church. This disposition was made in the darkness, without the enemy gaining any knowledge of it, although his entrenchments were close in

TRENCHES AND BRIDGE AT CALOOCAN.

front and our movements exposed to his short-range fire. The 2d Oregon was placed on the left, 22d U. S. Inf. on the right, the battalion 3d Inf. in the enclosure, or wall, about Caloocan church, and near the center. March 25th, soon after daylight, Major-General MacArthur commenced his movement by

* Written by an officer of the brigade.

advancing his right brigade to attack the enemy in the trenches on his front, and to advance his right on Polo. Soon after, his left took up the movement and advanced to the front and left his artillery near the center, advancing with his lines.

As soon as the left brigade moved, Gen. Wheaton advanced one battalion of the 22d Inf. on his right to cover the movement of the 3d U. S. Art.—foot—on Gen.

SECTION OF FIRST RESERVE HOSPITAL, USED FOR WOUNDED FILIPINOS. *Photo by Lillie.*

MacArthur's left. The turning movement having sufficiently developed to threaten the rebel entrenchments on their left flank, Gen. Wheaton directed that fire be opened on the rebel entrenchments on his front by the guns of the Utah Light Artillery, 1st. Lieut. George W. Gibbs, and at 8:30 A. M. directed his whole line to advance in the following order: 22d U. S. Inf., Col. H. C. Egbert, on the right to endeavor to keep in touch and communication with the 3d U. S. Art. on the left of Otis' Brigade; MacArthur's Division, one battalion 3d U. S. Inf., Capt. Cooke, center; two companies on the east side of the railroad track and two on the west side. Second Oregon Volunteer Inf., Col. O. Summers, left extending to near the channel separating Malabon from the mainland. The rebels were found in their entrenchments in great force, and line after line of their works was carried with the utmost gallantry. The roll of the infantry fire was now continuous and intense; the heaviest fighting at this time falling on the 2d Oregon and two companies of 3d U. S. Inf. By 11:30 A. M. the enemy was thrown to the line of entrenchments along the Tuliahan River, he having been driven from his successive lines of entrenchments with great slaughter. The two guns of the Utah Light Battery were now brought up from the line of works in front of Caloocan to a point on the railroad track, nine hundred yards from the bridge across the Tuliahan; a Hotchkiss revolving cannon was sent to the extreme left to keep down the fire of the enemy coming from across the channel near Malabon. His block-houses and entrenchments along the river on the north bank were shelled. A battalion of two companies of the 23d U. S. Inf., one hundred and fifty-nine officers and enlisted men, Capt. S. B. Pratt, having been sent out from the city, were placed on the right with instructions to connect with the left of Otis' Brigade, which was done by fording the Tuliahan. Late in the afternoon, a despatch was received from

lacArthur that it was probable, owing to the difficulties of the country, : would not be able to place his right at Polo that day, but hoped to be arly next morning. Gen. Wheaton now suspended his forward movement, r that the enemy might not be driven beyond Polo or Malinta before the ; in that vicinity had been seized by Gen. MacArthur. Night closed Gen. Wheaton's right connecting with Otis' Brigade of the second n, and the line close to the Tuliahan, with the enemy all driven to the ank. March 26th, at daylight, the indications were that the enemy was ng for retreat.

: city of Malabon, on the left, was on fire, and a stream of fugitive soldiers, nemy, and inhabitants, was pouring from the city toward the north. Col. was ordered to ford the Tuliahan River with his regiment—the 22d U. S. ear the right, and form line perpendicular to the river, his right to the his left to be supported by the battalion 23d U. S. Inf. By 11 A. M. all hments near the river were carried, the 2d Oregons on the left meeting ı obstinate resistance. Gen. Wheaton crossed the river in person at this ar the railroad bridge, and the rebels opened fire from an entrenchment y, from the river to Malinta, from walls, loopholed for musketry about the , and from entrenchments at Malinta. The 22d U. S. Inf. was ordered to ne, facing the entrenchments, and to charge and carry them, which the nt did with great gallantry. Col. H. C. Egbert was mortally wounded in arge, and died soon after. At the same time the 2d Oregon, on the left, everything before it. The 3d U. S. Art. now—about 12 M.—entered a. The enemy fled north, pursued by Gen. MacArthur's center and right. Wheaton's whole brigade went into camp at Malinta, the two remaining ns of the 3d U. S. Inf. having joined from the transport, about dark. 27th, under order from the Division Commander, the 2d Oregon was left at a, and the rest of the brigade joined head of column. The battalion of the S. Inf. was returned to Manila. At 8:40 A. M. Gen. Wheaton received a h from the Department Commander to be under his orders direct, and to ilroad open in the rear of Gen. MacArthur's Division. March 28th, the 3d

JUST BEFORE THE ADVANCE.

l Infs. marched to Marilao. March 29th, the Marilao was crossed and the : marched up the railroad. March 30th, the 13th Minnesota Volunteer Inf. igned to Gen. Wheaton's command. Column moved at 6:30 A. M. All trains ft at Bocaue with one battalion, 22d U. S. Inf., as guard. The column l Guiguinto at 9:30 A. M., and before dark the 3d U. S. Inf., Col. Page, and

two battalions 22d U. S. Inf. were in bivouac, one half mile in rear of Major-General MacArthur's line of battle, one and one-half to two miles from Malolos. In conference with Gen. MacArthur it was decided that Gen. Wheaton should support his attack on the enemy's position, in front of Malolos, by supporting his left with two battalions 22d U. S. Inf. and his right with three battalions 3d U. S. Inf. March 31st, soon after daylight, the five battalions mentioned were placed, deployed in two lines of skirmishers, closed to two and one-half paces interval; distance between lines, 500 yards. The right and left battalions to lap over and beyond the line of battle of the division. Action commenced about 7 A. M., the left occupying Malolos, the enemy's capital, early in the day. Gen. Wheaton was with the right and opened fire on an entrenchment of the enemy with Hotchkiss revolving cannon, soon after the line was formed.

After some maneuvering, Hale's Brigade carried the enemy's works, and pursued him in the direction of Calumpit. The entire movement from the lines in front of Caloocan to Malolos was a complete success. Great damage and heavy loss in killed and wounded was inflicted upon the rebels, and nowhere was the

WHERE THE NEBRASKA REGIMENT LOST TWELVE MEN WITHIN FIFTY YARDS.

enemy able to considerably retard the advance. He was in strong force in front of our lines on March 25th. In front of Gen. Wheaton's Brigade his entrenchments were held by not less than 4000 men, mostly armed with Mauser rifles. The conduct of our officers and men was distinguished by daring and the utmost energy. Gen. Wheaton expresses the highest admiration for the distinguished gallantry of Col. Harry C. Egbert, 22d U. S. Inf., who fell at Malinta during the charge of his regiment upon the enemy's entrenchments. He should be held in grateful remembrance by his countrymen. The gallant conduct of Col. O. Summers, 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf., on March 25th and 26th, is worthy of the highest praise. He maneuvered his regiment with ability and did excellent service, inspiring his command which fought with courage and determination. The conduct of Capt. John G. Ballance, 22d U. S. Inf., was distinguished for courage and skill. His ability in handling his battalion under the enemy's fire is worthy of the highest consideration. Gen. Wheaton states that he is indebted for valuable asistance to Capt. H. C. Cabell, 3d U. S. Inf., Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. V., 1st Lieut. F. D. Webster, 20th Inf., Aide-de-camp; 2d Lieut. W. D. Connor.

Corps of Engineers, Acting Aide-de-camp, and 2d Lieut A. P. Hayne, Battery A, California Volunteer Heavy Artillery, Acting Aide-de-camp; that they carried his orders to all parts of the field during these operations; he expresses his thanks for the courage and ability with which they carried his orders. Gen. Wheaton also states that Maj. G. F. Shiels, Brigade Surgeon of Volunteers, rendered valuable service in bringing wounded from the most exposed places, and in many instances carrying orders under the heaviest fire of the enemy.

THE GILMORE INCIDENT.

In the latter part of March, during the period covered by this chapter, the gunboat *Yorktown* was ordered to patrol the coast of Luzon. After liberating foreign residents in towns where they were held as prisoners, the *Yorktown* proceeded northward as far as the province of El Principe, stopping at the capital town of Bales, where she arrived April 12th. The province contains about 50,000 inhabitants, and is a mountainous country. The town of Bales has a population of nearly 12,000, and is ten days' distant by land from Manila—three days on horseback, and seven by coach. So isolated is the place that neither the natives nor Spanish residents were aware of events transpiring in Manila, nor of their changed relations to each other, or the world.

The Spanish had maintained a garrison at Bales, which for nearly a year had been besieged by the insurrectos, a siege which was continued nothwithstanding surrender of Spain's claims to sovereignty. The garrison consisted of eighty-three soldiers, three officers and two priests, who were defending themselves in a church. The mission of the *Yorktown* was to acquaint the insurrectos with the change in government, and to rescue the beleaguered garrison. On the arrival of the *Yorktown*, Lieut. J. C. Gilmore, and Ensign W. H. Standley were directed to proceed up the river in the *Yorktown's* launch, making soundings, and discovering the conditions of affairs at Bales. On arriving at the mouth of the river, Ensign Standley landed, and Gilmore with a party from the gunboat proceeded up the stream, soon being concealed from view by a bend in the shore. Shortly after losing sight of the boat, Standley heard a bugle call, followed by three volleys and cheering. That the launch had been surprised by insurrectos, he did not doubt, and as the automatic gun with which the boat was equipped, made no reply, it seemed almost certain that Gilmore and party had been killed, or taken prisoners.

Returning to the ship with this report, search was instituted for the Lieutenant, his party, and the launch, but nothing coming to light about either, after a few days, during which the Filipinos refused to communicate with the American officers, the *Yorktown* continued her voyage to Iloilo. From that time, and to the time when these pages are printed, the party have been held as prisoners by the Filipinos.

CHURCH AT MALOLOS.
Used as headquarters for our troops.

CHAPTER IX.

MacARTHUR'S MARCH ON SAN FERNANDO.

FOR some weeks after the capture of Malolos, MacArthur's Division remained there awaiting further developments. The position of affairs was not much changed, except that the headquarters of the insurrectos had been pushed back a few miles. The insurrectos were as active as ever, and their lines confronted ours near Malolos, just as they had previously confronted them at Caloocan. Whenever the Americans appeared in force the insurrectos retired. When the Americans fell back, the insurrectos returned. About this time Gen. H. G. Otis resigned and returned to the United States, and was succeeded in the command of the 1st Brigade by Gen. Lloyd Wheaton on April 2d. The regiments of Wheaton's Brigade were partly returned to Manila and partly scattered along the line of the railroad upon guard duty, under command of Gen. Wheaton. Gen. Wheaton remained in command of the 1st Brigade until our forces reached San Fernando, and was also in general charge of the railroad communications with Manila. On April 14th, the 10th Pennsylvania Regiment was relieved by the 51st Iowas.

During the second week in April, a body of insurrectos appeared near the railroad between Malolos and Manila, threatening our communications. Gen. Wheaton proceeded to attend to that matter, and the following, written by an officer of his brigade, describes his operations in so doing:

WHEATON'S OPERATIONS ALONG THE RAILROAD.

At 1 A. M. April 11th, Gen. Wheaton received a despatch from the commanding officer at Bigaa that the enemy had attacked in force at Bocaue, on the railroad, our line of communication; that he was attacked and that he wanted re-inforcements. In compliance with instructions from Major-General MacArthur, commanding the second division, Gen. Wheaton immediately proceeded (on foot) in the direction of points attacked, taking with him a detachment of twenty-five men of the 4th Cav. (dismounted), under command of Lieut. Charles Boyd, 4th U. S. Cav. Upon reaching a company of the 13th Minnesota Volunteer Inf., encamped two and one-half miles south of Malolos and along the railroad track, it was found that an additional company had been sent there from Guiguinto. The company was ordered to follow the General, and also one platoon of the other company. Upon arriving at the bridge, one mile or less from Guiguinto, the company there was ordered to follow. The command arrived at Guiguinto as the

enemy attacked the outposts there. The commanding officer seemed to have made no adequate preparation for combat. Gen. Wheaton immediately deployed the whole force, amounting to about 400 men, along the railroad track, and pushed by hand the armored train lying there into position to command the ground east and north of Guiguinto. The enemy now attacked by firing from all the bamboo thickets and timber near the station and north and east of the depot. Fire was opened upon him from the six-pound rifle, and the Hotchkiss revolving cannon and the two machine guns on the armored train. The whole infantry line opened fire, and before daylight the enemy was driven off and dispersed.

Gen. Wheaton then proceeded to Bigaa, taking the troops at Guiguinto with him and leaving the detachment 4th Cav. to guard the station, until relieved by troops sent from Malolos by the Division Commander. The armored train was pushed by hand. The enemy was driven from the vicinity of Bigaa, and taking the troops there, excepting detachment left as guard, the General proceeded to Bocaue. Upon arriving within a mile of that place he found the troops yet engaged. He opened fire on the enemy with machine guns and attacked him with infantry, deployed in the extended order, and drove him in flight in the direction

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of Santa Maria and east of Bocaue. It was found that there had been a spirited combat at Bocaue, and the four companies of infantry there and in the vicinity had preserved the railroad track intact and had inflicted loss upon the enemy. It was also learned that the three companies of the Oregon Regiment at Marilao had been attacked by about 400 rebels, who were driven off. The telegraph line between Bocaue and Marilao had been cut in several places, and it was not until afternoon that the line was restored. The enemy had attacked in considerable force all the places held by troops, from Marilao to Guiguinto inclusive. He was beaten off everywhere by daylight and driven from the vicinity of all the stations before 6:30 A. M. The General ordered four companies of the 2d Oregon from Malinta and two from Marilao, and with two companies at Bocaue assembled at that point two battalions of the regiment and had there the entire Minnesota Regiment. Major-General MacArthur sent from Malolos one 3.2-inch gun and one Hotchkiss revolving cannon. At daylight, on the morning of the 12th of April, a move was made upon Santa Maria with this force. Fire was opened upon the position and entrenchments of the enemy at that place with artillery, and the



MAP SHOWING MOVEMENT OF MAC ARTHUR'S DIVISION FROM CALUMPIT TO SAN FERNANDO

KARL IRVING FAUST AND JOHN W. TAYLOR.
Near the Luneta, Manila

infantry advanced in the extended order. The enemy—eleven companies of infantry—offered a feeble resistance, and fled north and east of Santa Maria. Strong detachments were sent on all north and east roads. They pursued the enemy in every direction, but were unable to come up with him, as he had dispersed. The command returned to Bocaue, during the afternoon, and from there the troops were sent to the several stations they occupied before the enemy's attack upon the points, held by the troops along the railroad track. From information obtained from prisoners and from escaped Spanish refugees, it was learned that this attack upon our communications was made under the orders and supervision of Aguinaldo, who was at Santa Maria the 11th of April. The loss of the enemy, as near as could be ascertained, was about 250 killed and wounded.

Thanks are due Col. O. Summers, 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf., for prompt cooperation and to Capt. H. C. Catell for able assistance, also to 1st. Lieut. F. D. Webster, 20th Inf., Aide-de-camp, and 1st Lieut. H. E. Ely, 22d Inf., Acting Assistant Quartermaster and Acting Chief Surgeon. Maj. Bell, U. S. V. Engineers, of Major-General MacArthur's staff, rendered valuable services on the 12th of April, and had charge of an important reconnaissance from Santa Maria.

In the latter part of April, Gen. MacArthur was instructed by the commanding general to renew his pressure upon the insurrectos, and drive them from Calumpit and San Fernando, which had become their headquarters.

HALE'S OPERATIONS FROM MALOLOS TO CALUMPIT.

The country from Malolos to Calumpit is level for the most part. A wagon road runs five miles northeasterly to Quingua, bordered with a fringe of woods most of the way, with open fields on both sides. For half a mile about Quingua, the country is covered with woods, but just before reaching the woods there was half a mile of open space defended by trenches—the scene of the battle of Quingua. Around the town itself was a strong line of trenches. The Quingua River flows westward past the north edge of the town of Quingua, and the south edge of the town of Pulilan toward Calumpit, eight miles west of Quingua.

GEN. WHEATON AT MALOLOS. Photo by Fabie

The railroad runs northwest from Malolos to Calumpit, through a rich farming country like the English downs. Five miles from Malolos it crosses the Bagbag River, which here flows southwesterly. The railroad has an iron bridge, the farther span of which had been dropped into the river by the insurrectos,—a fact discovered by Maj. Bell in a reconnaissance from Malolos. A mile and a quarter further on, the road crosses the Rio Grande de la Pampanga on a fine iron bridge,

the condition of which was unknown. Three hundred yards above and northeast of the broken Bagbag Bridge, the Bagbag River is formed by the junction of the Quingua River, flowing from the east, and the Calumpit River, a narrow, deep, canal-like stream extending from this junction northwesterly parallel to the railroad to the Rio Grande, thus forming a connecting link between the two rivers.

OREGON BOYS ON THE FIRING LINE. *Photo by Lillie.*

The town of Calumpit lies in the rectangle formed by the railroad, the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, the Calumpit and the Bagbag, being thus surrounded on three sides by rivers said to be unfordable. It was known to be very strongly fortified by entrenchments built in a practically continuous line along the river banks, covered in some cases with bomb proofs, and other cases with loopholed breastworks, having individual coverings for each rifleman. The railroad enbankment was also converted into a parapet for firing in either direction, and was gashed with trenches cut across it, to fire on troops advancing along the road.

The Americans fully appreciated that the capture of this place, so strongly fortified, both by nature and the insurgents, was a serious problem—the most difficult yet encountered. The insurgents regarded it as absolutely impregnable. Buencameno, one of their leaders, stated in a letter to Aguinaldo, picked up on the battle-field after the capture, that "Calumpit will be the sepulcher of the Americans," and he was certainly justified in this opinion by the strength of the position.

The original plan was for the 1st Brigade to work up the railroad, Hale's Brigade moving due north from Malolos across the Quingua River, and thence westward to the Calumpit, from which position it could partially enfilade the trenches along the Bagbag, near the railroad bridge in front of the 1st Brigade, and thus enable the latter to effect a crossing. The Quingua part of the fight was not premeditated, but events so shaped themselves that the 2d Brigade had to go to Quingua and fight its way along the Quingua River, past Pulilan to Calumpit, and so attack the city in that way.

Before the march commenced, Maj. Bell went with a cavalry troop in the direction of Quingua, to reconnoiter the river. At the camp in Malolos, at six o'clock on the morning of April 23d, a heavy firing was heard coming from the direction of Maj. Bell's expedition. The firing being so heavy and continuous, as to indicate something more than a mere brush with an outpost, Gen. Hale immediately sent an order to Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, of the 51st Iowas, to send two companies to Maj. Bell's support, and, as the firing did not abate, increased this to four companies. A cavalryman rode in and reported that Maj. Bell had sent for a

battalion of Nebraskas, whose camp was nearest the Quingua Road, and that they were already on the way out. A little later another battalion of Iowas and one of Nebraskas went out to re-inforce their comrades. About this time Capt. Lockett, Gen. MacArthur's Aide, who had ridden out to investigate, reported that the morning skirmish had developed into quite a serious situation, and that artillery would be required to drive the Filipinos from their strong position. Gen. MacArthur ordered four guns to the post.

Gen. Hale at once took the field in person, and reached the firing lines to find that the Nebraskas were deployed behind a rice-ridge in the field, at the right of the road; that the Iowas had taken a position on their right and the cavalry were posted on the left. The Filipinos were pouring a fierce and deadly fire on our lines. The General waited for our guns, which were rapidly coming up the road, placed them at the edge of the woods, ordered the Nebraskas, who were between his cannon and the enemy on the right, to withdraw to the woods as soon as the artillery began firing on the left, thus permitting the shelling of the insurgent trenches in front of the Nebraskas before they advanced, and then opened with the artillery.

The Nebraska firing line, however, began to advance under a terrific musketry discharge. Thinking that his instructions had been misunderstood, Hale ran down the road towards the Nebraskas and discovered that Col. Stotsenberg, who had just come out and was not aware of the General's plan and orders, had gone to the front, and, with his characteristic, impetuous bravery, had given the order to advance. It was too late to recall the men who had by this time almost reached the enemy's trenches and were fighting with the courage and spirit of Napoleon's Old Guard. The Filipinos in this fight delivered a very effective fire, and within a few hundred yards Col. Stotsenberg, Lieut. Sisson and two enlisted men were killed, and thirty-one men wounded, out of not over 200 men actually on the firing lines. But the charge of this "thin, brown line" was irresistible, and the Filipinos were beaten back from their position and driven through the town only after they had made several stands behind the barricades.

GUNS OF THE UTAH BATTERY TRAINED ON MALABON

When the artillery fire was about to begin, Capt. Brooks, Adjutant-General of the brigade, had been sent above the line, to the right, to direct the Iowa troops to advance with the Nebraskas, which they did, meeting strong resistance from the enemy, entrenched around the southwest side of the town, but gallantly carrying these works and entering the town with the Nebraskas. The unexpected events of the day having put our troops in possession of Quingua, it was considered better to hold it, and effect a crossing of the Quingua River at that point, and march from there against Calumpit

instead of carrying out the former plan of advancing north from Malolos and forcing a passage at a new place which would probably be strongly defended. The events of the next day proved the wisdom of this judgment, and showed that the battle of Quingua was a blessing in disguise. Accordingly, the South Dakotas, and the remaining companies of the Nebraskas and Iowas were marched to Quingua.

Rations and ammunition were distributed, and everything put in readiness to force the passage of the river on the following morning. During the night the enemy made an attempt to destroy the bamboo bridges, but was frustrated by the American outposts. Sergeant-Major Coleman of the Nebraskas succeeded in reconnoitering the ford, although the enemy on the opposite bank fired on everyone approaching the river, and found that it was shallow enough for troops to pass.

After a busy and anxious night the infantry and artillery were placed, at 5 A. M., along the south bank of the river, the guns being located in such a way that they could partially enfilade the Filipino trenches. At 5:30 the firing began. Twenty-five minutes later Company B of the Nebraskas, under Lieut. Osborne, advanced through the ford, and Company F, of the South Dakotas, under Capt.

IN THE TRENCHES AT THE PUMPING STATION.

Brockway, dashed across the frail bambooo foot-bridge. This boldness of the Americans, which was not down in the books, and which Spain had not taught them, seemed to paralyze the insurgents, and they left their trenches forthwith. After four hours' hard work, owing to the rickety condition of the bridge, and the steep approach to the ford, and the soft bottom of the river, transportation and army were all taken across, and a northwesterly march on Pulilan began. Pulilan lies on the north bank of the Pulilan River, about two miles northwest of Quingua and six miles east of Calumpit. The thick jungles rendered the maintenance of an extended line extremely difficult, but by hard riding up and down the line and constantly passing of signals, the continuity of the brigade was preserved as it forced its way through the dense, thorny brush. The artillery was kept within 100 yards of the firing line, to be ready for quick action in an emergency.

Gen. Hale is a strong advocate of this departure from the text-book rules for location of artillery, when applied to warfare with the Filipinos. On account of the high fire of the Filipinos, it was fully as safe on the firing line as farther back. The guns did not have to come up under fire, and a few shells and shrapnel promptly administered at the very outset of an attack, exert a wonderful influence.

At 10:20 A. M. the line was met by a heavy fire from the dense bamboo thickets in its front, where the enemy was strongly entrenched in a line of earthworks built across the road, and in the woods. One field gun opened immediately to the front, and a few well directed shots from another put to flight a party of the enemy who had attacked our right and rear. The South Dakotas and Nebraskas charged the enemy's earthworks, and, as a longer resistance than usual was made, a large number were killed. In one barricade thirty-eight dead were counted, at another, twenty-eight, and at a third, fifteen, while many more were seen along the lanes and in the woods. The brigade halted at Pulilan, resuming the march at 3 P. M.

TRENCHES AT SAN FERNANDO. *Photo by Harvey.*

As the sun was sinking towards the horizon, and the weary skirmish line was plodding along past the ford of the Quingua where the crossing would have been made if the plan had been carried out, and thinking that the enemy would probably not make another stand before the final and crucial conflict at the stronghold of Calumpit, they were rudely awakened by the crackling of Mausers from a line of invisible trenches extending perpendicularly to the river along the entire front of the brigade for a distance of nearly a mile. The left battalion of the Nebraskas and the artillery took up some earthworks which had been vacated by the Filipinos, and which made a splendid defense at this time. Lieut. Webber's company was sent up the road on the left to turn the enemy's right flank. The right battalion of the Nebraskas, under Maj. Eager, in company with the South Dakotas, under Col. Frost, charged across the intervening space. When they were half way across, the Filipinos retreated, leaving twenty-five dead. This ended the third fight of the day. Without counting those scattered through trees and jungles, over one hundred of the enemy were found killed and wounded in four groups alone during the day, and it is a conservative estimate to place their dead at two hundred. The Americans lost in the day's fight six killed and fourteen wounded, one of whom afterwards died. The command camped on the battle-field during the night. Under the cover of the darkness supplies were brought from Malolos and taken across the river on the men's backs. The dead, wounded and sick were carried across and sent back to Malolos in ambulances, and in the wagons and bull carts which brought out the supplies. The next morning, April 25th, after a practically sleepless night, making forty-eight hours of almost continual fighting, marching and handling supplies

PENNSYLVANIAS SKIRMISHING JUST AFTER DAYBREAK IN THE MARCH ON MALOLOS

the advance upon Calumpit was resumed. The order of battle was for the main body to march in an extended line, leaving one battalion of each regiment in reserve. When within a mile of the Calumpit River, Gen. Hale, by means of the compass, established a new line, forty degrees west of north, and swung his brigade around, so that it would be parallel with the river, before he made his final advance on the town. Maj. Mulford, of the Nebraskas, and the General made a reconnaissance, locating the Bagbag railroad bridge, the west span of which had

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been broken down, and the enemy's entrenchments across the river. The 1st Brigade was working up the railroad, on the south side of the Quingua River in conjunction with the 2d Brigade on the north side. When sure that the 1st Brigade was up, the guns, which had been placed to command the bridge and trenches, opened fire. The enemy replied with much vigor. When the artillery had sufficiently shaken things up, the infantry advanced, firing, until they came to the east bank of the Calumpit River, where they engaged with the enemy only fifty yards away, defended by the strong entrenchments already mentioned, and with a deep and apparently impassable stream. The brigade staff and the artillery came forward, Lieut. Fuller, Aide-de-camp, going back to hurry up the last piece. Lieut. Fleming, with great coolness, placed his guns on the bank and poured death into those wonderfully constructed trenches. Not in the whole Filipino war have our troops occupied more dangerous ground, and it is only owing to the fact that the insurgents were obliged to fire without aiming, that our men escaped a heavy slaughter. The conduct of the men was gallant, and so heavy and accurate was their fire that the frame of the covered and loopholed earthworks was afterwards seen to be cut in shreds by bullets passing through the loopholes themselves. The insurgents were afraid to raise their heads above the ramparts, but their hands and guns could be seen rising over the edge, firing and dropping back to load. Consequently, their sheet of bullets flew over the prostrate forms of the Americans, lying on the opposite bank, and delivering a cool and aimed fire that played like a garden hose along the top of the enemy's parapets. After half an hour, when the enemy's fire was practically silenced on our left, it seemed feasible to Hale to get a line of troops across, near the junction of the Calumpit and Quingua Rivers, and put an end to the agony. He therefore told Maj. Mulford to take Company K of the Nebraskas, which was on the left, and make the attempt. Mulford and Lieut. Webber waded in with their men, but were soon beyond their depth. A second attempt farther out on the Quingua showed the water to be only shoulder deep, and at this point the line was sent across.

Gen. Hale and his staff intrepidly plunged through with the first fording party, at the same time hurrying about fifty more men across, and formed them in line to sweep through Calumpit and take the river trenches in flank. The Nebraska men at once marched through the town, and the Iowas and South Dakotas were told not to fire across the river while this move was going on. Several times Aguinaldo's men rallied, but at each stand they were routed and left their slain in the blood-stained trenches. Forty dead, and fourteen wounded, were found as the result of this movement through the town. The number killed and wounded in the earlier part of the fight can not be estimated, as they were removed before our troops crossed the river.

When the Americans approached Calumpit church, which the insurgents had fired before retreating, a reconnoitering party went forward and discovered that the insurrectos had left the district south of the Rio Grande, and were in strong force on the north bank. Soon afterward the Filipinos opened fire with artillery as well as infantry. It was one of the few instances in which they used artillery. A shrapnel burst over the heads of our men. Receiving no reply, the insurgents soon tired of their artillery and rifle practice, and stopped firing. The Nebraskas bivouacked on the Calumpit and Bagbag Rivers, with their left on the railroad track. The Adjutant-General of the brigade, Capt. Brooks, was sent up the railroad with a detail of ten men, to ascertain the condition of the track and the Rio Grande Bridge. He found that the road-bed had been stripped of ties and converted into a breastwork for resisting the American advance, either along or across the road, but that the trusses of the railroad bridge were apparently uninjured. As he approached within 400 yards of the Rio Grande Bridge, he had been fired on by infantry and artillery. The total number of our losses during these engagements at Calumpit, were three killed and thirty-three wounded, of which one, later, died. During the rest of April, the command remained at Calumpit, guarding the bridges over the Bagbag and Rio Grande Rivers.

On May 2d, Gen. Hale took the South Dakota and Iowa Regiments with a

MINNESOTA FIRING LINE IN THE ADVANCE ON SAN ISIDRO. Photo by Lee.

platoon of cavalry and three guns to a point on the Pulilan-Quingua Road, east of Pulilan, holding them there as a re-inforcement for Gen. Lawton's Division in the movement, then proceeding against Baliuag, in case assistance should be required. Baliuag, however, was captured with little resistance, and the next morning the command was ordered back to Calumpit, and in the afternoon moved north of the Rio Gronde in preparation for the advance on San Fernando the following day. The total distance marched in the two days was twenty-one miles.

OPERATIONS OF WHEATON'S BRIGADE TO CALUMPIT.*

Pursuant to orders of Major-General MacArthur, Gen. Wheaton moved his brigade, now consisting of a battalion of 3d U. S. Cav., one of Montana Volunteer Inf. and one 20th Kansas Volunteer Inf., out of Malolos, on the morning of April 24th, with instructions to attack the enemy on the north bank of the Bagbag River, but the brigade of Gen. Hale, with which it was desired he should co-operate, not having advanced from the direction of Quinga on Calumpit sufficiently to attack at that point that day, Gen. Wheaton was directed by Major-General MacArthur to hold his brigade in the vicinity of the railroad at Barasoain until Hale had fought his way to the vicinity of a ford across the Quinga, not far from the Calumpit River. About 8:30 A. M., on the morning of April 25th, by direction of the Division Commander, Gen. Wheaton marched his brigade on the enemy's position, moving the 20th Kansas Volunteer Inf. on the left of the railroad and the 1st Montana Volunteer Inf. on the right. The battalion of the 3d U. S. Art., Maj. Kobbe, was left at Malolos and Barasoain to guard the line of road. The armored train was directed to follow up the track, after the brigade was well on

INSURGENT TRENCHES AT CALUMPIT.

the march. His movements being well screened from the enemy by extensive lines of bamboo jungle, the General moved both regiments of infantry into a well-protected position, about 1200 yards from the enemy's entrenchments along the Bagbag. The armored train, having reached at this time a point on the road near the infantry, it was ordered that fire be opened from the rifled six-pounder and the three machine guns on the train, and at this minute Hale's Artillery, in front and on the right, across the Quinga, opened fire, and the guns of the Utah Battery on the right commenced firing. Soon after the armored train was moved to the front and several companies of infantry, from both regiments, were advanced to seize all places near the river, from which an effective fire might be directed upon the enemy's entrenchments. The converging fire of the two brigades of the division and the artillery now began to shake the enemy.

Col. Funston, 20th Kansas Volunteer Inf., with Lieut. C. M. Warner, 1st Sergt. Raymond Enslow and Sergt. C. P. Barshfield, Company K 20th Kansas, endeavored to rush across the railroad bridge. A span of the bridge being

* Written by an officer of the brigade.

broken, Col. Funston, Lieut. Ball and the two sergeants named, swam the river and drove the enemy out of the entrenchments near the bridge. At the same time Hale's Infantry on the right, forded the Calumpit to the front and right, turned the enemy out of his entrenchments along the Calumpit and pursued him to the vicinity of the Rio Grande, near the town of Calumpit, which the enemy burned. The two regiments of Gen. Wheaton's Brigade bivouacked near the Bagbag. April 26th, the enemy was in force on the north bank of the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, a broad and deep river. He was protected by a most elaborate system of field fortifications and had near the railroad bridge three pieces of artillery, and one rapid fire Maxim. The important stragetic position of Calumpit would be untenable until he was driven off. Gen. Wheaton was directed to do this, his force to be the 20th Kansas, and 1st Montana Volunteer Inf., five guns Utah Light Artillery, and three machine guns. It was effected in thirty-six hours as follows: The infantry was advanced in deployed lines in the extended order from the Bagbag, to an entrenched position about 600 yards from the Rio Grande, which position had been abandoned by the enemy, placing the 20th Kansas on the left of the railroad, and the 1st Montana on the right. The main body now being well screened from the enemy's fire, detachments and several parties of skirmishers were advanced, and seized all sheltered places near the river, and within long rifle range of the railroad bridge. Two brick and stone buildings near the river were seized and loopholed for musketry. The machine guns and a part of the artillery were placed in position for fire upon the enemy's entrenchments. The river was reconnoitered below the railroad bridge for the purpose of ascertaining any place feasible to cross. A constant and continued fire of sharpshooters was kept up, and a slow, but continued fire from the 3.2-inch guns, during the 26th. On the night of the 26th, the railroad bridge was found to be in such condition that to rush it with men carrying arms would be impracticable. A reconnaissance at night by Col. Funston, made it apparent that the enemy was entrenched in force at all points for a considerable distance down the river. The morning of the 27th of April, a 3.2-inch gun was brought up to the brick house near the bridge and opened fire at short range upon the enemy's works.

A SNAPSHOT BEHIND THE FILIPINO TRENCHES.

Upon consultation with Col. Funston a point about 900 yards below the railroad bridge was selected as the place that he would endeavor to cross part of his regiment. The enemy's entrenchments opposite this point were well screened by bamboo thickets, but a well-directed fire from the brick house near the bridge from the 3.2-inch gun and by the companies of infantry was kept up. Col. Funston also advanced to the river bank strong parties that kept up a fire of great volume. The effect of the heavy and continued fire was to drive a part of the enemy's force from his works and Privates Edward White and W. B. Trembly of Company B,

20th Kansas swam the river with a rope and fastened it to a stake on the enemy's entrenchments while yet occupied. Rafts were pulled over by means of this rope, Col. Funston going over on the first raft. The artillery had during this time kept up a heavy fire from positions selected by Maj. Richard W. Young, Utah Light Artillery. Under direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, 1st Montana, a heavy and continuous fire was directed on the enemy near the railroad bridge, the machine guns also being directed upon the same place. When Col. Funston had crossed forty-five officers and men he attacked the enemy, turning him out of his works near the bridge. Gen. Wheaton with his staff then crossed the bridge followed by the 20th Kansas and 1st Montana as fast as they could pass over such frame work as the enemy had not destroyed. Upon reaching the north bank of the river two bodies of the enemy, each about 1500 strong were observed, one about one and a half miles to our left which had evidently been guarding the river below. They formed in deployed line in extended order and advanced, but after being subjected to fire about twenty minutes they fell back in disorder and retreated out of range. The other body was in front and along the railroad. The 20th Kansas and 1st Montana were deployed on the left and right side of the railroad embankment and drove them beyond Apalit Station in the direction of St. Tomas. The whole force of the enemy disappearing in that direction, the nature of the country being such that they were compelled to march along the embankment, Gen. Wheaton estimated as 4000. The night of the 27th of April the brigade bivouacked in the town north of the railroad bridge. The next morning two commissioned officers came from the rebels under a flag of truce and asked for an armistice saying, "They wished to acknowledge the valor of the American soldier." They were sent to the Division Commander.

OUTLOOK IN THE TREE TOP. *Photo by Lillie.*

Gen. Wheaton invites attention to the gallant conduct of Col. Frederick Funston—now Brigadier-General U. S. V.,—during these operations. Also to the very efficient services and meritorious conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert B. Wallace, Commanding 1st Montana Volunteer Inf., and Maj. Richard W. Young, Utah Light Artillery, for the courage and skill with which he directed the operations

of his guns. The extraordinary and most gallant conduct of. Private Edward White, Company B, 20th Kansas and that of Private W. B. Trembly same company and regiment in swimming the Rio Grande in face of the enemy's fire and fastening a rope to a stake in his occupied works is worthy of high commendation and reward. The conduct of Lieut. C. H. Ball and of Sergts. Emerson and Barshfield and Corp. A. M. Ferguson of Company E. 20th Kansas Volunteer Inf. in swimming the Bagbag with Col Funston under the fire of the enemy is worthy of reward and great praise. Gen. Wheaton also states that he is indebted for efficient assistance to Maj. G. F. Shiels, Brigade Surgeon of Volunteers; to Capt. H. C. Cabell, 3d U. S. Inf.; to 1st Lieut. F. D. Webster, 20th Inf., Aide-de-camp; to Lieut. A. P. Hayne, Battery A, California Heavy Artillery. Lieut. Philip P. Russell, 1st Nebraska Volunteer Inf., A. A. G. rendered gallant and effective service during these operations.

SENDING A MESSAGE TO MACARTHUR FROM CALUMPIT.

HALE'S BRIGADE FROM CALUMPIT TO SAN FERNANDO.

Beyond Calumpit the Dagupan Railway runs northwesterly ten miles to San Fernando, past the towns of Apalit and Santo Tomas. The 2d Brigade marched on the right on the railroad. It moved for two miles north, along the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, and by wagon road ten miles more, in a northwesterly direction, parallel to the railroad and a mile or two from it. From the river to San Fernando the country is flat and cut by esteros, mud-bottoms, swamps and bayous. It is a country which only an adventurous huntsman would venture over in search of the wild fowl that inhabit its dark fens—a land of moors and tarns, difficult to cross in most peaceful times—a horrible place for an army with artillery, baggage and accoutrements, and with an entrenched enemy to dispute its passage through every river and swamp. Into this country of desolate moors and dangerous bogs the American army plunged.

Hale's Brigade advanced in a northwesterly direction along the wagon road toward Santo Tomas and San Fernando, co-operating with the 1st Brigade which was to move up the railroad. The Divisional Artillery (Utah and 6th U. S., under Maj. Young), squadron of 4th Cav. and the wagon train, went with the 2d Brigade. The 3d Battalion of the 51st Iowas was left at the Rio Grande Bridge to guard the stores and bridge. On May 4th the column formed in the following manner: 2d Battalion of the 51st Iowas advance guard; two field guns and one Gatling gun behind the advance party, for prompt action if resistance was encountered; 1st Battalion of 51st Iowas; remainder of artillery; 1st Nebraska Inf., 1st South Dakota Inf, and wagon train escorted by squadron of 4th Cav.

At five o'clock the advance began. After marching a couple of hours, they

reached some recently constructed, but unoccupied trenches across the road. Receiving a report from Maj. Bell, who as usual, was scouting to the front, that there was a party of natives or insurgents half a mile ahead in the road, Gen. Hale deployed the advance battalion, placed the guns near the road out of sight, and went forward with Maj. Bell to reconnoiter. The suspected party consisted of some uniformed insurrectos, and some natives in white, who were swarming in the road, busy as ants in constructing obstacles to the advance of the Americans. A shell or two from a field gun put to flight the trench builders, and also brought a fusilade from a party of Filipinos to the right, sheltered in the woods. Another field piece and a Gatling gun were brought into operation, and the concealed foe was silenced. The infantry devoted its attention to the road party which retreated northward. The road which had just been the scene of so much industry was discovered to be honeycombed with conical pits, in the bottom of which sharpened bamboo stakes had been stuck, and the whole covered with light bamboo mats on which earth was being spread to make the place appear safe. As the pits were in front of a stone bridge, which had swampy ground on either side, it took some time to build a road strong enough to support the artillery around the pits. While

BRINGING THE ARTILLERY ACROSS THE BAGBAG RIVER.

this was being done, the artillery again opened fire on the insurrectos, who ha halted and seemed disposed to make a stand, but who finally moved on. Whe the column had passed the pitfalls, and come to where the enemy's fire had bee so annoying, they found a deep estero with a destroyed foot bridge.

Just before reaching this place, a battalion of the Iowas which had swung o to the left of the road, came upon a swamp and were obliged to return. At th estero a strong fire from the enemy was encountered at 800 to 1000 yards to th front and right. Hale replied with all the artillery he could advantageously pla on the road, and sent the Iowa Battalion to the right, along the bank of th estero, and the Nebraskas still further to the right, with a view to their crossi the stream and flanking the enemy. The Nebraskas, however, were greatly im peded by the deep swamps they encountered. A heavy artillery and infantry fir for half or three-quarters of an hour producing no apparent discouragement o the part of the Filipinos, it became evident that only a charge would drive them from their stronghold among the swamps. Gen. Hale found that the estero could barely be forded by his troops, being neck-deep in places, with a foot or two of

mud. Nevertheless, he urged the Iowas across, and proceeding along the line to where the Nebraskas were just arriving, on the banks of the estero, sent them also across, instructing them to go to the right and ahead of the Iowa men, and, if possible, to flank the enemy. As they advanced through the swamps in execution of his order, they were fired into on their right and front. The fire on the right, showing serious signs of flank attack, the South Dakotas were ordered to go to the Nebraskas' right and draw it off. Thus, the three regiments advanced, floundering through swamps and muddy streams, firing as they went. On seeing this, the Filipinos hastily retreated.

GEN. MACARTHUR, GEN. HALE AND GEN. OTIS AT MALOLOS. *Photo by Lillie.*

Gen. Hale crossed the river and followed the Nebraskas until they succeeded in getting through the first branch of the Santo Tomas River. After this he went to the left of the line, where the Iowas, near the destroyed stone bridge, were delivering a telling fire upon the insurrectos, driving them across the stream, many of them throwing their guns into the water as they fled. When the General found that the insurgents were retreating towards a strong line of entrenchments, between the wagon road and the railway, he sent word to Col. Mulford of the Nebraska Regiment to flank them out.

Col. Mulford in a few minutes appeared, covered with blue swamp mud, and gave the gratifying information that his regiment had kept on, wading eleven streams altogether, and had already taken the trenches in question.

This advance of the Nebraska, Iowa and South Dakota Regiments through swamps knee- to waist-deep, and numerous stagnant, mud-bottomed esteros, waist- to neck-deep, under oppressive heat and in the face of a galling fire, driving the enemy from entrenched positions, which would have been strong without these natural obstacles, and with them would have been impregnable, if held by well armed troops, may fairly be considered the most remarkable exhibition of persevering pluck and energy during the campaign. The Iowas, having constructed a floating bamboo foot-bridge across the river at the broken stone bridge, began to cross and move forward, deploying on the Nebraskas' left in trenches. Gen. Hale returned to the first river to see what progress was

WOUNDED FILIPINOS. *Photo by Dorsey.*

being made in bridging it and getting the artillery across. The engineers were obliged to send back a considerable distance for bamboo to make a raft, and it was doubtful whether a crossing could be effected before night. The pack-horses, unloaded, swam across, the packs being carried by the men, but the wheeled transportation had to remain. The remainder crossed on the footbridge and deployed on the right of the Nebraskas. The brigade then advanced in line, and bivouacked on the road running northeast from Santo Tomas railroad station. During the night, although exhausted by the day's work, large details went back about three miles for the wagon train, which could not cross the streams, and carried up rations and ammunition. The distance marched by the flank, not counting the trip to the wagon train, was eleven miles, including about two miles of swamps and esteros. The casualties for the day were, 1st Nebraska, two enlisted men killed and five wounded; Iowas, three enlisted men wounded; South Dakotas, one enlisted man wounded.

MAJ. FITZGERALD, CHIEF SURGEON AT FIRST RESERVE HOSPITAL, PERFORMING AN OPERATION.

The next morning, Gen. MacArthur, having received report from Maj. Bell's scouting party that San Fernando seemed to be held only by a small force of the enemy, directed Gen. Hale to take two battalions and occupy the town. Two battalions of the Iowas were immediately formed and moved to the corner of main San Fernando Road. The column marched northwest on the road to a point near the entrenchments, about half a mile southeast of the river and town. They proceeded north across open fields, forded a muddy estero, advanced beyond the bend in the river, and deployed parallel to river, facing west, so as to enter the town on the east side.

Gen. Hale accompanied the right battalion, and Maj. Bell the left. On reaching the bank of the river a brisk fire opened on the left. The right battalion was rushed across the river which was about chest deep, and flung to the left, to flank the enemy in front of the left battalion. The latter kept on, however, without serious resistance, and the entire line wheeling to the left, reached the railroad near the station, discovering and firing on some parties of insurgents escaping on the roads to the west of Bacolor. From there companies were sent out up the roads and the railroad, and others through the town, all finally assembling in the church.

In this engagement one enlisted man was wounded and several insurgents were killed. Sentinels were promptly posted throughout the town to protect property, and a line of outposts established in semi-circular form from the river, southwest

of town, towards Bacolor. Strict orders were issued against looting, and it is believed that the behavior of troops in this respect was very exemplary. The South Dakota Regiment, in compliance with instructions from the Division Commander, was sent for, and arrived at San Fernando about 5:30 P. M., relieving the Iowas from interior provost guard duty. The railroad station, church, and a number of buildings in its vicinity, had been burned by the insurrectos, but the greater part of the town was uninjured. A number of warehouses containing a large quantity of sugar were found.

Several Spanish prisoners were discovered in the town, including the former secretary of the province, a captain and other officers. They stated that from 1200 to 1500 insurrectos had passed through to the north on the previous afternoon, after the fight of Santo Tomas, and that Gen. Luna was wounded on the arm or chest, and was carried on a couch.

Next morning the Nebraska Regiment was ordered from Santo Tomas to San Fernando, and was quartered on the main road, guarding the front, from the railroad northeasterly about 1400 yards. The 1st Brigade also came up, and occupied the ground west of the railroad. The insurgents were located around the entire front of our troops on the northwest side of the river, and had been entrenching, especially across the Mexico road, and the adjoining country.

From the outbreak of the Filipino war on its front on the night of February 4th, and the capture by it of the first Filipino position, taken by the American troops on the morning of February 5th, the 2d Brigade of the second division fought its way through fifty miles, as the crow flies, of hostile and strongly defended country, marching, in its numerous turning movements and side engagements, as measured on the way, over two hundred miles. The entire brigade was involved in eighteen battles; portions of it consisting of two or more organizations, had eight engagements; and single regiments or parts thereof fought on nine other occasions, making a total of thirty-five engagements in which the troops of this brigade participated. It lost six officers and forty-seven enlisted men killed, twenty-two officers and three hundred and thirty-one enlisted men wounded, making a total of four hundred and six casualties—the largest of any brigade in the corps. In the advance from Manila to Malolos, Gen. Hale and two of his three staff officers, Capt. Krayenbuhl and Lieut. Perry were wounded,—Capt. Krayenbuhl, mortally. Three brigade orderlies were wounded during the campaign. Two staff officers and four orderlies were compelled to return to Manila on account of heat exhaustion, and other sickness, and another officer was rendered practically

SOUTH DAKOTA BOYS ON THE FIRING LINE. Photo by [illegible]

unfit for field service by partial sunstroke. These facts testifiy to the hard work and excellent service rendered by the brigade.

OPERATIONS OF WHEATON'S BRIGADE, CALUMPIT TO SAN FERNANDO.

The morning of May 4th, in compliance with instructions of Major-General MacArthur, Gen. Wheaton advanced from the vicinity of Calumpit to attack the enemy in position near St. Tomas. His force consisted of the 20th Kansas and 1st Montana Volunteer Inf., with two machine guns on small cars pushed by hand. The advance was directed along the railroad track, while that of Brigadier-General Hale with his brigade and the artillery was directed along the wagon road, a mile to two miles on Gen. Wheaton's right. The country along each side of the railroad embankment was found to be cut up with tide-water channels or esteros, and marshy ground was so continuous that all the command kept on the railroad. Upon approaching St. Tomas, about five miles from Calumpit, the enemy was found entrenched upon the north bank of a river, deep and unfordable, and the bridge broken down. Hale, upon the right, became engaged in

THE "THIN BROWN LINE" BEHIND THE RICE PADDIES.

spirited combat, and Gen. Wheaton opened upon the enemy's entrenchments with both the Gatling guns and the Hotchkiss revolving cannon. Three companies of the 20th Kansas were advanced and seized all points from which an effective fire might be directed upon the enemy's entrenchments to the right of the railroad bridge, and one company of 1st Montana was deployed to the left. A fire was also kept up from points along the enbankment upon the enemy's works near St. Tomas. After some time, Hale continuing to advance, and our fire increasing in intensity, the enemy set fire to St. Tomas and soon after was driven from his entrenchments near the bridge. Gen. Wheaton crossed the bridge with the 20th Kansas, and a heavy fire was opened on the enemy as he evacuated the entrenchments on our left and fled beyond St. Tomas. The 20th Kansas was then advanced to the railroad station a half mile or more north of the bridge, and at once became engaged with a large force of the enemy occupying two lines of entrenchments. With his staff, Gen. Wheaton at once proceeded to the place of combat,

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

SHOWING MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS IN THE MORONG EXPEDITION

and taking five companies of the 20th Kansas, in person, led a charge upon the enemy's entrenchments, which were all carried, and he fled in the direction of San Fernando. Col. Funston, 20th Kansas Volunteer Inf., was wounded at this time. Capt. Cabell, 3d U. S. Inf.; 1st Lieut. F. D. Webster, 20th U. S. Inf., Aide-de-camp; Lieut. Philip P. Russell, 1st Nebraska Volunteer Inf., A. A. A. G., and Lieut. Edward Kinnell, 3d U. S. Art., A. A. Q. M.; all of the General's personal staff accompanied him in this charge.

On May 5th, San Fernando was occupied, the enemy having burned the public buildings and fled on the night of the 4th.

GEN. FUNSTON SUCCEEDS GEN. WHEATON.

On the 16th of May, Gen. Funston was assigned to command the 1st Brigade, second division, at San Fernando, relieving Gen. Wheaton, and on the 22d, having about recovered from his wound received on May 4th, at Santo Tomas, assumed command.

On May 25th, at about 7 o'clock A. M., the enemy opened fire on the left of the line occupied by the brigade, from a trench at right angles to the Bacolor Road, and at a distance of about one mile from our outposts. At 8:30, the brigade having been assembled at the outposts, two battalions of the Montana Regiment, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, were sent along a sunken road to fall on the enemy's right, and two battalions of the 20th Kansas, under command of Maj. Whitman, were sent to make a similar movement against the enemy's left, while two guns of the Utah Art., under Capt. Wedgewood, took up position opposite the enemy's center. The movement was completely concealed until the two attacking columns had arrived within 200 yards of the enemy's lines. The affair lasted less than one hour, both flanks of the enemy were rolled back, and the entire force driven in confusion through Bacolor. The enemy's loss was fifty-three dead, thirty-four wounded, and twenty-nine prisoners. Three horses and all the official correspondence of the Filipino commanding officer were captured. Our loss, one man killed, one mortally wounded, one officer and five enlisted men wounded in the Kansas Regiment, and four men wounded in the Montana.

SKIRMISH LINE USING SMOKELESS POWDER.

On May 25th, Gen. Funston, with three companies of the brigade and detachment of scouts, made a reconnoissance to and through the town of Santa Rita, driving a small body of insurrectos toward Porac, with no losses. Upon his return to this place, he found that the enemy had appeared in force in front of the right of the brigade. Taking eight companies of the Kansas Regiment, Gen. Funston moved against the enemy's right flank, quickly repulsing them, and driving them back.

About 4 o'clock A. M., on May 26th, a slight affair occurred on the right of the Montanas' line, a scouting party of insurgents having cut off one of our outposts, forcing it to move by the flank to escape capture.

At 4:05 A. M., June 3d, the enemy opened fire from a point on the Bacolor Road with artillery, and volleys from infantry, advancing several hundred yards.

LOOKING FOR TROUBLE.

No reply on our part being made, the enemy quickly withdrew. On June 10th the Brigade Commander with his staff and one company, each, from the Montana and Kansas Regiments, made a second reconnaissance through and to the north of Bacolor. Reaching Bacolor, the Kansas company was left at that point to protect the line of retreat, and the remainder of the command advanced towards Angeles. About one and a half miles beyond Bacolor a force of Filipinos, deployed across our road, was met. Though about 200 in number, the forty men of the Montana company were deployed, and opened fire on them. The firing was vigorously replied to, and ten minutes later an additional force of about 250 of the enemy opened fire from a distance of about 800 yards, and on our left flank. This second party attempted to cut us off from Bacolor, by extending to their right. A withdrawal was promptly ordered and successfully accomplished, the Kansas company that had advanced at the sound of the firing covering the movement. Two Montana men were severely wounded.

On June 16th, at about 4:45 A. M., a general attack was made by the enemy from all around the town of San Fernando. They employed several pieces of artillery, and it was estimated that at least 4000 infantry were in the attacking force. Our outposts were promptly re-inforced, and the enemy having advanced all along the front of the brigade to within 500 yards, a sharp fight of about an hour and a half resulted. A flank movement against an exposed portion of the enemy's line was admirably executed by a battalion of the 20th Kansas, commanded by Maj. Bishop, taking the enemy at that point entirely by surprise. Thirty-six of the enemy were killed by this battalion in five minutes. Total casualties in the brigade, six enlisted men wounded.

On June 24th, the 20th Kansas was relieved by the 9th U. S. Inf., Col. E. H. Liscum commanding, and on June 28th, the Montana Regiment was replaced in the brigade by the 12th U. S. Inf. Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Smith commanding. The four batteries of the 3d U. S. Art. were detached from the brigade on June 3d. On June 30th, at 10 A. M., and at 10:30 P. M., and at about 10 P. M., July 4th, desultory firing by the enemy, at long range, was experienced. At no time did the enemy attempt an advance, and but two casualties, both slight, resulted.

HALL'S MOVE ON MORONG.

When Gens. Hale, Otis and Wheaton moved north, Gen. Hall remained in the province of Manila, guarding the water-works, and meeting the annoying attacks of the insurrectos. Gen. Lawton having relieved Gen. Anderson, in

command of the 1st Division, and subsequently been assigned to command of all troops south of Caloocan, Gen. Hall was directed to make a movement southeast from the pumping station. His column, which was assembled at the water-works on the evening of the 2d of June, consisted of the 2d Oregon Inf., a battalion of the 1st Wyoming, four troops of the 4th Cav., one mounted on American horses, the others dismounted, two battalions of 4th Inf., one battalion of the 9th Inf., six companies of the 1st Colorado, and two mountain guns.

At four o'clock on the morning of the 3d, they began crossing the San Mateo River, and about noon easily repulsed a considerable force of Filipinos, twelve miles east of Manila. At the same time Col. Wholley, who relieved Gen. King in command of his brigade, proceeded east from San Pedro Macati, the two columns approaching each other. The town of Cainta was captured, with small loss, Gen. Hall driving the Filipinos from the vicinity of Mariquina towards Wholley's column. During the night of the 3d, a part of Wholley's Brigade, under Col. Treumann, advanced to the Filipino position at Taytay, which they reached at daybreak of the 4th, immediately attacking. After a sharp engagement the natives fled over the mountains, Col. Treumann pursuing. Many were killed, and many captured, with their arms and ammunition.

Hall's Brigade moved at the same time toward Antipolo, leaving behind the Oregon Regiment and 9th Inf., to guard Mariquina. The Filipinos made, as usual, a vigorous resistance, feeling hopeful of success, Antipolo never having been taken by the Spanish. Situated high up in the mountains and easily defended it had always made a successful defense. After three or four hours' climb up a steep mountain grade, the American lines, which were thrown around the town on three sides, closed in for a final advance, at 8:30 A. M., but closed upon a deserted city. The Filipinos had abandoned their last refuge in this direction.

Gen. Hall marched from Antipolo towards Morong, which lies about six and a half miles southeast of the mountain town, on the peninsula of Morong, stopping at Teresa, half way between, until the morning of the 5th, when he advanced to the town of Morong without incident.

SHOWING CONSTRUCTION OF INSURGENT TRENCHES.

In the meantime Col. Wholley, with eight companies of the Washington Inf., had marched by night from Taytay to Pasig, where he embarked on cascos, which were attached by lines to the three gunboats *Napidan*, *Covadonga* and *Oesta*, lying there ready to tow them to their destination near Morong. Col. Treumann, with the 1st North Dakota and 12th Inf., advanced by the lake shore, clearing the country of the natives. Thus the large force in the field was concentrated on this province, thought so important by Gen. Lawton, who had met Gen. Hall at Taytay and was present in person at Morong, and who had passed two nights without sleep, directing the movements of his army

At Morong the Filipinos made a stubborn fight, using artillery, and sending a shell into the *Covadonga*, but the contest ended, as was intended by Gens. Lawton and Hall, with the evacuation of Morong, and its re-occupation by the Americans.

In this movement on Morong peninsula, Gen. Hall completed the circuit of twenty miles over a rough country, fighting two engagements, one of them severe, and keeping up an almost constant fire against scattered parties of insurrectos for almost twenty-four hours, from four o'clock on the morning of the 3d to about the same hour on the morning of the 4th. The gunboats, as in so many other operations, had been of great assistance in driving the natives from their defenses. The difficult nature of the country prevented heavy artillery from reaching position. Lieut. Hawthorne, who was in command of the light mountain battery, was compelled to burn his wagons to prevent them from falling into the enemy's hands.

The Washington Regiment, which returned to Pasig on the 5th, and which had not rested for forty-eight hours, was exhausted, and all had found the service hard, although cheerfully performed. On the 6th, Hall's Brigade, excepting three troops of the 4th Cav., and all of Wholley's Brigade, excepting the North Dakotas, returned to their quarters.

The excepted companies, under Col. Treumann, remained at Morong until the 7th of July, when six companies of the 21st Inf., relieved them. During the month of June there were some slight skirmishes, in which twelve or fifteen Filipinos were killed, and one American scout killed. The base of operations on the lake shore was a mere hamlet of the "nipa" huts. On the 21st of July, the 21st Inf., leaving a small guard, advanced along the lake shore to Paete, where they were joined by other troops brought there on cascos. The town of Calamba was taken by the 21st Inf., on the 26th of July. An attack was made July 29th, on Santa Cruz, which Gen. Lawton had selected for a base of operations, but the American force was repulsed, and Santa Cruz remained untaken. The American loss in this campaign, was ten killed, and twenty-seven wounded.

With the exception of a movement of a part of Hall's Brigade, under command of Col. Summers, of the Oregon Regiment, from Bocaue, in support of a northern movement by Gen. Lawton, of which some account will appear in describing that expedition, this practically concludes the history of the operations of MacArthur's Division, for the spring of 1899. The rainy season coming on, no further active operations were attempted, pending the arrival of the new troops to replace the volunteers whose terms of enlistment had expired. Our lines were gradually contracted as our effective force diminished, and the territory yielded was immediately re-occupied by the insurgents.

CHAPTER X.

LAWTON'S LAKE EXPEDITION.

WHILE the 2d Division, under Gen. MacArthur, was actively engaged north of the Pasig, in its move on the insurgent capital, the 1st Division, operating south of the Pasig, was occupied with a series of expeditions, whose object was the exploration of the country, the disposal of armed bands of insurgents, the capture of supplies intended for the rebel army, and, if it should be found possible with the force at command, —which it was not—the permanent occupation of the country visited. With the occupation of Manila, Gen. Otis had no military reason for the occupation of Camp Dewey, or indeed any of the country between Manila and the peninsula of Cavite. Both these places were securely held and the line of communication was by water, and so long as there were to be insurrectos at all they might just as well be along the bay shore between Manila and Cavite as anywhere else; perhaps better, as being more conveniently found when wanted. The small size of his force compelled Gen. Otis to contract his lines so as to include only Manila and a small district about it, and upon the south the line was substantially that occupied by the Spanish before the surrender of Manila, resting on the bay at Malate. All the bay shore and country between our lines and Cavite was promptly occupied by the insurrectos. As already stated the 1st Division, after the return of Gen. Anderson to America, was in command of Major-General H. W. Lawton, with Brigadier-Generals Charles King and Samuel Ovenshine in command of the 1st and 2d Brigades respectively.

OBJECT OF THE LAKE EXPEDITION.

The first expedition undertaken was to the towns along the shore of the large lake known as the "Laguna de Bay," of which the River Pasig is the outlet. The district to be reached was a beautiful rolling country, raised above the lowlands which immediately surround Manila, densely populated and very wealthy, the principal towns being ranged along the shore of the lake, from which the products were transported to Manila by water. Besides the main Pasig, which is navigable for small steamers, the lake has a large number of shallow outlets which unite with each other, and then with the main stream below the city of Pasig. These outlets which are navigable for cascos, are interconnected and form a series of islands, of which some portions are swampy, but for the most part are high and dry, and densely populated. The distance from Manila to the lake, at the outlet of the Pasig, is about ten miles. The possession of so populous and wealthy a

district was of course of most importance to Aguinaldo, not only as a source of supplies, but as affording a point from which to make flank attacks upon our advanced posts at the water-works. The lake country, therefore, was obviously the first district to be occupied in a movement of the 1st Division, auxiliary to the attack upon Aguinaldo's main army at Malolos.

GEN. LAWTON AND STAFF IN THE FIELD.

The special objects of the expedition were three in number; first, to secure several launches and cascos still in possession of the insurrectos, and to cut off their most northerly fortress on the lake, the town of Santa Cruz; secondly, to distribute the proclamation issued by the American commissioners; thirdly, to sweep back overland, and in conjunction with Gen. Ovenshine's command to crush the enemy at Paranaque. The first two were brilliantly and successfully accomplished; the third was delayed by the recall of the expedition, after eight days, to Manila, for other military movements.

Lawton's expedition on this occasion comprised 1509 men, and as it was led through a portion of Luzon hitherto unvisited by our soldiers, it united to some extent, the element of exploration as well as of military operations. The land on either side of the Pasig River from Manila to the Laguna de Bay, is varied and beautiful. First, there are the rich rice-lands bordering the river as far as San Pedro Macati, then there are six miles or so of green banks and over-hanging trees. As you near the island on which Pasig town is built, the view expands into a fine vista of far hills, and near rolling fields. The air is sweet with the odor of wild flowers; and the traceried branches of the palms and the bamboos cut clear silhouettes against the sky, while the burned villages, and the ruined Guadalupe church, suggest the stern rigor of war.

THE DETAIL FOR THE EXPEDITION.

On the 6th of April, 1899, the following order was issued from the Headquarters of the 1st Division, 8th Army Corps:

The following named organizations will be immediately prepared to take the field on a special expedition. They will be equipped in light marching order and will be supplied with 200 rounds of ammunition per man and ten days' rations, two of which will be "travel rations," and will be carried in the haversack: 4th U. S. Cav, Gale's Squadron, Troops C, G, and L, 219 men; 14th U. S. Inf., Hasbrouck's Battalion, A, G, L, and K, 311 men; Patten's Battalion, Companies C, D, E and I, 290 men; 1st Idaho Volunteer Inf., Linck's Battalion, Companies A, C, D, and F, 225 men; 1st North Dakota Volunteer Inf., Fraine's Battalion, Companies C, D, I and K, 248 men; two mountain guns, Hawthorne's Battery, Lieut. Koehler commanding, with necessary equipment, etc., and sixty rounds of ammunition for each piece (shell and shrapnel) sixteen men.

For the purposes of this expedition, the authorized sharpshooters, whose names have been reported to these headquarters, with the officers selected to command them, will be temporarily organized as follows:

First Company—14th U. S. Inf., nine squads, forty-five enlisted men, and 4th U. S. Cav., three squads, fifteen enlisted men, commanded by Lieut. W. C. Geiger, 14th Inf., sixty men.

Second Company—1st North Dakota Volunteer Inf., eight squads, forty enlisted men, commanded by 1st Lieut. H. J. Gruschus, 1st North Dakota Volunteer Inf.

Third Company—1st Idaho Volunteer Inf., eight squads, forty enlisted men, commanded by 1st Lieut. R. H. Hartman, 1st Idaho Volunteer Inf.

Fourth Company—1st Washington Volunteer Inf., twelve squads, sixty enlisted men, commanded by 1st Lieut. W. E. Weigle, and 2d Lieut. R. T. Hazzard, 1st Washington Volunteer Inf. Making a total of 1509 enlisted men.

With the exception of those belonging to the 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., sharpshooters will remain for rations with their respective companies, and those detached from companies not taking part in this expedition will be assigned for rations to companies of their regiment above designated, but will be held under charge of squad leaders and the officers assigned to command them, in readiness to respond promptly to calls for service in their special duties. The Washington detachment will be equipped as a separate company.

Maj. Weisenburger, 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., is assigned to command the battalion of sharpshooters. Brigadier-General Charles King, U. S. V., is assigned to command the forces as thus organized, and will report in person to the Major-General commanding the division for detailed instructions.

The Quartermaster and Medical Departments, and the Signal Corps, will furnish the necessary personnel and material.

Brigade Commanders are charged with the concentration of the troops of their respective commands at a point and time to be designated by telegraph from these headquarters.

No transportation other than by boat will be provided except from camp to the place of embarkation. As the journey by boat will probably be made during the night, company commanders will arrange to have coffee made and served during the night or just before landing, which will doubtless occur about daylight or before.

It is the desire of the Major-General commanding the division that this expedition have a thorough and complete organization, and, to that end, the companies will be divided into squads and a non-commissioned officer as chief will be assigned to the charge of each. This assignment to squads will be made permanent, and the men remain attached to the squads to which they are assigned, except when changed by direction of the company commander, and the chief of squad will keep in his possession a list of names of men in his squad, and he shall know at all times the whereabouts of each man and be able to account for him.

In battle, the men of each squad will constitute "comrades in battle," and will support and assist each other. In no case will a man be abandoned, except when specially so directed by the company commander in each case. When a member of a squad is killed, wounded, or otherwise disabled, the fact will be immediately reported by the chief of the squad to his next superior. In case it becomes necessary to detach individual men from squads, they will be sent in pairs, and the chief of squad will know that all his men are accounted for.

One of the purposes of this special expedition is the fulfillment of a desire and determination of the United States government to prove to and reassure the Filipinos that a campaign conducted by Americans, through a hostile country, can and will be prosecuted according to the most generous rules of civilized warfare. To this and General Orders No. 7, series 1898, and No. 7, current series these headquarters, and paragraph No. 2, General Orders No. 15, current series, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and 8th Army Corps, will be rigorously executed. (These orders refer to looting, etc.)

Capt. F. A. Grant, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery, is assigned to command the gunboats forming a part of this expedition; he will also arrange, prescribe and superintend the formation of the flotilla and the order of the sailing of same, taking due and proper precautions against accident

During the absence of the Major-General commanding the division on this expedition the line of entrenchments from Pasig to Pasai will be in charge of Brigadier-General Samuel Ovenshine, U. S. V., commanding 2d Brigade, who will assume control of all the troops remaining of the 1st Division. CLARENCE R. EDWARDS, Assistant Adjutant General.

By command of Gen. Lawton.

These orders are quoted at length, to show how complete and careful was the preparation. Accompanying the expedition, were a number of war-correspondents, and Hon. H. A. Ramsden, the English Vice-Consul, a man of very agreeable companionship, and thoroughly in sympathy with out-door life, and with our American boys. Brigade Surgeon Maj. George Shiels, with twelve assistants, constituted the Hospital Corps. Early in the move, Gen. King had to be relieved from his command, owing to an attack of heart trouble.

THE COMMAND BEGINS THE MOVE.

On April 8th, at 5:15 P. M., Lawton, with eight launches, seventeen cascos, and two bancas left San Pedro Macati. The journey up the Pasig River, to the lake, consumed the night until 4 A. M. next morning. The winding narrow channel and inexperienced pilots caused much loss of time through the frequent grounding of the launches and cascos, which had to be floated by the launch *Maria*, acting under Capt. Grant's orders. Through the indefatigable and intelligent efforts of Capt. Grant, the entire flotilla was formed at the entrance to the lake

SOUTH DAKOTA PACK TRAIN CROSSING THE RIO GRANDE. *Photo by Bonnet.*

an hour before daybreak of the 9th. The Associated Press boat *Orient* volunteered its aid as a tug boat, and the three gunboats, *Laguna de Bay*, *Oesta* and *Napidan*, also acted in the same capacity.

It was an interesting sight to watch the hulks of the black cascos lying between us and the rising sun; to hear the men chat and chaffer with one another from boat to boat. They all went into the day's work as if they were going out among the hills for a holiday. "Who are you?" one boat would ask another in the gray light. "We are the 4th Cavalry." "Who are you?" "Oh, we are the Heavy First; we do all the scrappin', and we get all the praise." "Here you fellows keep quiet, I can't hear the orders," yelled the Sergeant, as one casco crashed into another. It was all taken in good part, and by daylight the whole flotilla started up the lake.

Before noon we lay in front of Santa Cruz, a fine town strongly defended. The winds come suddenly on lakes which lie among mountains, and a stiff breeze swept the waters as the men prepared to land. The infantry and battery were

landed on a beach in front of a wide meadow. The wind interfered a good deal with the landing, many of the men having to wade ashore in water shoulder deep. From the Associated Press boat, we could see the whole of the maneuvers on lake and shore as on a chart.

THE EXPEDITION LANDED.

Soon all the boys were on the land, except the 4th Cav. We could see the long line form and the march begin. Soon a sharp fire opened on the right of our advancing line. The boys started "the grinning guns," and after half an hour, quietness fell on the scene. Darkness came quickly, as it does in the tropics, and the soldiers bivouacked for the night. The insurgents were seen to be well fortified on the beach where the cavalry were to land, so they stayed on the cascos all night.

At daybreak of the 10th, Gen. Lawton, in person, landed on the left flank of the line, walked along to the right, which he found resting on the main road leading from the south into the town. A telegraph line was cut, thus destroying the connection with Malolos. Owing to the illness of Gen. King, Maj. Weisenburger of the 1st Washingtons, was put in command of the expeditionary brigade. The companies were at once put into position; three companies of the Idahos on the right of the road, the artillery section on the road supporting Company I, of the Idahos; on the left of the road, Capt. Hasbrouck's Battalion of the 14th Inf.; the Washington sharpshooters; Capt. Patten's Battalion, 14th Inf., and North Dakota Battalion in the order named, the last resting its left flank on the beach. The advance toward the city was then begun, Gen. Lawton, himself personally supervising the right of the line; Maj. Edwards, the center, and Maj. Starr the left.

In his report of the fight, Gen. Lawton highly commends these two staff officers and Maj. Weisenburger. Meanwhile little opposition was met until the command reached the main bridge of the city. Here Capt. Hasbrouck's Battalion of the 14th, and some of the Idahos and Washingtons made a beautiful charge, completely routing the enemy, who put up a plucky fight. On the north side of the field of operations, the 4th Cav., were successfully landed by Capt. Gale. The gallant Captain not only landed in the face of an insurgent fire, but dislodged the enemy and took their fortifications on the north. As the rebels fled from the city, the gunboats under Capt. Grant did good execution; for the Filipinos had to cross an open field, where they were exposed to the

WOODEN GUNS USED BY INSURGENTS. Photo by Fox.

hot fire of our men on land as well as a scathing fire from the gunboats. It seemed as, from our coign of vantage, we saw these Filipinos running out of cover into the field, and then saw our men after them like fury, that we were watching some terrific foot-ball game.

THE LOSS ON BOTH SIDES

The record of casualties on our side was a short one. No one was killed in this action. William Somars, Company D, 14th Inf., was cut in the right arm with a bolo knife in the hands of a wounded insurgent; 1st Sergt. Wall, Company A, had a gun-shot wound in the wrist; Private Pitts, Company G, a gun-shot wound in the head, which proved fatal. In the 4th Cav., 2d Lieut. Eltinge was shot in the finger, J. Grabowski, Troop G, shot in the head seriously; in the Idahos, A. Pearson, Company A, gun-shot wound on the wrist; G. B. Manning, Company C, shot in the foot. No one was missing. The enemy's loss was ninety-three killed, thirty wounded, of whom three died; prisoners, forty-one. The wounded both of the insurgents and ours were sent to Manila on a casco that night.

THE WORK OF THE GUNBOATS.

The gunboats the *Laguna de Bay*, the *Oesta* and the *Napidan* did fine work under Capt. Grant. Capt. Gale was put in charge of the city of Santa Cruz with his command of cavalry; and at six o'clock, on the morning of the 11th, Lawton set out to hunt up the fleeing Filipinos. Capt. Grant from his boat reported that the natives were seen retreating towards the head of the bay.

Some of the reports of the subordinate commanders are good reading. One characteristic report is that of Maj. Figgins, of the Idahos. He closes it with this entry: "Estimate of killed and wounded Filipinos: April 9th, killed eight, wounded none; April 10th, killed thirty, wounded none." It would seem from this that the Idahos were out to kill, and that everything they hit died. Capt. Gale reported that all he needed was ammunition, which he ran out of, or he would have taken the town himself. One of the 14th Inf. boys stated to the reporters that he had been gored by a carabao bull, as his regiment charged. He was, indeed, all torn and ripped. But he had self-command enough to take the bull by the hind-foot and hold him till the rest of his squad got together and shot the animal. This is a better thing than taking the bull by the horns.

MOVEMENTS AFTER THE FIGHT.

From Santa Cruz the Americans chased the enemy in the direction of Pagsanjan, a beautiful village, nestled at the foot of the mountains, which, at this northern end of Laguna de Bay, rise like a rim of bastions from the level face of the fields. The broad avenues, well macadamized, which we marched over, indicated prosperity, and the fine cocoa-nut groves, that bordered our way, gave us grateful shade, as we took a quick march among song-birds and the dew. We had gone not more than a mile when the crackle-crackle-crackle of Mausers told us that the day's work was on. At 7:15 the 14th Inf. deployed into the palm woods; then the Idahos came up and deployed to the right; then the North Dakotas and deployed to the left. A general advance was at once made, but it met with no further resistance. Pagsanjan was taken without a shot. In the center of this

fine town there is an old Spanish monument, from which the natives have taken the original inscriptions and put in inscriptions of their own; one of these is to "E. Aguinaldo, el Libertador." In this town there was an air of so much refinement and wealth that it seemed strange, that such intelligent folk should run off before a civilized army, as if it were the hosts of Timur.

One poor woman was left in town; but she was curled up in a clothes basket. Lieut. Hartman, of the Idahos, discovered her there; but the gallant officer from the Silver State was so embarrassed that he was golden in his silence, and bowed sweetly, smiled and vanished, finding the situation more trying to him than to the poor, half-dead lady. Hens and chickens were in plenty. Dogs gave us but a cold welcome. The soldiers halted an hour or two. Some geese and hens fell under their conquering blades. But the town was policed and left in the same good state of preservation in which Lawton's army found it.

Maj. Weisenburger took six troops of infantry forward along the Lumban River, to effect a junction at its entrance with the gunboat *Laguna de Bay*. About two miles down the river the rebels again made a stand for a couple of hours, but were dislodged. The troops then marched to the lake and took their supper on the beach.

GEN. LAWTON'S LAKE EXPEDITION MOVING TROOPS IN CASCOS UP THE PASIG RIVER.

The Idahos under Maj. Figgins camped in the church at Lumban. The orders were very strict about looting. But the old Major said he thought he could construe them so as to let his men catch chickens, and take mats from the houses to cover them from the dew. One brawny miner was hauling away a piece of carpet, and was thus found by Gen. Lawton. Lawton took him up to Maj. Figgins. "What is the charge, General?" asked Figgins. "I found this man looting," answered the General. "All right, General," said Figgins, "leave him to me. I'll deal with him." When Lawton went away, the Major turned to his man who was an Irishman: "You big galoot; why did you let the General catch you? Now off with you, and get your carpet, and don't let me see you get caught again."

During the action along the Lumban or Pagsanjan River, the expedition captured six rebel launches and two cascos. It was impossible to bring these out into the lake until dredges were used. The insurgents had put obstructions in the river and a bar had formed. While waiting for these bars to be removed, Maj. Weisenburger led the advance along the lake from Lumban to Longos. He met no resistance up to this point. The road was a good one, running between the

lake and the mountains. As the soldiers looked around them, they saw scenery which reminded some of California, some of Georgia, some of other fine mountain lands they had seen. The valleys and ravines were thickly overgrown with underbrush; but on high the palm tree lifted its disheveled head like a woman in grief. Brooks burst out of the side of hills, at which the men filled their canteens and were refreshed. About noon, the column halted to take lunch at Longos, a small town which straggles along the road, has good water, and a fine old church. All the natives had left, and our lads were enjoying a quiet meal. All at once the bugles blew. The boys laid down their half-eaten meal, and got out in the road in battle array. One man in the 6th Art., loaned me his cup. It was full of hot tea, and he did not want to have me throw it away, so he shouted to me as he unlimbered his gun: "You keep the tin, and bring it on. Iv'e got to go." He was off immediately. The firing increased and lasted for two hours. I waited at the old church of Longos. At four o'clock a quiet little procession came, bearing three men, one shot seriously, two fatally.

INSURGENT ARMY MARCHING THROUGH PASAI.

HEROISM OF THE WOUNDED.

The doctor came in and told them they would die in an hour. One looked to the other and smiled; "Well, its all right, let us die bravely." They died at five o'clock. Chaplain Father McKinnon of the 1st Californias, and Chaplain Stephenson, of the 1st Idahos, did beautiful service for the men that day. They got them tea and food, or took their dying messages and prepared them for the last. At six o'clock a second procession came with three silent stretchers. All dead. They laid out on the church aisle at Longos five men, with strong, firm faces, under the dim altar light. The firing ceased. Father McKinnon was kneeling at the sanctuary with a wounded man, now giving him nourishing draughts, now giving him consolation, now staunching his wounds. All quiet, all sacred. Out in the sky the Southern Cross shone brightly; in the dim aisle the face of the Virgin was suffused as with tears.

What had happened was this: Maj. Weisenburger sent Maj. Fraine of the North Dakotas ahead to reconnoiter the road between Longos and Paete, San Antonio. The battalion marched three-quarters of a mile in columns of fours, with point two hundred yards in advance of column, point being followed by twenty sharpshooters, at a dislance of one hundred yards, and with sharpshooters out on the right flank in the jungle.

The country, away from the road, was an impenetrable jungle, and on the right, rising at angles of about forty-five degrees, were gullies and dry beds of water-courses. At half past three, the point signaled back that the insurgents

were seventy-five yards ahead, behind strong entrenchments. The sharpshooters were brought up and deployed. At that time a heavy fire from our right flank, extending the entire length of the command, was poured into us. A platoon from each company was sent into the jungle, the left resting on the road, the right swinging up the hill and making a left turn.

While this was going on Lieut. Brooke, of the staff, arrived, and shortly afterwards Maj. Weisenburger with the mountain battery and the Washingtons. They took up a position in front of the entrenchment, first noticed by our point. Lieut.



MAP SHOWING MOVEMENT OF GEN. LAWTON'S LAKE EXPEDITION

Brooke deserves great credit for the coolness with which he steadied the men with him. When that part of the line was receiving a terrific hail of lead, his courage, good-nature and calmness communicated itself to the men. Everybody did his duty well. After two hours' sharp fighting the entrenchment was passed, and the Americans went on and entered Paete at six o'clock. The conduct of the officers and men was exceptionally good on this occasion. Maj. Fraine said afterwards that no fear was shown, no orders misunderstood, and all worked well. He mentioned the conduct of Lieut. Brooke, and also of Private John I. Wamples, Company D, Idahos, and Thomas Sletteland of Company C, who volunteered to

take extremely dangerous positions where they could observe the enemy in their trenches. The loss to the one regiment of the North Dakotas was five killed and one wounded. The killed were, Corp. Isador Driscoll; Privates Peter Tompkins, Alfred Almen, William C. Lamb, Company C, and Musician George Schneller, Company I. Wounded, Private Herbert J. Fyles, Company I. The *Laguna de Bay* shelled the rebels in this engagement, and the 14th Inf. and 6th Art. reinforced Maj. Fraine. Sergt. Charlton, of the Washingtons, was also wounded.

RETURN TO MANILA.

On the 15th of April, Gen. Otis sent word to Gen. Lawton that the expedition would have to return to Manila, owing to military necessities arising in other parts of the field of war. Our men then rested quietly at Paete for two or three days.

The town of Paete is situated at the mouth of a ravine. On the high hills above us we watched the rebels bury their dead, after their fight on the 12th. A strict guard was placed at all the avenues to the town. It was a pleasant camping ground. The streams that flow from the hills come through the town and cool the warm heart of it. Springs and cool gardens abound. The palm and the plantain throw delicious shadows. The hills are ever changing in glorious, verdurous robes. It is a land of sunny days and starry nights; of river-beds gleaming, and hills crowded with waiting metals.

Such is Laguna de Bay country—a land even richer and fairer than has been described. The Idahos went to panning gold and found in the streams of Paete that the waters do truly "wander o'er sands of gold." Of course, all were tired of their cramped life and were glad when the orders came that embarked them on the launches and cascos, and bore them back to Manila.

The expedition accomplished this: It captured six launches and two cascos; one hundred and twenty-five of the enemy were killed, thirty wounded and forty taken prisoners. Sixty Chinamen, who begged to be taken from Santa Cruz, were brought to Manila. When we pulled out from Santa Cruz, amid the golden glory of mountain sunset, we saw the rebel fires on the hills and discerned that the insurrectos were back in the town. Yet, much was learned on this expedition; among other things the fine qualities of our soldiers, and the wonderfully rich and varied country which in Luzon lies near the door of the capital.

CHAPTER XI.

LAWTON'S NORTHERN EXPEDITION.

UPON his return from the lake expedition, Gen. Lawton was immediately directed to prepare for an expedition upon a larger scale into the country immediately east of that occupied by Gen. MacArthur in whose field would be located Lawton's base of supplies, and from which a supporting column was to join him. It appears to have been assumed that Lawton could go where he pleased with his columns, but that insurgent bands would close in behind him, rendering his communications with Manila insecure, unless protected by a larger force than he could spare. And such proved to be the case. The Dagupan railroad, along which MacArthur was operating, runs somewhat west of north from Manila. Starting also from Manila a main road runs northerly with a deflection from the north to the east about equal to the westerly deflection of the railroad. Along the general direction of this main road Gen. Lawton was to advance. It is evident that as he proceeded north, he would continually be getting farther from the main line of MacArthur's Division. Upon the east of the Rio Grande from Calumpit north lies an extensive swamp known as the Pinag de Candaba, or Swamp of Candaba. This swamp was intersected in several directions by roads built through it, but was otherwise impassable. All the operations of MacArthur's Division had been conducted on the west of this swamp, while the route marked out for Lawton's column lay to the east of it. The following account of the movement is substantially that given by Gen. Lawton in his report to Gen. Otis:

ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMAND.

Pursuant to orders from the Corps and Department Commander, during the afternoon of April 21, 1899, the 22d U. S. Inf., 1st North Dakota Volunteer Inf., 2d Squadron (Gale's) 4th U. S. Cav., Hawthorne's Separate Mountain Battery and Scott's Platoon (two guns), Battery D, 6th U. S. Art., assembled in the vicinity of La Loma church, about four miles north of Manila. The troops bivouacked for the night, and instructions were given for an early movement in the morning.

Eight companies of the 3d U. S. Inf., under the command of Capt. J. W. Hannay, of that regiment, were encamped about a mile distant and reported for duty with the expedition.

PURPOSES OF THE EXPEDITION.

The purposes of the expedition or plan of campaign contemplated the advance of this column on what appeared on most maps to be a practicable road through Novaliches and San Jose to Norzagaray, where a large insurgent force was reported

to have their headquarters. In front of Norzagaray, junction with another column, 1200 strong, marching from Bocaue through Santa Maria, was to be made.

After the capture and occupation of Norzagaray, the road leading north from there to San Miguel was to be thoroughly reconnoitered, especially as to the practicability for this column. On the best credited map, this route is represented a good road. San Miguel was supposed to be an insurgent stronghold, and the probable rendezvous of the forces to be defeated, but it was suggested that the 2d Division column, could move on San Miguel along the road east of the swamp, thus making a combined attack with the 1st Division. This Novaliches–San Jose route would promise that this column would get over on the extreme right of the insurgents' left; would invade their country; engage the enemy's forces, and prevent a concentration of the forces in our front upon MacArthur, if not at the same time turn the enemy's flank and disconcert his plans. The combined northern movement of both field divisions, if unable to secure a decisive action against the northern insurgent army, would at least drive the enemy out of the Tagalog provinces into northern ones, whose inhabitants were reported unfriendly to the insurrection. At five o'clock next morning, April 22d, the command commenced the march northward, the 3d Inf. joining the column at its formation.

TRENCHES AT SAN FERNANDO. *Photo by Darcey.*

COLUMN MOVES IN LIGHT MARCHING ORDER.

The command was equipped in the lightest possible marching order compatible with an expedition of the duration contemplated for this. Ten days' field rations were taken in carts, drawn by carabao, or water buffalo, as was also a reserve of 100 rounds per man of ammunition. One hundred rounds were also carried by each soldier on his person. The transportation was very limited and orders were issued directing the loading of wagons to 3000 pounds and carts 1500 pounds, exclusive of forage for the animals. It was represented that the proposed route was over a passable wagon road, and these loads were considered conservative maxima.

NOVALICHES OCCUPIED.

The order of march for the first day placed the North Dakotas in the advance, and Gale's squadron in the rear. The command passed the trenches of the 4th Inf. shortly after leaving the camping grounds of the night previous, and advanced about six miles without incident when the enemy was encountered in small force, being developed by Company H, 1st North Dakotas, the vanguard of the column. Companies A, B, G and I, of that regiment were immediately deployed, and the enemy fell back making but feeble resistance. After driving the enemy about



MAP SHOWING MOVEMENTS OF GEN. LAWTON'S NORTHERN EXPEDITION

AGUINALDO AND FOUR OF HIS LEADING GENERALS.

1. EMILIO AGUINALDO. 2. GENERAL POW, an influential Chinese official in the insurgent army, and brother-in-law of Aguinaldo. 3. GENERAL PILAR, one of Aguinaldo's ablest officers. 4. GENERAL TORRES. 5. GENERAL GARCIA.

a mile, the column was again formed. After proceeding about a mile further, the enemy was again encountered in larger force, and made a determined opposition to our advance, pouring in a strong fire on our front from both sides of the road, principally from the left. The same companies were again deployed, and vigorously engaged the enemy, completely routing them and driving them on through the village of Novaliches, to a point about two miles beyond. Our troops occupied the village about 10 A. M., and a line of outposts was established about the town. Our casualties: Two enlisted men, 1st North Dakotas, wounded, one seriously, and several men overcome by heat.

Considerable difficulty was experienced in crossing the transportation over the Rio de Tuliacan, as the north bank of that stream is of solid rock, and no suitable approach to the ford from that side has ever been constructed.

During the afternoon the pickets of the 22d Inf., on the northeast side of the village were fired on by the enemy who had entrenched about 1000 yards away on a hillside. Shots were exchanged during the whole afternoon, Scott's platoon being brought into action, and the enemy finally silenced with the exception of single shots throughout the night. No casualties.

The town being entirely deserted by its inhabitants, the troops occupied "nipa" huts as quarters for the night. Nothing of value was to be found in the town, practically all stores of rice and other provisions having been removed by the people in their flight. At five o'clock next morning, the 23d, the command was again on the move toward the north, San Jose being the objective point. On leaving Novaliches, the road which up to that village had been, with the exception of the approaches to the ford, passable for wagons and carts, now became a mere footpath, winding its way over rice-fields with their innumerable dykes, which were too high to permit the passage of wagon and cart wheels, without work with pick and shovel at each dyke. Great difficulty was experienced by the rear guard of that day, the North Dakota Regiment, in assisting the carts along. The "road" leads over a succession of hills and valleys, on the former of which the troops and water buffalo were exposed to the burning rays of a tropical sun, and in the latter they labored through jungles and mudholes. The heat was intense, the loads so great (though only absolutely necessary rations and ammunition were carried) and the trail so rough, that it was necessary to unhitch the carabao on many of the divides and lead them down to waterholes to soak for a half hour, thus greatly impeding the progress of the train.

WOODEN GUN USED BY INSURGENTS

Headquarters, the 3d and 22d Regiments of infantry, and Scott's platoon reached the ford crossing the Pasunkambor River, about one and one-half miles south of San Jose, at 3 P. M., having been delayed through not having any official

guide, and being misdirected by an impressed native guide picked up on the way. The advance during the day had been without contact with the enemy. The 4th Cav., Hawthorne's Battery, and the North Dakotas, with the wagon train went into camp about four miles back toward Novaliches, the men and animals being almost completely exhausted by hauling the transportation over sun-scorched divides, and through swampy valleys and rocky gullies.

THE COLUMN REACHES SAN JOSE.

Early on the morning of the 24th, the command, now separated into two parts, through the failure of the wagon train to reach the river before going into camp the night before, was in motion. The 22d Inf. advanced to, and occupied San Jose without opposition, being accompanied by Scott's platoon. The 3d Inf. occupied the approaches to the ford and the adjacent thickets to guard the transportation. The remainder of the command, with wagon train, resumed the advance toward the river. The same condition, or worse, if possible, continued to impede the progress of the wagon train as on the day previous. Capt. Gale,

BRIDGE AT BAGBAG RIVER, SHOWING SPAN CUT OUT BY INSURGENTS. *Photo by Darcey.*

with his dismounted squadron of the 4th Cav., furnished the advance guard and convoy of the train, and with his entire command rendered valuable aid as engineers in assisting to prepare the roads, building bridges, etc. Lieut. Hawthorne, with his mountain battery detached, and even Maj. Penrose, Lieut. Kemp of the Medical Corps, with their hospital squad, and Chinamen, lent a willing hand to overcome what frequently appeared insurmountable obstacles to further progress. But of the North Dakotas, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, Gen. Lawton expresses special appreciation. They exchanged their well performed duties of advance guard of the day before, for the laborious one of rear guard of the two days necessary to reach Norzagaray. This regiment had orders to leave nothing behind, and literally carried transportation over bad places and put squads of men in the shafts to replace worn-out and dead bulls. Every service, even to the use of pick and shovel was performed, from the Colonel down to the private, with the same commendable earnestness that has given this regiment its reputation for cheerful and effective accomplishment of any task set them.

As rapidly as the troops came in, they occupied the deserted huts of the town, (San Jose) and remained all night. The wagon train came in during the night, men and animals completely exhausted, many carabao having died, the men taking their places and hauling the carts along.

During the afternoon 2d Lieut. C. H. Boyd, 4th Cav., reported Troop I, of that regiment, for duty with the expedition. He had come with his troop, which was mounted on native ponies, from the vicinity of Norzagaray, to which point a provisional brigade, composed of seven companies of the 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf. and eight of the 13th Minnesota Volunteer Inf., and a section (one gun) of the Utah Light Artillery, under command of Col. Owen Summers, 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf. had been accompanied by Maj. Charles G. Starr, Inspector-General, U. S. V., from Bocaue, with a view to joining the expedition. Lieut. Boyd reported that, while with Col. Summers' command, the enemy had been encountered and had made a stubborn resistance, but had been driven back through Norzagaray and across the river, just east of that town, without serious casualty on our side. Lieut. Boyd and his troop returned at once to Norzagaray. The march was resumed at the usual hour, on the morning of the 25th instant, for Norzagaray, with Troop L, 4th Cav., as escort, and advanced with headquarters, without waiting for the remainder of the command, arriving at Norzagaray about 12:30 P. M., without incident.

PARTIAL BURNING OF ANGAT.

While on the march, dense smoke was observed, rising from the valley in the direction of Angat. It was found, on arrival at Norzagaray, that Maj. Eastwick's Battalion, of the Oregons, and Capt. Masterman's, of the Minnesotas, with the Utah gun, had that morning routed the enemy from and occupied the town of Angat, some four miles northwest of Norzagaray, and that during the engagement a portion of the town had been burned. During the engagement at Angat about 200 men of those left behind at Norzagaray, while swimming in the river, were surprised by a heavy fire from the enemy on the opposite bank. The mounted troop was watering at the same time, but fortunately not a man was hit. The enemy, in small force, were entrenched across the river from Norzagaray and scattered through the bamboo. During the afternoon they kept up a desultory and annoying fire upon the town, the bullets striking the church in which a hospital had been established. No casualties resulted, as the firing was at long range and not intelligently directed. The transportation made but little progress as the road, over which our route lay, did not improve until Norzagaray was sighted. The train camped some distance back, toward San Jose, and, advancing next morning, was directed to continue to Angat and

BRINGING IN WOUNDED MEN ON A HAMMOCK.

go into camp at that place, which the 3d and 22d Inf. and the 1st North Dakotas, accompanied by Hawthorne's Mountain Battery, occupied the same day.

The mounted troop was sent on a reconnoissance along the west bank of the river and about two miles west of Angat, at Marunco, encountered the enemy in force reported to be about 500—200 were actually counted by Capt. W. E. Birkhimer, 3d Art., Acting Judge-Advocate. At the same time the cavalry started, one battalion of the Oregons, under Maj. Eastwick, forded the river, just above Norzagaray, and successfully dispersed the insurgent forces from the thickets, along the river bank from east to west. Maj. Eastwick reported an insurgent loss of five killed and several wounded. The following report will explain Gen. Lawton's view of the situation at this time.

GEN. LAWTON REPORTS PROGRESS.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Norzagarary, Luzon, April 26, 1899.

To the Adjutant-General, Department of the Pacific and 8th Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR—Your messages of 9:30 and 9:35, 25th inst., reached me this A. M. The command with transportation has not yet reached this point. I hope to get it all up this evening. The mounted troops were sent this A. M., on a reconnoissance west along the bank of the river to look at roads and fords. Two miles west of Angat, the enemy was encountered in force, reported to be about 500—200 were actually counted by Capt. W. E. Birkhimer who accompanied the cavalry. At the same time cavalry started, one battalion of the Oregons forded the river opposite this place and drove the enemy from the country opposite; they were plainly seen from this point scattering, some fifty moved up the river in southeast direction, others moved toward the main body. Our troops occupied high ground and moved down river opposite Angat. As soon as my command arrives will cross Col. Summers' command and move by both flanks down river and endeavor to throw flanks around the enemy and destroy some of them. Concerning your message of 9:30, there seems to be no direct road from this place to Quingua. The only route for wagons is via Baliuag to Bocaue. I will be prepared to follow instructions contained in message of 9:35 as soon as my column has arrived with transportation, and I have drawn the enemy from this vicinity. I desire, however, to submit the following suggestions:

From the best information I can obtain, I learn that there were at this place and at Angat about 1000 men. They were reported to have plenty of ammunition and expended it freely at long range, mostly Remington, but very little food. Gen. "Punta" Pantelon Garcia, commanding a few local troops, but mostly troops driven from Malabon about March 25th or 26th. The action of the enemy indicates that they are disintegrating, as small detachments have been wandering in different directions over the country and there seems to be little organization. They have been well cut off from the east and south and the mountains in the up-river country, and the main force have been pushed north and west. I feel sure we are on their extreme left and can double them up. Our problem is transportation. Buffalo carts are out of the question for even ordinary marching except over smooth, hard roads, for rapid moving over rolling country they are impracticable. The conditions of marching are such that the soldier is taxed to his utmost capacity of endurance to carry his rifle, ammunition and blanket roll, without being yoked to a cart to haul the supplies as we have been obliged to do, and are doing at this moment. A number of our bulls have died, I cannot ascertain how many, but ten or more, and the men pull along the carts. These bulls have died from exhaustion and not from disease. The four-mule teams have done very well, with help over bad places and on the hills, but the two-horse and mule teams could not pull more than the empty wagons. I have therefore no spare transportation even after the reduction of weight after the consumption of rations; we have, however, traveled over a rough country with no road. I hope when I get my transportation in to replace dead bulls with others found in the country, to re-adjust and arrange it so that it can continue

over good roads and make short marches each day. The fifty pack mules will give us very little material assistance, as they will not carry one day's rations for the whole command, and I must still rely on the bull teams. I can, however, give the pack train to the squadron of cavalry, including the mounted troops, and it will carry ten days' rations for the whole squadron, and I can use them for flank or rapid movements as they will be strong enough to maintain themselves anywhere.

My suggestion then is to let me move west down the river by both banks to or near Baliuag, where I should be met by a supply train with ten days' rations. Then let me move north along the road through San Ildefonso to San Miguel, and let MacArthur move over the road to the west of the swamp along the river. I can keep my cavalry squadron on my right flank, and in communicating distance, and thus the whole country between the mountains on the east and the Rio Grande on the west will be covered. I believe the movement would disintegrate the insurgent army in that section, and I gather from information received that the roads suggested are very good. The signal officer has reported it impossible to maintain the telegraph line, it having been cut many times between San Jose and Novaliches. He has sent out twice or oftener each day to repair it, but it is as often cut, and the last time a long section was removed, and he did not have wire enough along to repair it. I suggest that it be taken up from Manila and toward Novaliches, and I will send out and take up from this end as far as possible, and then that a line be laid out to me with supply train, if it be sent.

I do not believe I will be much in advance of MacArthur, if my suggestion is approved; at any rate I feel that I have force enough for any emergency. A reply by return of this escort will reach me before I can be ready to move.

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON,

Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

LAWTON'S COMMUNICATIONS DISTURBED.

As there was no other means of communication Gen. Lawton was obliged to send this by courier. No one had been over the route from Norzagaray to Bocaue since Col. Summers' advance, and therefore the security of this route to small parties was problematical.

Maj. Charles G. Starr, Inspector-General, U. S. V., was selected for this duty, which he unhesitatingly performed, accompanied only by his personal orderly.

With the exception of Troop I, 4th Cav., all the troops left Norzagaray for Angat on the morning of the 27th, Col. Summers' command continuing two miles further down the river to and occupying the town of Marunco. Much trouble was experienced with the telegraph line, it having been cut many times between San Jose and Novaliches. Information was received from Corps Headquarters, that the line would be taken up from Manila to Novaliches, and the remainder would be abandoned unless the command could recover it from the north. This was afterwards done by Capt. F. A. Perkins, U. S. V., Signal Corps, escorted by Troop I, 4th Cav.

From an insurgent officer captured by Maj. Eastwick's Battalion, of the 2d Oregons, on the 26th, it was learned that the San Jose and Novaliches insurgents did not obey orders from Aguinaldo, but acted separately; and that the insurgent forces were falling back to San Miguel where Aguinaldo was supposed to be. It was also learned from the same source, that if the soldiers of the insurgent army knew of the treatment they would receive from the Americans, many would desert and come into our lines, and that the officers, particularly, feared maltreatment by Americans.

At 9 A. M., the commanding officers of regiments, battalions and separate organizations were called together at headquarters, and were advised regarding treatment of the property and persons of non-combatants, the purpose of the expedition, and what was contemplated for the future. Two companies of the 22d Inf. were sent back to Norzagaray to re-inforce Troop I, 4th Cav., the insurgents having attempted to re-occupy the town.

Information was received from headquarters, that the fifty pack mules loaded with ammunition, and the additional four-mule teams, hauling rations, would leave Bocaue the morning of the 29th, and request was made that they be sent via Angat to join the command. Instructions were received on the 29th, after the first battle of San Rafael, to remain at Angat until supplies arrived.

GALLANT BEHAVIOR OF WILLIAM H. YOUNG.

At daybreak, on the 29th, the 1st North Dakotas, 3d U. S. Inf. and Scott's platoon, moved down the south bank of the river toward San Rafael. At the same time Col. Summers' command, to which was added Hawthorne's Separate Mountain Battery, moved down the north bank of the river in the same direction. About noon Col. Treumann's command developed a force of the enemy, afterwards estimated at 400, which they drove on down the river. Here an incident took

WORK OF INSURGENTS AT SAN FERNANDO. *Photo by Darrey.*

place which Gen. Lawton says he shall not soon forget, in that it made him acquainted with that splendid and gallant man and scout, William H. Young. He, in citizen's clothing, was noticed walking well in front of the right flankers of the advance point. Gen. Lawton ordered him in, intending to reprimand and send him to the rear. Something in the man's bearing and appearance made the General change his mind, and he directed him to go to the front and bring in a citizen that the General might get definite information about the location of San Rafael. He cheerfully complied, and in less than five minutes Gen. Lawton heard three shots and Young appeared as cool and collected as ever, bearing a rifle and haversack with eighty-six rounds of ammunition, dripping with blood. He had run into an insurgent outpost of eight men, and had alone killed one and driven the others off. His action prevented a surprise to our advance guard which was soon under a rapid and hot fire.

THE COMMAND OCCUPIES SAN RAFAEL.

Col. Summers' command occupied San Rafael without opposition. Our casualties: 2d Lieut. C. C. Todd, 3d Inf., slight gun-shot wound, right thigh, and two enlisted men, 3d Inf., and one enlisted man, 1st North Dakotas, wounded, the latter severely. One insurgent is known to have been killed. Scott's platoon of

artillery participated in the engagement with some effect. Telegraphic instructions were received from Corps Headquarters that peaceful conditions would obtain while representatives of insurgent government, who had come in through Gen. MacArthur's lines, remained. April 30th, two companies of the 22d Inf. were sent with wagons from Angat to meet supply train coming from Bocaue and relieve its escort, a battalion of the 51st Iowa Volunteer Inf., and allow part of the wagons to return. Instructions were received from Corps Headquarters that upon moving, the objective would be Baliuag, where a strong force (3000) of insurgents was reported to be. Information was received from the same source that the armistice requested by the enemy had not been granted. Much difficulty was experienced by the Quartermaster Department in bringing supplies from Bocaue. The mules were very soft, and the teamsters and packers, almost without exception, were inexperienced.

SUPPLIES FOR GEN. LAWTON'S TROOPS.

YOUNG'S SCOUTS ORGANIZED.

Mr. W. H. Young, previously mentioned, was employed as guide and scout, and placed in charge of twenty-five selected men who were detailed by name from the 4th Cav., 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf., and the 1st North Dakotas.

SAN RAFAEL CAPTURED AGAIN.

The rations arriving at Angat in good season, May 1st, issue was made as speedily as possible, and the Oregons, Minnesotas, 3d Inf., Scott's platoon, under command of Col. Summers, moved down the right bank of the river toward San Rafael. Gale's squadron, 4th Cav., was ordered to be reported to Col. Summers for duty with his column. The remainder of the expeditionary forces, under command of Col. Treumann, moved down the left bank of the river as a co-operative force. Gen. Lawton accompanied Col. Summers' column, and Maj. Charles G. Starr of the staff, the force on the south bank.

The enemy was developed on the north bank by the scouts about one and one-half miles above San Rafael. Private Harrington, scout, accompanied by one other, was well in advance of the left of our skirmish line. They steadily advanced, taking advantage of every shelter, entered the village, constantly firing, and steadily pushed back and drove a large force from the village and rang the bell in the belfry before our troops entered. The enemy were driven through the town under the fire of the Oregons and Minnesotas, and made a stand across the river from the town. Scott's Battery was brought into action, and the force on the south bank of the river co-operating, the enemy dispersed. The strength of the enemy estimated at about 1000. Our casualties, one enlisted man, 13th Minnesota, killed; one man, Battery D, 6th Art., and three men, 2d Oregon, wounded.

The town of San Rafael thus occupied by our forces was found deserted by the inhabitants. But little rice was found in the grainaries of the town. The troops on the north bank of the river remained in the town during the night, those on the south bank bivouacked opposite the town. Telegraphic communication was now via Bocaue, from which point a line had been constructed with the advance of the supply train. Information was received that a line was now in progress of construction via Quingua, to meet the expedition at some favorable time and place in the future.

THE COLUMN REACHES BALIUAG.

At daybreak, the 2d of May, the commands on both sides of the river left their bivouacs of the night and continued the advance down the river toward Baliuag on the north bank, and Bustos on the opposite bank. About one mile from the latter town, Col. Treumann's command encountered the enemy, and forced them back and through the town which our forces occupied at 11:30 A. M. A half hour later, Col. Treumann's scouts crossed the river to Baliuag and rang the cathedral bells to announce their arrival. Col. Summers' column developed a force of the enemy about two miles out from San Rafael and easily forced them back for about two miles, when we came in view of the troops and citizens fleeing in great confusion along the road to the north (toward San Miguel). Owing to the great number of women and children and what appeared to be wounded, being carried on litters, our fire ceased, and a flag of truce was sent out, hoping we might assure them of their safety. Capt. J. F. Case, 2d Oregons, Acting Engineer Officer of the expedition, with Private Schnutenhaus, 1st Idaho Volunteer Inf., as orderly, conducted the flag toward these people until at a point within about 500 yards of them, fire was opened on the flag detachment, and it returned to our lines without casualty. Col. Summers' troops were then deployed in the hope of surrounding the fugitives by advancing our right flank, but they scattered in dire confusion. Capt. Gale, in charge of his three dismounted troops and the mounted Troop I, 4th Cav., was sent up the San Miguel Road in the hope that a hurried march would allow him to get far enough north to turn to the left and cut off the fleeing force that was making for the marsh. When about three miles out, this command run into what was believed to be the rear guard of the enemy, belonging to, or bound for San Miguel. A sharp engagement followed, in which the enemy were driven rapidly north. It was midday

INSURGENT TRENCHES NEAR PASAL

and excessively hot, and this pursuit was at the end of a day's march. The resultant strain on the men of this seasoned organization, as well as on others of the command, may be imagined, when the facts are considered, that in less than twenty minutes thirty-five men fell out from the two dismounted troops with heat prostration, eight of them were in a comatose condition. For this reason the pursuit was discontinued. The loss suffered by the enemy was undoubtedly severe, as seen by our troops, and corroborated by a Spaniard, found at Baliuag. Large numbers of dead and wounded insurgents were carried toward San Miguel on wheeled vehicles and on litters Several commissioned officers were included in the casualties of the enemy. It is known that six insurgents were killed, and fourteen wounded. It was learned that Gen. Gregorio del Pilar had had his headquarters at Baliuag with a force of 800 men, but on our advance had fallen back to San Miguel. Our casualties in the occupation of Baliuag were two enlisted men wounded.

FISHING FOR ALLIGATORS IN THE PASIG RIVER.

NATIVES FED FROM THE CAPTURED STORES.

The citizens of Bustos and Baliuag, like those of the other towns along our advance, had fled from their homes, but within a short time after our occupation of Baliuag many of the poorer class had returned to that town, and by dark, on the first night our troops were there, the native population had increased from a scant half dozen at noon, when we entered the town, to several hundred—so great was their confidence in our humanity as reported to them by the natives, through whose territory we had hitherto passed. They immediately commenced to beg for food, of which they claimed to have none, having been robbed by the insurgents.

Under the supervision of Capt. G. H. Gale, 4th U. S. Cav., Provost Marshal, the granary of the tax collector of the place, Capt. Esteban, of the insurgent army, was opened, and its 30,000 bushels distributed, each native, man or woman, who asked, receiving as much pilai, or unhulled rice, as he or she could carry. To prevent conveyance of stores to the enemy, strict orders were enforced, prohibiting the departure of any one from the town, to the north only, except on presentation of a pass from headquarters or other competent authority. All who wished were permitted to enter the town, and in many instances the male members of families having come in and investigated the conditions, they were allowed to return outside our lines for the purpose of bringing in their women and children.

VARIOUS MINOR OPERATIONS.

On the 3d, Col. Treumann's command forded the river from Bustos, and joined the remainder of the expedition at Baliuag. A suitable guard was left at Bustos. About three o'clock on the afternoon of the 3d of May, a scouting party was fired

on by the insurgents, some three miles northeast of Baliuag on the San Miguel Road. Troop I, 4th Cav., was promptly sent out to assist the scouts. The enemy, in strength about two hundred, was dispersed without casualty to us. The pursuit was kept up until darkness came on.

Upon information from the Department Headquarters to the effect that the insurgents were constructing store-houses in the Maasim River country, scouts were sent out with instructions to destroy all stores and property belonging to insurgents, but to respect the persons and property of non-combatants.

Telegraphic communication was established via Malolos and Quingua, and proved much more reliable than the Bustos-Angat-Bocaue line, which was a source of much annoyance and hard work for the signal detachment, being frequently cut. On the 4th, one company of the 22d Inf. was sent to Quingua in accordance with instructions from Corps Headquarters, for the purpose of preserving telegraphic communication, and to assist in guarding railway lines in the vicinity of Malolos.

MAASIM OCCUPIED.

Col. Summers with the Oregons, Minnesotas, 3d U. S. Inf., and the section of Utah Volunteer Light Artillery was ordered out, and left Baliuag about 6 A. M., May 4th, and advanced toward Maasim, a village on the Baliuag-San Miguel Road. Instructions were given that scouting parties be sent out from Maasim to make careful search of the country thereabouts to discover the insurgent stores reported to have been taken there, and to destroy the same, great care being taken to respect private property. Shortly before noon Col. Summers encountered the enemy and an engagement ensued, lasting about an hour, when the insurgents were forced to evacuate Maasim and retreat toward San Miguel. The enemy occupied trenches, and their strength was estimated at about four hundred. Our casualties were Capt. P. S. Heath, 2d Oregons, and two enlisted men, 13th Minnesotas, slightly wounded. Four dead insurgents were found on the field. This advance was beautifully made in the shape of a "V," enveloping the enemy's position. Col. Summers in his report of the occupation of Maasim stated that two store-houses, containing about four tons of rice, had been found. He found the road in some places impassable without repairs, and that another heavy rain would render it altogether impassable for wagons.

LARGE AMOUNTS OF STORES CAPTURED

The search for insurgent supplies from Baliuag had resulted in the finding of thirty-seven store-houses containing, on conservative estimate, 100,000 bushels of rice and 160 tons of sugar. Many other store-houses had not been examined when Lawton's report was made to Corps Headquarters. The buildings were of stone, with iron roofs, rendering it almost impossible to burn their contents—and from their location, to have burned these store-houses would have resulted in the destruction of much of the town. Instructions were requested as to the disposition of stores.

Chief Scout Young was instructed to proceed, on the afternoon of the 4th, with the entire detachment of scouts, in a northeasterly direction, covering the country between the San Rafael Road and the Maasim River, for the purpose of

locating and destroying all magazines, store-houses and caches of insurgent subsistence, or other supplies. He was instructed to keep a careful record of stores destroyed; that his party would not carry rations, but would subsist on the country traversed by them; that the expedition should continue; that reports of progress be sent in at every opportunity practicable, and that his movements should be concealed from the enemy as much as possible, with whom no avoidable contact should be had, though he might, when returning, secure as many guns as possible from the insurgents. The usual instructions as to private persons and property were given.

Troop I, 4th Cav., was sent up the river toward the foothills of the mountains, to search out supplies of the enemy. The wagon train left Baliuag on the 4th, with ninety-two sick and wounded for Malolos, the sick and wounded to proceed thence by rail to Manila, and the wagons to bring the supplies back to Baliuag.

GROUP OF WOUNDED MEN AT FIRST RESERVE HOSPITAL.

On May 6th, Col. Summers reported the destruction of 2000 bushels of rice, and that a reconnoissance toward San Miguel had developed the enemy entrenched near San Ildefonso in force, about 1500, and extending for about one mile. No shots were exchanged. It was reported to Corps Headquarters that the examination of store-houses had been completed, and that they contained at least 150,000 bushels of rice and 265 tons of sugar, in which estimate were not included small, or apparently private stores. These amounts did not include the stores found in Bustos, of which there was a large quantity, including maize. As the river from Baliuag is navigable for bancas, it was suggested the stores be shipped to market and sold at auction. To this suggestion, reply was received that until the navigation of the river had been tested, it was not apparent how the stores could be moved in that way. It was later directed that the stores be confiscated, and pending final determination of the matter that they be distributed to families residing in the vicinity who desired them. Col. Summers reported that scouting parties returning on the 5th, had destroyed 17,045 bushels and 644 sacks of rice and

100 rounds of Remington ammunition. On the 6th, Capt. Perkins and a detachment of the Signal Corps, escorted by a company of infantry, commenced recovering the Bustos-Angat-Bocaue telegraph line.

A MYTHICAL INSURGENT ARMY.

At this time information was received from Corps Headquarters, that Gens. Geronimo with 3000 troops at San Mateo, and Pio del Pilar with 2000 at Antipolo, were reported as having received instructions from Aguinaldo, to proceed with their united forces by a mountain road to Norzagaray and Angat, for the purpose of co-operating against this expedition, and cutting off our communication with the base of supply, evidently thinking our route of supply was via Angat. The reported line of advance of this large force was Norzagaray, Angat, San Rafael and Bustos. Caution was ordered to watch with scouting parties the country to the eastward. To these instructions, reply was made, that the mounted troop of cavalry would be on the hills southeast of Norzagaray, on the San Jose Road, from which they can view the country for miles around, and that a company of infantry was at Angat, and that three would be sent to San Rafael to watch for the enemy. Col. Summers at Maasim, and the command at Quingua, were similarly instructed. Request was made for authority to advance Col. Summers, driving out the enemy from San Ildefonso, and to threaten San Miguel. Reply was received from the Corps Commander, that it was "not prudent to advance Summers north until the reported movement of insurgents from the south developed," and that his command should be held in readiness to unite with the troops at Baliuag in crushing force on this large body of insurgents, should they appear.

FILIPINO TRENCHES NEAR BAGBAG.

From Col. Summers, it was learned that the enemy, who still continued on his front, were reported by a captured spy to be about 2000 strong, and that at San Miguel, they had two large pieces of ordnance. Col. Summers also reported that the parties from his command had just destroyed 3500 bushels and 644 sacks of rice, 15 bells of sugar, and as many gallons of syrup, within a radius of two and one-half miles from Maasim.

Reports were received of the destruction of quantities of military stores by Young's scouts in the country northeast of Maasim. These scouts also reported the killing of an insurgent officer and the capture of his mount, an excellent one.

A CIVIL GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED AT BALIUAG.

On May 6th, large numbers of the inhabitants having returned to their homes in Baliuag, a meeting, by permission of the Division Commander, was held in the public square or plaza, for the purpose of electing a Mayor or Capitan Municipal,

who might administer the civil affairs of the town, and represent its civil population in its official business with the military forces occupying it. Señor Francisco Guerrero was the unanimous choice of the people, and on the following day was announced in Spanish, English and Tagalog, as Mayor of Baliuag, and given authority to select and appoint such assistants as might be necessary, no responsibility for salaries or compensation of these civil officers to devolve on the United States government.

A party of twenty-five insurgents was reported to have been seen in the vicinity of Norzagaray, and supposed to belong to a force of some two or three companies scattered through the mountains to the northeast of that place, and that they were foraging for food. Young's scouts were ordered to search for the enemy through the foothills east of Norzagaray, and southward toward San Jose, co-operating with the mounted troop.

From an insurgent officer, captured by the mounted troop, it was learned that four or five miles to the northeast, in the mountains, there were four or five companies of insurgents, and from captives it was learned that two days' march to the northeast there were insurgents in large numbers, but nothing could be learned of the large force under Gens. Geronimo and Pilar. Maj. Fraine, commanding North Dakota Battalion, along the river, in the vicinity of San Rafael, reported that, with the exception of a force of 150 some four miles away, traveling northward, his scouts had not been able to discover any body of insurgents. He also reported that from natives it was learned that the hospital and cartridge factory had been moved by the insurgents from San Miguel to San Isidro. He also stated that he had about 20,000 bushels of rice under guard in warehouses.

INTERIOR VIEW OF PATOMA CHURCH.

Capt. Case, Acting Engineer Officer, was sent to Maasim, and reconnoitered the lines of the enemy for the purpose of sketching their fortifications, which he did on the 8th inst., under the fire of the enemy, accompanied by a portion of Col. Summers' command. Our casualties were Maj. A. W. Diggles, commanding 13th Minnesotas, seriously wounded in the head, and one enlisted man, 2d Oregons, slightly wounded. Shortly after noon, on the 9th, the Corps Commander authorized the withdrawal of the scouting parties which had been searching in vain for the San Mateo and Antipolo insurgent column.

Much difficulty was experienced by the Quartermaster Department in bringing up supplies from Malolos. The acting engineer officer devoted considerable time and effort toward making a satisfactory ferry or ford, over the river at Quingua. While the command remained at Baliuag, practically the whole time was occupied

by the transportation in bringing up rations, ammunition and quartermaster's supplies. The roads were in a passable condition, and the river at Quingua falling slowly; but a heavy rain would render the roads, through a low, swampy country, too muddy for wagons, and the river too deep to be forded, and too swift for safe ferriage.

EXTENSIVE RECONNOISSANCE MADE.

Being still dissatisfied with the results of the reconnoissances made at San Ildefonso, and anticipating that any day might bring favorable answers to Gen. Lawton's repeated request to make an advance on San Miguel, on the 11th of May, Young's scouts were ordered to report to Col. Summers. Capts. Birkhimer and Case were sent to Maasim to thoroughly reconnoiter the enemy in Summers' front. Capt. Birkhimer was especially directed to look up good artillery positions. These officers were advised to confer with Col. Summers and request of him such aid, including the use of the scouts, as was proper. The enemy's right and left were to be investigated, but especially the roads to the enemy's left and rear, (San Miguel way) with a view to a turning movement and subsequent advance on San Miguel.

A CONCERTED MOVEMENT PLANNED.

Information was received from Corps Headquarters that the command should be prepared for a forward move on the 14th inst., and be rationed to include the 25th; that a battalion of the 17th would be sent Saturday to join the command; that Gen. MacArthur and the gunboats on the Rio Grande would be ready to advance on Monday; that the movement would be by San Ildefonso and San Miguel; and that Gen. MacArthur could join Gen. Lawton at the latter place if found necessary.

Information was also received that one gun of Battery D, 6th Art., would be sent by Gen. MacArthur, with two companies of the 3d Inf., from Calumpit to join at Baliuag; and that three guns of Light Battery E, 3d Art., would be sent to join the command.

Word was received from Capt. Birkhimer that he and Capt. Case, with Young's scouts, and eighty-four men, under Maj. Eastwick, of the Oregons, had flanked and routed the enemy about noon from their trenches in front of San Ildefonso and pursued them until they had fallen back to a point some three miles from San Ildefonso toward San Miguel; and also that 2d Lieut. Perfort Reyes, of the insurgent army, with an orderly, had come into our lines under a flag of truce, with request from Gen. Gregorio del Pilar for safe conduct to Manila for the purpose of arranging with the military authorities there for a conference of the representatives of the so-called Filipino government with the United States Peace Commissioners. The mission of the insurgent officer and our occupation of San Ildefonso was immediately reported to Corps Headquarters with the remark that Capts. Birkhimer and Case were sent to make reconnoissance, and it was not intended to make any advance. Our casualties were, one scout wounded in knee. Insurgent loss, four killed and six or more wounded, including one officer.

Instructions were received to have Col. Summers occupy San Ildefonso, leaving the 3d Inf. at Maasim; and to send in the insurgent officer to Corps Headquarters. Lieut. Reyes was promptly brought in, and was accompanied from

Baliuag by Capt. Sewell, Aide-de-camp, going to Malolos by horseback, and from there by rail to Manila, and reporting to the Corps Commander, who, after receiving him, gave Capt. Sewell written instructions for the Division Commander to make the necessary arrangements for Gen. Pilar's visit to Manila. Capt. Sewell and the representative of Gen. Pilar immediately returned by the same route they pursued in going in. Lieut. E. L. King, 8th U. S. Cav., Aide-de-camp, escorted the Filipinos through our lines.

REMARKABLE GALLANTRY OF YOUNG'S SCOUTS.

When Capts. Birkhimer and Case arrived at San Ildefonso they requested, and were granted, two companies as a reconnoitering force. They first went to the right of the line, and there found Young's scouts, who had preceded them, heavily engaged, or rather by their tactics, drawing a heavy and continued fire from the insurgents, and only returning a shot when a good target presented itself.

CONVALESCENTS AT THE FIRST RESERVE HOSPITAL.

The enemy's line was thus well developed and was conservatively estimated at about 500 men, who wasted about 7000 rounds of ammunition. The scouts were then sent to the left of the enemy's line with directions to the commanding officer of the supporting battalion to make quite a detour, and keep themselves entirely concealed. The scouts finally took position on a knoll that commanded the enemy's left. A heavy fire was at once opened on them. Range flags, as well as the fact that all bullets struck dangerously close, showed that ranges had been carefully measured. The enemy could easily see and count on this hill our forces, which consisted of the scouts and Capts. Birkhimer and Case, in all less than twenty men. Their courage accordingly increased, in spite of the deadly aim of the scouts, and it appeared that the latter would soon be surrounded. Messengers were sent to tell Maj. Eastwick, but finally Capt. Case was successful in finding him, and the battalion hurried gallantly to the rescue. As soon as the insurgents saw this supporting force, although only eighty-four men, they faltered and fell back,

closely pressed, and finally fled and evacuated the town. This heroic act of the men on that knoll was to be duplicated, if not excelled, on the following day. A list of the scouts selected by Chief Young and detailed by special field orders follows, as their achievements up to this time had already made the list an honor roll:

Fourth U. S. Cav.—Privates Eli L. Watkins, Troop C; S. Harris, Troop G; Peter Quinn, Troop L. First North Dakota Volunteer Inf.—Corp. W. F. Thomas, Company K; Privates A. Jensen, Company D; D. Powell, Company H; J. H. Illion, Company H; J. C. Smith, Company K; P. Hussey, Company K; Christiansen, Company G; Charles Davis, Company G; F. Andres, Company B; C. M. Luthur, Company B; McBain, Company B; Sletteland, Company C; M. Glasley, Company A; C. Wilson, Company A; J. R. Desmond, Company I; Otto Boehler, Company I. Second Oregon Volunteer Inf.—Privates Jas. Harrington, Company G; F. High, Company G; W. Scott, Company K; J. B. Oneal, Company L; E. C. Lyon, Company B; M. Robertson, Company B.

Lieut. Reyes, the insurgent officer who entered the lines, reported that their losses that day were twenty-five killed, including his Captain and 1st Lieutenant, and about forty wounded, and also that the charge was blown three times without results against that small body of men on the knoll.

Telegraphic information was received on the 12th, from Corps Headquarters, that it was contemplated sending the entire 17th Inf., and one battalion of the 9th Inf., also part of Andrews' Light Battery, with three mountain guns, as an independent column, on Candaba, with the gunboats. It was stated that junction with this column could be made by this command at San Miguel, or on the river south of San Isidro.

Suggestion was made that a detachment be left at Baliuag, as the town is an important produce mart, seven roads centering there, and the large quantities of rice and sugar enough for six months' supply for the insurgent army, left by the insurgents, showing in part, the amount brought to that place for shipment to market. Its strategic value is also great.

Early in the afternoon of May 13th, Capt. Case telegraphed from San Ildefonse that San Miguel was being held by our forces. Shortly afterwards information was received from Capt. Birkhimer, stating that the scouts, supported by Company A, 2d Oregons, commanded by Lieut. Kelly, and Company H, 13th Minnesotas, Capt. Bjornstad, commanding, both under Capt. Heath, 2d Oregons, Capts. Birkhimer and Case accompaning, routed the enemy, and occupied the town of San Miguel at 12:30 P. M., May 13th, with a loss of one enlisted man, 13th Minnesota, seriously wounded. Insurgent loss, three killed and several wounded, including two officers. Our force was 118 strong; the insurgents under Gen. Gregorio del Pilar, were reported

to have numbered 600. Again was demonstrated the value of these scouts. In the quest of information for the objective attack on this reported stronghold of San Miguel de Mayumo, Capt. Birkhimer urged forward the scouts, only eighteen of them being able to turn out that morning. After a steady advance before anything definite had been developed or known, the outskirts of the town were reached.

CHIEF SCOUT YOUNG MORTALLY WOUNDED.

All of a sudden a heavy skirmish line appeared. It consisted of what was then estimated at 300 in view, behind rice dykes; the right upon the river concealed in the bamboos, and left on a hill with ravine in front, both flanks unturnable. The enemy were not more than 150 to 175 yards distant,—with Chief Young opposite the center. There happened to be only 11 other scouts present, their names follow:

First North Dakota Volunteer Inf.—Privates P. Hussey, Company K; J. McIntyre, Company B; J. R. Desmond, Company I; G. Jensen, Company D; F. Summerfield, Company K. Fourth U. S. Cav.—Privates P. Quinn, Troop L; S. Harris, Troop G; Eli L. Watkins, Troop C. Second Oregon Volunteer Inf.—Private Jas. Harrington, Company G. (Privates McIntyre and Summerfield voluntarily joined the scouts after detail was made.)

Taking the situation at a glance, with the favorable endorsement of Capt. Birkhimer, who was with this party throughout, Chief Young, with scout Harrington at his side, gallantly and desperately charged the center of this line, unhesitatingly followed by the above loyal ten. The line faltered, and finally broke and fled to the other side of the river. It was on this side of the river, on this side of the bridge, that this gallant leader received a severe wound through his knee, that subsequently proved fatal. These ten scouts were recommended by Gen. Lawton, for a medal of honor.

Four companies of the 3d Inf., were moved forward to San Miguel, where they arrived about 8:30 P. M. without incident, and the telegraphic communication was established with that place about the same time.

THE COMMAND OCCUPIES SAN MIGUEL.

Col. Summers had during the afternoon occupied San Miguel with his command, except two companies left at Maasim, and two at San Ildefonso. In compliance with telegraphic authority, thirty dollars reward was offered for each insurgent rifle turned in. This information was published in Spanish and Tagalog, and every effort made to get it within the insurgent lines. On account of desired

concert of movement, with the column moving toward Candaba, the movement of Lawton's headquarters from Baliuag toward San Miguel was postponed by the Corps Commander. The piece of artillery (Battery D, 6th Art.), and Companies E and I, 3d Inf., reported at Baliuag about four o'clock on the afternoon of the 14th. Orders were then received for the movement of all the command, except a battalion of 22d Inf. from Baliuag to San Miguel. This was made next day. It commenced early in the morning and headquarters arrived at San Miguel about 10 A. M., without incident. About three o'clock in the afternoon Col. Summers with the 2d Oregons and 13th Minnesotas, accompanied by a section of artillery, were advanced from San Miguel and proceeded north toward San Isidro, to the village of Bulac (or on most maps, San Jose), a distance of about three miles. About two and one half miles out, the scouts were fired on, and the command deployed, driving the enemy who were strongly entrenched on the north bank of a stream, about one and one-half miles north of Bulac, toward San Isidro. Our casualties—one enlisted man, 13th Minnesotas, very slight wound, not disabling for continuance on duty with regiment. The insurgent loss—sixteen killed, including at least one officer, and five wounded, left on the field. Twenty-one or more guns and equipments were captured from the enemy.

SPAN CUT OUT OF BRIDGE OVER BAGBAG RIVER.

On the morning of May 16th, Capt. Gale, commanding 4th Cav., moved out with his dismounted squadron, two battalions 3d Inf., Troop I, 4th Cav., and Hawthorne's Mountain Battery, toward Sibul, for the purpose of reconnoitering that town, and the insurgent stronghold known as Split Rock, and to destroy the supplies supposed to be at the first-named place.

Sibul was reached by the middle of the forenoon and found deserted by the insurgent troops, although a few of the residents of the town remained. Much difficulty was experienced by the wagons and artillery as the road passed through muddy sloughs. An attempt was made to find the trail into the mountains, but owing to unreliable information of natives, nothing was accomplished and the reconnoissance was concluded by the return of the command to San Miguel, in the evening.

San Miguel was the most important town occupied thus far by the expedition, with the exception of Baliuag. There were many handsome residences and other evidences of the wealth of the people who had, with the exception of a very few of the wealthy class, and a few hundred of the poorer classes, deserted their homes, and gone to the mountains. Many came in as soon as the troops arrived, and the insurgents had fallen back toward San Isidro, and hundreds were returning daily

as long as we remained there. As is the case with all these towns of considerable size, no reliable information is at hand concerning their population. The inhabitants cannot even guess, and it is not easy to form a satisfactory estimate, owing to the crowding of houses and huts customary among the lower classes of the natives and Chinese. Of the latter a large number appear to have lived in each of these larger provincial towns, and to have constituted the commercial class, conducting a multitude of small shops. These Chinese merchants have been scattered by the unsettled conditions in the provinces, some remaining, paying heavy war taxes to the insurgent officials, for which they are supposed to receive protection from the Filipino soldiers who are said to have ruthlessly slaughtered many.

LIEUT. THORNTON SUCCEEDS CHIEF SCOUT YOUNG.

About the time that Capt. Gale's column moved out on its reconnoissance toward Sibul, Col. Summers and his column advanced toward, and occupied San Roque, where they arrived about nine o'clock. The scouts under 2d Lieut. J. E. Thornton, 2d Oregons, (successor to Chief Scout Young) were sent forward in search of water. About two and one-half miles out they were fired on by the enemy, whom they engaged and forced back across a river about forty feet wide, and too deep to be forded, necessitating the use of a large wooden bridge by any one desirous of crossing to the north bank. The insurgents retreated across the bridge, which they set on fire, and entered their trenches which commanded the approach to the bridge by a frontal and enfilading fire. The scouts charged across the bridge, followed by a battalion of the Oregons, and engaged the enemy in their trenches, completely routing them, with a known loss of six killed and eight prisoners, six of whom were wounded. Fourteen Mausers, and two Remingtons with equipments and ammunition, were captured. Many killed and wounded are known to have been carried away to San Isidro, which is not far from the bridge.

INSURGENTS FISHED OUT OF THE MARILAO RIVER.

SCOUT HARRINGTON KILLED.

Our loss was numerically small, but was nevertheless severe, in that Scout James Harrington of the 2d Oregons was killed. As Young's assistant, he had done many gallant deeds of which official records exist. Prior to the organization of Young's scouts, Harrington's reputation as a successful, intelligent scout had extended beyond his regiment, his many daring encounters with outposts of the

enemy being known generally throughout the whole command; and after the beginning of the operations of the scouts as an organization, he was invariably placed in charge of any detachment sent out from Young's charge.

The bridge was saved from destruction by the efforts of the Oregons and the scouts, and, occupying both sides of the river, they set about repairing it, wisely recognizing the delay that would otherwise be caused the main command in advancing. Col. Summers and his troops were again commended in reports, and great regret expressed at the loss of the two most important and valuable members of the detachment of scouts.

THE COLUMN REACHES SAN ISIDRO.

Orders were then issued for an advance on San Isidro, the new objective, to take place early on the morning of the 17th. Col. J. W. French, 22d Inf., commanding his own regiment and the 1st North Dakotas, was sent forward in the evening of the 16th to join Col. Summers for the contemplated movement of the morrow. About four o'clock, May 17th, Gen. Lawton and staff left San Miguel for the front, which was found to be just north of the bridge and trenches occupied the day before by the scouts and the 2d Oregons. Telegraphic communication was established with San Miguel, and Corps Headquarters without delay, and the movement on San Isidro commenced. Col. Summers deployed the column; the 22d Inf. on the left, their right resting on the road, the 1st North Dakotas and 1st Battalion, 2d Oregons on right of road; along which Scott's Battery followed; the scouts preceded the right of the line. Troop I, 4th Cav., operated on the left of the road.

The command advanced toward the town, and when within about 1800 yards of it, fire was opened on the scouts and on the right of our line. The advance was continued and the city occupied by our forces. Our casualties, one enlisted man, each, 13th Minnesotas and 2d Oregons slightly wounded. Insurgent loss, fifteen killed, twenty wounded, three prisoners. Seven guns and four horses fell into our hands. Several Spaniards who claimed to have been held prisoners by the insurgents were found in the city, among them three officers. Many wealthy natives remained with their property and families, and at once applied for, and were accorded protection by our troops. Dr. Albert a former Peace Commissioner selected by the Filipino Congress, of which he was still a member, reported the presence at his residence of a large number of non-combatants, including the wives and children of insurgent officers, and gave much imformation concerning the doings of the insurgent leaders.

THE FILIPINO PEACE COMMISSION.

Arrangements were made for the entry of Gen. Gregorio del Pilar, and three other members of the Filipino Peace Commission, who desired to go to Manila for conference with the American Commission, with a view to the termination of hostilities. These persons came within our lines, May 18th, and next morning started for Manila, accompanied by Lieut. E. L. King, Aide-de-camp, with orders to commanders of all forces of this expedition, located on their route, to secure for the party every accommodation and courtesy possible. It was learned that the

insurgents had had at this place fourteen prisoners, thirteen Americans, including a lieutenant of our navy, and one Englishman, whom they had moved back into the mountains on our advance. The afternoon of the capture of San Isidro, it was reported that the enemy had fled toward Gapan, a town of considerable importance, about four miles east of San Isidro. The insurgents had a hospital there, which was reported to be filled with wounded Filipinos. It was further alleged that stores and munitions were there located.

One battalion of Oregons and one of Minnesotas were sent to Gapan from San Isidro, and their departure so timed as to effect a junction with another column, under Capt. Hannay, from San Miguel, by way of cross-roads at San Roque, the second column consisting of Gale's dismounted squadron and a battalion of the 3d Inf. The two columns joined as anticipated, and with the exception of a desultory fire from the other side of the river, no resistance was encountered. The town was deserted. The San Isidro troops were returned next morning and the San Miguel troops were sent to San Miguel the same afternoon.

Capt. Hannay, with ten companies of the 3d Inf. and one gun from Hawthorne's Mountain Battery, was ordered to remain at San Miguel, and Gale's squadron, with another gun from Hawthorne's Battery, were ordered to re-inforce the garrison at Baliuag, which was reported to be in danger of attack by a large force of the enemy.

AN ENGAGEMENT NEAR SAN FERNANDO.

Col. French with the 22d Inf., 1st North Dakotas and Scott's Battery (two guns), proceeded down the Rio Grande toward Candaba, on the afternoon of the 18th. When near San Fernando they met the enemy in trenches, or behind embankments commanding the road, and an engagement ensued which lasted until

ENGINEER CORPS REPAIRING RAILROAD TRACK TORN UP BY INSURGENTS

darkness came on, the enemy being forced back across the river, where they poured in a hot fire from that side of the stream. Scott's guns were brought up, and threw shrapnel at point-blank range. Many of these shrapnel burst in the piece, the projectiles falling harmlessly into the water. This frequently occurred during the campaign, and experience had rendered the use of shrapnel for the protection of our advancing infantry too dangerous an experiment to hazard.

However, the effect of such shrapnel as did reach, was the next day attested by our column on that side of the river finding several rifle-pits filled with new earth. Our loss, suffered from the first fire from the barricade across the road, was five wounded, two of whom afterward died. The enemy left two killed and four wounded. Col. French's command bivouacked when darkness overtook them, and next morning moved out and occupied Cabiao.

THE EXPEDITION REACHES CANDABA AND BREAKS UP.

On the morning of the 20th, the entire command left San Isidro, proceeding down the river toward Candaba, with the exception of the signal detachment, which returned toward San Miguel, recovering the telegraph line. Lieutenant-Colonel Yoran and the two battalions of the 2d Oregons, crossed over to the west bank of the river, the remainder of the command moving along the road on the east bank, arriving at Cabiao about 10 A. M., at which point Col. French's command joined the main column, and all proceeded on down to the vicinity of Mount Arayat, and went into camp about dark.

Just before starting from San Isidro, two or three Mauser volleys were fired from across the river, some of the bullets going through the house occupied as Division Headquarters. The scouts under Lieut. Thornton, 2d Oregons, as planned the night before, shortly afterwards crossed over, and under cover of the morning mist, secured a good position directly in the enemy's rear, and waited to communicate with the force under Col. Yoran. Col. Yoran's column after crossing the river at San Isidro proceeded up the road toward San Antonio, where, after a junction was effected, they engaged the enemy under Col. Tecson, in force of about five hundred and fifty, who were driven back in great disorder, leaving five dead on the field, and with an estimated loss of twenty-five. Col. Yoran then proceeded down the west bank of the river and re-crossing, joined the main command at Cabiao. The entire command left its bivouac early on the morning of May 21st, and proceeding down the river, arrived at the ferry near the town of Arayat shortly after sunrise. Much to our surprise, no resistance was encountered. It was an ideal place for defense, and the crossing was commanded by many deserted rifle trenches.

Much difficulty was experienced in preparing the approach to the ferry for the passage of wheeled vehicles, and in improvising a suitable raft for the crossing of stores and ammunition. The river at this point was about four and half feet deep, and, as indicated by its banks, is subject to a considerable rise at some seasons of the year.

The advance of the column, a battalion of the 22d Inf., entered the town of Arayat at 7:12 A. M., and found no evidence of the presence of the enemy anywhere in the vicinity. Many of the residents of the town were in their houses, and many others came in during the day.

As rapidly as possible the command was ferried over to the west bank of the river, and entered the town. Col. French's command was brought over before dark, and even Col. Summers completed his crossing before the end of the day. The column which had been advancing up the river under command of Maj. J. A. Kobbe 3d Art., joined the expedition at Arayat, and remaining over night

accompanied the main column down the river toward Candaba where they arrived without incident. The launch and cascos carrying supplies had grounded about two miles below Arayat, and no effort was made to push them further up the river.

At Candaba were found the U. S. A. gunboats, *Laguna de Bay* and *Covadonga*, the armored launch *Oceania*, and cascos carrying supplies. Telegraphic communication was again secured, and instructions were received to send the Oregons, Minnesotas and Andrews' Battery to the south side of the river at Calumpit. These organizations left en route to Calumpit early in the morning of the following day.

During the day, after the departure of the troops for Calumpit, considerable firing was heard to the eastward in the direction of San Miguel and Baliuag. A battalion of the 22d Inf., commanded by Capt. Ballance and the detachment of scouts were sent in the direction from which the sound of firing came, but were unable to discover anything, the swamp preventing their continuing to the San Miguel-Baliuag Road. Later it was learned that the troops in San

THIRD ARTILLERY TRENCHES NEAR CALOOCAN.

Miguel in obedience to orders from Corps Headquarters had, under command of Capt. Hannay, 3d Inf., started to Baliuag to join the garrison at that place, and had met the enemy near San Ildefonso, and were engaged almost continuously all the rest of the way to Baliuag. The insurgents were in strong force and suffered severely. Capt. Hannay was prostrated by heat, result of over-work during the expedition. Insurgent loss estimated at fifty killed and fifty wounded.

Capt. Hannay's command performed an excellent day's work, comprising, as it did, fifteen hours marching, covering a distance of fourteen miles, during which time the command fought four different battles. Capt. J. W. Hannay was awarded much credit for the way he handled his regiment, (ten companies) during a series of difficult situations. A battalion of the 22d Inf., came to the support of the 3d just after the last skirmish. The two Captains who had been captured were sent to Manila, and turned over to the Provost Marshal-General.

During the evening of the 23d, telegraphic orders were received from the Corps Commander breaking up the expedition, stating that it was contemplated assigning Gen. Lawton to the command of the forces, including, and south of the

Caloocan, Taguig and Pasai line of trenches, except certain organizations in the city of Manila performing special duties. In accordance with these instructions, one battalion of the 22d Inf., and one Utah gun were left at Candaba and San Luis, with orders to report to Gen. MacArthur. The remainder of the troops composing the expedition with the exception of the four troops of 4th Cav., the 1st North Dakotas, the battalion of the 9th Inf., and Scott's Battery, which were ordered to return to Manila, were turned over to Major-General MacArthur.

On May 24th, Gen. Lawton proceeded by steam launch to Calumpit and thence by rail to Malolos to carry out instructions from the Corps Commander in regard to distribution and rationing of troops, added to Gen. MacArthur's command, and to supervise the re-arrangement of the 13th Minnesotas, guarding the railway. On May 26th, it was reported that a force of the enemy was being concentrated in the vicinity of Baliuag, and instructions were given to the commanding officer at that point to send out reconnoitering parties in the direction of the enemy to ascertain the facts. One company of the 3d Inf., under 1st Lieut. Moore, of that regiment, developed a force of the enemy in the direction of San Rafael, and being encumbered with two wounded men was forced to continue the engagement until relieved by two more companies, when the enemy were dispersed in short order. Other scouting parties failed to discover evidences of the enemy.

The troops destined for Manila were shipped in by rail from Calumpit as rapidly as possible, and the wagon train marched in overland.

Gen. Lawton returned to Manila on the 27th, with his staff. The wagon train arriving in the city on the 30th, closed the expedition, although it was practically completed at the breaking up on the 23d at Candaba.

VIEW OF FORTSON'S KNOLL. *Photo by Jackson.*

CHAPTER XII.

LAWTON'S PARANAQUE CAMPAIGN.

GEN. LAWTON'S command, composed of the following-named troops, concentrated at San Pedro Macati on June 9th, for operation against the insurgent forces in the vicinity of Paranaque, Gen. Wheaton now commanding King's old brigade.

Gen. Ovenshine's Brigade—13th U. S. Inf., (complete); 14th U. S. Inf., (nine companies); 12th U. S. Inf., (two companies); two guns, 6th Art., (Battery D); two guns, Hawthorne's Separate Mountain Battery; two guns, Andrews' Battery E, 1st Art. Gen. Wheaton's Brigade—9th U. S. Inf., (eight companies); 21st U. S. Inf., (eight companies); 1st Colorado Volunteer Inf., (six companies); two guns, 6th Art., (Battery D); two guns, Hawthorne's Separate Mountain Battery; two guns, Andrews' Battery E, 1st Art.

On the following morning, June 10th, the command left camp at San Pedro Macati at 5 A. M., and moved in the direction of Paranaque. The line of march was over the ridges of Guadalupe to attack the town in the rear. The intention was to clear out the country lying between Laguna de Bay and Manila Bay. It is a rough grazing country, cut by gulches and overgrown by grass and chaparral.

While the men slept with no tents, the rain poured down heavily for an hour. The men only laughed, for in the gentle air of these favored isles, rain, however it may dampen, seldom chills one. Then again, the lust of war was in our blood, and we knew that to-morrow would show us the terrible beauty of skilled and legal murder.

Before dawn we passed out of the shadow of the church and in sight of the benediction in the chapel. Out to war and past the blessed Christ who taught us to love one another; along Pasig River; then up past ruined Guadalupe; over the hill, till we came to a high ridge, where the white tents of the 12th Inf. kept watch and ward over the sleepy fields. A long procession of men, miles long, a file of ruthless steel, a wall of iron and will, came over the ridge and went across the face of the ground, towards Paranaque, hidden in the woods, yet revealing the white steeple of a church, and pointing a finger to the skies, and to the infinite Justice throned there.

THE CLICK OF THE GUNS.

A kind of soothing rap-tap-tap, tickety-tick-tick, comes to your ears, and somebody looks two miles off among the ranges and ridges. "They are using black powder," he says. We had heard that the Filipinos were manufacturing their own powder at Lipa, in Batangas province, out of the sulphur from the volcano of Taal.

This tapping is not hard or unpleasant. If this is death, you say, it is an easy death; some such quiet feeling as a man has who has taken laughing gas. He knows something tragic is going on, but he does not care nor bother about it.

At last, as we look over the land we see long files of brown men stalking knee deep in long grass. Some one says, "that looks like the Colorados." No. The Colorados are away a mile and a half making those rapid tick-tacks which are so soothing. A big vase seemed to burst at our feet. But it was not a vase, it was Lieut. Scott's first shot from the artillery at the line of insurgent defense. He hit close to it and exploded some shells right over them. But sly Pio del Pilar was too old a rat to be caught in a cheese trap like that. You could see his men vamoose over the hill, and no cannon could shoot away a hill. Not yet, Pilar, whether you are a traitor or a patriot, shall Yankee hands be laid on you.

ARTILLERY IN ACTION, NEAR ANGELES. *Photo by Lillie.*

We are standing under a tree, which, from its shape, the boys have christened the "T" tree. It is on the topmost ridge and commands the prospect of the field of fight and flight. But we want to hear those tick-tacks a little closer. So we follow a trail down the hillside and into a valley. Tick-tacks over in these wolds. The 14th Inf. must be tacking up proclamations of the peace commissioners. What did you say about peace? Did you notice those "rookies," or new men, duck? Did you hear an angry bee buzz past your ear? Well, then listen, and look out. You may not be an inch from death.

THE SIGNAL CORPS AT WORK.

As we marched into the rough land, we were surprised to see a man uncoiling a wire. He must be out surveying the land for a farm. No. He is the Signal Corps man. His wire does not measure land, but conveys thoughts. It runs from Lawton's headquarters to those of Otis. It took a curt message to-day.

Otis is fussy, sends word to Lawton about something. He thinks so and so, and like a school girl, wants to talk it over. Lawton can't be reached. Again and again Otis tries to reach the Indian Exterminator. At last, he gets this out to him: "Where is Lawton?" The grizzly fighter sends back in reply: "At the front firing line with his men, where he ought to be."

The Signal Corps are brave. To-day they got ahead of their body-guard, and were almost bagged by Pilar's men.

Anon, Maj. Penrose of the staff goes over a hill to a grassy field. Here he establishes a temporary hospital. No sooner is this done, than the enemy fires

into the hospital. We, who are unarmed get behind the ammunition boxes and "Suave qui peut," is in order. Forty riflemen come up and fight the trees and fields for two hours and a half. But thick and fast flow events. Here is a wounded man: "Company K, wounded in right forearm, not serious."

A hundred feet behind, the Chinese have a litter. They carry a silent form. A young boy of seventeen years. Ten minutes ago, that was Healy—little Joe Healy of Company M, 13th Regulars. Somebody in America to-day is poorer because of the rich Philippines. Joe was terribly young. He had a surprise look of wonder on his face. What could death have told him that surprised him so? Ask the Sphinx. Why did the tap-taps come out of the woods and cut his throat like that? Not much had happened to Joe. Only "shot in the neck fatally." Ah, Joe, what makes you lie so still, gazing intently up? You are not always serious, you were gay and sprightly, Joe.

And now the tropic sun is getting up above our heads. The boys are young, and many are for the first time under fire. Under a tent cover in this long, hot grass, are two men overcome by heat. A comrade watches by. This one is prostrated by the heat, and that one has fever coming on.

THE WORK OF THE EXPEDITION.

What had happened in military details is this: The Colorado Inf., the 9th and 21st Inf., and one troop of the Nevada Cav., swung around the hilltop of the ridge above Guadalupe church and opened battle at 6:30 A. M. The rebels made no response from the hills and the Colorado men cautiously advanced through the thick grass until they were confronted by a trench.

The Colorado Regiment then advanced toward Laguna de Bay. Two companies encountered trenches on the top of a knoll, where the Filipinos stood waist high above a trench, pouring a volley upon them. They charged and drove out the enemy, Lieutenant-Colonel Moses being wounded in the arm as he jumped into the trench. On the Paranaque side, meantime, Scott's Battery of the 6th Art., shelled the first line of insurgent defense with good effect. Then a part of the 13th and 14th Regiments formed in skirmish line, extending a mile to the right, and supported by the rest of the regiments swept down the valley and up the hillside toward another trench. The approach through the morass seriously hampered the 14th, and the rebels, taking advantage of this, poured a galling fire upon them for thirty minutes. The 14th was twice compelled to withdraw for the purpose of finding a safe crossing in the swamp. Finally the trench was enfiladed on both flanks. The rebels fled to the woods

THE BURNING OF CALOOCAN.

and sustained severe loss. Lieut. Geiger of the 14th with forty-five men took a hill from 300 Filipinos. About three o'clock in the afternoon, Gen. Wheaton's Brigade, headed by Gen. Lawton, who, in his white clothing and helmet, on a big black horse, was a shining mark for the enemy's sharpshooters, circled to the south of Las Pinas, encountering a large force of Filipinos in the shelter of

TRAIN WRECKED BY INSURGENTS NEAR ANGELES. *Photo by Lillie.*

the trees. Gen. Lawton had a narrow escape. In the first volley of the enemy the horses of three officers were shot from under them. The Colorado Regiment and the 9th Inf., bore the brunt of this attack and dispersed the Filipinos. Hardly had they finished off that lot when a large force appeared in the rear, which the 9th Inf. and a part of the Colorado Regiment drove away. By this time nearly the whole division was around Las Pinas.

During the march, men were prostrated on all sides, owing to the lack of water and exposure to the sun. It is estimated that forty per cent of the troops were exhausted. Our men threw away their blankets, coats and even haversacks, stripping to the waist and trusting to luck for food. Water could not be obtained, and there was much discomfort after the canteens were emptied.

While the troops were advancing the army gunboat *Napidan*, on the river near Pasig, shelled the enemy, killing several of them. The monitor, *Monadnock*, and the gunboat *Helena*, shelled Paranaque and Las Pinas, all day with the full power of their batteries. The rebel sharpshooters kept in hiding until the American lines had passed, and then attempted to pot stragglers from the trees. Owing to their poor marksmanship their efforts were without result.

The Americans made camp for the night, south of the town, during a heavy rain. Gen. Ovenshine's Brigade did not come into camp until after dark. Stragglers came in all during the night. Men had fallen on the way and were able to continue their march only after rest and the coolness of evening had refreshed them. At six o'clock on the morning of the 11th, Gen. Wheaton advanced upon Las Pinas with a troop of cavalry, the 21st Inf., the Colorado Regiment, part of the 9th Inf., and two mountain guns, crossing two streams and entering the town without firing a shot. He then entered Paranaque.

PARANAQUE OCCUPIED.

Gen. Ovenshine came into Paranaque with his brigade, about 10 A. M. The troops had been stalled in mud, two feet deep. Only by proceeding in single file and each man treading in the footsteps of the man in front of him were they able to

advance. How the artillery was brought through these bogs is a mystery. Lieut. Scott, of the 6th Art., and Lieut. Fleming brought up cannon and horses.

The women and children and, for that matter, many men, remained in the towns. No houses were destroyed, though many were torn by the shells from the warships. Everywhere the Americans found white flags flying.

So far as could be ascertained, the Filipino loss was about fifty killed, about three hundred and fifty wounded and twenty taken prisoners. The 13th U. S. Inf. and the Colorado Volunteer Inf. were ordered to return to Manila, leaving Las Pinas about 5 P. M. same day.

On June 12th, the command remained in their relative positions during the day, except that outposts south of the camp were strengthened by artillery. During the afternoon of the same day the Commanding General examined the insurgent's position along the bay, on board the launch *Helena*.

THE FIGHTING CONTINUED.

Early the following morning, Gen. Lawton, with two companies, 21st Inf., left camp at Las Pinas and proceeded towards Bacoor to reconnoiter the enemy's position. After going about one mile, the enemy was encountered in large force. They opened fire from all sides, the fire being returned by our men with good effect, and the gunboats in the bay shelled the enemy's trenches. The enemy was found to be too strong for our small force, and they were obliged to retreat for a short distance. Re-inforcements were brought up about noon, and a hot fight ensued, lasting until about 5 P. M.

After an artillery battle and some lively skirmishing, an advance was made in the direction of Bacoor, and it developed into the hardest fight since the hostilities with the Filipinos began.

The main work was the direct attack on Zapote Bridge. Kenley's Battery of four mountain guns and two 3-inch guns, with Company E of the 14th Inf. as support, advanced straight along the road to the bridge. The other companies of the 14th Regiment moved forward to the right and left of the road.

INSURGENT TRENCHES AT MALINTA.

The rebels had dug enormous trenches along the Bacoor side of the river and had burned the planking in the middle of the bridge to prevent the Americans from crossing and taking their positions. Our men pushed steadily forward until they reached the bank of the river. Then Kenley took his mountain guns right up to the bridge and poured a heavy fire into the trenches, but they were so well

constructed that it was impossible to damage them greatly. So close were we to the enemy that we could see their heads above the earthworks. Gen. Lawton told the writer that the Filipinos here made the bravest defense he had ever seen. Our artillery was within thirty-five yards of their trenches.

A tremendous fire was set up in spite of the galling return. It was not long before the rebels began to grow restive under the hail of bullets that was being poured into them, and finally they broke and ran. That part of our army in front of the Filipino trenches then ran along the bank of the river, and standing upright, directed a terrible fire upon the fugitives. The 14th Inf. swam across the river and found many Filipinos dead and dying in the trenches and fields. Probably fifty dead natives were found in the vicinity of the bridge.

The rebels had a second line of trenches half a mile away. Half an hour after the retreat from the first line, firing was re-opened from this second line. Fresh troops were hurried forward to relieve the tired men who had captured the first line, and a heavy fire was opened on the enemy, who responded only for a short time and then fled. Gen. Wheaton was slightly hurt by falling from his horse. Gen. Ovenshine commanded the attack on the bridge. Gen. Lawton personally directed the movement. The latter was a conspicuous mark for the enemy. He is a big man and his uniform and his white helmet could be easily distinguished for a great distance, but he went up and down the line unscathed.

Ensign Davis of the *Helena* came ashore with a Colt rapid-fire gun and saw lively service. He captured a Filipino cannon, which had been placed below the bridge, and found a supply of canister shot and brown powder.

Almost at the same time the 9th and 12th crossed a bar of the bay and came upon their left flank at a point where a body of marines, with Maxim guns, landed under protection of the ships' batteries and fired upon the enemy's left rear with a demoralizing effect. The 21st crossed the river by a bridge as soon as it could be mended. Sixty-five Filipinos were found dead in the trenches, most of them shot through the head. Several five-inch smooth bore guns were captured, with ammunition marked "United States Navy." After crossing the river, the troops were withdrawn, with the exception of the 9th and 21st, these regiments being left with four guns to guard the bridge.

As they were being formed into companies, the insurgents commenced to fire volleys from the bamboo jungle three hundred yards away. The regiments formed into line coolly, though under fire, rushed to the woods, driving the enemy a mile away, the Filipinos disputing every foot. The 14th camped across the river, the men caring for many of the Filipino wounded. Eight prisoners were captured. The majority of the Filipinos wore red uniforms. The American loss in the fighting of the 13th, was nine killed and thirty wounded. The Filipino loss was heavy.

After the engagement of the 13th, the Filipinos retreated to the strongly fortified town of Imus. The shelling of our warships drove the rebels from Bacoor. The Americans by these operations gained control of several miles of the coast, while the long line of entrenchments facing our south line had been cleared.

On the 14th, Gen. Lawton and his staff, and a troop of the 4th Cav., started to ascertain the nature of the insurgent's position. He rode five miles along the

coast to Bacoor, without discovering the enemy. He found the town full of white flags, but there were no soldiers there. The women and children who had fled to the woods during the bombardment were camping in the ruins of their homes. The shells had knocked the town to pieces. The big church was wrecked and many buildings were ruined. Even trees and shrubbery were torn as if by a hail-storm.

Several hundred women and children came into the American lines for refuge, and the road from Bacoor was covered all day with natives on foot and in carts, driving animals and carrying goods on their heads. The appearances of the battle-field testified to the fierceness of the fighting. The trees along the river were almost torn down by bullets. The American officers estimate that one hundred insurgents were killed and three hundred wounded during the engagement.

Services at Battery Knoll over the remains of three soldiers, Privates in the Kansas, Washington and 13th Infantry. This made a total of 54 men buried in this place to date June 2 1899.

All day many hungry Filipinos were fed at Paranaque and Las Pinas. The first issue of rations that morning consisted of rice and canned roast beef. Some of the beef issued was spoiled. On the 18th a strong reconnaissance had been made south of Noveleta. It was reported that a strong force of insurgents was at San Francisco de Malabon. Gen. Wheaton started a reconnaissance toward Perez Dasmarinas also. The country to the south of Imus had not been scouted. The rebels were reported to be concentrated at Perez Dasmarinas.

June 18th, our troops having occupied Imus, and the enemy threatening an attack from Dasmarinas eight miles north, Gen. Wheaton was sent by the Department Commander to assume, under Gen. Lawton, command of the troops at Imus. On the morning of the 19th, a battalion of the 4th Inf. and one gun, under Maj. John W. Bubb, was sent on the road from Imus in the direction of Dasmarinas to

make a reconnaissance, and found the enemy in force on the road, and about one mile from Imus. A spirited combat ensued, and Gen. Wheaton, at Imus, hearing the firing, proceeded at once to reinforce the battalion with the other two battalions of the 4th U. S. Inf., with three guns. The enemy, about 2500 strong, were immediately attacked in the flank by a heavy fire from the artillery placed by Gen. Wheaton, and the infantry advanced upon him. He was routed with great loss, and fled in the direction of Dasmarinas. The 20th Inf., Gen. Wheaton advanced on Dasmarinas with the 4th Inf., one battalion 14th U. S. Inf., one battalion 9th U. S. Inf., one troop Nevada Cav. (dismounted) and seven guns. Dasmarinas was occupied and the enemy's force entirely dispersed.

RESULT OF THE OPERATIONS.

In this series of operations the enemy were driven from the country in the vicinity of Manila Bay and north of the city. His loss in killed, wounded and captured was at least 2000 men. His forces were in a great measure dispersed.

FILIPINO TRENCHES.



This map shows the movements of Gen. Lawton's troops in the Paranaque campaign, and, like the rest of the military maps which appear in this book, was made by P. E. Lamar, official map maker in the 8th Army Corps, from surveys made by him.

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CHAPTER XIII.

EXPEDITIONS TO THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS.

(CEBU, PANAY, NEGROS AND SULU.)

NTIL the treaty of peace should be ratified or rejected by the United States Senate, the political situation in the Philippines was uncertain, but under the instructions of President McKinley, Gen. Otis was ordered to take and hold all the ceded territory. At this time the islands were entirely in the control of the natives, with the exception of the port and the city of Iloilo on the island of Panay. Here the Spanish force still held the city, but were closely besieged, and Gen. Otis had been notified by Gen. Rios that he could not hold the place against the insurgents. With the uncertainties as to the disposition of the Philippines by the Spanish Cortez and the American Senate, neither the Spanish nor American commanders wished to disturb the status unless pressing need required it. It was for this reason that the command of Gen. Miller was left inactive and on board the transport off Iloilo so long.

OPERATIONS ON PANAY.

On December 24, 1898, Gen. Otis, by order, created the "Separate Brigade," and assigned the command to Gen. Marcus P. Miller. The order directed that the command should proceed to Iloilo and there execute the special instructions which the commander might receive from headquarters. That part of the order relating to this matter is as follows:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 20.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

MANILA, P. I., Dec. 24, 1898.

1. Brigadier-General Marcus P. Miller is assigned to the command of the following designated troops, viz: Light Battery G, 6th U. S. Art., 13th U. S. Inf., 51st Iowa Volunteer Inf., and will proceed with them to Iloilo, island of Panay, by transports *Newport*, *Ingalls* and *Pennsylvania*, under such naval escorts as the Rear Admiral commanding the Asiatic squadron may furnish him, and there execute the special instructions he will receive from these headquarters. These troops will constitute the Separate Brigade within the meaning of the 74th Article of War, to be known and designated as the 1st Separate Brigade of the 8th Army Corps. They will be equipped and supplied as orders already and hereafter to be issued indicate.

By command of Major-General Otis.

THOMAS BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The importance of this Visayan group will be understood by reference to the chapter entitled, "The Philippine Islands and Their People." The principal islands in the group are Panay, Cebu and Negros. The distance from Iloilo to Cebu is about 60 miles; from Cebu to Escalante on Negros, about 50 miles; and from Bacolod, on Negros to Iloilo on Panay, about 35 miles. This is by the usually traveled routes, and the distance from the nearest point in the group to Manila is 355 miles. The military operations in these islands could not, in detail, be well directed from Manila, but they are in such close proximity that in any important movements there, the forces could support each other. While these islands, under Spanish rule, were divided into provinces, and had separate commercial centers, still there was such interchange of commodities and business that the inhabitants had become closely allied. The population of Panay is 781,325; that of Cebu 504,076; and of Negros 321,777; and the total population of the whole Visayan group is 2,384,142.

Prison at Malolos, where five Americans were kept for nearly three months.

So closely affiliated are the people of these islands, that immediately after the surrender of the Spaniards, under Gen. Rios, to the insurgents, the people organized "a Visayan Republic," with Iloilo as its capital. The governments in the different islands, however, were practically independent. The climate in these islands is salubrious, and the country well adapted to nearly all branches of husbandry. Next to Manila, the great centers of trade of the archipelago are here. It is not only a fine grazing country and well adapted to stock-raising, but sugar, hemp, tobacco, the cereals and a great variety of fruits are grown.

The expedition, under Gen. Miller, left Manila, December 26th, convoyed by the cruiser *Baltimore*. On arrival at Iloilo it was found that the Spanish garrison had withdrawn to Zamboango, and that the city was in possession of the insurgents. The expedition remained on the transports until February 11, 1899, pending instructions to meet the changed conditions. The 51st Iowa returned to Manila, and its place was taken by the 1st Tennessee, which arrived on February 10th. The *Baltimore* was replaced by the *Boston* and *Petrel*.

On the morning of February 11th, after bombardment of the insurgent position, the Tennessee Regiment and 18th Inf. landed, and took possession of the city, driving the insurgents from their positions, on the outskirts of the town, along the river, and saving much valuable property from incendiary fires. Capt. Richmond of Company C, 1st Tennessee, was placed at some sandbag entrenchments, on the point, to prevent the insurgents on the opposite side from firing on the landing party. The remainder of the force, accompanied by Gen. Miller, marched to the Plaza and Custom House, beyond which point were the insurgents. Here Col. Childers, of the Tennessee, assigned Companies A, Capt. Reed; E,

Capt. Hager, and F, Capt. Gilaen, all under Maj. Bayless, to that portion of the city along the river front and Progresso street, where they engaged the insurgents who occupied the entrenchments and houses on the opposite side of the river. By their prompt movements this command saved much property from destruction by fire.

Companies B, D, L and M, under Maj. Cheatham were sent up the river to Jaro Bridge, which position they occupied. Companies B, H and K, under Maj. McGuire, were instructed to encircle the town for the purpose of flanking the insurgents, which was done by a movement to the left until the beach was reached, and then up the bridge to the old cemetery which had been fortified by the insurgents, while they changed position to the right through the native village and through rice-fields, to the barracks on the Iloilo River and Molo Road. Here the insurgents were found in force and were driven hurriedly across the bridge to Molo by the American force.

On the morning of February 12th, Companies B, D, L and M, under Maj. Cheatham, made a reconnaissance through Molo, but found no armed insurgents. On the same day the 1st Battalion of the 18th Inf., under Maj. Charles Keller, consisting of Companies A, C, H and L, under the respective commands of 1st Lieut. A. E. Lewis, Capt. O. B. Warwick, 1st Lieut. D. H. Wells and Capt. E. E. Hatch, were ordered to make a reconnaissance toward Jaro, to which place the enemy had retired. The reconnaissance led to the sharp engagement at Jaro and the capture of that city. The battalion lost one killed and five wounded, including one officer. Nine of the enemy killed were buried.

Up to February 26th, all of these captured positions were held by the American forces, who were continually harassed by the picket firing of the insurgents, and there were numerous outpost skirmishes. On that date a reconnaissance in force was made, under command of Maj. Cheatham, marching to Molo, where the troops crossed the Iloilo River, and proceeded to Mandurriao. While resting there, a scouting party reported an insurgent outpost. After driving in this outpost, an advance was made on the main body of the force. This was attacked and dislodged, and rapidly driven through the woods and rice-fields for a distance of three miles, when a halt was ordered and the force returned through Jaro to Iloilo. The insurgent loss was reported heavy, but nothing definite as to this could be ascertained. On March 1st, reconnaissance was made to the north of Jaro by the 18th Inf., and the Battle of [illegible] The insurgents quickly gave way to the onslaught of the Americans and [illegible] in great disorder and confusion. The only loss on the part of the Americans

was one killed and two wounded. On March 16th, a force of insurgents, estimated at over 1000 men, suddenly precipitated itself upon the town of Jaro, now occupied by the 18th Inf., which they attempted to carry by assault. Five companies of the 18th, under Maj. Keller, crossed the Jaro River and engaged them. Companies B, C, L and M, and the Tennessees, under command of Col. Childers, with Maj. Cheatham, were sent as re-inforcements. Crossing the Jaro River, and forming with their left on the river, the Tennessees came in on the right flank of the enemy, who were driven back towards Pavia, the insurgent force continually retreating until dark, which prevented our further advance. The insurgent's loss was known to be 150 killed and many wounded.

Having learned that Gen. Araneta, with 800 insurgents, had occupied Oton, a city about seven miles from Iloilo, an expedition was made, with a view to effecting their capture. Sending Maj. Cheatham, with Companies L, D and K, of the

Photo by Lt. Thomas.

CAPT. STEWART, OF COLORADO REGIMENT (SITTING IN CHAIR), TAKEN SHORTLY BEFORE HE WAS KILLED.

Tennessees, by boat to a point about one mile beyond Oton, Col. Childers, with Companies A, B and F, with Maj. Bayless and Capt. Bridgman, of the 6th Art., with two guns, started before daybreak on the morning of the 8th of April, and proceeded to Molo and Aravelo, where they made a junction with troops sent by boat, and surrounded Oton at 7:30 A.M. The insurgents, however, decamped.

The Tennessee Regiment had a peculiar aptitude for winning the favor of the natives. The authority was tempered with a kindness which made itself soon felt and respected. It was no uncommon thing for the officers and soldiers to be seen in the native houses of worship, and their commingling was of that character so observable in our own south between the whites and the blacks. The obedience and respect of the latter was very evident, while the former yielded much to the little whims of the blacks. Such methods gained the good will of the blacks, who at the same time retained their self-respect. The same spirit exhibited throughout the Philippines would do much to the restoration and maintenance of peace. To the discretion of the Tennessee Regiment may be attributed the peaceable

occupation of Panay up to this writing. There have been occasional outpost skirmishes, but rather with the marauding class, who at all times have infested the country. There is a rebellious spirit in the island, but, up to this time, it has not broken out. Besides Iloilo the Americans have taken possession of the towns of Molo, Trinidad, San Juan, Arizalo, San Nicolas, Cagarman, Oton, Cagbran, San Diego, Butang, Mandurriao, San Roque, Jibadan, and other small places. The administration of civil affairs is proceeding with little friction.

OPERATIONS IN CEBU.

The instructions to Col. Miller were, after establishing American authority at Iloilo, to proceed immediately to Cebu and occupy that place. Pursuant to this instruction the *Petrel* was despatched to Cebu. Resistance was expected, but it was thought advisable to disclose to the native population the purposes of the government.

The situation in Cebu at that time, is disclosed in the following statement made by the German Consul to the writer:

Cebu was surrendered under protest by the influence of Majie and Llorente, the two ablest Filipinos in the island, on February 17, 1899. There was a stormy meeting of the townspeople upon hearing of the approach of the Americans. The young men advised the burning of the town and fighting to the bitter end, but the older men advised calmer councils. There was a second meeting at noon and the wiser heads prevailed. On the 21st of February, the U. S. *Petrel* was seen, and Llorente, Garardo, Qui and Chimaco, leaders in Cebu, went out to meet her. When told by Mr. Sidebottom, the English Consul, acting for the American government that the American Commander desired to treat, Majie said that "the people of Cebu, finding themselves abandoned by the Spaniards, have joined the Filipino Republic." The Commander of the *Petrel* gave them until eight o'clock on the 22d to surrender. A great many were in favor of burning the place, but at seven o'clock on the night of the 21st of February it was agreed to yield to superior force and to give up the town, protesting against doing so, and stating that they had no order from Aguinaldo to that effect. At 8:30 on the morning of the 22d they sent this word to the Commander of the *Petrel*. At 9:30, forty sailors were landed, and at 9:40 the Stars and Stripes were hoisted at Cebu.

On the 28th of February, the 1st Battalion of the 23d Inf., under Maj. Goodale, left Manila for Cebu to complete the American occupation. While the natives demurred to occupation, by the Americans, of territory outside the city of Cebu, the objections were overcome and the American occupation resulted in the establishment and maintenance of order under Col. Hamer of the Idaho Regiment, as Military Governor of the island, and for the period intended to be covered by this history there was peace in the island.

The writer, during that time, visited the island for the purpose of observing the local conditions, and there met Lieutenant-Colonel Bayless, of the Tennessee Regiment. He said:

There is a little trouble in Cebu, but it is not serious. Dissatisfaction exists in certain quarters. The Secretary of the Treasury for the Filipino government, Señor Moreno, has been stabbed, and the murderers cannot be found, because the native police will not give them up. They have fled into the mountains to a place named Sudlon, which is surrounded by an amphitheater of hills. They have 150 stands of Mausers and Remingtons and some old rifles, and 1000 bolos. There is only one road into this town. I can take it any time. The native policemen are unreliable, so I have to place night patrols of Americans.

Col. Hamer, the Military Governor, said to the writer that "Señor Flores, who was President of the island at first, was a weak and vacillating man, so the Americans put him on the retired list, and Llorente was elected. Llorente is not a very strong man, he is a Mestizo, half Spanish and half Visayan, and has been appointed by Gen. Otis one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of Manila."

In regard to the future government of the islands, the Colonel remarked:

What the conditions will be when the Governor has perfected his functions, I do not know. Some of these people are still for Aguinaldo, and it will be hard to make them discard him. The better class are shrewd enough to see that sooner or later the Americans will take possession of the archipelago, and have quietly changed their political belief without exciting unfavorable comment. The Filipino Governor is in the same building with myself, and we have the anomaly here of American Governor and Filipino Governor in the same building, and getting along on a very friendly basis. The native police are not reliable, and we cannot ferret out the crimes of the Bolo men. They are suspicious of us, especially the lower classes, which are the most numerous. I have a theory of the government of these islands. I do not believe the native government should be general at first. I think it would be better to begin at the bottom and organize upward; for example, organize the town first, and not the Provincial government. Preferably, let the Americans appoint a president of the town, let the natives elect and make a selection, subject to the American approval; leave the qualifications of voters for future consideration; elect a president and justice and clerk from the natives; but let their records and official acts pass under American inspection. Make the towns "kindergartens" to give the people a chance to learn the art of self-government; divide them into wards, some to be American wards absolutely. Permit the people to elect aldermen aud councilmen, and make the city council a "kindergarten" in which to give these people a chance to learn the American system of self-legislation. I would give the president, or mayor, of the towns the absolute veto right, supervised by the United States authorities. My impression is that these officials should be required to report all their acts in writing to some Central American Supervisor or Governor of the islands.

There are several classes of people here to be considered. The rich and intelligent, and a few Spanish, would favor the American control. Majie was our best friend and was the best man in the island. There are certain ambitious fellows, without property interests, looters and highwaymen and pirates by nature; they get a crowd around them and by intimidation and bribes, make trouble, in order that they may be able to levy tribute in the dress of the Filipino army, and make people take off their hats to them. There is a third class of citizens in Cebu, the hill-folk, they are a still lower class, both in intelligence and property. They want the opportunity to make a living, but are easily led, and very susceptible to military influence. They seldom visit large towns and then only on market days. They seldom go even to the local villages, and then only to procure necessities. The hill-folk are deceived by monstrous stories circulated by the military party. Some of them actually believe that the Americans are black, and eat children and live on babies, and many join the insurgent army because they are afraid to do otherwise. There are few schools here, and the well-to-do send their children to Hongkong or Manila, especially to Hongkong, because they have there the advantage of learning the English language. The poor class have no education to speak of, and not twenty-five per cent of the inhabitants can speak Spanish, they speak Visayan and nothing else. The young men and women of Cebu are very anxious to learn English. For the present, religion should be let alone, absolutely as it is. The priests here are mostly Mestizos.

Governor Llorente received me with the politeness which characterizes the Spanish Mestizo. He was very frank, and spoke in an interesting way of the change which the coming of the Americans had made in Cebu. He thought, as Col. Hamer did, that the best people of the island favored American control. "What elements are against the Americans?" I asked. He replied that there were only a few, and generally the most ignorant. Their leader was Arcadio Maxillon.

They were not strong in rifles, having less than 200. "What about religion?" I inquired. "The Filipino government," he answered, "wishes its church and state separate. It would be a pity, however, to introduce the discussion of a Protestant Mission at this time, because the public mind is pretty well unsettled just now. I would favor absolute freedom of religion, when things are in a settled condition. The Spanish rule here was very rigorous. They treated us like slaves. There are about 100 Spaniards here in Cebu."

The discontent of the natives of late, has created some apprehension that an uprising was imminent, and to prevent this, the Supreme Justices from both Negros and Cebu visited their respective islands and good results followed for a time, but in Cebu the insurgents have become active again, and at the date of the publication of this volume, there is fighting going on with what results cannot yet be ascertained.

OCCUPATION OF NEGROS.

The American occupation of the island of Negros was similar, in character, to that of Cebu, with the exception that the local authorities at that time, were more amicable and more in hearty accord with American domination than those

FILIPINO TRENCHES

of Panay and Cebu. The inhabitants of this island had been in revolt against the Spanish government, and had practically overturned all Spanish authority, so that, on November 12, 1898, a Provisional government had been established by the inhabitants with Anissitto Lacon, President, and José Luis Luzuriaga, President of the native Congress. A Cabinet was also created with functions similar to that in all republican governments, and the Congress was made up of thirty-six deputies. Preceding the American occupation, a deputation composed of many of the representatives of this government, including its President, waited upon Gen. Otis in Manila, and expressed their desire to co-operate in the amicable establishment of American rule on the island. Indeed, so hearty was this concurrence, that previous to the advent of the Americans on the island, the American flag had been raised there by the natives, and the subsequent coming of the Americans was distinguished by an ovation rather than the reluctant submission of a defeated people. It was apparent that with such manifestation of fealty and submission it behooved the command to maintain its prestige by giving to the people the largest liberty compatible with the military occupation of the country by the United States.

In the island of Negros, then, it was determined to test in the largest measure this capacity of the inhabitants for self-government, and with this object in view, it was desirable to place one who was well versed in law and civic affairs at the head of the military government of the island. Col. James H. Smith, of the 1st California Volunteers, afterwards General, was found to be admirably qualified for this position to which he was appointed by Gen. Otis.

Col. Smith, with the 1st Battalion of the California Volunteers, Maj. Sime, commanding, acting upon the request of the deputation, proceeded by the transport *St. Paul* from Manila, and, on the 4th of March, 1899, landed at Bacolod on Negros. The deputation accompanied the command but landed the previous night to arrange the welcome. Half an hour after landing, Capt. Tilly had re-opened communication with Iloilo by cable, and the first message over the line was the following:

The Governor and inhabitants of Negros to Gen. Miller, Iloilo.—We affectionately salute and congratulate ourselves upon the happy arrival of Col. Smith and troops, under your orders, and beg you to send this salutation and congratulation to Gen. Otis, Manila, as the representative of the United States in the Philippines. ANICETO LACSON.

Col. Smith proceeded at once to recognize and continue in force the existing civil government. In adjusting this authority to the needs of the military government a little friction was created, but patience and good judgment prevented any outbreak. The same class of law-breakers, however, are found in Negros as elsewhere in the Visayan Islands. These largely came from an unsubdued class of brigands for whose subjection time will be required.

In March, Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce arrived in Negros with a battalion of the Californias, and immediately the command was called upon to subdue an outbreak of this brigand class. These hill-tribesmen were under the leadership of one Papaissor, and were looting and destroying—their depredations being largely upon the inhabitants of the lowlands. Their effort, also, was to incite insurrection against the Americans. These brigands had killed many, taken more into captivity, and pillaged the lowland districts. The Californias were despatched against them, two companies under command of Col. Duboce, proceeding overland, and Maj. Sime, with two other companies by water, on April 2, 1899. The command of Col. Duboce made a forced march of twelve miles and captured Labzid, where the insurgents were well fortified, and destroyed the town, taking thirty-five prisoners, the remainder of the force scattering into the mountains.

THIRD ARTILLERY IN THE TRENCHES. *Photo by K. I. F.*

Gov. Smith retained exclusive control of the customs, postoffice, telegraph and police force, while all other civil affairs were left in the hands of the natives. The police force was constituted of natives, officered by Americans. Some time after the occupation, Capt. Tilley, of the Signal Corps, was murdered while he was preparing a telegraph line, under a flag of truce. As a punishment, Gen. Smith captured Escalante, where the murder occurred, and killed the natives who were implicated in the defense. During the spring and early summer, several expeditions were made into the interior, and across the island. Among the most important of these was one which resulted in an action at Bolong. This was an entrenched insurgent position, and was carried by the American forces in a hand-to-hand fight, the insurgents leaving one hundred and fifteen killed on the ground. The American loss was one killed and one wounded. There was another sharp engagement at Tibunan, of which Gen. Otis cables as follows: "Lieutenant-Colonel, 6th Inf., with eighty men, encountered one hundred insurgents entrenched in the mountains of the island of Negros and routed them after an hour and a half of severe fighting. The Americans had three men slightly wounded. Nineteen insurgents were found dead in the trenches. It is supposed the insurgents were armed Tagals, who, a few days since, had crossed from Panay in boats."

LOOKING FOR "DINERO" Photo by Ogawa.

THE SULU ARCHIPELAGO.

On May 20, 1899, Capt. Pratt and his command, consisting of two battalions of the 23d Inf., according to previous arrangement, peaceably received the surrender of the Spanish garrison at Sulu, and thereupon the United States succeeded to this, almost the only actual possession of Spain in the Sulu Archipelago, but at this time there was a ruler of Sulu whose power was far greater than that of Spain, whose title the United States acquired.

Through the fanaticism of the Mohammedans, the Sultan of Sulu is far more powerful than the United States can hope to soon become. Capt. Pratt, soon after his arrival, was waited upon by the Sultan, and in turn Capt. Pratt sought out this Majesty, whose mind may be gathered by these questions then put to Capt. Pratt by him:

"Why did you come here? For land, you have plenty at home. For money, you are rich and I am poor. Why are you here?"

In July, 1899, Capt. Pratt was succeeded by Maj. Goodale, and subsequently Gen. John C. Bates arrived and concluded a "Treaty" with the Sultan. Gen. Otis summarizes this treaty in the following communication to the War Department, under date of August 24th, last:

An agreement was made with the Sultan and Datos whereby the sovereignty of the United States over the entire Jolo Archipelago is acknowledged; its flag to fly on land and sea; the United States to occupy and control all points deemed necessary. Introducing firearms is prohibited. The Sultan is to assist in suppressing piracy. He agrees to deliver criminals accused of crime *not committed by Moros against Moros.* Two other points in the archipelago will be occupied by the United States troops when trade and commerce can be controlled.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL HALE AND BRIGADE-SURGEON MAJ. POTTER AT SAMPALOC CHURCH.

As with trifling exceptions, the population is Moro, it is evident that the Sultan's power is not greatly interfered with.

The Mohammedan is the dominant creed in Borneo, Sulu Archipelago and the great island of Mindanao. What is known as the Sulu Archipelago consists of about 150 islands, capable, so far as known, of cultivation and possessing some natural resources. What has led to much confusion in the enumeration of the number of islands in the Philippines, is the fact that some have attempted to include in the enumeration all the isolated ground surrounded by water, while others confine the estimate to those of some considerable dimensions or inhabitable. The Spaniards estimate that some ninety-five of the islands in the archipelago are inhabited, but very few of these have any import or export trade, and, with few exceptions, the great mass of natives in the archipelago live with little trade. There are some localities in which agriculture is pursued. The principal products of foreign trade are copra and coffee. All the industries in the islands are in a very primitive stage. The islands generally have a salubrious climate, and may be made very productive of all tropical products, but production, for a time to come, must depend upon the native industry, and this seldom looks beyond present needs.

It is probable that trouble may arise should our government attempt to enlarge the control imparted to it by the Spaniards, and hence it is well to examine the nature of the Spanish authority in the archipelago.

Many years since, the weaker of two contending "Sultans" sought an alliance with the Spanish government at Manila, which was perfected upon the agreement that he would recognize Spanish dominion in his territory, under certain restrictions, in consideration of which Spain should subdue the opposition

"Sultan." While waiting for Spain's co-operation, the Sultan, who was to be aided by the Spaniards, attacked and dispersed the insurgent forces, losing his life in the engagement. The Spanish fleet finally arrived, and, finding the Sultan dead, returned to Manila without, in any manner, complying with the agreement. Adasaolan succeeded to the Sultanship and made a new alliance with the Mindanao Sultan as well as the Sultan of North Borneo.

TRENCHES NEAR PULILAN WHERE THIRTY-EIGHT BODIES WERE FOUND.

Later, the Spaniards attempted to establish their rule in the archipelago, claiming the right by virtue of the old alliance. This was resisted and nearly the whole Spanish command perished. The Moros, for a long time thereafter, pursued a kind of predatory warfare in which piracy and brigandage were the chief features. Under these methods they took, and, for a long time held possession of Cebu, Negros, Leyte, Bohol and certain provinces in Panay. Spain, by a series of victories, finally drove the Moros out of their territory and built at Zamboango, a strongly fortified place which they used as a base of operations against the Mohammedans.

Disease attacked the Spaniards at this place and out of a total of 1000 men, 850 died in a twelfth month. In 1770, a kind of treaty was arranged between the governments, so that further warfare was averted, excepting occasional piracies, and this condition prevailed for nearly a century. There now followed a period of years in which the Moros again pillaged and destroyed Spanish coast towns so that in 1876, Spain despatched a force against the Moros which effectually quelled the disturbance. In 1887, the Moros were again found in revolt, and this being suppressed, was succeeded by another revolt. In 1888, an agreement was made which recognized the rule of the Sultan, subject to a kind of Spanish suzerainty, under which Spain paid a yearly stipend to the Sultan for its rights,

KANSAS BOYS BUILDING TRENCHES UNDER HEAVY FIRE.

which, under the treaty concluded by Gen. Bates, is to be continued by us. Even under this treaty, Spain had never exercised any control in these islands, except in some of the sea-coast towns, and the population in the island interior has known no rule but that of the Sultan. How ineffective was Spanish rule in these islands may be understood from the fact that so late as 1892, the Spanish Governor attempted to enforce, for the first time, the collection of a tax upon the Moros. The Sultan with a large following visited the Governor, and in token of his good will, presented him with a basket of pearls. While the Governor was in the act of receiving them, the Sultan drew a barong and split his skull to his teeth. The population of these islands cannot be even approximately given, but whatever it may be, the people have never been subdued, and thus far the Americans have made no serious attempt to do so.

KANSAS MEN CROSSING THE CALUMPIT RIVER. *Photo by English.*

CHAPTER XIV.

THE GUNBOAT FLOTILLA.

THROUGHOUT the operations against the followers of Aguinaldo, the improvised gunboats under the command of Brevet-Major F. A. Grant, of the Utah Light Artillery, took a very important part. The first boat to be put into service was the *Laguna de Bay*, and her work in assisting the land forces to clear the Pasig River was looked upon with such favor that later two other boats were armed and fitted out for the service.

Many engagements were had with the natives, especially along the upper Pasig River and on the lake, Laguna de Bay, after which the boat was named. As the boat was the largest and the first to be fitted up, a short account of her will be given.

THE "LAGUNA DE BAY".

The boat was an old side-wheel steamer owned by a Spanish company, and built especially for trading on the lake and Pasig River. She is 120 feet long, 40 feet beam, and of very light draft. Under orders of Major-General Otis, Maj. Grant was instructed to fit her out, and on the 27th of January, she was ready for duty. The report of the completion of the boat showed that the main deck of the boat had been completely surrounded with two thicknesses of steel plate as a protection from rifle bullets. Two three-inch marine guns comprised the forward battery, with portholes so placed that they could be fired straight ahead or on either bow. The after battery consisted of two 1.65-inch Hotchkiss rifles, arranged to fire broadside or to the rear.

A turret of steel plates was erected on the top deck, inclosing and protecting the men working at the wheel, and also the secondary battery of four 45-caliber Gatling guns set on tripods.

To support the armor and guns the deck had to be strengthened with heavy timbers, and when this was done the boat was complete and ready for service, with a full and complete equipment of working lines and ship stores on board.

Capt. B. H. Randolph, of Battery G, 3d U. S. Heavy Artillery, was placed in command of the boat, with a detachment of twenty nine men from his battery to man the guns on the main deck. Lieut. R. C. Naylor, of the Utah Art., with ten men, was also detailed on board the boat. Lieut. Naylor was given command of the guns, and the Utah men under Corp. Wm. Nelson were assigned to the Gatling battery. Lieut. E. A. Harting, with a detachment of twenty five sharpshooters from the South Dakota Regiment, completed the fighting force of the

boat. Lieut. S. G. Larson, also of the South Dakota Regiment, was detailed as navigating officer, his experience before joining the army fitting him for the position.

As a crew to handle the boat was necessary, the whole army was picked over for men who were suited for the work. Sergt. H. F. Juirs, of the Signal Corps, was made chief engineer. No less than six regiments were represented in the crew. The greatest difficulty was had with the old engines, which were of a dif ferent pattern to those used at the present time, but all difficulties were finally overcome, and the boat was ready late in January and anchored in the river each night below the outposts.

VARIOUS FIGHTS ON THE RIVERS.

On the historic night of February 4th, the *Laguna de Bay* was at her anchorage, and bullets struck all around her and whistled over her decks. Nothing could be done during the night, but early on the morning of the 5th, an aide appeared on the bank and gave an order to Capt. Randolph: "Gen. Otis directs you to proceed to the firing line and engage the enemy."

On arrival at the front a Filipino flag could be seen floating over Santa Ana, and a vigorous cannonade was opened on this place, which was soon in flames. The church of San Juan del Monte came in for a heavy fire. These places were later occupied by the infantry. In the thick jungle, near Santa Ana, a party of insurgents annoyed the boat and also the Nebraska camp with a Mauser fire, so the boat rounded the bend and drove the insurgents beyond the San Juan River with the Gatling guns.

The natives were then pushed up the river by Gen. King's Brigade, the gunboat operating with him. On February 9th, the guns of the boat commanded the town of Pasig, and Gen. King demanded its surrender, which was complied with. At this time the river was free of natives to the lake, which was visited by the gunboat. The line to the north of the river had been weakened, and the natives threatened to break through, so the boat received orders to drop back and anchor above Santa Mesa, where a wide stretch of level country could be commanded by her guns. The next active service of the boat was on February 14th, when it was decided to evacuate Pasig and fall back to San Pedro Macati, to shorten the line to the south of the river. The natives were in large force at this point, and sufficient troops could not be spared to hold such an advanced point as Pasig. The retreat of the California Regiment from Pasig was a perilous undertaking, and the boat was sent up to protect the rear. At Pasig ferry the infantry made a stand, with the gunboat lying in the middle of the stream. At this point the first casualty on board the boat occurred, when Lieut. Harting was drowned, while attempting to land a Hotchkiss gun in a rowboat which capsized. The gun was lost. All efforts to rescue the officer were futile, and his body was not recovered until the current of the river washed it ashore at Manila. The next day the natives continued the fight, and for more than two hours the boat kept up a terrific fire on a swamp and jungle in which they had taken up their position. The same evening the infantry retreated to Guadalupe church, without losing a man, although the natives followed them closely. The boat returned to her position above Santa Ana, where the next day Maj. Grant came aboard, relieving Capt. Randolph of his command.

It was then decided to abandon Guadalupe church, and retire to San Pedro Macati, and again the *Laguna de Bay* advanced to cover the retreat. All night long a desultory fire was kept up on the boat and between the outposts. At daylight on the 19th, the church was fired by the infantry, which at once retired to San Pedro Macati. The church and hill, upon which it was situated, were immediately occupied by the natives, whose sharpshooters began firing on the boat and outposts. At ten o'clock Maj. Grant decided to test the boat by running up between the native lines and see what the effect would be. As the boat advanced she received a hail of bullets from the native rifles, but the steel plates warded them off. For half an hour every gun on the boat was turned loose, and shells and bullets whistled into the insurgent position. At the end of the fire not a shot came from the natives, who were completely silenced. The boat again returned to a position below San Pedro Macati. The skirmish at Guadalupe had the effect of quieting the natives, and when they afterward became troublesome, the boat would be sent for. Five times similar engagements were had at Guadalupe, but so effective was the armor that but one man was killed, he being Private John Toiza, of Battery G, 3d Art., who was killed by a rifle ball on March 4th.

"WAR IS HELL."

After the arrival of more troops it was again decided to clear the Pasig River. On the morning of March 14th, Gen. Wheaton's Brigade advanced to the attack. The *Laguna de Bay* drove the natives from the hill and it was occupied by the infantry without interference. A short distance above Guadalupe, sunken cascos in the river prevented the gunboat from cutting off the natives, who escaped across the river. After a brief delay, a channel was found in the river through the obstructions, and the boat again advanced to the attack. The natives were in their trenches across the river from Gen. Wheaton's Brigade, but when the boat arrived, they broke and fled toward the city. A heavy fire was kept up, and on arrival at Pasig, in the open fields beyond the town were seen thousands of natives, soldiers and non-combatants. These were hurrying for shelter in the woods beyond and were not fired on. Two launches left Pasig as the gunboat neared the town. They were fired upon repeatedly, but succeeded in making their escape out into the lake.

The next day the *Oeste*, a tug protected with steel plates and armed with a small cannon and two Gatling guns, joined the *Laguna de Bay*. She was commanded by Lieut. W. C. Webb, of the Utah Art., and manned by men from the larger boat.

IN SUPPORT OF EXPEDITIONS.

The next move was to fit out an expedition to capture the towns on the lake. A company of the 23d Inf. was sent with the boats to accomplish this. The towns of Morong and Jalajala were taken. No resistance was met, but at the former a quantity of stores were burned. The next morning Santa Cruz was visited. The locality was reconnoitered, but it was decided that there was not sufficient force at hand to land. The steam tugs belonging to the insurgents were located in the Lambang River.

When the advance on Malabon was contemplated, the *Laguna de Bay* was ordered to that point to operate in the shallow bays and inlets which are everywhere along the coast, and which kept the ships of Admiral Dewey's fleet away from shore. The towns along the coast were shelled by this gunboat. On the 25th of March, the *Napidan* joined Maj. Grant. She was commanded by Lieut. Franklin of the 23d Inf., and manned by men from the same regiment. She carried two six-pound rifles, and two Gatling guns. The two boats operated along the shore in the advance on Malolos. The next move of the gunboats was in a campaign against Santa Cruz, and a direct move to cripple and destroy the power of the Filipinos on the lake. Major-General Lawton took great interest in Maj. Grant's report concerning Santa Cruz, and he decided on a move against that place. Before daylight on April 9th, there were assembled on the lake, besides the three gunboats, a number of tugs and cascos, on which were 1500 men of the 14th Inf., the 4th Cav., dismounted, and the North Dakota Inf. Major-General Lawton and Brigadier-General King were at the head of the expedition. The fleet started directly for Santa Cruz, under the convoy of the gunboats.

On nearing the city, a plan of campaign was adopted. The troops landed at a point about five miles from the city, under the guns of the *Napidan*, while the *Laguna de Bay* and the *Oeste*, with three troops of cavalry, anchored directly in front of the city. The land forces met little opposition, and succeeded in surrounding the city. The next morning the bombardment was commenced, and early in the forenoon the city was in the hands of the Americans. The Filipino loss was heavy, and many prisoners were taken. The loss of the land forces was light.

The troops scoured the surrounding country, while the gunboats directed their attention to the six captured tugs in the river. The natives had disabled the engines, but enough were repaired to tow the remainder to the city. On April 17th, the whole expedition returned to Manila, after a successful campaign.

Maj. Grant next made an attempt to ascend the Malolos River, to co-operate with the land forces in the advance on Calumpit, but it was found to be impossible on account of low water. The boats are now doing duty guarding the lake and upper waters of the Pasig River.

On May 7th, the *Laguna de Bay* and *Covadonga*, ascended the Pasig River to Guagua, to establish water communication with Major-General MacArthur's Division. No opposition was encountered until the boat arrived at Sexmoan, where a force of natives were found strongly entrenched. After a brisk skirmish

for a few minutes, the natives retired, firing the town. Guagua, a mile further up the river, was also evacuated and set on fire. With this move the advance line north of Manila, was put into communication with the city by an open water-way, as well as by the railroad.

Gen. MacArthur failing to meet Maj. Grant at Guagua as arranged, the boats waited at the town from 1 until 5 P. M., and as they could not hold the town without assistance it was left for the time.

On May 10, 1899, the *Laguna de Bay* and *Covadonga* entered the Rio Grande Pampanga River and made their way up to Calumpit, where they were in a position to assist the land forces and carry supplies up to Gen. Lawton's command at Candaba. On May 17th, the boats led the advance of Maj. Kobbe's troops, driving the insurgents before them and capturing San Luis. On the following day the town of Candaba was surrendered to Grant, Maj. Kobbe's command arriving about three hours later.

CAPTURES BY THE FLOTILLA.

The *Laguna de Bay*, *Napidan*, *Oeste*, *Covadonga* and *Oceania* captured over two hundred thousand dollars worth of coal, cascos and steamboats from the insurgents. In all eight steamers were captured, and at Guagua the enemy burned one gunboat and sunk another large steamer.

Gen. Lawton, who operated with the boats more than any other commander, was very loud in his praise of the work done by them.

The foregoing is a correct statement.

F. H. GRANT,

Late Maj. Utah Art., Commander United States gunboats.

LATER EVENTS IN THE ISLANDS.

The events occurring between the closing of the spring campaign and the opening of that which has just begun, have had no bearing on the fortunes of the war, and are of interest only to those who were engaged in them. So far as the volunteer troops were concerned in them, their history will be found in the regimental histories in the "special editions" of this book. There has been a series of detached operations whenever the insurgents happened to be most troublesome. Aguinaldo's forces have remained in front of our lines everywhere. As our army has been depleted by the return of the volunteer regiments and by sickness, the insurgents have pressed more heavily against them, only to be punished and driven back once more. Aguinaldo's capital has been pushed back along the railroad, having been variously reported, at different times, as at San Isidro, on the Rio Grande, Tarlac, on the railroad, and Porac. In the south the late fighting has been in the province of Cavite between Cavite and Manila, where our troops first landed. The absence of official reports, which are not available for the later operations, renders it impossible to give a very clear account of what has happened. We seem to have defeated all the bodies of insurgents with which our forces have come in contact, and taken all the towns which we have attacked. Whether or not we have retained or abandoned them is usually not clear. Aguinaldo is evidently without resources to maintain a large army in one place, and his troops are broken up into small bands which hover about and harass our

outposts. There is little or no vestige of civil government in any part of the island of Luzon with which we have become acquainted. In the Visayan group, where our force is small, there have of late been a good many outbreaks, doubtless incited by agents of Aguinaldo.

CHARACTER OF THE CAMPAIGN NOW OPENING.

The detailed history of our operations in the Philippines necessarily closes with the end of the spring campaign, and the beginning of the rainy season. The new campaign with increased forces is beginning as this volume goes to press. The reader of these pages will be able, in connection with the maps herein contained, to follow the telegraphic accounts of the movements of our army far more intelligently than has hitherto been possible to the American public. With the increased force now at command, and the certainty that they can be retained until their mission is accomplished, the American commander will be able to proceed far more effectively than has hitherto been possible. The geography of the country has become known, the disposition of the inhabitants, and the resources of the insurgents. It is announced that it will be the policy of the government to close all ports on the island of Luzon except those controlled by our forces. This will cut off a large revenue which Aguinaldo has enjoyed from customs, and put a stop to the importations of arms and ammunition, except such as escaping the vigilance of our navy, may be landed in out-of-the-way places. The first military operation will be to occupy the great fertile valley which runs northward from the province of Cavite, through Manila, and which is traversed by the Manila and Dagupan Railroad, which has been continually fought over for the past year. It is announced that this valley will now be occupied for the entire length of the railroad by a force sufficient to permanently hold and police it. When this is done, and the ports closed, the power of Aguinaldo will be broken. He can no longer maintain armies, and must either submit or resort to a guerrilla warfare in the mountains, which, if he is not captured, he can doubtless continue for some time. But with the permanent occupation of the great valley, the natives assured of protection, will certainly return and resume their occupations. They will have no other alternative. They cannot live otherwise. They will certainly enjoy a better government than they have ever before lived under, and the island will probably gradually become pacified.

CHAPTER XV.

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND THEIR PEOPLE.

THE story of the campaign in the Philippines cannot be intelligently followed without some knowledge of the islands and their people. It is also evident that, for other reasons, all that pertains to the country and its inhabitants is at this time of deep concern to the people of the United States; while no argument will be made upon questions of public policy, the facts set forth herein may be of benefit to those seeking a judicious solution of the vexed questions arising from our occupation; and while the moral and intellectual worth of the islanders is of grave consideration to those seeking their betterment, the material conditions and possibilities of the country will be important factors in shaping our policy with regard to it.

All that will be attempted, however, is a brief statement of the essential facts, leaving the reader to pursue such further research into non-essentials he may desire. While the descriptive matter is necessarily brief, it will be found well supplemented by the various maps, charts and illustrations.

The Philippine Islands (so called in honor of Philip II of Spain) extend over an area of about one thousand miles north and south, and six hundred miles east and west. The number of islands is variously estimated at from four hundred to two thousand. Of these many are unknown even by name, and of those enumerated many are wholly or in great part unexplored. All of the present maps and charts of the islands are very defective, even those which relate to the harbors, the bays, and the coast line. The value of each island to the group, or of that of the group to the world, can at best be but imperfectly understood until their interiors are better explored, and the numerous bays, harbors and channels properly surveyed. The maps and charts give substantially the location of the archipelago, or group, in reference to the seas and the continents. These should be considered in connection with a study of established steamship lines to or near the islands.

Some twenty islands are named as being considered the chief in size and importance, the principal of which is Luzon, upon which Manila is situated. Their particular specification will not add to the value of this summary. Their estimated area is 114,356 square miles. Luzon has 41,000 square miles, Mindanao has 37,500 square miles, and five of the others have over 10,000 square miles each. Luzon has been compared to the State of Virginia in size, and that of the group to Arizona.

PHYSICAL ASPECTS.

The physical aspect of these islands is of interest. Throughout the group there is a mountain system with a trend north and south, with occasional deflections. From sources in these mountain ranges spring a great multitude of rivers and rivulets, which make their outlet into the sea. In these, cascades, cataracts

and rushing torrents are very common. Between the ridges, and along the streams are found alluvial deposits, which broaden and widen as they approach the sea, until, in the region of their mouths, they constitute a vast plain, unsurpassed for fertility and productiveness. But it must not be inferred that this excellence of soil is restricted to the plains; rank vegetation and towering hardwood trees cover the major part of these ranges to their summits. There is a grotesque grandeur in the scene. The abrupt declivities, the precipitous walls, the rugged, towering pinnacles and peaks, are exhibitions of Nature in its wildest aspects. There is Mindanao, a wonder and surprise throughout the whole 10,000 feet of elevation from the sea to the summit of Apo. This is likewise true of Halcon in Mindoro, 8900 feet, and also Mayon, in Luzon, over 8000 feet. This last is well known to have been a volcano, and not long since in violent action; in fact the whole region may be said to be a land of extinct volcanoes, giving evidences of the most destructive eruptions. The latest convulsions are those noted as occurring in 1863 and in 1880, when the destruction was great in Manila. In 1627 one of the most elevated mountains in the province of Cagayan disappeared, and in 1675 a passage was made to the sea on the Island of Mindoro, from which a vast plain emerged.

EARLY HISTORY UNKNOWN.

But little is known of the origin and early history of the inhabitants of these islands. Their traditions, which should give us some clew, appear, under the educational influences of the Catholic clergy, to have been suppressed, changed, or inextricably intermingled with inventions of the friars themselves. It is believed that the original type is found in the Aetas or Negritos, a species of dwarfish blacks now found in the mountain regions of Luzon and Negros, but fast becoming extinct. Large areas in the interior, however, are inhabited by the savage natives, of whom but little is known. Their number is unknown, but from the best information obtainable, is supposed to approximate one million. All estimates, however, of the total population are conjectural, as there has never been a complete or reliable census of the islands. The estimates vary, and range from eight to ten millions. We should judge from the density of the population of the provinces best known—a tabulated statement of a few of which is subjoined—that the above total is rather under than over the actual number.

NATIVES GRINDING RICE.

The population of the best known provinces is exceedingly mixed. Malays predominate largely, and with these are found Aetas, Negritos (pure blacks), Chinese, Japanese, Indios, Moors and Europeans, and every conceivable shade of intermixture. It is estimated there are quite as many different tribes as islands, and that at least five hundred different languages and dialects are spoken. It may be said generally of the inhabitants that they are amenable to government, that the Malays are superior to many other Asiatics, and that they are honest, honorable, and readily yield obedience to better influences.

POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.

A province under the Spanish dominion was a division of land, with a capital and government of its own, but all subordinate to the Governor-General at Manila. Luzon had thirty-five of these subordinate provinces, as follows:

PROVINCE	POPULATION	CAPITAL
Abra	49,702	Bangued
Albay	286,850	Albay
Amburayan	30,150	Alilen
Apayaos	6,000	Bagubagu
Bataan	52,000	Balanga
Batangas	212,192	Batangas
Benguet	15,932	La Trinidad
Binatangan	.....	Binatangan
Bontoc	24,502	Bontoc
Bulacan	230,000	Bulacan
Cabugavon	.....	Cabugavon
Cagayan	112,357	Tuguegarao
Camarines	185,878	Nueva Caceres
Cavite	133,926	Cavite
Cayapa	.....	Cayapa
Ilocos Norte	156,900	Laoag
Ilocos Sur	172,836	Vigan
Infanta	10,200	Binangonan de Lampon
Isabela de Luzon	46,846	Hagan
Itaves	15,208	Macogao
Laguna	177,000	Santa Cruz
Lepanto	19,422	Cervantes
Manila	400,238	Manila
Morong	42,748	Morong
Nueva Ecija	155,000	San Isidro
Nueva Vizcaya	23,520	Bayombong
Pampanga	250,000	Bacolor
Pangasinan	295,105	Lingayen
Principe	5,000	Baler
Quiangan	24,800	Quiangan
Tarlac	97,947	Tarlac
Tayabas	105,576	Tayabas
Tuagan	3,041	San Emilio
Union La	119,421	San Fernando
Zambales	87,641	Iba

The province of Manila, the seat of the general government, has an area of 264 square miles, and a population of over 400,000. Manila proper, or Old Manila, contained a population, previous to the war, of 110,000. The main part of the

population of the locality known as Manila was in the suburbs, chief of which were: Pueblo, Binondo, San Jose, Santa Cruz, with fifteen wards; Quiapo, with two wards; San Miguel, with seven wards; Sampaloc, with thirty-nine wards, and Tondo, with eighteen wards. All of these suburbs are easy of access, and in them are centered the chief mercantile transactions of the islands, while not only in business, but in most of their attractions, they far outrank Old Manila. The total distance east and west, in a direct line through Manila, is 4¼ miles, and total distance north and south, 4½ miles.

The following are the chief cities and towns of the province:

NAME	POPULATION	DISTANCE FROM MANILA
*Caloocan	9,843	5 miles from city limits
Dilao	4,625	3 miles from city limits
Ermita	4,726	¼ miles from city limits
Las Pinas	4,000	8 miles from city limits
Malate	2,319	⅔ mile from city limits
Malabon or Tambobong	25,000	6 miles from city limits
Malibay	2,890	4 miles from city limits
Mariquina	10,313	7 miles from city limits
†Montalban	3,055	16 miles from city limits
Muntinlupa	5,068	21 miles from city limits
Navotas	9,154	6¼ miles from city limits
Pandacan	2,446	2 miles from city limits
Paranaque	9,863	6⅛ miles from city limits
Pasig	22,000	7 miles from city limits
Pateros	2,842	3 miles from city limits
Pineda	9,825	3⅛ miles from city limits
San Felipe Neri	5,465	2½ miles from city limits
San Juan del Monte	2,011	2 miles from city limits
San Mateo	6,700	17 miles from city limits
San Pedro Macati	3,921	3 miles from city limits
Santa Ana	2,194	3 miles from city limits
Taguig	9,662	9½ miles from city limits

* The distances given are calculated from the Walled City or Old Manila
† With highway to Caloocan.

Cavite is the capital of the province of Cavite. The province has an area of 480 square miles, and within this is a population of 133,926. It is contiguous to, and closely identified with, Manila in its enterprises. The towns and cities range from 1000 to 15,000 in population. Bulacan, the capital of the province of Bulacan, has a population of 13,186, distant 22 miles from Manila. The area of the province is 965 square miles, and it has a total population of 230,000. This is one of the richest provinces in the archipelago, and maintains a variety of industries, agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial. The cities are in close proximity to each other, with good means of communication.

Close at hand, and north of Manila province, is the province of Pampanga; it has an area of 787 square miles, and a population of 250,000, distributed among 22 pueblos and 329 barios. Bacolor, the capital, has a population of 10,642, and is situated 47 miles from Manila. The pueblos or cities range in population from 3000 to 20,000, and are distant from each other and the capital from 1 to 20 miles. The foregoing will suffice to illustrate the distribution of the great bulk of the population of the Island of Luzon.

THE VISAYAS.

Constituting a part of the Philippine system is a group of islands known as the Visayas, which have long been famous for their fertility and productiveness, and here is found a veritable mass of humanity. Up to the present time, except at Iloilo, and slight disturbances in the Islands of Negros and Cebu, there has been no special opposition to American control.

The population can be better enumerated by the provinces as follows:

PROVINCE	POPULATION	CAPITAL
Antique	119,356	San Jose de Buenavista
Bohol	247,745	Tagbilaran
Capiz	189,171	Capiz
Cebu	504,076	Cebu
Concepcion	19,342	Concepcion
Iloilo	472,798	Iloilo
Leyte	270,491	Tacloban
Negros Occidentales	226,995	Bacolod
Negros Orientales	94,782	Dumaguete
Romblon	38,633	Romblon
Samar	200,753	Catbalogan

Three of these provinces are on the Island of Panay, viz., Capiz, Iloilo, and Antique; and, as the table shows, their total population is 781,325, while the area is 4540 square miles. The province of Iloilo is 99 miles in length by 27 miles in width. Iloilo, the capital, is 355 miles from Manila, and has a population of 10,380. The distribution of the population may be set down as follows:

NAME	POPULATION	DISTANCE FROM ILOILO
Alimodian	11,837	12 miles
Anilao	2,699	12 miles
Arevalo	3,594	4 miles
Banate	6,764	31 miles
Barotac Nuevo	11,805	
Barotac Viejo	5,590	32 miles
Buenavista	3,497	1 mile
Cabatuan	18,177	13 miles
Calinog	8,866	23 miles
Cordoba	2,744	2 miles
Dingle	11,000	21 miles
Duenas	7,130	28 miles
Dumangas	14,114	24 miles
Guimbal	10,958	18 miles
Igbaras	12,140	24 miles
Janinay	28,738	3 miles
Jaro	9,482	
Lambunao	7,989	21 miles
Leganes	2,875	6 miles
Leon	13,950	16 miles
Lucena	6,511	7 miles
Maasin	9,674	
Manduriao	6,749	4 miles
Miagas	22,100	24 miles
Mina	4,357	
Molo	9,547	

NAME	POPULATION	DISTANCE FROM ILOILO
Nagaba	8,000	5 miles
Oton	13,363	7 miles
Passi	13,802	
Pavia	10,221	6 miles
Paz (La.)	3,641	¼ mile
Pototan	14,512	18 miles
San Dionisio	1,782	
San Enrique	3,015	27 miles
San Joaquin	13,918	34 miles
San Miguel	7,300	9 miles
Santa Barbara	13,000	16 miles
Sara	10,950	75 miles
Tigbauan	9,109	7 miles
Tubugan	4,368	31 miles
Zarraga	5,208	8 miles

The province of Cebu comprises the island of that name. The capital, Cebu, has a population of 35,243, and is distant from Manila 460 miles; the area is 2090 square miles, and population, as before stated, 504,076. The city and locality of Cebu long ranked Manila in importance, and is now considered the most important of the Visayas. On account of its varied industries, commercial facilities and numerous inhabitants, it may be fitly termed the mercantile center of the islands. The following indicates the distribution of population:

NAME	POPULATION	DISTANCE FROM CEBU
Alcantara	4,080	
Alcoy	5,040	44 miles
Alegria	11,460	90 miles
Aloguinsan	3,993	
Argao	34,050	33 miles
Asturias	6,000	109 miles
Badian	9,409	51 miles
Balamban	9,610	43 miles
Bantayan	10,016	62 miles
Barili	20,914	52 miles
Bogo	16,350	69 miles
Boljoon	7,413	57 miles
Carcar	30,300	23 miles
Carmen	6,673	25 miles
Catman	6,098	
Compostela	4,393	
Consolacion	4,616	7 miles
Cordoba	5,009	
Daan Bantayan	8,530	103 miles
Dalaguete	21,323	49 miles
Danao	15,483	4 miles
Dumanjug	13,171	42 miles
Ginatilan	12,144	
Liloan	8,380	
Malabuyoc	13,113	83 miles
Mandaue	15,307	41 miles
Medellin	8,221	
Minglanilla	6,310	5 miles
Moalboal	9,509	

NAME	POPULATION	DISTANCE FROM CEBU
Naga	10,926	11 miles
Nueva Caceres	3,339	42 miles
Opon	11,506	9 miles
Oslob	6,013	78 miles
Pardo (El.)	10,647	
Pilar	4,268	38 miles
Pina Mungajan	5,378	
Poro	7,000	
Samboan	10,422	68 miles
San Fernando	12,155	9 miles
San Francisco	6,567	
San Nicolas	17,800	
San Remigio	6,192	69 miles
Santa Fe	3,102	
Santander	4,686	88 miles
Sibonga	23,455	31 miles
Sogod	6,719	
Tabogon	8,631	
Talambang	6,226	1 mile
Talisay	19,000	6 miles
Toledo	10,922	39 miles
Tuburan	10,760	51 miles

THE SULU ARCHIPELAGO.

South of this group in the Philippine system, are the Sulu Islands or archipelago. The natives here are less civilized than those of Luzon and the Visayas, and while they have warlike proclivities they are wanting in many of the qualities of the barbarian. Of the Mangayans,—there are two distinct types, the highland and the lowland. The lowlanders for centuries have felt the contact of civilization, and morally, physically and intellectually, it has been to their detriment. The highlanders have had less intercourse with the white races; and as a race they are physically superior, having a well defined moral code, a due regard for the virtues of sex, the sacredness of the marriage relation, and the obligations to offspring; they are both brave and honest. A certain wild domesticity, sacredly observant of home and family ties, and scrupulous in regard to the higher virtues of life, permeates the life of the pure native Filipino wherever found; and it would seem that no race with such characteristics could be essentially vicious or take delight in the atrocities of the barbarian. The native learns easily and readily takes to books, education, mechanics and the arts. Such a nature must be susceptible to the good with which it comes in contact. How much then, of what he now is, is due to Spanish misrule, and now, divested of that, what will the Filipino be or soon become? It is this question with which some of the best of our countrymen are so greatly concerned to-day. There may be those who hold that in national affairs "public good makes public right," but with the majority is the desire that justice shall be done. Looking at the great admixture of races the wonder is that any special type should remain. It would be interesting to study in detail the effects of the curious intermingling of races which has taken place in these islands, but for want of space we must pass over a long period of bigotry and

superstition, of burdens and exactions, to a time when we see the primitive Filipino; then place him in comparison and contrast with the Filipino of the present.

AN EARLY ACCOUNT OF THE ISLANDS.

De Morga, a writer and author, whose work appeared about 1609, wrote extensively on the Philippine Islands. His position in their government, and his reputation, makes his work credible. De Morga Street, in Manila, was named after him. The following are largely paraphrases or excerpts from his book:

"The people who inhabit this great Island of Luzon, both in the maritime districts and in the interior of Camarines province, are of middling stature, of the color of boiled quinces; well featured, both men and women; the hair very black, scanty beard; of a clever disposition for anything they undertake; sharp, choleric and resolute. All live by their labor, gains, fishing and trade; navigating by sea from island to island, and going from one province to another by land. The natives of the other provinces of this island, as far as Cagayan, are of the same sort and quality, except that it is known by tradition that those of Manila and its neighborhood were not natives of the island, but had come to it and settled there in bygone times, and that they were Malays, natives of other islands and remote provinces in various parts of the Island of Luzon. There are a number of natives of a black color, with tangled hair; men and women not very tall in stature, though strong and with good limbs. These men are barbarians and of little capacity; they have no houses nor settled dwellings; they go in tribes, and bivouac in the mountains and craggy ground, changing their abode according to the season from one place to another, maintaining themselves with some little tillage and sowing of rice, which they do temporarily; and the game which they shoot with their bows, with which they are very dexterous and good marksmen; also with mountain honey, and roots which grow in the earth. They are a barbarous people, with whom there is no security; inclined to murder, and to attack the towns of other natives, where they do great mischief; without its having been possible to take effective measures to prevent them, either to reduce them to subjection or to bring them to a state of peace, although it is always attempted, by good or evil means, as the opportunity or necessity demands.

A FILIPINO BELLE.

"The province of Cagayan is inhabited by natives of the same color as the other inhabitants of the island, though of better shaped bodies, and more valiant and warlike than the rest. Their hair is long, hanging down over their shoulders.

They have been in rebellion and insurrection twice since they were reduced to submission, and there has been much work on different occasions to subject them and pacify them again. The costume and dress of these inhabitants of Luzon, before the Spanish entered the country, usually consisted, for men—coats of *Congan*, with collars sewed together in front, with short sleeves, coming a little below the waist; some blue, others black, and a few of varied colors for the chief men; these they call *Chininas*. A colored wrapper is folded at the waist and between the legs, so as to cover their middles and half way down the thigh; these they call *Bahaques*. Their legs bare and their feet unshod, their head is uncovered save for a narrow cloth wrapped around it, with which they bind the forehead and temples, called a *Potong*. Chains of gold wound around the neck, worked like sperm wax, and with links in our fashion, some larger than others. Bracelets on the arms, which they call *Calombigas*, made of gold, very thick and of different patterns, and some with strings of stones, carnelians and agates; and others, blue and white stones, which are much esteemed amongst them; and for garters on their legs, some strings of these stones and some cords pitched and black, wound round many times.

MARKET WOMEN.

"In one province which they call Zambals, they wear the front half of the head shaved, and on the skull a great lock of loose hair. The women in the whole of this island wear little frocks, with the sleeves of the same stuffs and of all colors, which they call *Varas*, without shifts, but they have white cotton wraps, folded from the waist downwards to the feet, and other colored garments fitting the body like cloaks, which are very graceful. The great ladies wear crimson, and some have silk and other stuffs woven with gold, and edged with fringes and other ornaments. Many wear gold chains around the neck, *Calombigas* (bracelets) on the wrists and thick earrings of gold in the ears, rings on the fingers of gold and precious stones. The hair is black, and tied gracefully with a knot on the back of the head.

"Since the Spaniards have been in the country many of the natives do not wear *Bahaques*, (waist cloths) but wide drawers of the same stuffs, and wrappers—and hats on their heads. The chiefs wear braids of beaten gold, and of various workmanships, and use shoes. The great ladies also are daintily shod, many of them with shoes of velvet embroidered with gold, and white robes like petticoats. Men and women, and especially the great people, are very cleanly and elegant in their person and dress, and of goodly mien and grace. They take great care of their hair, rejoicing in its being very black. They wash it with the boiled rind of a tree, which they call *Gogo*, and they anoint it with oil of sesame, prepared with musk and

PART OF THE FAMILY

other perfumes. All take much care of their teeth, and from tender age they file and make them equal in size with stones and instruments, and they give them a black color which is perpetual, and which they preserve until they are very old. They very generally bathe their whole bodies in the rivers and creeks. They say it is one of the chief medicines with which they are acquainted. When a little child is born they immediately bathe it, and the mother likewise. The women have, for their employment and occupation, needle work, in which they excel very much, as in all kinds of sewing. They weave coverings and spin cotton, and serve in the houses of their husbands and fathers. They pound the rice for their meals, and prepare the other victuals. They rear fowls and suckling pigs, and take care of the houses, while the men are attending to the labors in the fields, their fishing, voyages and gains. In their visits, and in going about the streets and to the temples, both men and women, and especially the principal ones, walk very slowly, and pay attention to their steps, and with a large following of male and female slaves, and with silk parasols, which they carry as a protection against sun and rain. The ladies go in front, with their maids and slaves, and behind them their husbands, fathers and brothers, with their servants and slaves.

NATIVE FRUIT STAND.

"Their ordinary food is rice, ground in wooden mortars and boiled, which is called *Morisqueta*. This is the ordinary bread of all the country. Boiled fish, of which there is great abundance, is a favorite food, and flesh of swine, deer and wild buffalo, which they call *Carabaos*. They also eat boiled *Camotes*, which are sweet potatoes; French beans, *Quitites*, and other vegetables. All sorts of plantains, guavas, pineapples, custard apples, oranges of various sorts, and other kinds of fruit and vegetables; in these the country abounds. What is used for drink is a wine made from the tops of cocoanut palms and nipa trees, of which there is a great abundance, and they are grown and cultivated like vines, though with less labor and tillage. When the sap is taken from the palm they distil it in retorts with their little stoves and instruments of a greater or less strength, and it becomes spirits, and this is drunk in all the islands. It is a very clear wine, like water, but strong and dry, and if it is used in moderation, it is medicine for the stomach; when mixed with the wine of Spain it becomes a sweet liquor, and is very wholesome.

"The weapons of these people are in some provinces bows and arrows, but in general, throughout the isles, they use lances with well made blades, of a middling size, and shields of light wood, with their hands fixed on the inside, which cover them from head to foot, which they call *Carasas*. At the waist a dagger four inches wide, the blade ending in a point, and a third of a yard in length; the hilt of gold or ivory; the pommel open, with two cross bars or projections, without any other guard; they are called *Bararoes*, and are two-edged; held in sheaths of wood or buffalo horn, elegantly worked; with these they strike with the point, but more usually with the edge. They are very dexterous; when they

reach their adversary, if they lay hold of his hair with one hand, with the other, at one blow they often cut off his head. Since they have seen Spaniards use their arms, many of them handle arequebuses and muskets very dexterously. Before this time they had small brass cannon, and other pieces of iron cast, with which they defended their forts and towns, though their powder was not as fine as that of the Spaniards.

"Their boats and ships were of many kinds, for on the rivers and creeks within the country they used canoes made of one very large tree and others with benches made of planks and built with keels; also *Vireys* and *Barangays*, which are vessels very swift and light, and low in the water, joined together with wooden bolts; as slender at the stern as at the bow, which contained many rowers on both sides, who with *Buzeyes* or paddles and with oars, rowed outside the vessel, timing their rowing to the sound of some who kept singing in their language, things to the purpose, by which they understood whether they were to hasten or retard their rowing. Above the rowers there was a bailior, or gangway, upon which the fighting men stood without embarassing the crew of rowers. These were built with out-riggers, to prevent sinking or capsizing, and carried sails. Another craft, of larger proportions, and differently constructed, was in use for freighting between the islands. Some of the fighting ships could carry one hundred and fifty men."

THE VISAYAS IN EARLY TIMES.

As to the inhabitants of the Visayas, the narration says;—"The Bisayas, also called Pintadoes, are thickly peopled with natives. All the inhabitants of these islands, both men and women, are well featured and of a good disposition, and more well conditioned, and of more noble conduct, than the inhabitants of the Isle of Luzon and other neighboring isles. They are different from them in their hair, which the men wear cut in a cue like the ancient Spanish fashion, and their bodies painted with many designs, without touching the face. They wear very large earrings of gold and ivory, and bracelets of the same material; their head dresses are twisted around their heads like turbans, with graceful knots and much striped with gold; jackets with light sleeves, without collars; with skirts half way down the legs, fastened in front, of *Medrinaque* and colored silks. They do not wear shirts nor drawers, but *Bahaques* of many folds, so that their middles are covered when they take off the jackets and skirts.

CAMP FIRE.

"The women are good looking and pleasing, very elegant and slow in their gait; their hair black and long, and tied upon the head; their wrappers are twisted around the waist, and hang down over them; they are of all colors, and their jackets of the same, without collars. They all go, men and women, without cloaks or other covering, and barefoot, with much adorning of gold chains, earrings, and wrought bracelets. Their weapons are long knives curved like alfanges, lances and shields. They use the same boats as the people of Luzon. They have the same labors, fruits and occupations, as all the other islands."

The Island of Cebu was inhabited by the same class of natives, and abounded in provisions, mines and gold washings. On the Island of Panay were some large rich towns, and stocks for building ships of large size, and a great plenty of timber for construction. There was also great abundance of rice, palm wine and provisions. The natives were skilled shipbuilders, and close by was a small islet where the natives were all carpenters and fine workmen, following no other employment. This was the Island of the Cagayans. All of the islands were thickly inhabited; the people industrious, pursuing different avocations, such as tilling the soil, fishing, shipbuilding, stock raising and trading. Their language was the same, and they communicated by speech and writing, and in this had letters and characters of their own, which resembled those of the Arabic. The writing was mostly done on the leaf of a tree.

The language of the natives of Luzon, and neighborhood, was unlike that of the Visayas. There were many different languages in Luzon. That of the Tagals in the province of Manila was elegant, copious, and abundant, and was not difficult to learn or pronounce. In all the islands they wrote well, using characters something like Greek or Arabic. There were fifteen letters used, three were vowels, the rest consonants. They wrote from right to left in the Arabic fashion and there were very few who did not write well and correctly.

The houses of these natives were fixed, and all built on a similar method or plan, the purpose being to avoid the torridity of the climate, and annoyances of the vermin and rats. These houses were built up on piles, there being sufficient space between the ground and the first floor for the fowls and animals; the roof was thatched with palm leaf, which is considered much more effective in resisting sun and rain than shingles or tiles. Ascent was made to the living apartments by ladders.

ANCIENT FORM OF GOVERNMENT.

They had a well defined form of government, which not only made provision for its permanence, but also for the social well-being and protection of the property and person of the subject.

De Morga says, of the government existing at the time of the Spanish invasion: "There were neither kings nor rulers who governed after the manner of other kingdoms and provinces, but in each island and province the natives recognized many of their number as chiefs, some greater than others, and each one with his own partisans and subjects, divided into quarters and families. These chieftainships and lordships were inherited by filiation and succession from father to son, and their descendants, and in default of them, the brothers and collaterals succeeded. Their duty was to rule and govern their subjects and partisans, and assist them in their wants and necessities. What these rulers received from their subjects was

respected and revered by the ruler, and a regular system of tribute from the subject obtained, by means of which the authority of the government was maintained."

THE SYSTEM OF SLAVERY.

The descendants of the rulers were regarded and treated as nobles, and their women had the corresponding rank and respect shown them. The rule of the chief was a kind of absolutism, in which he could, for a trifling offense, make the subject a slave; however, there were certain restrictions, involving a humanity and decency, unknown in our own late slave system. If the owner of a slave had a child by a slave mother, thereupon both mother and child became free, so that no man could traffic, sell, or hold in bondage his own child or its mother. The grievances between subjects involving property interests or damages to the person were held and determined by the "Ancients," that is, certain of the older members of the tribe. The parties were present, and witnesses heard in a manner similar to our regular court procedure, and their determination was a finality, and effect given to the judgment at once. The laws were unwritten, but were well in effect by custom and tradition. There were three distinct classes—the nobles mentioned; the *Timaguas*, this being the plebeian class; and the slaves belonging to these two. There were many peculiarities in this slave system, which would have been very tolerant if they had formed a part of our own. There was permeating through the whole system the possibility of freedom to the slave. By far the major part of these slaves were only slaves in part; for instance, a half, third, or minor part of the slave's time only was given to his servitude, and the rest of his time was for his own exclusive benefit, at which time he was absolutely free. Again, when only one of the parents was slave, and the other free, and there was only one child, he would be half slave and half free, and if more than one, the first child would take the condition of the father, whether slave or free, and the other the condition of the mother, and so on alternating. If there were an odd number, he would be half slave and half free. The offspring of such children would still be so apportioned as to being slave or free. These part slaves could also oblige their owner to emancipate them entirely upon payment of a just sum. This was regulated as to price, dependent upon conditions, and ranged from forty to eighty dollars. Much of the time of the courts was taken with the adjudication of these matters.

It is not known how the slave system became inaugurated, but it is supposed to have come in the way of conquest and usurious contracts, which provided the taking the body of a debtor in liquidation, upon forfeiture of debt. Even the were punished at the instance of the aggrieved party, and robbed a little

the schools.

punished by death or slavery. Insults by words might be punished to the same extent. Under certain circumstances such insults were regarded as more aggravating than violence to the person.

MARRIAGE INSTITUTIONS.

The marriages were mostly confined to the same class. Nobles with nobles; *Timaguas* with their rank; and slaves with slaves. They had a system of contract marriage, agreed to by the parents and relatives, which was celebrated by feasts and a public recognition. There was one real wife, who had property rights, and the children had inheritance and descent; she was called *Unasaba.* There were other wives called *friends;* the children of these did not inherit, but usually were apportioned. The marriage portion was brought by the man, and his parents gave him this, but the wife brought nothing till she inherited from her family. Marriage was dissolved by the judgment of the Elders, in which parents and relatives had consideration. If the husband were at fault his marriage would be retained by the wife, otherwise it would be returned to him. The property which they had acquired together was divided equally. There was judicious provision made for the adoption of children, and the inheritance and descent of property.

DETERIORATION OF THE FILIPINO.

The foregoing may suffice to show the attributes and character of the primitive Filipino. His love of home, country and order are strikingly manifest in those early times; his interpretation of rights and wrongs are all in accord with feelings of justice and humanity, and there is not in the characteristics of the native in those early times, a single disclosure of the instinct of savagery. In all the arts of peace he was certainly quite abreast of his times, while in warfare and defense he had the necessary bravery and fortitude, but without the art of military organization and effective weapons. For centuries this people must have existed as a pastoral peasantry, and were wanting in the polish and tarnish of modern civilized life. If we regard him now, we may find a defacement of his former self. He is as brave now as in those generations past when Magellan, under the direction and supervision of his astrologer, discovered him; for what can be stronger proof of courage than the act of coolly facing death? The Filipino to-day, knowing his inequality, coolly stands in his trenches to receive the fatal bullet of the Volunteer.

A YOUNG REBEL.

His institutions now are as they were then, and his impulses the same, but there is in him a timidity and evasion, a wariness and caution, that leads you to watching his deceits. It is scarcely human not to live to profit—even to profit by deception—and a little insight into his past will indicate the cause of his weakened moral fiber. It is said that perjury has controlled the Spanish Courts of Justice

in the Philippines for ages past, and that intrigue and deception is the rule of conduct in the governing class. It is also true that in pursuit of their oppression and exactions, the Spanish not only practiced intrigue and deceit, but fraud and violence, and these, by precept and example, entered largely into the business life of the people. The varied, iniquitous devices to enforce Spanish misrule upon the Filipino cannot be given within the confines of a chapter, but the whole system was a net-work of wrong, entering into the judicial and executive functions, and lowering the social standard of the people. How any residue of manliness and honor could outlive it all is a source of wonder; the fact that much has remained will always bring sympathy and esteem to the native Filipino. His status under the Spanish rule has received the condemnation of all who have written upon the Philippines, other than those of Spanish origin, and their conclusions concur as to the baleful effects of the Spanish policy.

A NATIVE MILK TRAIN.

In 1842 Lieutenant Wilkes, in command of the United States exploring expedition, makes the significant statement: "That they (the Filipinos) are an industrious class; that they are extremely hospitable, tractable, and possessed of quick apprehension; that they are intelligent and orderly, and govern themselves without the aid of the military; that their wages then were twelve and one-half cents a day in Manila, and six cents to nine cents a day in the provinces," and he says: "The government of the Philippines is emphatically an iron rule, and how long it can continue so is doubtful."

Under the present conditions, with his quiet reticence, the native seldom manifests his true character to those outside his class, and what he is or was before the insurrection must be largely gleaned from those who were his familiars at such time.

Professor Dean C. Worcester of the late Commission to the Philippines, had previously spent some years in the islands in his pursuit as a naturalist. He summarizes the Filipino then, and his relation to Spanish rule, as follows: "As a rule the civilized natives are orderly, and when well drilled they make excellent soldiers. Many of the natives are quick to learn, and are anxious for the opportunity, so that their education reduces itself to a question of ways and means. By centuries of oppression and injustice, this naturally gentle and peace-loving people has been drawn into armed revolt. One of the chief causes," he concludes, "is that a school system is provided for by the Spanish law, but favoritism prevails in the choice of teachers, who are often grossly incompetent, while the practical workings of the schools are frequently interfered with by the friars. The law provides that Spanish shall be taught, but as it suits their convenience in the more out of the way places to be the only means of communication between the government and the natives, they often forbid this. A few prayers, and a little writing and arithmetic, comprise the course of instruction in many of the schools.

The relation of the friars to the free school system naturally leads to the discussion of a delicate question, but it would be idle to treat of the problems of the Philippines without discussing the predominance of the friars, and the character of their influence.

"A clear distinction should be drawn at the outset between the friars and the priests. Some of the priests have accomplished an immense amount of good, as the Jesuits. Their 'Ateneo Municipal' at Manila is, with possibly one exception, the best educational institution in the archipelago, and numbers among its faculty many able and competent men. For some unexplained reason they are allowed to do missionary work only in the Morro country, where there is much danger and hardship.

CONSTRUCTING A NATIVE HOUSE.

"The priests of the mission are often very superior men, abuses are absent, and much good has been accomplished. Many parishes are held by a class of friars which would not be tolerated in any other country. While it is by no means true that all of these friars are incompetent, it is nevertheless a fact that many of them are ignorant beyond belief, and are given over to open and brutish licentiousness, practice inhuman extortion, especially in connection with the solemnization of marriage and the burial of the dead, while they interfere with the execution of the laws, and themselves openly violate them when it serves their ends to do so. The inevitable result is the utter demoralization of the communities which they control. There is no doubt that their evil practices have contributed, as much as any other one cause, towards bringing about the present revolution, and one of the demands of the insurgents has been that the friars should be expelled from the country.

"It is true that there exists a large class which has suffered at the hands of the friars wrongs which it is not human to forgive. Spain has purposely kept the natives in ignorance, has prevented them from communicating freely with one another, has removed men who showed capacity and inclination to become

leaders, and has above all, prevented the bringing in of firearms and ammunition The name of existing codes is legion, and a law-suit under any of them is the worst misfortune that can befall a man; precedent can be found for anything; bribery is universal and justice virtually unknown. Notwithstanding this, it is considered that a larger percentage of the Christian natives can read and write, than the percentage in Spain.

A BRITISH OPINION OF THE FILIPINOS.

In a British Consular report on the Philippines are these statements:

"Rarely is an intro-tropical people a satisfactory one, but this cannot be said of the Philippine Malay, who, in bodily formation and mental capacities alike, may fairly claim a place not among the middling ones merely, but among the higher ones included in the world's national scale. He is characterized by a concentrated, never absent self-respect; an habitual self restraint; a word and deed

STREET SCENE IN SAN FERNANDO.

very rarely broken, except when extreme provocation produces the transitory, but fatal frenzy 'Omuah!' an inbred courtesy, equally diffused throughout all classes, high or low; by unfailing decorum, prudence, caution, quiet cheerfulness, ready hospitality and correct, though not inventive taste. His family is a pleasing sight; much subordination, and little restraint; unison in [illegible], liberty, not license; orderly children, respectful parents; women subject, but not oppressed, men ruling, but not despotic; reverence, with kindness; obedience in affection. These form a lovely picture, by no means rare in the villages of the eastern isles."

The construction and operation of the only steam railway in the islands affords another illustration of the capacity of the natives. The Manila and Dagupan Railway was constructed on a guaranty by the government of an income of eight per cent on the investment, and as the government has never been called upon to liquidate the guaranty, it may be assumed that the investment is a paying one.

The road is one hundred and twenty-three miles in length, and extends from Manila, through and along the length of one of the largest, and perhaps the most productive valley in the islands, to Dagupan, a small port on the west coast. It has a good roadbed, well ballasted, elevated some three or four feet above the adjoining land; hardwood ties, and steel rails; the gauge is three feet six inches. There are some sixteen iron bridges crossing the streams on the course, and the line is almost entirely on the lowlands, in order that it may be accessible in moving the large rice crops which grow in what might be termed the swampy part of the valley. On the higher and dryer land grow the sugar cane and cocoa crops. The line, then, is peculiarly subject to washouts and overflows, common to certain periods of the year, owing to torrents of rainfall. The construction was begun in 1887, and completed in four years.

BUSINESS CAPABILITY OF THE NATIVES.

It goes without saying that a high order of intelligence and great trustworthiness on the part of the employees of our ordinary American railway is required; and it is apparent that the construction and maintenance of such a line as the Manila and Dagupan Railway, under the circumstances and conditions described, would call for the highest type of these qualities on the part of the employees.

The railway was built, and has ever since been maintained by Filipinos under the supervision of English management. Up to the time of the insurrection there had not been a single loss or accident chargeable to the neglect or want of skill on the part of an employee. There were some twenty-eight stations on the line, and with the exception of three Spanish station agents, all the rest were Filipinos. In fact, with the exception of the general manager and a few English overseers, the whole force, clerical and otherwise, were Filipinos. Their aptitude for this service is a revelation when it is further known that they had no prior training or discipline in the work. It is said that the clerks compare very favorably with the Europeans in the like service. Their wages were six to twenty dollars per month, and this service included station masters, telegraph operators, conductors, engineers and mechanics, the great bulk of them drawing the lower salaries. This is only one instance of the capacity of the Filipino, and may be an overdrawn statement. Under the restraints attending his position in this conflict he is too exclusive to

IGRITOS CAPTURED NEAR THE DEPOSITO, ON FEBRUARY 5TH.

an American to be by him fairly judged, but we may safely say of him that he is open-handed, capable, cheerful and hospitable. He does not count himself in his hospitality to the stranger; he never turns one of his kind from his door. If cleanliness is next to godliness he is to be commended; public and private baths are universal, and are daily used by all classes. There is a pretty custom at vespers, which has often been mentioned: "In an instant a hush comes over the home and place; in each house father, mother and children fall on their knees before the image of some saint and repeat their prayers; then, rising, each child kisses the hand of its mother and father and bids a good night; then obeisance is made to his fellow children, and if there is a guest present he is saluted with a bow, and to a white man they usually kneel and kiss his hand." The Filipino is a kind father, a dutiful son. His aged relatives are never allowed to want where there is wherewithal to give, but dependents are taken to the home and in all ways share in the living of the family. He is genial with his race; is a natural musician, and loves to sing, dance and be merry. Fearless himself, he much admires bravery in others. Such is the kind of people to be subdued in this conflict—persistent, indefatigable, brave. When once the science of arms is known to them it is the consensus of opinion among the volunteers that their subjugation and defeat can only be compassed by great effort and sacrifice.

NATIVES IN THE INTERIOR OF LUZON

CLIMATIC CONDITIONS.

Before turning to the topography of the country in which the campaign has been, and must for a time continue, consideration must be given to the climatic conditions under which the war has been and must be waged. "Seis meses de lodo,"—"six months of mud." "Seis meses de palvo,"—"six months of dust." "Seis meses de todo,"—"six months of anything." This is what the Spaniards said after losing twenty-five per cent of their command in fifteen months in the Philippines. While the climate in general is tropical, there is great variation, and this should be apparent when we consider the extreme length of the group, from north to south, their northern limit extending to a point north of the tropical zone· the variable winds and currents are more or less unlike in their

effects upon different localities differently exposed; and the varying altitudes, from plain to mountain top, should also be considered. We have the mean temperature of three seasons, known as cold, hot, wet, at several places, as follows:

MEAN TEMPERATURE.

	COLD	HOT	WET
Manila	72 degrees	87 degrees	84 degrees
Cebu	75 "	86 "	75 "
Davao	86 "	88 "	87 "
Sulu	81 "	82 "	83 "

At Manila the average rainfall yearly is reported to be from seventy-five to one hundred and twenty inches; this is small compared with many other localities. In the archipelago of Liano, northeast of Mindanao, the average rainfall is one hundred and forty-two inches. The United States Weather Bureau makes the following computation of weather at Manila, covering a period of thirty-two years:

TEMPERATURE.

Mean annual	80 degrees
Warmest month	82 "
Coldest month	79 "
Highest temperature	100 "
Lowest temperature	60 "

Humidity, relative per cent, 78 degrees, absolute grains, per cubic foot, 8.75.

WIND MOVEMENTS IN MILES.

Daily mean	134
Greatest daily	204
Least daily	95

Prevailing wind directions—Northeast, November to April. Southwest, May to October.

CLOUDINESS.

Annual per cent	53

DAYS WITH RAIN.

Total number	135

RAINFALL IN INCHES.

Mean annual	75.43
Greatest annual	120.98
Least annual	55.65

The heated term lasts from March to June, the greatest heat usually being in the month of May, before the wet season. At this time the temperature maximum ranges from 80° to 100°, but most of that time nearer the latter mark. The cool season is most marked, beginning with December and ending with February. During this time the temperature ranges usually from 60° to 65° at night, and seldom goes above 75° in the daytime. It should be noted here that the difference in the length of the longest and the shortest day at Manila scarcely exceeds one and one-half hours during the year. The months of November, December, January and February, are set down as "the delightful season" of the year. As a rule the sky is clear, and the weather dry and cool. Among the chief causes superinducing unlike conditions in different localities are the winds and the currents.

THE TYPHOONS.

There are three well defined classes of wind in the Philippines—the Calla, Nortada and Baguio, the last being more generally known as the typhoon. The Calla usually lasts three days, at the end of which its subsidence is usually perceptible; during this time, however, it has a varying force, but is constant from a given direction, although generally it has the accompaniments of calms, squalls, and then heavy dashes of rain. The Nortada is as a rule premonitory of an approaching or passing typhoon. It is in the nature of a constant wind, and is most common in the northern portions of the islands. It is in these localities that the typhoon is usually known in its season. This season proper is in the months of July, August and September, although it may be expected any time between May and November. Due to causes, not yet definitely known, these terrific wind centers have their origin in the Pacific Ocean, thence take their way across the China Sea, during which



THE FILIPINO SEDAN CHAIR. PAGE 7

time they seem to augment in power and force, striking in their southwesterly course from the northeast, the northernmost parts of the islands. As the summer time passes, their frequency increases, and with this, their track extends southward. Their course seldom extends south of 9° North latitude. Such regularity governs the action of these winds that the time of their regular coming at Manila is fixed for the latter part of October or the first of November. It is not the rapidity of the progressive motion of these winds and storms that is alarming, for they have never been known to exceed fourteen miles an hour; their usual speed is eleven or twelve miles per hour; but the spiral or gyrating motion is the destructive force, which seems to draw everything within its path into the vortex of destruction and death. The diameter of this wind circle ranges from forty to one hundred and thirty miles, with an axis or central wind vacuum of eight to fifteen miles. The length of time, then, that this wind or storm may continue at a given place, is usually less than ten hours. At times there is a deluge of rain, and from the low, dark clouds there is emitted a continuous electrical discharge.

The China Sea Directory treats of the typhoon as follows: "The earliest signs of a typhoon are clouds of a cirrus type, looking like fine hair or feathers, or small white tufts of wool, traveling from east or north; a slight rise in the barometer; clear and dry weather and light wind. These signs are usually followed by the usual ugly and threatening appearance of the weather which forebodes most storms, and the increasing of the number and severity of the gusts of wind with the rising of the storm. In some cases, one of the earliest signs is a long, heavy swell, and confused sea, which comes from the direction from which the storm is approaching, and travels more rapidly than the storm center. The best and surest warning, however, will be found in the barometer. In every case there is a great barometric disturbance, accordingly, if the barometer falls rapidly, or even if the regularity of its diurnal variation be disrupted, danger may be apprehended. No positive rule can be given as to the amount of depression to be expected, but at the center of some of the storms, the barometer is said to stand fully two inches lower than outside the storm field. The average barometer gradient near the vortex of the most violent of these storms is said to be rather more than one inch in fifty nautical miles. As the center of the storm is approached, the more rapid become the changes of wind, until at length, instead of its direction altering gradually, as is the case on first entering the storm field, the wind flies around at once to the opposite direction, the sea meanwhile breaking into mountainous and confused heaps. There are instances on record of the wind suddenly falling in the vortex, and the clouds dispersing for a short interval, though the wind soon blows again, with renewed fury."

A CHINESE MESTIZA.

THE OCEANIC CURRENTS.

The oceanic currents have much to do with climatic conditions in the Philippines. What is known as the Equatorial Current, exists between the 26° South, and 24° North. This consists of two mighty currents coming from east to west, on either side of the Equator, while between the two is the great Counter Equatorial Current, running from west to east, and having an average width of three hundred miles. The Trade Drift which flows to the westward between the parallels of 9° and 20° North, on reaching the eastern shores of the Philippines, again turns to the northward, forming near the northern limit of that group, the commencement of the Japan Current; the main body of the current then flows along the east coast of Formosa, and from that island pursues a northeasterly course through the chain of islands lying between Formosa and Japan, and sweeping along the southeastern coast of Japan in the same general direction; it is known to reach the parallel of 50° North. The limits and velocity of the Japan Current

are considerably influenced by the monsoons in the China Sea, and by the prevailing winds in the corresponding seasons in the Yellow-Japan Sea; also by the various drift currents which these periodic winds produce. It is thus easy to infer that the whole Philippine group presents a variable climate. It is told by a party of travelers that they passed a whole year in the Philippines, and at no time were in a locality during a rainfall. The intersection of storm currents by mountain ranges, and the change and alteration of these currents in the seasons, makes this possible.

UNHEALTHFULNESS OF MANILA.

The salubrity of many localities, including some entire islands, is unquestioned, but Manila and its environments will never be noted as a health resort. Good sanitation will dispel much of the pestilential conditions, but it will always be a marked place of discomfort. Healthfulness did not enter into the question of its founding. When first known by the Spaniards, there was a large center of population here, and the place was called by the natives, "Manila." There was another large city at hand, called by the natives, "Tondo," and under different chiefs. It was then a fortified place, with mounted bronze cannon, but there is no record by whom, or when founded. The Pasig River was on the north, the bay in front, while swamps were south and east. For defense, it was a place easily fortified, and in a large measure made impregnable to the old methods of warfare. The ground is but a trifle above sea-level. This place is now known as "Old Manila." It is a thing remarkable that in all the centuries since the Spaniards have but added to the noisomeness of the place. Internal improvement does not accord with the Spanish mind and Spanish official thrift. Here, with a population approximating 350,000 souls, there is not an artificial sewerage system in the whole place. The city depends almost entirely upon nature for sewerage, as the people do largely for a living. A few natural cuts or water-ways, which serve as conduits when there is an overflow caused by excessive rainfall at certain seasons of the year, is the only way of cleansing the city of its filth. The water is so stagnant that this is only in part washed from the city, but the decompositions of the season are left in solution, to impregnate and saturate the soil. When these water-beds become dry, and the black scum covers them over, the exhalation is awful. As a source of pestilence, it is difficult to conceive its equal.

A FILIPINO MOLO MAN.

It is said that the old moat surrounding the Old Manila wall has never been cleansed since the first century of its existence. It was formerly constructed so that it could be flooded through a number of gates, but the gates got out of repair soon after they were built, and as all the revenue was needed by the officials in their affairs, the necessary outlay

to put them in repair could not be made; so for centuries since, the moat has remained uncleansed, and there it is to-day, extending around the city, along the wall, a distance of two and one-quarter miles, a reeking putrescent mass. An apology has been made by the Spanish authorities that it could not be disturbed because of the pestilence it would breed. The sanitary condition of the city, through the work of "the details," has been much improved since the American occupation, who did much to rid the city of its putrefaction.

NATIVES OF MINDANAO.

With a heavy rainfall about one-third of the year and blistering sun the major part of the remainder, health conditions could not be desirable. There are few days in the year when the people are not compelled to remain indoors, avoiding, in a way, the excessive heat during this heated term. Still, this is the headquarters of our army, and for months this army of inactivity was kept bottled up amid these stifling elements of death. This plague-spot has many tributaries and ramifications, in which the military campaign must be made. Directly back of Manila, interior and northward, are the rice-fields, a fact sufficient of itself to account for the long campaign; and for months the army has been largely kept in the trenches, on the march or in battle in this miasmatic place. As was to be expected, there was enervation, exhaustion, debility and death. It is estimated that there are approximately 5,000,000 of the civilized natives. With few exceptions they seem to be hostile to our occupation. Their homes and property, without our lines, are largely in the great valley extending northward from Manila, and through which the Manila and Dagupan Railway, before mentioned, extends.

The region of the rice-fields is largely made up of small holdings, and here there is a dense population. Further north, and on the higher ground, of which San Fernando may be called the center, is the sugar-producing region, and beyond this the tobacco country. Nearly all the products of the island are grown in great abundance in this valley and its tributaries. Here is largely centered the wealth of Luzon Island. It may cost much in money and men to take and hold this country.

COMMERCE OF THE ISLANDS.

The following compilation is largely from the British Foreign Office report of 1897 and a United States Consular report of 1898:

The export staples from the Philippines are tobacco (manufactured and raw), cocoa, coffee, sugar, Manila hemp, and certain textile fabrics, consisting of baskets, ropes, mats, hats, carriages, musical instruments, pottery and furniture. During

the quarter ending December 31, 1897, there were exported to Great Britain and the United States 216,898 bales of hemp (280 pounds to the bale), of which 138,798 bales went to the United States and 78,106 bales to Great Britain. During this year the hemp trade increased as follows: To Continental Europe, 19,741 bales; to Australia, 2192 bales; to the United States, 133,896 bales. To Great Britain there was a decrease of 22,348 bales. Thus, it will be seen, in this increase the United States is 544 per cent greater than all other countries combined. Of the total export of hemp from these islands for the ten years ending with 1897, amounting to 6,528,965 bales, or 914,055 tons, 41 per cent, went to the United States. During this time sugar was exported from the islands amounting to 151,582,904 tons, of which 875,150 tons went to the United States, 666,391 tons to Great Britain and 41,362 tons to Continental Europe. By comparison, then, it will be seen that 55 per cent went to the United States. English reports estimate the imports into the islands, for the year 1896, at $10,631,250, and the exports at $20,175,000. The general imports being flour, rice, dress goods, wines, coal and petroleum.

The following is given for 1897:

COUNTRY	IMPORT	EXPORT
Great Britain	$2,467,000	$7,467,500
Germany	744,928	223,700
France	1,794,900	1,987,900
Belgium	272,240	45,960
United States	162,446	4,982,857
China	103,680	13,770
Japan	98,782	1,387,909

NATURAL PRODUCTS.

An important item is the vast area of primeval forest. There is not a timber growth essential in any wood work, that is not found here in the very highest stage of excellence. Those in most common use are found in abundance, and with them in like quantities, may be found ebony, cedar, spanwood, logwood, gumtrees, cocoa, nucifera, bamboo, arcea palm, and two woods, the bonava and malavea, which resist the action of water for centuries. There are over two hundred varieties of wood, and some most excellent for shipbuilding. In the southern isles there are reported to be over fifty varieties of food producing trees. It must not be assumed that these forests are isolated, or inaccessible; on the contrary, it would perhaps be difficult to find any considerable forest tract that is not easily approachable, either by stream, waterway or otherwise. What then, in the near future, may not be the status of the manufacture of lumber? And when the vast deposits of coal and iron are utilized, what will be the condition of shipbuilding, now in its infancy? In fact, any art in which wood and iron form an essential part, should soon find rapid growth in the opportunities of the

A GOOD THING. PUSH IT ALONG.
This will only be appreciated by those who have been in Manila

Philippines. Practically, the products include all citrus and many deciduous fruits, and much in plant life indigenous to the country, and not successfully grown elsewhere, such as Manila hemp. It is not to be said that all these varieties, which enter into our consumption are common to all localities, but that each finds localities suitable to its cultivation and growth. Mangoes, plantains, jack-fruits and all the Malayan fruits grow abundantly.

The hills or higher altitudes are well adapted to stock-raising. There are now in these regions, or rather were before the beginning of the insurrection, great herds of cattle, hogs, horses, buffalo, and many in a wild state. The buffalo, or "Karba," as called by the Malays, is the beast of common burden. In the wild state he is intractable, but domesticated, suits the purpose of the natives well. Of a grayish or mouse color, and smaller than our native ox, he is strong and hardy as long as he has his fill of water, and the frequent indulgence of a mud bath. He has many peculiarities, one being the shape of the horns, which is much like a three-cornered file, being flat on top. The native horse is small and unseemly, but enduring and strong. Before the outbreak, the best ranged in price from $100 to $150, but the average per pair for ordinary draft purposes, was from $15 to $20. The husbandry, which obtains in the Philippines, is very crude. In the cultivation and manufacture of hemp, sugar and rice, and in all the affairs of agricultural life, the primitive ways of centuries past are still in vogue; the reason of this is due to Spanish design or inertia. When the re-habilitation takes place, and the industries there adopt the science and appliances of modern times, the awakening will be astonishing. Indeed, the business world is already turning its attention to these islands. The "march of empire" is rapidly in the westward trend, and in this we are ourselves active participants. We can easily recur to that time when the Mediterranean was appropriately styled "the mid-earth sea." The central carrying trade became shifted to the Atlantic Ocean; and now, there is every assurance that this is soon to shift to the Pacific.

REV. PETER MACQUEEN AND BODY-GUARD ON HIS WAY TO VISIT THE SULTAN OF SULU.

With the decade ending in 1894, the shipping on the Atlantic decreased over 130,000 tons, while there was a corresponding increase on the Pacific. Now,

the commerce of the Pacific is rapidly increasing, and we can see that with the new era of commercial enterprise, it must soon be immeasurably expanded. The factors promotive of this may be stated in brief.

What pertains to ourselves may be considered known, but looking beyond this continent we see populations having the Pacific Ocean as a shore line, whose business interests will revolutionize the future. The carrying trade will have in view a desirable interchange of commodities, and in this, regard will be had to the vast populations bordering on the waters, and to economy in time and distance.

These populations may be set down as follows:

The Chinese Empire and Islands	400,000,000
British Indies and Dependencies	290,000,000
Japan and Formosa	45,000,000
Corea and Eastern Siberia	21,000,000
The Malay Peninsula and Siam	9,000,000
The Philippines, Australasia, Dutch East Indies and the islands of Oceanica	52,000,000
The total Western Slope of America	40,000,000

It is readily seen, estimating the total population of the earth at 1,500,000,000, that more than one-half of it is included in the above enumeration.

The enormous expenditures in the recent past, in railway and maritime construction; the vast outlays in developing natural resources, and other like sums given to commercial and manufacturing enterprises; all these tend towards making the Pacific the carrying center of the world's business and traffic. Russia is hastening the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and bending her commercial energies to share in this new field. England is directing her colonial enterprises to this end. Japan has arisen from her lethargy of ages. Thirty-five years ago she had not an iron rail, a steamer, or manufactures; now her manufactures are in active competition with the best the world produces, and her foreign commerce, in 1897, amounted to quite $200,000,000. Certainly much must be expected of China, in this behalf. Her richest part is the valley of the Yang-tse-Kiang, covering over 600,000 square miles, through which the great river flows to the Pacific. Here we find Shangai, with already an annual foreign trade of $40,000,000. Corea is another instance of rapid growth. A few years ago she had comparitively no foreign trade, but in 1897, this amounted to $11,755,625. The Dutch Colonial Possessions are all in place, and ready to avail themselves of the new trade and traffic. It is easy to see, that soon much of our European traffic will be diverted into this new field, where the consumer is not likewise competitor.

A YOUNG CHINESE MESTIZO

Our relation to this situation, together with that of a home government to its colonies, may be briefly indicated by noting the following: In 1892 our export trade to China amounted, in round numbers, to $9,600,000, and in 1896 this had increased to $17,675,000. The English say the Americans have an aptitude for manufacturing what the market demands, while they (the English) manufacture what they think the people ought to have. This seems to be supported by the facts.

CELEBRATING AGUINALDO'S ELECTION AT MALOLOS.

Our exports have increased in the last six years from 15 to 20 per cent, which is not equaled in the English trade. Our total exports for 1898 were $1,277,000,000. Since 1888 and including 1897, Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain and the British colonies have lost in exports $1,518,127,850, and during this time the United States gained $270,000,901.

England, it is estimated, controls practically 22 per cent of the entire area of the globe and 27 per cent of the population of the world, and has about 55 per cent of the carrying tonnage; still she lost in exports $566,000,000, or 7½ per cent of her export trade; but in her exports to her colonies she lost 10 per cent of this trade, or $200,000,000.

Our exports to the Philippines for the past eighteen years average less than $130,000 yearly, this being from 1880 to and including 1897. For the last year, as shown by the Treasury Department Report, it was $127,804. Comparing this with our world's business, it is about 1-100 of 1 per cent.

MINING INDUSTRIES.

Much has been said of the mining interests in the islands, but at present these are almost unknown. However, there is sufficient information to justify exploration, when conditions will permit, although no one now seems to be possessed of absolute knowledge of the mines. Perhaps a reason may be found for this in the early accounts of De Morga. He says:

"All the islands are rich in gold washings, and in ore of this metal, which the natives extract and work; although, since the Spaniards are in the country, they proceed more slowly with this, contenting themselves with what they already have got in jewels, and from a far distant time, and inherited from their predecessors, which is a large quantity; for he must be a very poor and wretched person who does not possess any chains of gold, bracelets and earrings. In the province of Camarines, Paracali, they work some washings and mines where there is good gold upon copper, also in Ylocos, this merchandise is dealt in, because at the edge and back of the province, which is on the edge and coast of the sea, there are some

high and craggy mountain ranges, which run as far as Cagayan, on the slopes of which many islanders dwell. These are not yet subdued, nor has any entrance been made amongst them; they are named Ygorrotes. These possess rich mines, many of them gold upon silver. From these they only extract as much as they require for their wants, and they descend with this gold, without completing its refinement, or bringing it to perfection, to trade with the Ylocos in certain places, where they exchange the gold for rice, swine, buffalo, wraps and other things, in which they are deficient; and the Ylocos finish the refining of it and getting it ready, and by their means it is distributed over the whole country.

"And although steps have been taken with these Ygorrotes to discover their mines, and how they work them, and the method they possess for extracting the metal, there has been no means of knowing it, because they are apprehensive of the Spaniards who would go to look them up, for the sake of their gold, and they say they keep it better taken care of in the earth than in their houses.

"In the other islands there is the same plenty of mines and gold washings, especially in the Pintadoes River of Botuan in Mindanao, and in Sulu, where a mine is worked and good gold extracted, named Taribon, and if the industry and labor of the Spaniards were applied to working the gold mines, as much would be extracted from any of these isles as from the other provinces in the rest of the world, but attending to other gains more than to this, as will be said in its place, this was not attempted with design or purpose."

Lieut. Wilkes, before quoted, having been in charge of government explorations for many years, is certainly an authority. He was in the islands nearly sixty years ago, in the same service, and says of the mines: "There are many valuable mines of gold, lead, copper and iron, besides coal; and the geological formation indicated a large area of these ores and deposits;" and concludes: "With such mineral resources, and a soil capable of producing the most varied vegetation of the tropics, a liberal policy is all the country lacks."

SAN JACINTO STREET, MANILA
Shows the office of CAMP OGDEN, IN THE PHILIPPINES.
Mr. Faust in center with umbrella.



MAP SHOWING THE DIFFERENT STEAMSHIP ROUTES BETWEEN SAN FRANCISCO AND MANILA.

THE VOYAGE FROM SAN FRANCISCO TO MANILA.

DESCRIPTION of the Philippine Islands would be unsatisfactory without reference to what must necessarily be considered in their connection—the trip to the islands. The great distance separating these islands from our Western Coast adds an especial interest to what is already an absorbing subject, in very much the same manner that distance lends enchantment to the view, and the voyage of nearly 17,000 miles from San Francisco to Manila and return is a feature of not the least importance. It seems appropriate, therefore, that the writer should give a brief description of the trip made for the purpose of obtaining information contained in this book, which, by the way of calling up pleasant memories, becomes a very agreeable task.

After having decided to make the trip the next question to be considered was, which steamship line offered the best inducements to the prospective tourist. It was found, after a careful investigation of the various routes, that the Occidental and Oriental Steamship Company's terms and accommodations were the most satisfactory, and passage was secured at their office, No. 421 Market street, San Francisco, on the steamer *Gaelic*, sailing from San Francisco, December 24, 1898.

The route of travel between San Francisco and Manila is via Honolulu, Yokohama and Hongkong, the latter city being the terminus of this Steamship Company's Line. Connections are made with steamers running between Hongkong and Manila, and through tickets are sold by this company from San Francisco to Manila as follows: First-class cabin passage, one way, $261.00; four months round trip, $397.50; twelve months round trip, $453.75. All passengers holding cabin tickets, who desire to lay over at Honolulu or at any port of call in Japan and China, are at liberty to do so and resume their journey by any steamer of either the Occidental and Oriental, Pacific Mail or the Toyo Kisen Kaisha Steamship Companies.

Families of United States army and naval officials, also missionaries and their families and servants accompanying same, are accorded special rates. Cabin passengers are allowed to carry 350 pounds of baggage free. The distance between San Francisco and Hongkong via the above-described route is 7579 miles, and it takes twenty-eight days to make the trip. From Hongkong to Manila the distance is 850 miles, which is made in about three and a half days.

One would naturally suppose it would require a good deal of preparation for such a long voyage, but upon inquiring at the steamship company's office you are advised to take no unnecessary baggage, and divest yourself of all non-essentials in wardrobe or personal effects, except such as are necessary for ordinary use. Of course, customs change in the Orient, but your wants can be supplied much

cheaper there than here. When settled down on board you will find yourself surrounded with all the luxuries of a first-class hotel in one of these splendidly equipped steamers, and you are not long on the voyage when you commence to have a home-like feeling, which is hard to shake off when you find all too soon that you are obliged to bid farewell to your pleasant environments.

The scene at the Steamship Company's dock on the day of departure of one of their trans-Pacific liners is at once novel and interesting. The custom officials are busy marshaling on board the hundreds of Chinese, who constitute a large percentage of the human freight carried by these steamers. The *Gaelic* on this trip carried over 450 "Celestials," who occupied a portion of the ship especially set apart for them, and are, therefore, not brought in contact with the cabin passengers in any way that is offensive. Passengers who have not already had their baggage checked are rustling around attending to this important duty, assisted by obliging and courteous employees. Friends of the passengers form an interesting feature of the crowd which is always present to watch the departure of one of these vessels. It was particularly noticeable on this occasion, as Lieut. Hobson, the hero of the *Merrimac*, was to be one of the passengers, and the esteem in which this gentleman is held by his admiring countrymen and "countrywomen" was shown by the great throng which had gathered at the dock to catch a glimpse of him and, if possible, shake his hand and wish him a pleasant voyage. The autograph and kodak "fiends" were well represented, and the gallant and obliging Lieutenant had much difficulty in elbowing his way through the crowd to the ship, shaking many hands and leaving his autograph on many slips of paper thrust before him.

The chorus of good-byes shouted back and forth soon make us realize that we are slowly backing away from the dock, and, as the ship swings around and points her bows toward the setting sun, we remember that it will be many moons before we can hope to again see those left behind. Out through the Golden Gate, past the light-ship, and we are on the great Pacific Ocean, steering a course for the Hawaiian Islands.

The trip from San Francisco to Honolulu has been described as "drifting to paradise on an even keel." Whether the expression originated with some enterprising real estate dealer of Honolulu, or is the product of a bard of modern lore, we are unable to say, but, after having made the trip, one must become convinced that there is at least as much truth as poetry in the statement. Certainly no ocean voyage could be more delightful than this, and it would be difficult to imagine any combination of earth, sea and sky that would better represent the average mortal's idea of an earthly paradise than that which unfolded itself in these beautiful islands of the sea. Masters in the art of word-painting have sung their praise in poetry and prose; yet, after beholding this marvelous work of nature, one can but realize the inadequacy of words to describe this "Paradise of the Pacific."

Our life is much as we make it, whether aboard ship or elsewhere. After finding yourself pleasantly ensconced in one of the light and airy cabins for which these ships are justly famous, if you are like the rest, you soon join the genial

throng and become one of them. On the *Gaelic* there was a continued overflow of this exhuberance, and acquaintance speedily ripened into friendship, the memories of which will be life long.

Our cabin passenger list, as is usually the case with the vessels of this line, ran up to the ship's full complement, and while the different walks of life were represented, the highly cultured class predominated. As it is desirable to have the best associations during this long voyage, one should be careful where he pitches his tent. The real luxuries of life are less in food supplies and physical comforts than in the satiation of our mental desires.

The courtesies of the ship were soon marked by the whole cabin. From genial Capt. Finch down through the gradation of attendants there was appar-

NUUANU AVENUE, HONOLULU.

ently nothing left undone that would add to the welfare and comfort of the passengers. A good library supplies the best literature, and a piano, organ and music-boxes furnish opportunity for those musically inclined to gratify their tastes. Games for upper deck, such as shuffle-board, quoits, etc., are provided, and an obliging attendant is always at hand to supply your slightest wish.

All the passengers, as a rule, participated in these sports, and even the venerable Dr. Allen, who, for forty years, has served as a missionary in China, and during this time has crossed the Pacific a dozen or more times, seemed to forget that he had passed the three-score-and-ten mark, and joined in the games with

as much enthusiasm as the two little girls who called him Santa Claus. Lieut. Hobson was always ready to join the party, and we found him a very agreeable and interesting traveling companion. His unassuming manners and gentlemanly conduct won for him the esteem of all on board, and the charming young lady from Georgia voiced the sentiments of us all when she said that "he was just the nicest gentleman that she ever did see."

We must not forget to speak of the ample provision made for supplying the desires of the inner man. To say that this far exceeded our expectations is but to poorly express our appreciation of the excellent fare served on the *Garlic*. To give the reader an opportunity to judge, for himself, we print one of the daily dinner bills of fare.

DINNER

Eastern Oysters on Half Shell

Celery Anchovy Toast Olives

SOUPS

Green Turtle Consomme

FISH

Boiled Salmon, Parsley Sauce

ENTREES

Kidney, Vol au Vent Haricot Ox Tail

Quail on Toast Peach Fritters

BOILED

Mutton, Caper Sauce Calf's Head, Brain Sauce

Ham, Champagne Sauce

ROASTS

Sirloin of Beef, Yorkshire Pudding

Turkey, Cranberry Sauce Suckling Pig, Apple Sauce

VEGETABLES

Cauliflower Green Peas

Maitre d'Hotel and Boiled Potatoes

PUDDING AND PASTRY

English Plum Pudding, Hard and Brandy Sauce

Compote of Pears Apple and Mince Pies

Candy Assorted Cake

DESSERT

Apples Oranges Bananas

Pineapples Nuts and Raisins Figs

Crackers Coffee and Tea Cheese

The Chinese servants, dressed in their long blue or white robes, move noiselessly about, and seem to know intuitively your every wish, and before you have reached the journey's end you are convinced that there are no better servants than those on these steamers.

It is such surroundings as those described above that make life on board one of these splendid modern steamers, "one continual round of pleasure," and it is not to be wondered at that by the time the journey's end is reached you feel like a new being, and treasure up in your store-house of memories this most delightful experience and leave the ship with feelings not unmingled with regret

After six days of this kind of life, land is sighted, which proves to be Diamond Head, and now we have reached the famous Paradise of the Pacific. There is a charm about the Hawaiian Islands which increases with your stay. The delightful langor of a restful repose is the first pleasing emotion of a visitor to these islands, and he then easily finds himself *en rapport* with his surroundings. The climate is so equable that one scarcely notices the change of seasons. For instance, the morning temperature at six o'clock, for the year, runs from 67 to 75 degrees, a variation of eight degrees. The noon temperature, from 72 to 84 degrees, and the evening, nine o'clock, from 63 to 76 degrees. The rainfall at Honolulu averages twenty-five inches a year. On other parts of the island the rainfall is very heavy, while in others it is much less. The Hawaiian archipelago consists of about twenty islands, the entry ports of any note being Honolulu, on Oahu; Hilo, on Hawaii, and Kahului, on Maui. The resources of the country are now in process of rapid development, and if the traveler has the time the situation will well repay his consideration. The population of Honolulu, prior to annexation, was about 25,000, but this is rapidly increasing, and the English language is generally understood. One will want to see the Punch Bowl Hill, an extinct crater—a few minutes' walk from the hotel. Go from this to Mount Tantalus, where you reach an altitude of 2000 feet, and the view covers a large area. Mount Konahuanui has an altitude of 4000 feet, from the summit of which the island of Oahu may be viewed. All these tours take the traveler through a country grandly picturesque, and in which the flora is bewilderingly beautiful. It takes about ten days to make the trip. Waikiki is the bathing resort. This is some three miles distant from Honolulu. It is said that no one has had the full luxury of a sea bath unless he has laved himself in the sea at Waikiki.

CAPT. WM. FINCH.

After spending a most delightful day in Honolulu, we reluctantly returned to the ship, regretting that circumstances would not permit us to take advantage of the stop-over privilege which cabin passengers are entitled to. As if to more firmly rivet the chains which Honolulu's natural charms have placed about the admiring tourist, young ladies are at the dock with garlands of flowers which they place about the necks of passengers, and a native band plays some of their weird pathetic music, which adds a peculiar fascination not easy to shake off. As the steamer backs away from the dock the passengers join in singing "Some Day I'll Wander Back Again," and you sincerely hope that Providence may so direct your footsteps. The usual schedule time from Honolulu to Yokohama, is ten days. The voyage is largely a repetition of the trip down to Honolulu. Friendships become

more cemented, and the ties are more and more like those of the family group. The first glimpse of the "Island Empire" is had at Yokohama. This is the largest of the treaty ports, and practically the port of Tokio. If you are bent upon a thorough inspection of this new wonderland, you quit the steamer at Yokohama, and with the stop-over ticket, proceed through the interior, by rail, to the temples and shrines, and many places of absorbing interest. A little note on climate that you may prepare yourself accordingly. To speak generally, the summer is hot, with occasional rains, and during September and a part of October very wet. Beginning late in autumn, and through the first part of winter it is delightfully cool and dry. February and March are variable with more or less snow, and in the late spring, considerable rain and high winds are interspersed with beautiful days. For thirteen years the mean temperature was 56.5°. The lowest, January, 36.7°. Highest, August, 77.9°. Mean rainfall 58.33". Number of rainy days 138.7, and days with snow 8.5.

Japan has been called "the pleasure ground of the universe," and it is said one always leaves the country with regrets, no matter how short or long his stay. Dr. Dresser said, while exploring the country: "I am getting weary of beauty and I am weary of writing of the beautiful." Percival Lowell says: "In the soul of the far East, the Japanese makes love to Nature, and it almost seems as if Nature heard his silent prayer and smiled upon him in acceptance, as if the love-light lent her face the added beauty that it lends the maids. For nowhere in this world probably is she lovelier than in Japan. A climate of long happy means and short extremes. Months of spring, and months of autumn, with but a few weeks of winter in between; a land of flowers where the lotus and the cherry, the plum and wistaria grow wantonly side by side; a land where the bamboo embosoms the maple; where the pine at last has found its palm tree, and the tropic and temperate zone forget their separating identity in one long self-obliterating kiss."

JAPANESE FLOWER MERCHANT

Japan "can be done" in three weeks, but three months is preferable. It is best also if you want the best of everything to start on an excursion in the morning and avoid night travel. Of course one must be armed with a passport, for this is in constant requisition. An excellent view of Yokohama and its approaches is had from Noge-Yama. Here are various shrines such as the Shinto God of Akiha, the great Buddhist God and the Sun Goddess of Ise.

It is eighteen miles from Yokohama to Tokio, the capital. The journey is made by rail in fifty minutes. It was the first railroad built in Japan and was opened in 1872. Tokio has good hotel accommodations and is the center of the trade in curios. On the road hither from Yokohama an excellent view of Fujiyama, the highest mountain peak in Japan may be had. It is 12,400 feet high. At Neno Park the Cherry Blossom festival is held each year in April. If the traveler returns to Yokohama he may go by steamer to Kobe, the distance being 348 miles. If he goes by rail the distance is 376 miles. Most travelers go by rail as they may thus visit Osaka, Kyoto, Nagoya and other desirable places en route. The road runs through a densely populated region and these cities are among the chief in the Empire. Kobe is the center for travelers, being situated accessible to the great Inland Sea and also communicating by rail with the interior important cities. The famous landscape gardens are in this region, and numerous temples of antiquity, while the scenic effects are incomparable. Lake Biwa is a national resort. It is 36 miles long by 12 miles wide, has an elevation of 340 feet and its depth is 325 feet. The oldest Buddhist temple in Japan is found near here and has many relics of antiquity. The bronze work in these temples is very elaborate. In one the bell was cast in 732, contains 37 tons of metal, is 14 feet high, 9 feet in diameter and 8½ inches thick at the edges.

SWIMMING TANK ON THE "GAELIC."

The Inland Sea of Japan is famous the world over. Its length is 240 miles, and is studded with beautiful islands, similar in contour and aspect to those in the St. Lawrence and Puget Sound. It is justly styled the most magnificent sheet of water in the known world. It narrows in places so that two ships can hardly pass, and from the time the steamer enters it, through the Straits of Akashi until she goes out through the Straits of Shimonoseki, it is one gorgeous panorama, a veritable sailing through "fairy-land." The islands and country are in a high state of cultivation and the whole scene is so emblazoned with grandeur that the travelers quit their meals and feast their souls on the beauties of their surroundings.

Emerging into the open sea from the Straits of Shimonoseki a detour is made southward, where Nagasaki is reached. The steamer remains here usually one day for the purpose of coaling, and this is done by men, women and children with small baskets. The adults standing in a row passing the basket along the line from one to the other to the boat, the children gathering up the empty baskets. The women receive for this work nine cents a day and the men twelve cents. The

largest engineering and ship-building works in the far East are situated here, also the Tategami dock, cut out of solid rock and costing over $1,000,000. It is available for the largest ships afloat, and is a remarkable piece of workmanship.

The distance from Nagasaki to Shanghai is about 400 miles, and Shanghai from Hongkong about 870 miles. Shanghai is termed the "Paris of the far East" because of its pleasures and social gaities. Its population is about 400,000 with 5000 foreigners. It is the largest treaty port in China. Usually the traveler takes a stop-over trip at Shanghai, partly because of the sights there and because he wishes to see the great city of Peking, about 80 miles inland, and the distance is covered in less than four hours. There are fine roads and beautiful drives in this region and a very profitable stay can be made in the study of the antiquities, habits and customs of the people. Peking became the capital of China in 1491 and its present population is placed anywhere between 1,000,000 and 1,750,000. The natives call the city Ching. It is surrounded by walls, the outer of which is distant about 130 yards and runs parallel to the city. Then high walls and open spaces surround the inside of the Imperial City of Peking and separate it entirely from the city itself. The great wall of China is 45 miles from the city, and the road leading to the nearest part is paved with solid granite slabs 10 feet long. The city and its surroundings are replete with curiosities, and well worth a visit.

It is about four days by steamer from Shanghai to Hongkong. Hongkong is styled the "Revelation" owing to its development since the incoming of the English in 1841. In that year the Island of Hongkong was ceded to Great Britain by China, the island then having a population of 2000, consisting of Puntis, Aborigines, Hakkas, or strangers from the highlands, and the Hoklos, hailing from the coast ports of the North. The island is about three miles in width and twelve miles in length. It now has a population approximating 250,000 and is cosmopolitan in appearance. Those journeying to the Philippines usually want to spend about three days on their outward trip, viewing the many interesting sights in and around Hongkong, and should by all means take a flying trip up to Canton, which is reached in about seven hours by boat. Here is found the temple of Honan, the finest temple in China, with its gardens, in the kitchen department of which there is a Columbarium similar to the one discovered at Pompeii. A Buddhist monastery and nunnery with water clock 800 years old and the five-storied Pagoda are also here. Another day is usually given to Macao where great gambling games

JAPANESE IDOLS



EXTERIOR AND INTERIOR VIEWS ON BOARD THE "GAELIC."

similar in style to those at Montecarlo are carried on. At Hongkong we bid good-bye to the good ship *Gaelic*, genial Captain Finch and his courteous officers and each one prepares to go his own way, and in winding up this short description of a most charming sea voyage, the writer feels it incumbent upon him to say that all the promises made by the steamship officials were more than fulfilled, and this was the concensus of opinion throughout the ship.

From Hongkong to Manila, the distance as heretofore stated, is about 850 miles and the trip is made in about three and one-half days. The China Sea is well known to be a body of rough water and you do not look forward with much pleasurable anticipation of the trip. However, it has to be made, and your first inquiry is, which of the steamship lines have the safest and best boats. There are several small boats running to Manila, and if you happen to be a passenger on one of these in some of the storms which are quite frequent in this latitude, you may not only have occasion to regret your experience, but there is also actual danger to life. It is generally the wisest and best in such cases to patronize an old established company as they all usually know by experience the existing conditions and are prepared for emergencies. The events of the past year in the Philippine Islands have caused a good deal of travel to Manila and this has made the steamship business unusually brisk and as a result a number of boats have been taken off other routes that are less profitable and put upon this one.

JAPANESE PAGODA.

The oldest firm operating a line of steamers between Hongkong and Manila is Warren, Barnes & Company. We took passage on their steamer *Esmeralda* and have never had occasion to regret the choice. Of course the change in our surroundings was quite noticeable as compared with those we had been accustomed to on the good old *Gaelic*, but as compared with some of the boats of the other steamship companies we think we were very fortunate in making the choice. The sea was very choppy and rough and although we had experienced only slight symptoms of seasickness in crossing the Pacific Ocean we are willing to admit that there were only two occasions when we answered the call of the dinner bell, once before the steamer left the harbor of Hongkong and the other after we were inside Manila Bay.

As we enter the historical waters of Manila Bay, past the guns which frown upon us from Fraile Rock and the forts on Corregidor Island, we remember with a thrill of admiration that a little less than a year ago a very unassuming Commodore in the American Navy, with his slim fleet entered these same waters,

silenced these guns, and passing on up the bay engaged and entirely destroyed the proud Spanish fleet which were there awaiting him and by this act changed the theater of war and focused the eyes of the world upon these islands in this remote corner of the globe—when we remember all this we are proud to pay homage to America's greatest hero in the late war with Spain—Admiral George Dewey

MONUMENT NEAR MALATE, SHOWING EFFECTS OF MAUSER BULLETS.

SUPPLEMENT.

THE STAFF DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY.

THE attention of the public is so much occupied with the fighting portion of the army—known as "the line"—that it usually gives little thought to those less prominent, but equally essential services which feed and clothe the army, transport it from place to place, care for the wounded and sick, minister to its moral and spiritual needs, arrange its fortifications and build its bridges and roads. The following is intended to give some idea of the nature of these services, which are performed by a number of departments, collectively known as "the staff." Officers of the very highest ability are selected for staff service. Any brave man can fight, but the number is comparatively limited who have the organizing and executive ability required for carrying on business upon the enormous scale requisite for the support of a large army. In time of war it is sometimes very difficult to keep these able officers in the comparatively obscure positions of the staff. They wish to be on the fighting line. In time of peace they are best satisfied where they are.

THE ENGINEER CORPS.

The planning and construction of the national defenses and the operations of an army in the field require a great amount of skilled work, which must be directed by the highest intelligence. Scholarship, especially in mathematics, is an essential prerequisite for the engineer service, and a certain number of the graduates of West Point who stand highest in scholarship are assigned to the Engineer Corps. In times of peace this is the most desirable assignment in the army, as the construction of harbor defenses and of river and harbor improvements, which are also usually directed by engineer officers, commonly goes on in the neighborhood of large cities, where conditions of life are most agreeable. In time of war, however, it is different, as the engineers, while quite as much exposed as those of other branches of the service, and engaged in the most arduous labor, are not in the line of promotion to high command, and have little hope of attaining the great military reputation which is the dream of all soldiers.

The chief of engineers is a Brigadier-General, and is stationed at Washington. All plans and estimates for the construction of national works pass through his office for approval before being submitted to Congress for authorization, and he makes the details of engineer officers for service in all parts of the country. When an army takes the field there is a chief of engineers attached to the staff of the commanding general, and also, usually, to Division Headquarters. Other engineer officers are assigned as occasion demands, it being necessary that every body of troops moving independently in an enemy's country should be accompanied by a skilled engineer. As all West Point graduates, however, have had instruction in engineering it is not always necessary that engineer officers should be detailed for the purpose.

THE BATTALION OF ENGINEERS.

In time of peace the construction force for government works can usually be employed on the spot, when necessary, although for the most part such works are executed by civilian contractors, but such operations as the mining of harbors, torpedo work, quick bridge building, trench and fort construction in the field, reconnaissance and quick map making, require not only skilled direction, but a force of trained men for execution. For this purpose there is constantly maintained a battalion of engineers whose headquarters are at Willets Point, on Long Island, a few miles from New York City. Here the men are trained in all kinds of engineering work, and kept in constant readiness for military operations. In peace, the strength of each

of the four companies of the battalion is kept at about eighty enlisted men, but in war time the company is filled up to one hundred and twenty. There is the regular company and battalion complement of officers, and the battalion is armed and drilled as infantry, doing its work in the field under arms, and serving as infantry as occasion requires.

THE ENGINEER CORPS IN THE PHILIPPINES.

During the Philippine campaign, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles L. Potter has been Chief of Engineers, on the staff of Major-General Otis, commanding the Corps, and Maj. J. F. Bell, upon the staff of Gen. MacArthur, commanding the 2d Division. Lieut. Edward L. King of the 8th Cav., has acted as Chief of Engineers, on the staff of Gen. Lawton, commanding the 2d Division. Lieut. W. G. Haan of the 3d Art., was in command of the company of the Engineer Corps until March 8, 1899, in which capacity he repeatedly distinguished himself. He was succeeded by Capt. Francis R. Shunk. Other engineer officers were detailed for various services as occasion required.

THE QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.*

The duties of the Quartermaster's Department are to provide means of transportation of every character which may be needed in the movement of troops and the materials of war. It furnishes clothing, camp and garrison equipage, barracks, store-houses and other buildings for the accommodation of soldiers. Under the direction of the engineers it constructs and repairs roads, telegraph lines, railways and bridges; it charters ships and boats, docks and wharves needed for military purposes. Moreover, all the disbursing of civil funds to pay for the foregoing is done through this department. The work of the Quartermaster's Department in the field is well illustrated by the efficiency with which, assisted by details of skilled mechanics from the volunteer regiments, it rose to an emergency in the Philippine campaign. Lieutenant-Colonel James W. Pope, has until quite recently, served as Chief Quartermaster in the Philippines, and has received great commendation for his efficiency.

OPERATING A RAILROAD.

After the fight of Saturday night and Sunday, February 5th and 6th, it was found that the last engine on the Manila and Dagupan Railroad had gone north and through the lines, conveying M. Haggin (the Superintendent of the road) into the insurgent lines. The road was thus rendered valueless to the American forces, while the insurgents were able to use it to their own very great advantage. Matters remained in this unsatisfactory shape until the night of Friday, February 10th, when Gen. MacArthur advanced and took Caloocan. Maj. C. A. Devol, Transportation Quartermaster, obtained Corp. J. J. Haish, 20th Kansas, an old Rock Island railroad man, to follow and see what could be found at the Caloocan round house. The Corporal appeared the next morning with a small yard engine, crew and all, fired and ready for work. The round house was found to contain three large engines, more or less disabled, and two small ones. The insurgents could readily have permanently disabled these engines and thus seriously crippled the American advance, but probably not realizing the ready ingenuity of the American soldier, they thought that an engine taken apart and resting on jacks was not of service. As the insurgent lines were just beyond Caloocan and firing almost continuous, Gen. Otis directed the five engines brought down at once to Manila that night, if possible. Maj. Devol at once proceeded with all available railroad men to the shops at Caloocan, and during the afternoon repaired and fired the least disabled engine, intending to pull the others down. Steam was not gotten up until after dark, and then all hands stood around while the engineer opened the throttle to see if she would work. Slowly and majestically she ran out of the house and up the track amid a general sigh of relief, when a crash and dismal rattle told experienced men that she had gone off the track. It was a bad derailment, and time was precious. Jacks, lanterns, pins, etc. were finally found, and after about seven hours' hard work she was on, and ran into Manila at three o'clock in the morning. The engines were repaired one after another. The 20th Kansas and 1st Montana furnished invaluable aid in the services of

*The work of the Quartermaster's Department in San Francisco has been very fully described in Chapter IV, in connection with the movement of the troops to the Philippines.

their railroad men These men didn't like to leave the firing line, but there is something about railroading that makes an old railroad man long to get back on an engine again, if only for a time, and as the engines, whenever they appeared, were usually saluted by a long range fire from the insurgent lines, they carry to this day marks of the Mauser bullet. The train crew did not have a chance to worry much about not being on the firing line. The train service settled into a steady routine supply of Gen. MacArthur's Division at Caloocan, until his advance on his long march to San Fernando. As soon as he had passed the Friageus River it was found that the track was torn up across the bridge and quite an embankment thrown across the track on the other side. The railroad wrecking gang, assisted by the engineers, immediately began to repair the bridge and track and had a train over in a few hours. All along the advance the track was found torn up at intervals and bridges damaged. Twenty railroad men were detailed from the 1st Colorado Volunteers and sent up to assist in the work of following the firing line. The track to Malolos was damaged at Tinajeus River, Malinta, Manlao, Bocaue, Bigaa, Guiguinto and Malolos, each break worse than the preceding one. The wrecking crew and engineers worked night and day and the trains followed the advance, supplying condensed water, fresh beef, bread and ammunition and nearly every night carrying to Manila the men who had lost their lives or been wounded in the advance.

On the night before Malolos was taken, the headlight of the locomotive was on the firing line, and the train delivered some badly needed ammunition to the battery. The stop at Malolos gave the enemy time to badly use up the road from this on to San Fernando. Realizing the futility of tearing up the track, they dropped a span of the bridge at Bagbag into the river, and tore up the track clear into Calumpit. After Gen. MacArthur had advanced, this span was repaired by trestling up from the inclined span. The similar break at St. Tomas was repaired in the same way. At Calumpit, twelve of the tie-bearing girders had been taken entirely away. These were made in a few days in Manila.

Too much credit cannot be given to the trainmen and crews during this long advance. They got no extra pay for this arduous and dangerous service. Trains ran day and night—all day with the advance, carrying rations, ammunition and bridge-builders' supplies, and all night with the dead and wounded, back to Manila. They had every difficulty to overcome. New and hastily repaired engines, uncertain roadbed, constant danger in night runs of being derailed by insurgents, loss of sleep and often scant food. Not a man of them would have stood this sort of service back in the States for any amount of money, but they were working with the firing line for the glory of the American soldiers, and they stood by their work to the end.

THE SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

The Subsistence Department of the U. S. A. is that branch of the service charged with the duty of supplying food and articles of consumption, such as groceries, fruits and other articles which comprise the rations of the troops, as well as such luxuries as they and other persons in the service of the United States are allowed to purchase from the government. Whenever it is practicable, the needed supplies are bought in the United States, but circumstances have arisen in the distant Philippine Islands, when the stocks of certain articles were depleted, that compelled the chief commissary at Manila to effect his purchases through tenders from local dealers, who, in the main, obtained supplies from Hongkong and Singapore. Distribution of rations to the troops takes place at stated intervals by the depot commissary, who delivers the supplies to men detailed from each regiment, who are authorized to receive the same by the officer charged with the duty of attending to the feeding of the command. This system applies when troops are in garrison.

In the field each brigade has a chief commissary, with a commissary for each division when practicable. These officers make requisitions upon the depot commissary for supplies for sale and the rations allowed by law, and upon receipt of the same apportion the allowances and regulate the issuances and sales to the respective regimental officers.

The company cooks of each regiment, under the supervision of Sergeants, prepare the rations. The officers and men buy articles from the sales depots of such food products as are not comprised in the ration list.

RATIONS ON THE TRANSPORTS.

The following table shows the quantity and description of food issued to the troops on board the transports en route from the United States to the Philippine Islands; the computations are for 1000 men:

MEATS.	Pounds
Pork	75
Bacon	150
Fresh Beef 875 pounds, or Fresh Beef 750 pounds and Canned Salmon 125 pounds	875
FLOUR.	
Flour	1125
VEGETABLES.	
Dry Beans or Peas	75
Rice or Hominy	50
Fresh Potatoes, 800 pounds, or Potatoes 700 pounds	800
Onions, 200 pounds / Canned Tomatoes, 300 pounds	300
Coffee, green	100
Sugar	150
Vinegar	30
Candles	15
Soap	40
Salt	40
Pepper	2.5
For 1000 men	3877.5
Per man one ration	3.88

RATIONS IN THE FIELD.

The following table shows the rations issued to the troops when in the field. Computed for a body of 1000 men:

	Pounds
Bacon	750
Hard Bread	1000
Beans	150
Potatoes, Onions and Canned Tomatoes (when possible)	1000
Coffee, roasted	80
Sugar	150
Vinegar	80
Candles	15
Soap	40
Salt	40
Pepper, black	2.5
For 1000 men	3307.5
One ration	3.31

THE TRAVEL RATION.

The travel ration when en route, computed at the rate of 1000 men:

FOR FIRST FOUR DAYS.	Pounds
Hard Bread	1000
Canned Beef	750
Baked Beans, (3-pound cans)	450
Coffee, roasted	80
Sugar	150
One thousand rations	2430
One ration	2.43
AFTER FOURTH DAY, ADDITIONAL	Pounds
Tomatoes, (gallon cans)	1000
One ration	1

Col. David L. Brainard has served as Chief Commissary with the army in the Philippines.

THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

The Medical Department of the army is under the supervison of the Surgeon-General, and no candidate can be examined for a commission as surgeon without his express sanction, which is only granted after evidence of such candidate's moral, intellectual and physical fitness to perform the necessary duties. The candidate for a commission must be a citizen of the United States, not more than twenty-nine years of age at date of appearing for such examination, and a graduate of some regular medical college with hospital training and practical experience.

The Chief Surgeon of an Army Corps is an officer attached to the staff of the commanding general, and is charged with the supervision of all matters pertaining to the health of the command. This includes sanitation, the hospital and ambulance service, the detail of medical officers and the ob aining, distribution and care of medical supplies. He prepares general orders, when necessary, which are signed and promulgated by the Corps Commander. The Chief Division and Brigade Surgeons have similar duties within their divisions and brigades. The regimental surgeon has charge of the health of his regiment, and the treatment of temporary ailments, all serious cases being sent to the brigade, division, or general hospital, as circumstances may require. There are attached to each full regiment, one surgeon, ranking as Major, and two assistant surgeons, ranking respectively, as Captain and Lieutenant. When in action, field hospitals are established in sheltered places, as near the firing line as possible where temporary treatment is given, and are manned from the staff and regimental surgeons as circumstances require or permit. The organization of a medical service in a campaign is constantly changing, according to circumstances, but severe cases of wounds or sickness are sent as soon as possible to the general hospitals, where the best care can be given, and which are under the control of the Corps Surgeon. Each hospital, however, is an organization of itself, in charge of a surgeon and as many assistants as necessary, the surgeon in charge reporting to the Corps, Division, or Brigade Surgeon as the case may be. All officers and men are under the direct medical and sanitary direction of the regimental surgeons, until transferred to some hospital.

THE SUPPLY AND AMBULANCE SERVICE.

That part of the medical service which in civil life is known as the "drug store" is in charge of non-commissioned officers, known as "Hospital Stewards." For the positions of hospital steward, and acting hospital steward, special examinations are necessary, and these are made by a medical board. Candidates must be unmarried and be physically and mentally capable of endurance, and have had experience in discipline and control of men, nursing and dispensary work, clerical work, cooking and mess management, hospital corps drill and minor surgery. Their duties are to care for the hospital stores and property, to compound and administer medicines, supervise preparation and serving of food, maintain discipline in the hospitals and watch over their police, and to supervise the duties of the Hospital Corps in the hospital and in the field. The Hospital Corps consists of stewards, and acting stewards and privates who are assigned to regiments as required.

The ambulance service is organized for the transport of the sick and wounded. Ambulances are attached to each regiment and hospital and are under control of the surgeons, and there is an Ambulance Corps organized for general service, in removing the sick to hospitals and the wounded from the field of battle.

Except under special circumstances which justify the expectation that their rights as non-combatants under the Geneva Convention will not be recognized, no arms are issued to the Hospital Corps. During the war with the Filipinos, however, it has been frequently necessary to arm them, as they were not respected by the enemy.

The ambulance and hospital service of each command is under the supervision of its chief surgeon, who makes all necessary arrangements for the care of the sick and wounded, and their transportation during action. These arrangements are so made that they may receive attention with the line of battle under fire, at the dressing stations, at the ambulance stations and at the division, brigade and field hospitals.

To the ranking surgeon also falls the duty of detailing the number of medical officers, hospital stewards and privates of the Hospital Corps for duty with the advance line. First dressing stations are established at places near to the combatants, but where the wounded and those attendant upon them will not be exposed to fire. These dressing stations are distinguished by Red Cross flags in the day and by red lanterns at night.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

At the head of the medical service of the 8th Army Corps was Surgeon Henry Lippincott,* U. S. V., with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and Deputy Surgeon-General. Immediately upon his arrival at Manila, Col. Lippincott was compelled to deal resolutely with the subject of

* Since relieved by Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred A. Woodhull, U. S. A.

sanitation. There was much sickness in the army, partly growing out of the filthy condition of all buildings and places which had been occupied by Spaniards or Filipinos, and partly by reason of the imprudence of the men, who did not willingly submit to the strict regulations concerning diet, drink and exposure which were necessary under the circumstances. By vigorous measures, however, the surroundings of the troops were made and kept clean, the men restrained from indulgence in unwholesome fruits, and compelled to drink no water which had not been boiled. As a result sickness rapidly decreased, and by the end of August, 1898, the health of the command was fairly good.

The surgeons had much to contend with on arrival, as transport work between the vessels and Camp Dewey and Cavite was difficult and dangerous, owing to the very stormy weather and heavy rain prevailing at the time. Much valuable property was lost or ruined, while lives of patients were endangered in the landing under such circumstances. On the organization of the Medical Department, under Col. Lippincott, the Volunteer Hospital Corps was transferred to the regular establishment. This secured many excellent men, and a sufficient number of privates was furnished for duty in the Divisional Hospital Corps and for attendance upon the sick in transports.

VICTIMS OF WAR IN THE PHILIPPINES.

The following is a complete list of the deaths, as copied from the records in the Surgeon-General's office, occurring in the U. S. A. operating in the Philippines up to June 2, 1899:

Name of Organization.	Killed in Action	Died of Wounds	Died of Disease														Total Each Regt
			Typhoid	Dysentery	Malaria	Smallpox	Diphtheria	Tonsillitis	Other Fevers	Meningitis	Pneumonia	Septicæmia	Accidental Drowning	Tuberculosis	Suicide	Miscellaneous	
Astor Battery	..	3	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	5
1st California Volunteer Inf.	6	5	5	6	..	2	..	..	..	3	..	..	2	..	..	2	31
California Heavy Artillery	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6
1st Colorado Volunteer Inf.	5	5	2	5	..	7	..	..	..	3	1	2	1	..	1	..	32
1st Idaho Volunteer Inf.	6	3	2	5	..	3	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	1	..	22
51st Iowa Volunteer Inf.	..	..	..	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3
20th Kansas Volunteer Inf.	17	17	2	..	1	13	..	..	..	3	4	1	..	..	..	..	58
1st Minnesota Volunteer Inf.	4	4	12	1	..	11	1	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	1	3	39
1st Montana Volunteer Inf.	10	13	5	2	1	1	..	..	..	2	..	1	1	..	..	..	6
1st Nebraska Volunteer Inf.	23	15	13	1	3	1	..	..	..	2	1	2	1	2	..	1	65
Nevada Volunteer Cav.	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
1st North Dakota Volunteer Inf.	5	2	2	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	15
2d Oregon Volunteer Inf.	12	3	9	6	3	7	1	1	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	2	46
10th Pennsylvania Volunteer Inf.	6	9	..	2	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1	21
1st South Dakota Volunteer Inf.	20	5	6	4	1	7	1	..	2	..	5	..	1	1	..	2	55
1st Tennessee Volunteer Inf.	..	..	..	..	..	7	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	2	10
Utah Volunteer Light Artillery	..	3	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	6
1st Washington Volunteer Inf.	15	9	8	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	36
1st Wyoming Volunteer Inf.	2	1	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1	..	9
Third U. S. Art.	18	8	1	..	2	1	..	1	..	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	33
Sixth U. S. Art.	..	..	3	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5
Fourth U. S. Cav.	4	3	1	2	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	13
Third U. S. Inf.	7	1	5	..	..	2	..	..	1	1	1	..	1	..	..	..	19
Fourth U. S. Inf.	1	..	2	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	2	8
Ninth U. S. Inf.	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	3
Twelfth U. S. Inf.	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	..	..	..	9
Fourteenth U. S. Inf.	13	4	3	2	1	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	9	38
Seventeenth U. S. Inf.	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Eighteenth U. S. Inf.	4	2	6	2	4	3	1	..	..	3	4	1	..	..	..	3	33
Twentieth U. S. Inf.	3	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	1	7
Twenty-second U. S. Inf.	10	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	12
Twenty-third U. S. Inf.	..	5	6	2	..	6	..	..	..	..	6	..	1	..	..	5	31
U. S. Engineer Corps	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
U. S. Hospital Corps	2	2	6	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	13
U. S. Signal Corps	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	2
Total	193	124	114	50	18	85	4	2	3	22	23	8	24	6	8	37	721

Total died of disease, 404. Total died of wounds, 124. Total killed in action, 193.

The total number of fatalities given is 736—23 officers, 699 privates and 14 civilians attached to the army. The mortality of officers from disease was small, but the officers killed in battle were out of all proportion to the number of privates. Of the 23 officers killed, 16

were shot down in battle and the other 7 died of disease. In the case of the men, 294 died of wounds received in action and 9 were killed accidentally. In addition to the above, 1 officer and 18 enlisted men died on transports returning to San Francisco, and 1 officer and 155 enlisted men had died in the general hospital at San Francisco up to September 30, 1899. The grand total of deaths in the Philippine campaign up to October 1, 1899, is 25 officers, 1 retired officer, 872 enlisted men and 14 civilians, in addition to deaths in the islands between June 2d and October 1st, and a small number who died on hospital ships not reported at Department Headquarters.

NOBLE WORK OF THE VOLUNTEER LADY PHYSICIANS.

It would be improper to close this sketch of the work of the Medical Department in the Philippines without mention of the effective aid given by several lady physicians, who were early on the ground, by permission of the government, and who placed their services at the disposal of the medical officer. The true physician is devoted to his profession and unsparing of himself in emergencies, and it would be improper to say that these ladies were any more zealous in the service than the medical officers, who exposed themselves on the field when occasion demanded, as freely as those bearing arms; but it is true that in the womanly touch there is a deftness and in the womanly nature a tenderness which are wanting in the kindest man; and the gentle ministrations of these faithful co-workers in the hospitals, comforted the departing hour of many a dying soldier, and live as a grateful memory in the hearts of hundreds of those who survive.

THE RED CROSS WORK.

In connection with the Medical Department, it is appropriate to make some mention of the "Red Cross Society." It is the duty of all governments to care for their wounded and sick soldiers, and they all seek to discharge that duty, but with the progress of civilization there has arisen an earnest and world wide desire to supplement government care with the gifts and services of private devotion. During the Crimean War, in 1854, Miss Florence Nightingale at the head of a body of women nurses sent out by the British government, first demonstrated, on a great scale, the effectiveness of women in organized work of relief, and while the Red Cross Society was not founded by women, they have always born their full share of the work, and, in this country, have usually been the recognized leaders.

The immediate occasion of the founding of the Red Cross organization, was the dreadful suffering which followed the Battle of Solferino in 1859, when the army surgeons were utterly unable to deal with the thousands upon thousands of the wounded of the two armies. Henri Dunand, a Swiss gentleman, who was present and aided in this care, was so much impressed with the inadequacy of government efforts, that he began an agitation which resulted, in August, 1894, in an official convention of delegates representing sixteen governments, which formulated articles "for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded in the armies in the field," and which, as modified in a later convention, have received the formal adhesion of the governments of nearly all civilized nations. The badge, the red cross on a white ground, is the national colors of Switzerland reversed, and was adopted as a compliment to the nation where both the treaties have been formulated, and which is the home of the International permanent Committee. This Committee however, is only maintained as a bond of unity between the national committees, which are entirely independent

The United States was very slow in giving its adhesion to the movement. In 1864, during our Civil War, the "Sanitary Commission" was successfully doing its work, and it was not, at the time, thought best to commit the government to any other movement. Subsequently, in 1877, a letter from the President of the International Committee sent through Miss Clara Barton, to President Hayes, does not seem even to have elicited a reply. Later, however, in 1881 a copy of the same letter presented by Miss Barton to President Garfield, received prompt attention, and as a result, the American Association of the Red Cross was immediately organized, and the United States, in 1882, agreed to the convention of Geneva, being the thirty-second nation to do so.

The American National Society has its auxiliaries in all parts of the United States. Its organization is permanent, and it pursues its work of mercy, not only in war, but at all times when sudden emergencies arise. It seeks to be constantly ready for duty, both as to material

and personnel. Its badge has become familiar wherever there is great trouble. Miss Clara Barton, as is well known, has been at the head of the American Society ever since its organization.

The American Red Cross had been active in Cuba, previous to the breaking out of the war, and immediately upon that event, and coincident with the raising of volunteer troops, Red Cross Societies, with or without formal connection with the National Society, sprang into existence everywhere. The headquarters of the National Society are at Washington, but its greatest center of work is in New York, where, at the beginning of the war, a powerful Relief Committee was organized, under the Presidency of Bishop H. C. Potter, which had received, up to March 17, 1899, over $320,000 to be applied to the work. To "Auxiliary No. 3," at New York, of which Mrs. James Speyer is President, was assigned the duty of caring for the soldiers in the Philippines, and nurses and supplies went forward by the first transport sailing from New York.

Immediately upon the call for volunteers a meeting of patriotic ladies and gentlemen was called in San Francisco and met at the California Hotel, on April 23d, Mrs. W. B. Harrington presiding. Other meetings were held in rapid succession in other cities of the State, and the result was the organization of a California State Red Cross Society of which Mrs. W. B. Harrington has been President, and which has been remarkable for its effectiveness and for the personal devotion of its officers and members. At first the main thought was for provision for the California soldiers, and the natural official affiliation of the society was with the California National Guard. There was no time to seek instructions from the National Society, and apparently no necessity, the proposed duty being mainly the proper equipment and care of the California Volunteers; but with Dewey's victory, and the American occupation of the Philippines, all this was changed. San Francisco would evidently be the post of departure for the troops for the Orient. Soldiers from many States would be for weeks in camp here, and later would be returning, in both cases needing such care as no government ever did or ever can supply. How nobly the women of California rose to the unexpected opportunity has been told in emphatic language from the lips of every soldier who has passed through San Francisco. Originally organized to aid the soldiers of California, the charity and loving care of the society has known no bounds. Soldiers have been cared for regardless of State bounds. Although a local society it has been doing a national work. It has not only cared for soldiers in San Francisco, but has sent nurses, agents and supplies to the Philippines for the succor, not only of Californians, but of all in distress. It has had the aid of more than one hundred local auxiliaries, of which that of San Francisco, under the presidency of Mrs. John F. Merrill, has naturally been the largest. Large sums of money have been expended by the State, San Francisco and Oakland societies. It is not yet possible to give the aggregate of the disbursements of the California Red Cross Societies, but the State Society alone expended $22,494 during the year ending October 17, 1899. The money was expended for the support of nurses and supplies sent to the Philippines, and employed in San Francisco, where a convalescent hospital was maintained. Indentification medals were supplied to all soldiers, and nearly all organizations, passing through San Francisco, were met and fed on arrival. The Society acted as bankers for soldiers paid off, and distributed literature and stationery in great quantities.

THE SIGNAL CORPS.

The Signal Corps is the staff department which is charged with the duty of maintaining communications between commanding generals and their subordinates in the field, by means of telegraphs, telephones, flag signals, balloons, carrier pigeons or whatever other means of communication may be found practicable. The head of the department is a Brigadier General, at Washington, and there are signal officers attached to all armies in the field according to their requirements for the time being. The enlisted force consists of Sergeants, Corporals and Privates, as in the line. In the reorganized regular army there are six companies, fully officered, the aggregate enlisted force being about 750 men. There is a school of instruction maintained on the Atlantic Coast where men are trained for their duties. In time of war the service is rapidly recruited, mainly from telegraph operators and others accustomed to electrical work, and wherever an army moves the Signal Corps men go with it, the telegraph lines being kept as close as necessary to the firing line, so that the commanding general is kept in constant touch with

Division and Brigade Headquarters. It is a laborious and hazardous service, as no point is more eagerly sought for attack than the communications of an enemy. The lines are often put up and maintained under fire, and during the Philippine campaign many acts of heroism have been performed by the men of this corps who freely exposed themselves to sharpshooters in climbing poles and trees while stringing the telegraph lines. Lieutenant-Colonel R. E. Thompson has been Chief Signal Officer upon the staff of the Corps Commander, during the operations of our armies in the Philippines.

THE CHAPLAINS IN THE ARMY.

[According to army regulations, there is attached to each regiment a Chaplain whose duty is to conduct religious services when possible, and otherwise to minister to the regiments in the field as he would to a congregation at home. Being non-combatants, they are not necessarily exposed to the fire of the enemy, but to the credit of our Chaplains be it said, that where there was a soldier needing their attentions, there they were to be found, whether on the firing line or elsewhere. It has not been found possible to procure any complete record of the services of the Chaplains in the Philippines, and it has seemed best to give in full the following personal narrative, which includes merely a record of a few incidents coming under the personal observation of the writer, but illustrates better than any more formal statement, the life and work of the Chaplains in the army. It is proper to say that the writer of the following was a Press Correspondent who is also a congregational clergyman, who was himself several times wounded, and who was as active and helpful in ministering to the soldiers, as those whose services he chronicles].

"The Chaplain is the true knight of the battlefield. His high duty it is to march with the soldiers, assist the weak, succor the wounded, administer to the dying, and bring the consolation of God to the dripping edges of the battlefield.

"There were not wanting in our army in the Philippines splendid and heroic Ministers of various denominations and creeds of Christianity, who abandoned their homes and their work in order to be of use and blessing to the soldiers fighting in the distant land. I have seen these Chaplains on the firing line, with the Hospital Corps, the Military Reserve Hospitals, and beside the soldier's grave. No class of men behave with more gentleness and chivalry than these devoted Soldiers of the Cross. It would be invidious to select from so able and perfect a body of men any particular members for special praise or consideration, but I was fortunate enough to meet and campaign with several of them, while I was not able to see them all on the battlefield. Among the very best and most heroic of these men was Rev. Father W. D. McKinnon, Chaplain of the 1st California. He it was, who entered Manila under the fire of the Spaniards, walking along the shore near old Malate, in order to interview the Archbishop and to ask him if Manila could not be surrendered without loss of life. He told me himself that in this expedition he received a wound in the fleshy part of the leg, which he tried to treat himself, and which after a couple of days gangrened, giving him considerable trouble. He was not a spectacular man, Father McKinnon, but did his work in a kind, gentle and modest way which attracted to him the hearts of all who met him. Among all the regiments I think no Chaplain was more sincerely loved by men of all denominations and creeds than Father McKinnon. Together we trudged along dusty roads, through the rice-fields and through the cane-brakes on the torrid, dusty battlefields between Caloocan and Malolos.

"I remember one morning, as we came along the railroad beyond Bocaue, how we found a poor Filipino lying with his leg broken at the thigh. He must have been running and fell into one of the deep ravines, for his clothes were saturated with water, and his hands and feet were all pale and white. Two soldiers had brought him from the swamp and laid him on the dry ground beside the railway. I was very much touched at the way in which Father McKinnon, with the aid of Mr. Waage, of the California Red Cross, worked over the restoration of this poor man. The Padre went across the scorching rice-fields to get some branches of bamboo to shade the man withal, while Mr. Waage, from his medical kit, gave restoratives and hypodermic injections to the sufferer.

"Again on the Santa Cruz expedition, I met Father McKinnon and Mr Waage. There was no duty too menial, no work too hard, and no task too perilous for the Chaplain to undertake. He would walk by the side of a soldier and encourage him in a kindly way and help him

with his knapsack, or try and get food or medicine for the poor fellows who fell out from the heat of the sun. Between Santa Cruz and Pagsanjan, while we were on the roadside waiting for the artillery to come up, a great fellow over six feet tall broke in from the cocoanut groves, saying he was prostrated by the heat. It was evident that he was thoroughly demoralized, and perhaps his brain touched by the sun. It was a telling sight to see Father McKinnon encourage the poor fellow, and by a few restoratives bringing him around so that by afternoon I saw this same man fighting away on the firing lines as if he had never been injured. I shall never forget a night that the reporters, chaplains and military attachés encamped at Longos church on Laguna de Bay. That day a part of the North Dakota Regiment had been ambushed and five of its men killed and several wounded. The killed and wounded were brought back as the evening shades grew to gray around the old church walls. One poor fellow was shot through the lungs, another was shot through the neck. They were both alive when brought to the church. Still a third had been shot through the spine. He also was alive. From five in the afternoon until midnight, Father McKinnon was engaged with these men. From some he took their confessions, to some he brought tea and such other restoratives as we could get ready.

"There was also with us that night a very noble man, the Rev. Mr. Stephenson of Idaho. These two Chaplains exercised a wonderful influence in the tragic scene. Here in the dim church aisle were stretched in pathetic windrows, the living and the dead, and up under the altar, where the dim light of the candles throws a shadow, lay the man who was wounded in the lungs, and in the little sacristy lay two of the mortally wounded. When the Chaplain told these men they had but an hour to live, one of them, a young bugler, sipped a cup of tea and turning to his friend, who was also mortally wounded, said: 'Well, Jack, let us die bravely.' Chaplain McKinnon sat up most of the night with the man who was shot through the lungs. I remember looking along the floor of the church that night, and the shadow of the sentinel pacing to and fro, mingled strangely with the shadow of the preacher as he bent above the agonized and dying. It was a scene to live in a man's memory forever. As I went outside the stifling church—for in that tropic country decomposition sets in as soon as death, and the odor of choloroform and decomposition was stifling—I looked up at the sky and saw the 'Southern Cross.' It seemed to me almost a sign from Heaven. Out in the dew where the stars are always peaceful, the 'Cross' seemed like an emblem of Hope. It seemed as if God knew that our hearts were hurt and weary. In the early gray of dawn, I walked down to the church again and found the Chaplain there. Still those pathetic windrows of the dead, and those pathetic faces of the living. The stars were shining still. The 'Sign' was hung out in the branding sky, and in the dim aisles where the altar candles burned the face of 'Our Lady' was suffused as with tears.

"In Lawton's expedition north, there campaigned with us Father Hart of the 3d Art., and Father Fitzgarald. In the expedition to San Isidro, we traversed a country that was almost impassable. Few armies would have been able to cross it except under such a brilliant and determined a man as Major-General Lawton. To watch the battle was interesting, and to march with and talk to the men was an education for a lifetime, but as a change I sometimes fell back to talk and interchange views with the Chaplains. In places, these men were under severe fire because the insurgents fire high and the spent bullets usually take effect with the Hospital Corps, and the Signal Service men, who are in the rear. At San Rafael we had various skirmishes, but you could see these Chaplains moving to and fro along the road, which was a very exposed and dangerous place, helping the men and cheerfully doing any task or duty that came their way. One day we were led off into ambush by a spy, who was our guide. After the army had wandered two or three miles across the country, we discovered a native priest who offered to show us the way to San Jose, our next town. It was impossible, however, to get very much out of him, as he did not understand Spanish very well, but Father Fitzgarald, was in the expedition, and I suggested to Gen. Lawton, that perhaps Father Fitzgarald could understand the priest's way of expressing himself. I went back about two miles and found Father Fitzgerald at dinner, which consisted of one slice of bacon and one and a half hardtack. He immediately left his luxurious meal, and accompanied me across the hot stifling landscape in the middle of the day. Reaching the tent where Gen. Lawton and the Filipinio priest were, Father Fitzgerald engaged the priest in conversation in Latin, and in a few moments was



BURIAL SCENES IN THE GRAVEYARD NEAR FORT SAN ANTONIO
CHAPLAIN PIERCE, OFFICIATING.

able to find out from him the various trails and roads leading to the town we were looking for. Gen. Lawton spoke to me in terms of highest commendation of Father Fitzgerald.

"It was upon a dark night in front of San Rafael. I reached the camp at midnight, worn out with the journey of thirty-five miles, and lay down upon the road beside a carabao wagon. A bull was tied to one side of the wagon and in between the shafts was a heap of hay. As I lay down with a groan I was surprised to see this heap of hay move, and Father Fitzgerald extricate himself from the shafts of the wagon, saying to me in a kindly voice, 'I know you have come all the way from Manila. You get in this hay. I can sleep on a board which the Chinaman, our cook, offered me this evening.' It rained that night and, as I was a sick man, I felt how good a turn the priest had done me. I should have been very comfortable under my coverlet of hay, only the old bull, in the middle of the night, became hungry and ate up this unusual counterpane.

"After the fall of Malabon, Father Hart was stationed in that town for some time. The natives were a little shy of him when he came in an American uniform, but when he brought his Catholic vestment and conducted their services for them, they opened their hearts and homes to him, and he told me that never in his life had he been received with such courtesy and loving kindness as by the inhabitants of Malabon. I think it would be of immense value to these Philippine Islands to import into the Catholic Church there a large number of our American priests. Here in America the Catholic priests have become so thoroughly imbued with the ideas of universal liberty that they could not but impart to the Filipinos a great deal of the results of American training. A man like Archbishop Ireland, in my opinion, could do more for the Islands, with an able staff of Catholic priests, than all the armies that we can send against these benighted folk.

"Chaplain Stephenson of the Idaho Regiment was a man for whom the whole army had the highest respect; a man who lived with the troops, who partook of their scanty fare, journeyed in their hard marches, shared their dangers, and did all these things with a modesty of forgetfulness for self, which creates the true gentleman hero.

"Chaplain Pierce of the First Reserve Hospital, has been of great help to the sick soldiers, and of great use to the country by reason of his carefulness in burying the dead and marking their graves against the time that their friends at home may wish to remove their heroic ashes. Since Chaplain Pierce came to this work no single American soldier has been buried without military honors. We have lost by disease and battles a good many men in the Philippines. The cemetery at Battery Knoll is filled, and a new cemetery was opened on the level ground, near old Malate Fort. As we passed one day, we saw a long trench like a deep gash in the face of nature. A few graves were already there. A week later I visited the same place and found the significant line of graves had lengthened, and the gash in nature was being filled. After a few weeks this long trench was nearly filled in, and one quiet afternoon, as we neared the place, we saw four hearses there. There were no mourners, only Chaplain Pierce standing bareheaded, while four coffins were lowered into the graves. The wild waves beat on the shore of Manila Bay, as if to sing a requiem for the brave dead who would never see their native land again. A strong wind was blowing across the level lands, and in the woods the cooing of the ring-dove sounded strange and weird. The Chaplain read, as he stood alone, the glorious words of the burial service of the Episcopal Church The weed-grown grave, already, nearby, was the scene of the burial of a child, and the service of the Chaplain, as it rose free to the sky in that desolate and lonely place seemed a fitting prayer for the child who had died on its mother's knee, and the man who had hobbled across the hospital of life to the grave on the other side. There was a prayer for the 'Martyr,' a prayer for the 'Suffering,' a prayer for all in 'Trouble' and a Benediction.

"As I went away from that sad place the grand words seemed to mingle still upon the air and make it sweet, tho' lonely. Some of the words kept coming back like the words of an unforgotten song.

"'Lord, have mercy upon all who are wounded or suffering. Let thy grace be their comfort, tho' kindred and friends be far away . . . Almighty God, with whom do live the spirits of just men, made perfect after their delivery from their earthly presence, we humbly command the souls of these thy servants, our brothers, into thy hands. . . .

"'Lord, support us all day long of this troublous life, until the shadows lengthen and the evening comes, and the busy world is hushed, and the fever of life is over and its battles done. Then, in thy mercy, grant us a safe lodging and holy rest and peace at last.'

"These words seemed so gracious on the horrid edge of war. They seem to grow into our memory like a little root of daisies blooming undefiled amid the riot of the battlefield. It seemed to send the throes of grace and poetry into the hard and sordid world. The dead had not died in vain, their friends remembered them: 'Tho' kindred and friends were far away.' They were sustained by the prayers of those across the sea: 'Support us all day long of this troublous life, until the shadows lengthen and the evening comes, and the busy world is hushed and the fever of life is over and its battles done.'

SKETCHES OF SOME CHAPLAINS.

"Rev. Charles C. Pierce of the Episcopal Church in Philadelphia, a graduate of Shurtleff College, Illinois, was the Chaplain of the Regulars at Camp Merritt. He has been in the army for thirteen years. When active operations began in the Philippines, he was in the Second Division, Chaplain with the Regulars on Gen. MacArthur's staff, and was ordered to the First Reserve Hospital, his duty being to take charge of and identify the dead, prepare them for burial, make arrangements for the sounding of the taps over their graves, and for the sending of the clergyman to conduct the services. He has charge of the coffins and the supplying of clothes, carriage escorts and buglers. When there is no other Chaplain at hand he goes to the grave himself. He told me of a case of five men who were killed at Paete and brought down in the middle of the night. They had been dead several days, and in the tropical climate decomposition had strongly set in. These bodies were placed in the aisle of a hospital among the sick people and were a danger and menace to health. Dr. Pierce came in at midnight and found this condition of things. He made a protest but could find no one to help him in the difficulty. Finally he engaged a dozen natives and with them set out himself to Battery Knoll, placed the soldiers in graves and located each body, so that they could be found when their friends at home sent for them. He had buried, when I saw him on the 16th of June, since March 20th, 217 American soldiers. Not one man had been buried without the honors of war and the Chaplain. That is, the sounding of the taps and the wreathing of the grave with the American flag. The work of this one man shows the value, courage and constancy of the work done by the Chaplains in the army.

"Sometimes men are inclined to slight the Chaplains. This happened to be the case in the Kansas Regiment, where the Chaplain, Dr. J. S. Schliemann, was supposed to be too much of a recluse and religious man to suit the fighting blood of Funston's soldiers. Time went on and open war began, and the temper of the Chaplain had never been known to his regiment until the night of the fight at Caloocan, when the Kansans discerned the tall and rail like figure of their Chaplain stalking through the woods with a gun, bringing down the wily sharpshooter from his perch in the trees, even as the hunter brings down his game. From that moment Dr. Schliemann was one of the chief heroes in the Kansas Regiment, 'that body of heroes and hero worshipers.'

"We read of the Tennessee Chaplain dying at his post from the plague of smallpox; of the Washington Chaplain also falling martyr to duty, and it would be invidious to mention one without naming all for heroism and duty well performed. The only reason why I cannot give a sketch of the work of each Chaplain, is that I am speaking now only of those with whom I came in contact. I have heard of the work of all of the Chaplains, and I have heard them all highly praised.

"Rev. W. S. Gilbert, Presbyterian, of the Oregon Regiment, was a man who impressed me with his great common sense, and his deep interest in the welfare of his men. He prepared a tablet for me, showing how the army influences the character of young men. He prepared several questions which he gave to each one of the Captains and Sergeants of the Oregon Regiment, in relation to the moral influence of the army life, and received in reply an almost unanimous answer, that in every respect, with the exception of profanity, the men had improved in character since coming to the Philippines.

"There is every reason for me to believe that the Chaplain was an instrument of good among the men. This is true, not only in regard to those I have mentioned, but in regard to all the Chaplains in the field.

"Chaplains Stull and Cressy were especially prominent in their efforts to give the soldiers and civilians religious exercises on Sunday. There seemed to be no distinction of sect, all difference of belief seemed to sink in the face of heroism and duty. I have seen a Catholic priest and a Methodist minister bending over the same, wounded, dying man, and giving him whatever human help they could.

"The Y. M. C. A., under Messrs. Glunz and Jackson, did splendid and effective work in helping the men along the lines. They used to go along the firing lines with note paper, pens and pencils so that the soldier did not feel himself utterly abandoned if he happened to fall in the fight, but was able thus to send messages, oftentimes his last word to his kin beyond the sea. The Y. M. C. A. also had a tent near the Bridge of Spain, near Manila. Their books, papers, periodicals, and all kinds of writing material were given to the soldiers free of charge. As one crossed the Bridge of Spain, nights, the kindly lights of the Y. M. C. A. tent gleamed out amid the tents of war and the streets of turmoil, like a silver beacon along the wave-tormented coast.

"Rev. James B. Rodgers and the Rev. E. S. Hubbard of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, conducted the missionary work in the city of Manila, in a quiet, modest and substantial way. Just at present, owing to the unsettled condition of Luzon, and, in fact, of all the Philippines, the work of the missionary will necessarily be very slow. Only the very wise and level-headed preachers should attempt any of that work to-day in the Philippines, because the people are very strongly opposed to Protestantism, and feel that if we thrust Protestantism into the islands, we will take away their religious, as well as their political liberty. This was the case with the Rev. Dr. Hermann in Cebu. He had distributed some tracts among the Bisayans. The tracts were harmless in themselves, but the town priest and local paper immediately became enraged, and Col. Hamer, the American Military Commander, was forced to send Mr. Hermann to Manila."

A DESERVED ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

An interesting chapter might be written, describing the circumstances under which many of the views which appear in this book were taken. The writer's own personal experience with a kodak could be made, with a little embellishment, into a very exciting tale. Many of the pictures were taken in the open battlefield, under the fire of the enemy, and several men were wounded while thus engaged. It requires as much nerve to take a photograph of a company of soldiers charging the enemy's trenches, as for one of those engaged in the movement—possibly more, when the enemy is firing wild, or when they happen to select the camera for a target.

Special mention is due to the following soldiers of the different regiments, who have furnished us with photographs, taken on the field or elsewhere. Their addresses, as far as we have them, are given for the benefit of those who may be collecting war views:

W. H. Lillie, official photographer, 8th Army Corps, box 614, Leadville, Col.

Harry Coombs (1st Washington), North Yakima, Wash; C. C. Jackson (1st Washington), Dayton, Wash.; Howard Page (13th Minnesota), Minneapolis, Minn; Wm. Darcey (remained in Manila); J. E. Northrup (20th Kansas), Lawrence, Kas.; C. C. Cole, (20th Kansas); Arthur C. Johnson (1st Colorado), Denver, Col.; Lieut. G. E. Thomas (1st Colorado), Pueblo, Col.; Geo. R. Boomer (1st Nebraska), Beatrice, Neb.; Wm. H. Reedy (1st Nebraska), Beatrice, Neb.; Lieut. Van Valin (1st Nebraska), Nelson, Neb.; John W. Jones (2d Oregon), Portland, Or.; C. C. Stoakley (6th U. S. Art.), remained at Manila; C. B. Bishop (6th Art.), remained at Manila; Steward Wells (Hospital Corps), Corregidor Island, P. I.

Sam C. Partridge, 121 Post street, San Francisco; B. F. Rahmeyer, Greenwich street, San Francisco; Hodson, 416 Geary street, San Francisco, have photos of companies and officers in volunteer regiments.

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